Chapter 10: Requests For

Requests for admissions seek binding commitments from other parties under Rule 36 — operating less as a pure discovery device and more as an accessory to efficient trial and hearing practice by streamlining proof and isolating exactly which matters will be contested.

Chapter 10

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Your First Admission

§ 10.1 Introduction

Requests for admissions seek to obtain admissions (naturally!) from other parties in a case. They can be effective when used properly and judiciously, although some advocates have consigned them to a seldom used discovery device.^[1]^ Further, the overall success of the discovery rules that produce relevant and reliable information have made admissions requests less necessary.

The utilization of the other discovery devices (particularly depositions and document production requests) permits the inquiring party to establish facts in a manner that leaves the responding party little room for later denial. Depositions are taken under oath and key documents are often provided by the opposition. Many attorneys believe that admission requests may not be especially useful or needed in many cases; some lawyers frequently rely on them; still other lawyers find them quite helpful in appropriate cases.

This tendency to overlook requests for admissions also stems in part from the adversary system and the mutual distrust harbored by some opponents. These lawyers may believe a discovery device premised on receiving accurate, truthful, yes-or-no answers from the other side is doomed to ineffectiveness. These skeptics overlook that interrogatories and document requests also depend to a large extent upon the honesty of opposing counsel who primarily respond in a trustworthy manner.

The more commonly employed discovery devices are helpful even where the opposition is recalcitrant because these methods will still illuminate factual issues. The admission request, if denied, reveals significantly less evidence. To a large extent, requests for admissions are not so much a discovery device as a mechanism for streamlining proof for a hearing or trial or determining exactly which matters will be contested. They can also produce responses helpful to successful negotiated settlements. When used properly and appropriately, Rule 36 requests can provide supportive and conclusive evidentiary facts. Admissions requests are not inherently inferior to the more popular discovery mechanisms—just different.

In federal cases, Rule 36 governs requests for and responses to admissions and their uses. State procedural rules governing admissions are identical to, very similar to, or based on the federal rule. Many states have adopted the same number, 36, as well, to refer to the admission rule.

There ordinarily is less of a need for admission requests in arbitrations and administrative hearings. The lawyers may be amendable to mutually agree to stipulated facts. The applicable rules and provisions in these types of cases determine the availability and use of requests for admissions.

§ 10.2 Admission Purposes

Rule 36 is not a pure discovery device in that it does not require a party to disclose information.^[2]^ Rather, Rule 36 is limited to compelling concessions from a party by way of admissions, denials, or simple statements. Admissions cannot be sought from a non-party. Although admission requests can be phrased like interrogatories or deposition questions, Rule 36 serves different purposes, which can make it more useful in certain conditions. For example, an interrogatory answer or deposition response may be phrased in a self-serving or equivocal manner. Admission responses allow less flexibility.

Rule 36(a)(4) requires that a responding party either admit a statement, or specifically deny the matter, or set forth in detail the reasons why the answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny the assertion. The Rule further requires that a denial shall fairly meet the substance of the requested admission. When a good faith response allows a party to qualify an answer or deny part of the admission request, the responding party must specify the portion of the admission that is true and deny or qualify the remainder. An answering party may not give lack of information or knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny unless it represents that it made reasonable inquiry and that it cannot admit or deny based on known or readily obtainable information. A party cannot object to an admission request merely because it views the request as relating to a genuine issue for trial or hearing.

In short, admission requests seek binding commitments, whereas interrogatories, document requests, and depositions usually pursue information. Responses to these other discovery devices, although often persuasive, are not conclusive proof as is an admission, which is definitive evidence that cannot be later contradicted unless withdrawn (which requires the permission of the decision maker). To be sure, the line between seeking information and seeking a commitment may be blurred.

Successful lawyers, for example, frequently use depositions to obtain an admission to an adverse fact or commit the deponent to an unfavorable statement. Similarly, an opponent’s responses to admission requests assist the lawyer in discovering the opposition’s likely points of contention. Rule 36 operates more like an accessory to efficient trial and hearing practice than a discovery procedure. Admissions can expedite cases and relieve the parties of expenses involved in proving facts.

Despite its link to evidence, the scope of Rule 36 is as broad or limited as that of the other discovery devices by explicitly incorporating the scope of Rule 26(b). Admission requests can address any matter “relevant to the claim or defense of any party and proportional to the needs of the case.” Presumably, Rule 36 presupposes that some information has been discovered or is known. The admission request shapes the information into statements designed primarily for evidentiary purposes for trial or hearing. These assertions help the discovering party recognize the relevant and admissible evidence, the facts that need to be proven, and the issues that need to be decided.

State court rules commonly are identical or similar to the federal rules regarding the scope, use, and effect of admissions. Arbitral rules may also provide for admission requests. And, some administrative proceedings authorize their availability.

§ 10.3 Admission Requests

The timing of requests for admissions depends upon the applicable rules of the jurisdiction. The Federal Rules permit requests for admissions to be served after the time specified in Rule 26(d), which rule requires that the parties confer in accord with Rule 26(f). This conference typically takes place early in the case. See § 5.2.1.

Federal Rules 36(a)(3) and 29 expressly permit the parties by written stipulation to vary this time unless the time extensions interfere with scheduling deadlines imposed by a court. These rules also allow any party to pursue leave of court to submit requests at an earlier stage of the case. The attorneys when they confer in accord with Rule 26(f) may establish a discovery plan that would include the timing and scope of requests for admissions. In the absence of any agreement or order, parties may serve requests for admissions in accord with Rule 36.

In the federal system, parties may no longer unilaterally serve requests for admissions with pleadings. In many state courts, requests may be served at any time, including with pleadings. In both federal and state courts, a responding party typically has 30 days to respond, which requires a party to serve requests no less than 30 days before a certain trial or hearing date or the date established by a scheduling order.

Rule 36 requests must be served upon the respondent party and all other parties to the lawsuit. Rule 36(a)(2) requires that each admission matter be separately set forth but does not fix a limit on the number of requests. Reasonableness is the standard for numerosity, and complex or multi-party cases may allow for numerous requests.^[3]^ Supplementary court, arbitration, or administrative rules may restrict the number of admission requests a party may propound.

Locating examples of requests is more difficult than for other discovery devices. Admission requests are rarely contested with a motion, and few case opinions list actual requests submitted. The historic, oft cited, and still quite relevant 1939 Walsh case^[4]^ details a number of early American acceptable requests:

The defendant, The Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company, requests the plaintiff, Mabelle Walsh, to make the following admissions for the purpose of this action only, and subject to all pertinent objections to admissibility, which may be interposed at trial:

That each of the following statements is true:

1a. In October, 1922, Samuel A. Walsh (plaintiff’s deceased husband) sustained a personal injury, to-wit, a fracture of his jaw.

1b. Said fracture was on the right side of lower jaw.

1c. Said Samuel A. Walsh consulted Dr. Henry S. Dunning of New York, in October, 1922.

1d. Said Samuel A. Walsh consulted said Dr. Dunning in October, 1922, for said fracture of the jaw.

1e. Exhibit A, annexed hereto, is a correct copy of said Dr. Dunning’s record of his treatments of said Samuel A. Walsh in October and November, 1922.

1f. The facts stated in Exhibit A, annexed hereto, are correct.

1g. In or about October, 1922, or thereafter, said Samuel A. Walsh informed the plaintiff that he had received an injury to the jaw.

. . .

1i. Said Samuel A. Walsh informed the plaintiff that he sustained said injury to his jaw by being struck by a person’s fist.

1j. Said Samuel A. Walsh informed the plaintiff that he sustained said injury to his jaw while he was intoxicated by the use of alcoholic stimulants.

1k. Said Samuel A. Walsh informed the plaintiff that he sustained said injury while engaged in a fight or brawl.

1l. Said Samuel A. Walsh informed the plaintiff that he had been treated by Dr. Dunning for said injury.

While these requests are allowable, some of the assertions may escape affirmation by the lawyer for Mr. Walsh because of the uncertainty of the meaning of some words. For example, the word “informed” may be too ambiguous to affirm generally and a response may include an explanation of how, if at all, Mr. Walsh “informed” the plaintiff.

Some civil procedure rules include an approved Rule 36 request form such as the following:

Plaintiff A.B. requests defendant C.D. within 30 days after service of this request to make the following admissions for the purpose of this action only and subject to all pertinent objections to admissibility which may be interposed at the trial:

(1) That each of the following documents, exhibited with this request, is genuine. [Here list the documents and describe each document.]

(2) That each of the following statements is true. [Here list the statements.]

The 30-day period to respond may be increased or decreased by agreement of counsel in accord with Rule 29, or by a federal court under Rule 36(a)(3).^[5]^ State court, arbitration, and administrative rules may vary.

The use of requests early in a case may avoid the efforts and expenses of further discovery and trial preparation, but it may not be possible in many cases to frame Rule 36 requests effectively until after thorough discovery or during trial or hearing preparation.

§ 10.4 Drafting Admissions

Requests for admissions must be simple, direct, and concise.^[6]^ Considerations involved in drafting requests parallel those for drafting interrogatories or similar deposition questions. A motion to compel discovery may be an appropriate response when an opposing party fails to properly respond to requests. The use of an admission request does not preclude the utilization of interrogatories or depositions regarding the same topic (or vice versa) as discovery procedures are cumulative and complementary, unless these submissions become unduly duplicative, burdensome or disproportionate.

The drafting of an effective Rule 36 request document generally includes:

  • Case caption.
  • A preface regarding the applicable rule provisions.
  • Definitions describing the meaning of certain words or phrases.
  • References to the specific time periods covered by the requests.
  • The deadline when responses are due.
  • Other acceptable responses to admissions (optional).
  • Other informative instructions.
  • The requests for admissions.
  • Attorney signature.

The following guidelines for drafting a request are useful:

  • Draft a precise and direct request, not an interrogatory.

Ask: You said out loud: “The sky is falling” when you saw the sky falling.

Not: Describe in detail what you said about the sky falling when you observed the sky falling from the sky.

  • Phrase a request for which a yes or no answer provides the admission or denial sought.

Ask: The color of the sky you saw falling was blue.

Not: The color you saw may have been sky blue, with a hint of green, a splash of yellow, and a dab of orange.

  • Eliminate unnecessary adjectives, adverbs, and other characterizations.

Ask: A one-foot square piece of sky hit your school desk.

Not: A large, segmented portion of the upper, thinner atmosphere landed with a shattering thud upon the relatively small location you occupied in the schoolroom.

  • Draft requests as simple, singular requests in separately numbered declarative sentences.

Ask:

(1) You saw a piece of the sky fall on August 21.

(2) The piece of the sky that fell on August 21 hit the top of your head.

(3) You were treated at the Roost Hospital Emergency Room on August 21.

(4) You paid a Roost Hospital bill of three bushels of corn.

Do not ask: The sky that fell from the sky, which you observed fall on August 21 hit the top of your head on August 21, causing you hospital emergency-room expenses of three bushels of corn.

  • Avoid incorporations by reference.^[7]^ Compose each request as a complete admission by itself, quoting the original source when available.

Ask: “Plaintiff hit Nate Ruess on his jaw with her right fist for the fun of it” as stated in Paragraph 3 of the Complaint.

Do not ask: You admit the statements made in Paragraph 3 of the complaint as being true and accurate.

Some complex cases involving extensive information and documents may require the use of admissions incorporating some of the information or documents by reference. If so, appropriate directions should state what is incorporated as precisely as possible. Incorporation by reference is practical if the documents, such as attachments to the pleadings or numbered deposition exhibits, are formally identified.

LLMs can improve the effectiveness of requests for admissions by ensuring that they are precise, enforceable, and strategically valuable. By drafting simple and direct statements that comply with Rule 36, GenAI can help attorneys structure requests that are more likely to elicit clear “admit” or “deny” responses, rather than interrogatory-style answers. LLM-backed tools can refine wording by eliminating ambiguity, unnecessary complexity, and vague terms, ensuring that each request stands independently and is not subject to misinterpretation. Additionally, GenAI can cross-check admission requests against pleadings, depositions, and prior discovery responses, flagging areas that could weaken a case.

While there is or may be no specified numerical limit on the number of requests nor on the quantity of sets of requests, the requests cannot be harassing, unduly burdensome, or excessive in amount.^[8]^ The Federal Advisory Committee recognizes that “requests to admit may be so voluminous and so framed that the answering party [will find] the task of identifying what is in dispute and what is not unduly burdensome.” And the Committee suggests that the responding party take appropriate responsive action, such as obtaining a protective order under Rule 26(c) from an oppressive request.^[9]^

§ 10.5 Opinions and Conclusions

Federal Rule 36(a)(1)(A) and similar state rules specifically provide that requests may relate to statements, or opinions of fact, or the application of law to fact. It is clear that one party can demand that another party respond to factual statements, opinions, conclusions, mixed statements of law and fact, and to statements that constitute the application of the facts to the law. Requests that seek purely legal conclusions are not allowed.^[10]^ Rule 36 practically eliminates the need to make distinctions between what is a fact versus an opinion versus a conclusion. The Federal Advisory Committee Notes supply an explanation and illustration:

Not only is it difficult as a practical matter to separate “fact” from “opinion,” . . . but an admission of a matter of opinion may facilitate proof or narrow the issues or both. An admission of a matter involving the application of law to fact may, in a given case, even more clearly narrow the issues. For example, an admission that an employee acted within the scope of employment may remove a major issue from the trial. In one case, the plaintiff admitted that “the premises on which said accident occurred, were occupied under the control” of one of the defendants.^[11]^ This admission, involving law as well as fact, removed one of the issues from the lawsuit and thereby reduced the proof required at trial.^[12]^

Further appropriate requests include: An example of a factual request is: “A piece of the sky that fell on August 21 hit your head.” An opinion or conclusion is: “You were not expecting the sky to fall on your head that day.” An application of law to fact is: “The entity that created the object that hit your head was also licensed to do business in South Dakota.”

§ 10.6 Admission Documents

Federal and parallel state rules specifically allow requests regarding the genuineness of documents and electronically stored information (ESI), and it requires that copies or reproductions be served with the request, unless the documents or ESI files have been otherwise made available or furnished to the responding party.^[13]^ See [Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N9342BE90B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N9342BE90B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). Further, many other sorts of admission requests can be made concerning documents: their authenticity, their status as originals or duplicates, their creation as ESI, the identity of the author who drafted them, the identity of individuals who were sent and received the materials, or any Rule 26 relevant matter. Emails, Posts, Snapchats, Instagrams, Linked In references, Facebook entries, blog contents, website homepages, list serve comments, and all other business and social network communications are subject to a [Rule 36](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N9342BE90B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N9342BE90B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) request if relevant to a case.

The original of the document or source of the electronically stored file need not be attached to a request, as a copy or reproduction will suffice. Responding parties seldom want to admit something about a copy or duplicate without first having reviewed the original, and can conveniently do so if they have it in their possession or have access to the original. A [Rule 36](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N9342BE90B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N9342BE90B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) request regarding a document often seeks the admission of some familiar matter. Should that not be the case, the respondent may either deny the sought-for admission because of the lack of familiarity or demand that the requesting party make the original available for review.

A [Rule 36](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N9342BE90B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N9342BE90B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) description need only be detailed enough to identify the document or ESI sufficiently for the respondent. A description such as “Exhibit 1 is a copy of the original May 1 Employment Agreement between the plaintiff and defendant” is more than sufficient to apprise the respondent of the identity of an attached exhibit. In many cases, the circumstances may make it clear that the attachment is a copy or reproduction of an original and such a notation may not be necessary. A more detailed description might be necessary if the respondent did not have the original or access to an authentic document or ESI.

The applicable rules permit the admission of other things in addition to documents and ESI. The Rule specifically allows a request to be submitted regarding the truth of a matter relevant to any party’s claim or defense. This includes statements and documents, tangible things and property, real evidence, and anything admissible at a trial or hearing, and may also include demonstrative exhibits, like a diagram, video, or other visual aid.

§ 10.7 Admission Responses

The party receiving Rule 36 requests must respond in one or more ways appropriate to the particular requests. There are several alternatives available. A responding party may:

  1. Do nothing.

  2. Admit.

  3. Deny.

  4. Qualify the answer.

  5. Object to the request.

  6. Move for a protective order.

  7. Request an extension of time.

  8. Crying or pouting are not expressly allowed, or disallowed.

A party must respond to each individual request by specifying which of these responses apply, and cannot respond in the alternative to a singular request.^[14]^ A party must choose one appropriate response for each request and cannot respond alternatively as in a pleading. An LLM can provide assistance with determining and selecting appropriate responses.

The response should be a single document, listing the various requests, followed by the corresponding responses, and signed by the party or attorney. The response must be served upon all parties to the action. A party who fails to properly respond to requests may be sanctioned. See § 10.12.

Rule 36 is self-executing and quite clear regarding the timing of responses: if a party does nothing and sends nothing, the party has admitted the requests. A timely response is one that is made within 30 days, unless an order establishes or the parties agree to a different time. Deadlines are usually strictly enforced, depending in part upon the reaction of the opposition.

If the opposing party accepts a late response, the response is effective. If the opposing party refuses the late response, the judge, arbitrator, or ALJ may determine whether to waive the rule’s automatic effect. This discretion relies on the degree of prejudice suffered by the party relying upon the automatic-effect rule.^[15]^ Responses that may have been a few days late were ruled acceptable because there was no prejudice suffered.^[16]^ A late reply has been refused when the discovering party relied upon the rule and dismissed witnesses whose recall would seriously inconvenience and prejudice that party.^[17]^

An admission pursuing something beyond the scope of Rules 26 or 36 will probably be ineffective. For example, a request seeking an admission of law not applicable to the facts exceeds the scope of Rule 36, so the failure to respond does not constitute an automatic admission.^[18]^ If no timely response has been submitted to admission requests, the delinquent responding party should ordinarily file responses and argue that the late responses constitute “amendments,"^[19]^ or seek an order arguing that the delinquent responses have not prejudiced the opposition. See §§ 10.11 & 10.13. A party who legitimately claims not to have received the requests must persuade a decision maker of that non-event.

A party must respond to each request in a truthful, specific, and straightforward manner.^[20]^ Honesty determines how to respond. A party admits something by responding yes or in some other specific affirmative or appropriate fashion. Parties are to base their admissions and responses on their knowledge and true information. Where a party has no personal knowledge of a fact but has relevant information obtained from a reliable third person or authentic document and believes the information to be accurate, the party must admit it, regardless of the source of the information.

If a party has reasonable doubt about the information, the party need not admit the fact. For example, presume an independent witness to an accident told a party that she thought the traffic light was red. If that party has a sufficient doubt about the accuracy of the statement or the believability of that witness, the party need not admit the request regarding whether the light was red. A qualified response or a denial may be appropriate. The decision to admit a fact provided by a witness may depend on the assessment a party makes of the eyewitness credibility. See § 10.9.

LLMs can help counsel craft accurate and strategic responses to requests, recommending whether to admit, deny, qualify, or object. GenAI can help ensure compliance with discovery rules, helping prevent improper alternative or evasive responses. LLM-backed tools can cross-reference discovery materials—including pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, and document productions—to help generate factually consistent responses and flag discrepancies that could lead to contradictions or impeachment. LLMs can also help classify each request to the applicable claims and elements, elucidating what opposing counsel seeks to demonstrate through each request. Additionally, GenAI can help identify when objections are appropriate, ensuring they are specific, well-supported, and compliant with all applicable rules.

§ 10.8 Denials

Federal Rule 36 and applicable state rules require that a denial must be specific about what is being denied and must fairly meet the substance of the requested admission. This means that a party must determine: “Can I in good faith, honestly, and unconditionally deny all or part of this request?” The Rule also requires a party to specify which part of a request is true or untrue. Relevant and reliable information may render an entire request deniable in good faith.

To be effective, a denial must deny the truth of the matter. An absolute denial, that is, the use of the word denied*,* unqualified by any other statement, constitutes a sufficient denial. Parties who state that they “refuse” to admit something have not properly denied the request.^[21]^ And parties who deny the “accuracy” of a request have likewise not properly denied a statement.^[22]^

A party may not admit and deny something at the same time, but that does not mean lawyers have not tried. For example, a request for admission asked the plaintiff to admit that the plaintiff had released the defendant’s corporation from responsibility “for all indebtedness.” The response was: “Admitted, except that it is denied that the said corporation was released of all indebtedness."^[23]^ The court held that the reply constituted an admission, averting sanctioning the lack of good faith or common sense of the noncompliant advocate.

§ 10.9 Qualifying Responses

The general rule regarding responses requires the admission of any request that is substantially correct by admitting what is correct and denying the part that is incorrect. Rule 36(a)(4) explicitly envisions limits to qualifying responses. The Federal Rule states that: “The answering party may assert lack of knowledge or information as a reason for failing to admit or deny only if the party states that it has made reasonable inquiry and that the information it knows or can readily obtain is insufficient to enable it to admit or deny.” Authorities construe Rule 36(a)(4) to require an explanation of the basis for the information and belief for it to be an effective denial, and this is a well-reasoned expectation. An information-and-belief denial without an appropriate explanation may well be ineffective.

A party has to respond based on the facts, opinions, and conclusions. The Rule requires a party to set forth in detail the reasons why the answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny a matter. A general or qualifying response that does not include detailed reasons is insufficient.^[24]^

A party cannot attempt to be evasive or to avoid direct responses by using ambiguous answers. Such responses are not and should not be countenanced.^[25]^ “It is the genius of Rule 36 that responses that do not advance the cause of clarifying and simplifying the issues must be explained."^[26]^

What constitutes a reasonable inquiry usually depends upon the nature of the request and the extent of the potential inquiry. The Federal Advisory Committee Notes explain that the Rule imposes upon the responding party a “reasonable burden” to obtain the information. The extent of such investigation should mimic the work necessary for proper case preparation or should include an investigation of all information “close enough to be ‘readily obtainable.’ “^[27]^ Cases have held that a party must make a reasonable effort to discover answers, short of undue hardship^[28]^ or any substantial and legitimate reason.^[29]^ These guidelines rely on standards: what efforts are necessary, appropriate, or reasonable under the circumstances?

Rule 36 allows a party to plead inability to respond fully by claiming there is insufficient information to respond to a contested issue in the case. A party who considers that the matter of which an admission has been requested presents a genuine issue for trial or hearing may not, on that ground alone, object to the request. A party may, subject to the provisions of Rule 37(c)(2), deny the matter or set forth reasons why it cannot be admitted or denied.

A party may be able to add more information to a response than the request seeks. It is an appropriate tactic for an attorney to include accurate, admissible information in some responses. The legitimacy of the tactic depends on the precise request and response, and some requests may require a qualified response that includes narrative information. This type of response may be suitable if a request has not been carefully and precisely drafted, leaving room for an interpretive response.

§ 10.10 Objections to Admission Requests

An objection that identifies the defects of a request is proper. The types of objections appropriate to requests for admissions are the same types applicable to interrogatories and document production requests. Whatever objection is interposed, specific reasons explaining the grounds must be included. An excessive number of requests may be objectionable on the grounds of undue burden, unless justified by the issues and parties.^[30]^ Objections based on inaccurate, immaterial, or incompetent grounds may be insufficient.^[31]^ Objections based upon Federal Rule 26(b) grounds, including discovery irrelevancy, are effective.

Because Rule 36 is denominated a discovery rule subject to the definition of relevance under Rule 26, an irrelevancy objection based upon the more restrictive Federal Rule of Evidence 401 may have no effect, but it might. If an admission would be inadmissible at a trial or hearing, an irrelevancy objection may be appropriate. If a request properly pursues relevant Rule 26 information, a response may be required.

Other objections may be appropriate to defectively drafted requests. Requests that are truly ambiguous or overly complex may be objected to as “vague” or “confusing” or with a description specifying the defect. These responses should be used only with unintelligible requests.

An objection based on a ground sufficient to obtain a protective order, such as a confidential trade secret, may also be available and appropriate. This objection may relieve counsel of the need to pursue a Rule 26 protective order and place the burden on the opposition to obtain a Rule 37 order to compel. The objection must contain the specific, legitimate grounds on which it is based.

Rule 36 has eliminated as proper objections a number of questionable protestations, including: the request presents an issue for trial only resolvable at trial; the request includes disputable matter; and the request seeks a factual opinion or a mixed question of law and fact. Case law also has declared a number of objections improper including: the requesting party already knows the answer,^[32]^ or the request relates to matters on which the requesting party has the burden of proof.^[33]^ “The very purpose of the request is to ascertain [what] is a genuine issue for trial."^[34]^

LLMs can help attorneys draft well-supported objections to Rule 36 requests by identifying valid grounds such as undue burden, ambiguity, privilege, or irrelevance. GenAI can help ensure that the objections are specific and legally sound by refining vague or overly broad responses and providing precise descriptions of the defects. Additionally, LLM-backed tools can walk the line between discovery objections under Rule 26 and evidentiary objections under Rule 401, avoiding improper challenges likely to be overruled. If the LLM can access case law, the system can also flag historically rejected objections, suggesting stronger alternatives that are more likely to withstand judicial scrutiny.

§ 10.11 Response Strategies

In responding to requests, an advocate must consider the impact of the responses upon the case. The more harmful the impact an admission may have, the more scrutiny an attorney should devote to uncovering objections or drafting good faith qualifying answers or denials. This scrutiny must also weigh the risk that the responding party may challenge the sufficiency of a response that is not an admission. A non-admission may increase costs, expenses, and time that are disproportionate to the impact on a case. Moreover, admissions usually foreclose an area to discovery, whereas denials may prompt the other lawyer to use discovery devices to ferret out information.

A party may obtain more time to respond to requests by stipulation or by court order. Federal Rule 29 requires court approval if a stipulation extending the time for any form of discovery would interfere with the time set for completing discovery, for hearing a motion, or for a trial. Because of the adverse impact an admission may have on a case, it is critical to timely meet the response deadline.

A request becomes admitted if a response is not timely, as explained previously. See § 10.7. A court has the power to convert an untimely response into a timely response by retroactively extending the time limit.^[35]^ Rule 36 also allows untimely answers as “amendments” to admissions: Rule 36(b) allows a party to “withdraw” admissions and “amend” answers. A party who files an untimely response can bring a motion to withdraw the admissions and substitute the late responses as amendments.^[36]^ The Rule allows this procedure unless it adversely affects the presentation of a case or unfairly prejudices the requesting party.^[37]^

Improper responses can result in sanctions against recalcitrant parties. The sanction provisions of Federal Rule 37(c)(2) concern the expenses that a party who fails to make an admission may have to bear if that party has no good reason for declining to admit. The requesting party can pursue the recovery of expenses from an obstinate party.

Rule 36 allows a requesting party to dispute an objection through a motion and hearing. If it is determined that the objection is justified, it will prevail. If not, an order will require the answer. The objecting party has the burden of showing the validity of the objection. That makes sense. If the objection does not make sense, an order may sanction the objecting party to pay cents to the requesting party who had to obtain the hearing. That may make a lot of cents.

LLMs can help evaluate response strategies by simulating how an opposing party may challenge a particular admission, denial, or qualified response. By “shadow boxing” potential risks, GenAI can help predict whether a response might trigger additional discovery, lead to a motion to compel, or tempt sanctions. LLM-backed tools can also carefully craft responses to avoid claims of bad faith. If responses are untimely, GenAI can assess the likelihood that a court will permit withdrawal or amendment under Rule 36(b), drafting persuasive motions demonstrating the lack of prejudice to the requesting party.

§ 10.12 Challenging Responses

Federal Rule 36(a)(6) and similar state rules allow a requesting party to challenge the sufficiency of any response. If a response does not comply with Rule 36, the judge, arbitrator, or ALJ has three options: (1) to declare the request admitted, (2) to order an amended answer, or (3) to postpone the “final disposition” of the request until a pretrial or prehearing conference. In any event, an order may be entered imposing expenses upon the responding party as provided in Rule 37(a)(5) for improper responses. The third alternative of judicial scrutiny may be appropriate when the request either seeks a factual response that requires further investigation or seeks an uncertain mixed question of law and fact. The responding party may need more time to formulate a response.

A non-response or an improper response to a request automatically becomes an admission after the appropriate time passes. An improper response must be challenged by the requesting party and may result in an admission. The Federal Advisory Committee Notes explain that it is usually more effective and fairer to decide the fate of a response within a reasonable time before the trial or hearing. This avoids an untimely or unfair surprise for the parties.

Any and all discovery devices can be employed to supplement requests for admissions. For instance, an attorney can submit interrogatories or ask deposition questions seeking to explain the underlying facts supporting the denial or qualification of a response or why a request was not admitted.

§ 10.13 Changing Admissions

Rule 36 permits a party to obtain a court order allowing the withdrawal of a previous admission and the substitution of an amended response. The Rule spells out the considerations the court must employ:

A matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court, on motion, permits the admission to be withdrawn or amended. Subject to Rule 16(e), the court may permit withdrawal or amendment if it would promote the presentation of the merits of the action and if the court is not persuaded it would prejudice the requesting party in maintaining or defending the action on the merits.^[38]^

Reasons supporting withdrawal and substitution might be that the admission was a genuine mistake, or was inadvertently made, or was a good faith drafting error.^[39]^ Another reason might be that the circumstances have changed, so the admission is no longer true.

Parties opposing an amended or withdrawn admission must persuade the decision maker that a withdrawal or amendment will “prejudice” a case by indicating that they relied upon the admission to their detriment. They may be able to show that some investigation was deferred, some discovery curtailed, or some relevant evidence deteriorated as a result of reliance on the admission.

A party may have difficulty countering these prejudice claims. A factor significantly influencing the degree of prejudice is the timing of the request for the withdrawal or amendment. The sooner the change is sought after submission of the admissions, the more likely it will be granted. The closer in time to a trial or hearing the change is sought, the more likely it will be denied. This provision of Rule 36 does not include amendments to other responses besides admissions, like denials, objections, or qualifications.

Conditions may be imposed on the withdrawal of an admission. Costs may be assessed against the moving party incurred by the other party relying on the to-be-withdrawn admission.^[40]^ Further, a withdrawn admission may be available for use at a trial or hearing as any other evidentiary admission or for impeachment.^[41]^

§ 10.14 Effects of Admissions

Federal Rule 36(b) and parallel state rules declare admissions to be conclusive proof of the matter asserted for purposes of the pending action only, unless a court allows a withdrawal or an amendment. The Federal Advisory Committee explains that an admission has the same effect as a pleading admission or as a stipulation of facts executed by the attorneys. The judge or jury must accept the admissions as true and proven and cannot disbelieve them. The party that made the admissions cannot contradict or rebut the admissions. These effects would also occur in arbitrations and administrative cases.

Admissions are admissible at the trial or hearing. Admissions that are dispositive of a case constitute adequate support for summary judgment.^[42]^ A party need only offer them in support of a motion. Any party can object to their being offered as they remain subject to appropriate evidentiary objections. For example, even though a party has admitted a request, that party’s irrelevancy objection to that request may be granted excluding the admission.

An admission that has been withdrawn and amended may also have an effect in the case. A withdrawn admission may be available for any evidentiary purpose.^[43]^ A requesting party could introduce a withdrawn admission as an impeaching prior inconsistent statement at the trial or hearing and the responding party could explain or rebut it.

Similarly, a denial of an admission may have an effect. It can be used for impeachment purposes or to preclude the denying party from introducing contrary evidence. An unjustified denial, which causes the requesting party to prove the matter at the trial or hearing, may well result in the payment of the costs of proof by the opposing party.^[44]^

Practice Problems and Assignments

Follow the directions from your professor in completing an assignment.

Requests for Admissions

  1. Prepare to discuss in class or online the contents of requests for admissions as required by Federal Rule 36.

  2. Prepare to discuss in class or online the procedures required by Federal Rule 36 for requests for admissions.

  3. Prepare to discuss in class or online the required court documents and their contents required by Federal Rule 36 for a motion to compel responses.

  4. Prepare to discuss in class or online the possible responses and answers to requests for admissions under Federal Rule 36.

  5. Prepare to discuss in class or online the effects of admissions under Federal Rule 36.

  6. Research the differences and similarities between Federal Rule 36 and the state court rules regarding requests for admission and responses and answers to admission requests that are applicable in the state of your law school. Prepare to discuss in class or online these differences and similarities.

Drafting Requests

Draft a variety of Rule 36 requests for admissions in the following problems, including statements involving facts, opinions, genuineness of documents or electronically stored information, and application of law to fact. Form or standard requests may be useful as guides in composing requests. but may not be used verbatim. The Summit Discovery Rules place a limit of 10 requests for admission. Your professor may specify other limits.

  1. You represent Hot Dog Enterprises in Hot Dog Enterprises v. Tri-Chem (Case A). Draft requests for admissions directed to the defendant.

  2. You represent Tri-Chem in Hot Dog Enterprises v. Tri-Chem (Case A). Draft requests for admissions directed to the plaintiff.

  3. You represent the plaintiff in Northern Motor Homes v. Danforth (Case J). Draft requests for admissions directed to the defendants.

  4. You represent the defendants in Northern Motor Homes v. Danforth (Case J). Draft requests for admissions directed to the plaintiff.

  5. You represent the plaintiff in Burris v. Warner (Case K). Draft requests for admissions directed to the defendant.

  6. You represent the defendant in Burris v. Warner (Case K). Draft request for admissions directed to the plaintiff.

  7. You represent the plaintiff in Vasquez v. Hot Dog Enterprises (Case F). Draft admission requests directed to the defendant.

  8. You represent the defendant Hot Dog Enterprises in Vasquez v. Hot Dog Enterprises (Case F). Draft admission requests directed to the plaintiff.

  9. You represent the defendant in FJE Enterprises v. Arbor Vineyards (Case L). Draft admission requests directed to the plaintiffs.

  10. You represent the plaintiffs in FJE Enterprises v. Arbor Vineyards (Case L). Draft admission requests directed to the defendant.

Reconsidering and Redrafting Admissions

  1. You represent the Defendant Summit Insurance Company in Pozdak v. Summit Insurance Company (Case B). Casey Pozdak has sued for breach of contract seeking to recover for the fire loss to the building and for the loss of its contents. You defend claiming Pozdak committed arson that bars recovery under the contract. An associate in your firm prepares a draft of the following requests for admissions:

Defendant demands that the Plaintiff admit:

(a) That Casey Pozdak increased the value of the fire insurance contract with the Defendant to $825,000 for real property coverage and $1,250,000 for personal property coverage four months before the fire of July 3.

(b) That Casey Pozdak had been accused of insurance fraud while in college.

(c) That Casey Pozdak could have driven from Stacy Lindberg’s cabin to Mitchell the evening of July 3 in less than 2 hours.

(d) That Casey Pozdak owes Stacy Lindberg at least $25,000.

(e) That Casey Pozdak owns a new BMW Turbo and owes $45,000.

(f) That the fire insurance policy between the Plaintiff and Defendant in force on July 3 states that: “Payment shall not be made under the terms of this policy for the fire destruction of the insured building and contents if the insured fire was caused by arson and if the insurer caused or participated in the arson.”

(1) Which of these requests would you not submit, and why?

(2) Redraft those you would submit.

(3) What other requests would you submit, and why? Draft those requests.

(4) If you represented the Plaintiff Pozdak and received this set of requests, how would you respond to each of these requests?

  1. You represent the plaintiff in Northern Motor Homes v. Danforth (Case J). The defendants have submitted the following requests for admissions to you. Draft responses to these requests.

Do you admit that each of the following statements is true?

(a) Sara Duncan was an agent and employee of Plaintiff and was at all times acting within the scope of her employment in dealing with Defendants on May 25 and 26, 20XX.

(b) Plaintiff provided Defendants with a “Limited Warranty,” an exact copy of which appears as Exhibit A in the Answer.

(c) Between June 11 and June 22, Plaintiff did not check nor test the gas mileage of the Voyageur Camper.

(d) On June 25, 20XX, John Danforth telephoned and talked to Bill Burke.

(e) The Voyageur Motor Home was in the possession of Plaintiff for repairs from July 2 through July 10.

(f) The law of the State of Summit permits Defendants to revoke acceptance in this case if defects in the Voyageur Motor Home substantially impair its value to Defendants.

  1. You represent the defendants in Northern Motor Homes v. Danforth (Case J). The plaintiff has submitted the following requests for admissions to you. Draft responses to these requests.

Do you admit that each of the following statements is true?

(a) John and Joan Danforth failed to pay the July 25, 20XX installment of $1,199.22.

(b) John and Joan Danforth signed a Retail Installment Contract, an exact copy of which appears as Exhibit A in the Complaint.

(c) John and Joan Danforth accepted the Voyageur Camper on May 26, 20XX.

(d) John and Joan Danforth drove and used the Voyageur Camper from May 26 to July 23, 20XX.

(e) The failure to pay the July 25, 20XX, installment payment of $1,199.22 constituted a default of the retail installment contract.

(f) Paragraph 4 of the Retail Installment Contract permits Northern Motor Homes to accelerate all payments if a default occurs.

Drafting and Responding to Admission Requests

  1. You represent the plaintiff in Northern Motor Homes v. Danforth (Case J). Respond to the requests for admissions prepared by the student attorney representing the defendant.

  2. You represent the defendant in Northern Motor Homes v. Danforth (Case J). Respond to the requests for admissions prepared by the student attorney representing the plaintiff.

  3. You represent the plaintiff in Burris v. Warner (Case K). Respond to the requests for admissions prepared by the student attorney representing the defendant.

  4. You represent the defendant in Burris v. Warner (Case K). Respond to the requests for admissions prepared by the student attorney representing the plaintiff.

  5. You represent the plaintiff in Vasquez v. Hot Dog Enterprises (Case F). Respond to the requests for admissions prepared by the student attorney representing the defendant.

  6. You represent the defendant in Vasquez v. Hot Dog Enterprises (Case F). Respond to the requests for admission prepared by the student attorney representing the plaintiff.

  7. You represent the defendant in FJE Enterprises v. Arbor Vineyards (Case L). Respond to the requests for admission prepared by the student attorney representing the plaintiffs.

  8. You represent the plaintiffs in FJE Enterprises v. Arbor Vineyards (Case L). Respond to the requests for admission prepared by the student attorney representing the defendant.

Planning and Drafting Admissions

  1. You represent a party in a case assigned by your professor in which another student represents the opposing party.

(a) Plan requests for admissions directed to the opposing party.

(b) Draft requests for admissions directed to the opposing party.

(c) Draft responses to the requests for admissions prepared by the student attorney who represents the opposing party.

(d) Prepare to meet and confer with opposing counsel and attempt to reach agreements on disputed admissions.

(e) Plan to discuss with opposing counsel converting the admission requests into mutually agreeable factual stipulations and propose suggested fact statements.

  1. See Paul R. Connolly, et al., Judicial Controls and the Civil Litigative Process: Discovery 28 (1978). Little has changed since way back when. ↑
  2. See [Sommerfield v. City of Chicago](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ieb9c893d576911ddb6a3a099756c05b7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ieb9c893d576911ddb6a3a099756c05b7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 251 F.R.D. 353 (N.D. Ill. 2008)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ieb9c893d576911ddb6a3a099756c05b7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ieb9c893d576911ddb6a3a099756c05b7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0); Henry v. Champlain Enters., Inc., 212 F.R.D. 73 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). ↑
  3. State v. United States, 163 Fed.Cl. 520 (Fed. Cl.). ↑
  4. [Walsh v. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I863e4c3e548a11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I863e4c3e548a11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 26 F. Supp. 566 (E.D.N.Y. 1939)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I863e4c3e548a11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I863e4c3e548a11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0); *see also *Thalheim v. Eberheim, 124 F.R.D. 34 (D. Conn. 1988). ↑
  5. *See, generally, *8B Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2257, and [Minn. R. Civ. P. 36.01](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N9968CBD0951711DB9BCF9DAC28345A2A/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N9968CBD0951711DB9BCF9DAC28345A2A/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  6. [Sommerfield v. City of Chicago](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ieb9c893d576911ddb6a3a099756c05b7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ieb9c893d576911ddb6a3a099756c05b7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 251 F.R.D. 353 (N.D. Ill. 2008)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ieb9c893d576911ddb6a3a099756c05b7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ieb9c893d576911ddb6a3a099756c05b7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  8. See **State v. United States, 163 Fed.Cl. 520 (Fed. Cl. 2022) and [Sommerfield v. City of Chicago](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I92ad6480674911e7bcf2cc0f37ee205d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I92ad6480674911e7bcf2cc0f37ee205d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 863 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2017)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I92ad6480674911e7bcf2cc0f37ee205d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I92ad6480674911e7bcf2cc0f37ee205d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  9. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N9342BE90B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N9342BE90B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0), Notes of Advisory Comm.—1970 Amendments. ↑
  10. [Tulip Computers Int’l B.V. v. Dell Computer Corp., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I856fd3bc53fd11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I856fd3bc53fd11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[210 F.R.D. 100 (D. Del. 2002)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I856fd3bc53fd11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I856fd3bc53fd11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  11. [McSparran v. Hanigan,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I66d9aaf754c211d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I66d9aaf754c211d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 225 F. Supp. 628 (E.D. Pa. 1963)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I66d9aaf754c211d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I66d9aaf754c211d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0), judgment affirmed [356 F.2d 983 (3d Cir. 1966)](https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?cite=356FE2D983&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?cite=356FE2D983&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  12. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N9342BE90B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N9342BE90B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0), Notes of Advisory Comm.—1970 Amendments. Also see **[In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ibe4b585a120911e1be8fdb5fa26a1033/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ibe4b585a120911e1be8fdb5fa26a1033/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 281 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2011)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ibe4b585a120911e1be8fdb5fa26a1033/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ibe4b585a120911e1be8fdb5fa26a1033/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  13. [XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. Bollinger Shipyards](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5ee8e60663ec11e4a795ac035416da91/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5ee8e60663ec11e4a795ac035416da91/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 57 F. Supp. 3d 728 (E.D. La. 2014)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5ee8e60663ec11e4a795ac035416da91/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5ee8e60663ec11e4a795ac035416da91/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  15. [Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. Tripodi, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2e4ee754564711d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2e4ee754564711d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[913 F. Supp. 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2e4ee754564711d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2e4ee754564711d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  16. [Pritchard v. Dow Agro Sciences,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ieb54783ddcf611ddbc7bf97f340af743/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ieb54783ddcf611ddbc7bf97f340af743/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 255 F.R.D. 164 (W.D. Pa. 2009)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ieb54783ddcf611ddbc7bf97f340af743/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ieb54783ddcf611ddbc7bf97f340af743/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  17. [Sonoda v. Cabrera, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I075bcb6679b811d9bf29e2067ad74e5b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I075bcb6679b811d9bf29e2067ad74e5b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[255 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2001)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I075bcb6679b811d9bf29e2067ad74e5b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I075bcb6679b811d9bf29e2067ad74e5b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  18. [Williams v. Krieger,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I019702f5550d11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I019702f5550d11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 61 F.R.D. 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I019702f5550d11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I019702f5550d11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  19. Printy v. Crochet & Borel Servs., 196 F.R.D. 46 (E.D. Tex. 2000). ↑
  20. EEOC v. E.J. Sacco, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 2d 413 (E.D. Mich. 2000). ↑
  21. [Fuhr v. Newfoundland-St. Lawrence Shipping Ltd., Panama, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I298b220454b811d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I298b220454b811d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[24 F.R.D. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I298b220454b811d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I298b220454b811d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  22. [Congress Fin. Corp. v. Commercial Tech., Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2e72ea1e564711d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2e72ea1e564711d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 910 F. Supp. 637 (N.D. Ga. 1995)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2e72ea1e564711d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2e72ea1e564711d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  23. [Riordan v. Ferguson, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iccb28a90549a11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iccb28a90549a11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[147 F.2d 983 (2d Cir. 1945)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iccb28a90549a11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iccb28a90549a11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  24. [Villarosa v. Massachusetts Trustees of Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I20badd9954c811d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I20badd9954c811d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[39 F.R.D. 337 (E.D. Pa. 1966)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I20badd9954c811d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I20badd9954c811d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  25. [EEOC v. E.J. Sacco, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I525daee153ce11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I525daee153ce11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 102 F. Supp. 2d 413 (E.D. Mich. 2000)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I525daee153ce11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I525daee153ce11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  26. See **[Henry v. Champlain Enterprises](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia8c62a44540111d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia8c62a44540111d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, Inc., 212 F.R.D. 73 (N.D.N.Y. 2003)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia8c62a44540111d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia8c62a44540111d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  27. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N9342BE90B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N9342BE90B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0), Notes of Advisory Comm.—1970 Amendments. ↑
  28. [Harris v. Oil Reclaiming Co.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ideb8650c53b611d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ideb8650c53b611d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 190 F.R.D. 674 (D. Kan. 1999)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ideb8650c53b611d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ideb8650c53b611d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  30. State v. United States, 163 Fed.Cl. 520 (Fed. Cl.). ↑
  32. [Electric Furnace Co. v. Fire Ass’n of Philadelphia,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iac06522b54a611d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iac06522b54a611d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 9 F.R.D. 741 (N.D. Ohio 1949)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iac06522b54a611d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iac06522b54a611d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) (still controlling law). ↑
  33. *Adventures in *Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1942) (burp). ↑
  34. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N9342BE90B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N9342BE90B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0), Notes of Advisory Comm.—1970 Amendments. ↑
  35. [French v. United States,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I7e43ee6f8f7f11d98e8fb00d6c6a02dd/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I7e43ee6f8f7f11d98e8fb00d6c6a02dd/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 416 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1968)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I7e43ee6f8f7f11d98e8fb00d6c6a02dd/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I7e43ee6f8f7f11d98e8fb00d6c6a02dd/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  37. [Pleasant Hill Bank v. United States, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib79fec28550c11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib79fec28550c11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[60 F.R.D. 1 (W.D. Mo. 1973)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib79fec28550c11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib79fec28550c11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  38. [C.J. Hughes Construction Co. v. EQM Gathering OPCO, LLC](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia3c99060309f11e987fd8441446aa305/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia3c99060309f11e987fd8441446aa305/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia3c99060309f11e987fd8441446aa305/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia3c99060309f11e987fd8441446aa305/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[358 F. Supp. 3d 486 (W.D. Pa. 2019)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia3c99060309f11e987fd8441446aa305/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia3c99060309f11e987fd8441446aa305/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  39. See,* e.g., **[Human Res. Dev. Press v. IKNO Office Solutions, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ibce28b12726c11dcbd4c839f532b53c5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ibce28b12726c11dcbd4c839f532b53c5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)*[246 F.R.D. 82 (D. Mass. 2007)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ibce28b12726c11dcbd4c839f532b53c5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ibce28b12726c11dcbd4c839f532b53c5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  40. *Hadley v. United States, *45 F.3d 1345 (9th Cir. 1995). ↑
  41. [General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Rhoades](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3a6e275253d411d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3a6e275253d411d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 196 F.R.D. 620 (D.N.M. 2000)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3a6e275253d411d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3a6e275253d411d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  42. [Quasius v. Schwan Food Co.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia6cf92c9286a11df8bf6cd8525c41437/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia6cf92c9286a11df8bf6cd8525c41437/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 596 F.3d 947 (8th Cir. 2010)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia6cf92c9286a11df8bf6cd8525c41437/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia6cf92c9286a11df8bf6cd8525c41437/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  43. [General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Rhoades](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3a6e275253d411d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3a6e275253d411d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 196 F.R.D. 620 (D.N.M. 2000)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3a6e275253d411d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3a6e275253d411d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  44. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NA31111F0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NA31111F0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). *See, e.g., **Moses v. U.S. Steel Corp., *946 F. Supp. 834 (N.D. Ind. 2013); *Popeil Brothers, Inc. v. Schick Electric, Inc., *516 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1975). ↑