Chapter 8: Requests For

Federal Rule 34 permits a party to obtain from another party the production of relevant documents, electronically stored information, property, and tangible things — making document production, alongside depositions, the most used and most useful of the discovery methods.

Chapter 8

Documents and ESI

■ ■ ■

The harpoon was darted; the stricken whale flew forward; with igniting velocity the line ran through the groove—and ran afoul. Ahab stood to clear it; he did clear it, but the flying turn caught him round the neck, and voicelessly as warriors bowstring their victim he was shot out of the boat.

Herman Melville Moby Dick

§ 8.1 Introduction

You will never have the difficulty Captain Ahab had in inspecting and copying Moby Dick. All you need do is shout “Give Away”^[1]^ and you can obtain documents from your opponent.

Federal Rule 34 permits a party to obtain from another party the production of relevant documents, electronically stored information (ESI), property, and tangible things merely by asking, as long as that party has possession, custody, or control.^[2]^ Most state courts have a rule identical or similar to Rule 34. Document production along with depositions are the most used and useful of the discovery methods.

Documents may also be disclosed or exchanged by agreement of the parties. Federal Rule 26(a) requires some materials to be affirmatively disclosed by a party if the documents, ESI, property, or things may be used by a party in support of claims or defenses. And parties can always decide on their own to agree to exchange documents and ESI. See Rule 29.

Although it is not the exclusive discovery device for making available documents and things, Rule 34 is the only discovery device that requires opponents to produce them. Rule 33(d) allows a responding party to produce business records in lieu of interrogatory answers; Rule 30(f)(2) authorizes materials to be produced during a deposition; and Rule 45 permits the discovery of documents, ESI, and tangible things from non-parties.^[3]^ A party can also request the production of materials informally, without relying on a formal discovery request. But Rule 34 is the only device that has the enforcement capabilities to compel disclosure.

Document production is ordinarily available in arbitrations and administrative hearings. The rules of these forums usually allow for relevant document production exchanges providing the parties and the arbitrator or administrative law judge (ALJ) with the essential information they need.^[4]^ The rules also allow for enforcement of the production requests.

As explained in previous chapters, parties have an obligation to retain documents and ESI in anticipation of a dispute or litigation. They must not destroy or delete relevant materials. It is common for counsel to advise parties and their representatives of this duty.^[5]^ The destruction or deletion of relevant materials subjects a party to spoliation sanctions. See §§ 8.27.2 & 11.2. Consequently, there commonly exist numerous relevant documents to be discovered in cases.

In this Chapter and throughout this text, a reference to documents includes all types of documents, such as written and printed papers and materials and electronically stored information and social network communications. The provisions of Rule 34 are comprehensive and apply to data of all types. There are a few specific Rule 34 provisions that only apply to electronic documents because the nature of ESI differs from paper documents.

§ 8.2 Saying Please

If you can say please to the other attorney, you can frequently obtain access to documents and things without reliance on Rule 34. Email, letter, text or phone requests frequently result in the unilateral or reciprocal exchange of documentary information. It is a common practice for attorneys to forward copies of documents to each other, with each side bearing the duplication costs.

These informal agreements save time and money, but they also have some drawbacks. The disclosing party has the flexibility to define the scope of the request and to decide what relevant documents will be voluntarily turned over. It may not be certain or readily determinable that all the documents requested were produced. The discovery rules do not provide any specific sanction for the breach of an informal disclosure agreement, although such a breach may constitute an ethical violation. Only a Rule 34 request requires a party to respond as mandated by the rules.

Formalizing the agreements helps reduce these drawbacks. An email or letter reply can be sent after an informal oral agreement, confirming the scope of the request and the expected items. Likewise, correspondence sent after production, listing all the things disclosed, can ask whether they comprise all the writings and things requested within certain designated categories. A stipulation can be drafted and executed, listing the terms of the disclosure exchange, the scope of materials requested, the manner of disclosure, and its time and place.

Federal rules encourage parties to exchange materials by agreement. Federal Rule 26(f) requires that the parties confer early in the case to discuss a discovery plan, including the exchange of relevant documents and things. Unless the parties have objections to requests, a significant amount of materials are likely to be voluntarily exchanged by agreement without the need for a Rule 34 request.

Federal Rules 26(c) and 37 also require parties to discuss specific discovery disputes before pursuing a motion to compel discovery. If a party submits a Rule 34 document request which is objected to by the receiving party, the discovering party may bring a Rule 26(c) motion seeking an order from a court requiring the disclosure of these materials. Before the discovering party can file this motion with the court, the parties must discuss the discovery dispute in an effort to resolve the matter without court intervention.^[6]^ A similar mandate to discuss a discovery dispute with another party is required by Federal Rule 37 if a party seeks sanctions for violation of the discovery rules. The intent of these rules is to increase the likelihood that lawyers can solve their own disputes and to reduce the time spent by judges in reviewing motions and issuing orders.

Strategically, it may be advisable to voluntarily provide an opponent with the requested documents. This is especially true in situations where the documents support a claim or defense the disclosing party is advocating or where the disclosed documents strengthen a party’s position regarding a motion or prospective settlement talks, or when mandated by rule.

§ 8.3 The Document Disclosure Rule

In federal cases and many state cases, you will not have to ask for some materials. A party must voluntarily disclose certain documents and data including:

[Rule 26(a)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) requires parties to disclose all these materials and eliminates the need for a party to submit a Rule 34 document production request for these items. See § 8.6. Federal Rule 26 further requires that the parties meet and confer regarding disclosures. The purpose of the rule is to have the parties discuss and agree what documents should be exchanged without the need for drafting document production requests. In states that do not have a similar disclosure rule, a formal document production request will need to be submitted.

§ 8.4 The Document Discovery Rule

Rule 34 ipsa loquitur:

In General. A party may serve on any other party a request within the scope of [Rule 26(b)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0):

**(1) **to produce and permit the requesting party or its representative to inspect, copy, test, or sample the following items in the responding party’s possession, custody, or control:

**(A) **any designated documents or electronically stored information—including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings, images, and other data or data compilations—stored in any medium from which information can be obtained either directly or, if necessary, after translation by the responding party into a reasonably usable form; or

**(B) **any designated tangible things; or

**(2) **to permit entry onto designated land or other property possessed or controlled by the responding party, so that the requesting party may inspect, measure, survey, photograph, test, or sample the property or any designated object or operation on it."^[7]^

§ 8.5 Parties

[Rule 34](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) permits production only from parties. Rule 45 allows obtaining documents, electronic messages, files, data, and tangible things from non-parties. See Section 8.21. If materials are available from both a party and a non-party, it is preferable for a requesting party to use [Rule 34](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) rather than to impose the discovery burden on a non-party through a subpoena.^[8]^ In a class action, [Rule 34](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) requests can be directed to representative parties and to absentee class members. The request submitted to absent class members must seek documents that are unavailable from the representative parties and must be relevant to common issues.^[9]^

§ 8.6 The Scope of Rule 26 Disclosures

[Rule 26(a)(i)(A)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) requires a party to disclose initially three types of materials, as outlined in Section 8.3:

  1. A copy—or a description by category and location—of all documents, electronically stored information, records, emails, files, data, and tangible things that the disclosing party has in possession, custody, or control and may use to support claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for impeachment (which would rarely occur). [Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). See § 5.3.5.

  2. A computation of each category of damages claimed by the disclosing party—who must also make available for inspection and copying under [Rule 34](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) the documents or other evidentiary material, unless privileged or protected from disclosure, on which each computation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered. [Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iii)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). See § 5.3.8.

  3. For inspection and copying, as under [Rule 34](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0), any insurance agreement under which an insurance company may be liable to satisfy all or part of a possible judgment in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment. [Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). See § 5.3.9.

Federal Rule 26(a)(2) further requires a party to provide disclosures of expert testimony at a later stage of litigation. This rule requires that a party who identifies trial experts must also accompany this disclosure with a report prepared and signed by the trial expert, or by a witness who is retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony, or by an employee of the party regularly involved in giving expert testimony. The report must contain a statement of the expert opinions, bases for opinions, data, information, exhibits, qualifications, publications, compensation, and other information. Section 5.9.3 explains these disclosures.

Further, the federal rules require additional disclosures of documents and materials at the pretrial stage of a case. Federal Rule 26(a)(3) requires that a party disclose to all other parties the identification of all exhibits and documents expected to be presented at trial. Ordinarily, the initial disclosure and document production rules would produce these materials before the pretrial stage. See § 5.12.

Arbitration rules and administrative law provisions may have similar disclosure requirements. The type of case and the applicable procedures determine the kind of disclosures. Arbitrators and ALJs have powers similar to a judicial judge in enforcing the rules and provisions.

§ 8.7 The Scope of Rule 34 Requests

The scope of discovery under [Rule 34](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) is identical with other discovery devices outlined in [Rule 26(b)(2)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0):

Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.

The provision allows for the discovery of [Rule 34](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) matters subject to two constraints. See § 5.4. Discoverable documents must be:

  1. Unprivileged matter that is “relevant to any party’s claim or defense,” and

  2. Proportional to the needs of the party and the case.

Accessible ESI documents are required to be disclosed and are discoverable. While ESI materials the responding party identifies as “not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost” are not, upon a good cause showing a judge may order that they be produced. Federal Rule 26(b)(2)(B).^[10]^

Specifically, the following categories of documents, things, and property are discoverable:

A.* Documents Including Writings, Drawings, Graphs, Charts, Photographs, Electronically Stored Information, Computer Records, and Other Data Compilations.* Anything that contains writing, print, emails, electronic messages, social network communications, data, recorded information or images is discoverable. These documents can be inspected and copied. Section 8.20 discusses electronically stored information.

B. *Tangible Things That Are Discoverable Under *[Rule 26](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). Any object can be inspected, copied, tested or sampled. Sections 8.18 and 8.19 discuss testing issues and procedures.

C. Land and Other Property. Real and personal property may be inspected, measured, surveyed, photographed, tested, and sampled.

Most, if not all, cases involve some sort of documents, and [Rule 34](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) is the routine way of discovering them. Some cases, such as product liability and environmental actions, involve tangible and real property. Other cases may involve access to property for critical discovery purposes. Treatment facilities may need to be inspected, relative to their conditions and procedures, in a case seeking better treatment for the residents.^[11]^ An inspection tour of a factory may be necessary to obtain evidence for a product liability or employment-discrimination case.^[12]^ These situations may first require a discovering party to use less intrusive discovery devices, like a deposition, to establish a need for [Rule 34](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) access.^[13]^ This rule may also be an appropriate device to create tangible things for discovery purposes.^[14]^ It may be possible to require a party, for example, to produce a voice exemplar by speaking into a voice recorder.^[15]^

The scope of electronic and digital documents and records grows exponentially as commercial, social, and professional network communications sources proliferate and the use of them by clients, parties, and witnesses seemingly knows no bounds. Pragmatic and rule-based limits restrict broad requests for potentially massive amounts and numbers of documents, photos, videos, and digital images and reproductions. Reason and rationality must prevail.

Broad requests for “all social media postings” are improper and even ought to be sanctioned as seeking irrelevant, burdensome, and disproportional discovery.^[16]^ It would be as if a party asked an opposing party in an interrogatory or a deposition to recall and describe all conversations and communications that party had with anyone at any time about the subject matter of the case. That, as you can readily surmise, would be an objectionable inquiry. See § 8.20.

§ 8.8 Possession, Custody, and Control

All these documents, things, and property must be in the possession, control, and custody of a party.^[17]^ Possession and custody include both actual and constructive possession and custody, while control means the party has a legal right to obtain the documents.^[18]^ Case law has clarified and occasionally confused the discoverability of items and information contained in both documentary paper and electronic form:

  1. Non-party witness statements that support the claim or defense of a party need to be unilaterally disclosed as explained in Section 8.3. Other non-party witness statements may be trial preparation materials, requiring a showing of substantial need and undue hardship before they may be obtained by a party. Because non-party witnesses may obtain their own statement without any special showing, a friendly witness may request a copy at the urging or on behalf of one of the parties and provide it to other parties. Tactically, an advocate is unlikely to preserve a witness statement unless that witness has supportive information, reducing the likelihood that negative trial preparation witness statements exist. Some state rules make witness statements easily discoverable by explicitly allowing for the discovery of non-party witness statements that are signed by the witness or contemporaneously recorded.

  2. Documents and things in the possession, control, or custody of a party’s attorney are discoverable, excluding trial preparation materials and attorney mental impressions.^[19]^

  3. Documents of which a party does not have copies or duplicates, but has a right or opportunity to copy or duplicate, must be produced.^[20]^

  4. Documents a party possesses, but that belong to a third person who is not a party, may have to be disclosed.^[21]^ A party need not “own” the documents; it is enough if the party possesses them.^[22]^

  5. Documents prepared by or under the direction or supervision of an expert expected to be called at trial, including reports embodying conclusions and final opinions,^[23]^ are discoverable.

  6. Documents and objects that a party possesses, controls, or has custody of are discoverable, even though they may be beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court.^[24]^

  7. Documents and things in possession of a party’s liability insurer are discoverable in an action against its insured, on the basis that the insurer is a real party with an interest.^[25]^

  8. Corporations have to produce documents held by subsidiaries they own or regulate,^[26]^ and intertwined companies may have to obtain materials from contracted businesses.^[27]^

  9. Parties have control over their available tax returns.^[28]^

  10. Electronic documents and email messages are routinely discoverable because the expansive definition of documents under Rule 34 includes these types of documents.^[29]^

§ 8.9 Timing of Disclosures and Requests

Federal Rule 26 governs the timing of affirmative disclosures. The rule requires document disclosures to be made shortly after the parties have conferred pursuant to Federal Rule 26(f), which typically occurs early in the case. See § 5.3. Additional disclosures about expert reports occur at later stages of a case after a party has identified expert trial witnesses. Pretrial and prehearing disclosures of documents occur at those stages.

Federal Rule 34(b) provides that document production requests may not be served before the time specified in Federal Rule 26(d) without leave of court or agreement of the parties. Rule 26(d) states that discovery requests may be served any time after 21 days have passed following service of the complaint on a party. Responses to “early” requests (those served before the parties have conferred on discovery) may not be due until after the parties have met in accord with Rule 26(f). Serving the requests may be useful to allow a more thorough response when due and also will establish an unambiguous date for the duty to preserve evidence.

The parties may vary this time and allow document production requests to be served and responded at any time that does not conflict with the deadline provisions of a court order. This agreement may be common in situations when parties seek documents from each other. Leave of court may be sought in accord with the motion brought under a Rule 26 or Rule 34 provision or a Rule 16 scheduling order.

§ 8.10 The Request Procedure

A party wanting to inspect documents and things or to enter property usually needs to serve a request setting forth the what, when, where, and how of the examination.^[30]^ Requests for production may be used in any sequence with other discovery devices to precede or supplement other information. A request may accompany a deposition notice requiring the party deponent to bring documents to a deposition.

Rule 34 requires that a request: (1) set forth with reasonable particularity a description of the items to be discovered and (2) specify a reasonable time, place, and manner for making the inspection and copying. Former Form 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contains an illustration of a proper request:

Plaintiff A.B. requests defendant C.D. to respond within _______ days to the following requests:

(1) That defendant produce and permit plaintiff to inspect and to copy each of the following documents: [Here list the documents either individually or by category and describe each of them.]

[Here state the time, place, and manner of making the inspection and performance of any related acts.]

(2) That defendant produce and permit plaintiff to inspect and to copy, test, or sample each of the following objects: [Here list the objects either individually or by category and describe each of them.]

[Here state the time, place, and manner of making the inspection and performance of any related acts.]

(3) That defendant permit plaintiff to enter [here describe property to be entered] and to inspect and to photograph, test, or sample [here describe the portion of the real property and the objects to be inspected].

[Here state the time, place, and manner of making the inspection and performance of any related acts.]

Rule 34(b) permits the requesting party to specify the format in which electronically stored information is to be produced. The rule does not require that all data be produced in the same form, but for each category of requested information, a requesting party normally can have it in one form only. Thus, a request can specify that email messages be produced in their native format, while written correspondence and notes be produced as paper copies, but the requester cannot require that emails be produced both on an electronic disk and as paper copies.

The Rule 34 request procedure suggests that a party will copy documents and materials after inspecting and examining them. The reality in practice is that the responding party often provides duplicates of original paper documents and accessible electronic copies of ESI directly to the requesting party. Copying expenses and other details of these exchanges are commonly and mutually arranged by the lawyers.

§ 8.11 Reasonable Particularity

How do you know for certain whether the request you have drafted designates the items sought “with reasonable particularity”? You could ask the law-school classmate who stands one rank ahead of you in class standing. Or you could apply common sense. The standard of reasonable particularity is not a standard susceptible to an exact definition; it is, rather, a flexible standard that varies with the circumstances of a case.^[31]^ Descriptions of materials by the subject matter they contain, by particular classification, or by definite time periods, are usually specific enough.^[32]^ Moreover, there is a simple, two-prong test that, if met, clarifies “reasonable particularity.” The request should be sufficient to:

(1) Allow a person of ordinary and reasonable intelligence to say “I know what they are asking for and want;"^[33]^ and

(2) Permit a judge, arbitrator, or ALJ to readily determine whether all the requested matters have been produced.^[34]^

Rule 34 allows descriptions of the items sought to be stated with exactitude and precision (“I want the June 27, 2:00 P.M. to 3:15 P.M. discovery class video recording.”), or with a generally descriptive categorization (“I want the files containing the real civil procedure exam answers.”). General descriptions that are vague, ambiguous, or too broad are disallowed. For examples, it is improper to seek: “all diagrams or documents containing drawings,"^[35]^ “written communications about financial transactions,"^[36]^ “all data relating to certain facts”,^[37]^ or “files pertaining to the defendants."^[38]^ Requests must meet the two-prong test described above and need to occasionally comply with more stringent requirements imposed by case law.

There are alternative effective drafting techniques, for example the “33–34 One-Two.” You submit a Rule 33 interrogatory asking the other party to describe certain documents, and then after receiving the answer, you submit a Rule 34 request containing the document whose description appears in the interrogatory answer. There is also the “33–34 One.” You combine in one document Rule 34 requests with Rule 33 interrogatories. Since Rule 34 merely requires a request to be “in writing,” a request, in a set of interrogatories, that a party produce “all documents identified in the preceding answers” is an appropriate Rule 34 request. You can also add a snicker to your Rule 34 request.

§ 8.12 Drafting Techniques

The drafting suggestions described in the preceding chapter (see § 7.4) on interrogatories apply equally to requests for production. You want to draft with some specificity, to avoid allowing the other side to withhold some documents, while at the same time drafting with enough breadth to make certain that no existing documents escape your attention. Two drafting techniques that may be employed to make requests escape-proof and all-encompassing are:

  1. Draft requests seeking both specifically designated items and generally described items, and

  2. Use definitions.

For example:

Furnish all documents concerning any contractual breach by defendant alleged in paragraph 2 of the complaint including but not limited to:

The original and all copies of each email or written communication between the plaintiff and defendant between May 1, 20XX and August 1, 20XX.

All emails and writings submitted by the plaintiff to the Banking Commissioner that contain any reference to the defendant.

All complaints plaintiff received relating to the conduct of defendant from May 1, 20XX, to and including August 1, 20XX. Complaints include any writings including emails submitted by any person, corporation, organization, agency or other entity that in any way refer to the alleged conduct of the defendant described in the complaint.

The most important definition is usually the meaning of the word document, which can be expanded beyond the definition provided in Rule 34 to include the following attached to a request:

The term documents means all writings and electronically stored information of any kind, including the originals and all non-identical copies, whether different from the originals by reason of any notation made on such copies or otherwise, including without limitation, correspondence, memoranda, notes, emails, instant messages, texts, diaries, calendars, statistics, letters, telegrams, minutes, contracts, reports, studies, checks, statements, receipts, returns, summaries, pamphlets, books, interoffice and intra-office communications, internet communications, social network communications, smart phone messages, web based media messages, face book entries, twitter messages, data, data compilations, notations of any sort of conversations, telephone and cell phone calls, voice mail, meetings or other communications, bulletins, printed matter, computer print-outs, teletypes, telefax, invoices, worksheets, all drafts, alterations, modifications, changes, and amendments of any of the foregoing, graphic or oral records or representations of any kind (including, without limitation, photographs, smart phone photos, instagrams, images, films, web based media images, charts, graphs, microfiche, microfilm, video recordings, audio recordings, motion pictures), and any electronic, mechanical, or electric records or representations of any kind (including, without limitation, tapes, cassettes, discs, flash drives, hard drives, recordings, CDs, cloud storage, mainframe, and computer systems).

Whew. You may impress yourself with the complete enumeration of all forms that information might take, but in truth the clever, multi-page definition of “document” may not be particularly productive. However detailed you make it, it may not cover everything possible. A shorter, broad definition may be as or more effective and preferred.^[39]^ And, a few specific examples may reveal what you really want. For example, if you know you are searching for email messages and their attachments, it’s wise to highlight that in the definition.

The request for production can include a preface and instructions similar to the introduction to interrogatories (see § 7.3) and for the same reasons. A Rule 34 introduction can include the following or similar statements:

1. If your response is that the documents are not in your possession or custody, describe in detail the unsuccessful efforts you made to locate the records.

2. If your response is that the documents are not in your control, identify who has control and the location of the records.

3. If a request for production seeks a specific document or an itemized category that is not in your possession, control, or custody, provide any documents you have that contain all or part of the information contained in the requested document or category.

4. Identify the source of each of the documents you produce, identifying the person or persons who produced them or the physical or electronic location of the document.

5. If the native format of the electronically stored information is not in a readily accessible format or is only available on a proprietary or unique format, contact us before you attempt to provide this information to discuss what format would be readily accessible.

6. If you assert any claim of privilege or similar protection that has caused you not to produce any requested document, produce a log for each such document that identifies the document, its author, recipient, any other persons who have had access to it, and the privilege or protection asserted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5).

LLMs can help draft requests for production by balancing specificity with breadth, seeking all relevant documents without inviting objections. By analyzing pleadings, client materials, caselaw, statutes, rules, and other binding materials, GenAI can help craft tailored requests that align with claims, elements, and defenses—all while identifying potential additional document categories. LLM-backed tools can also refine definitions for key terms, such as “documents and “communications,” helping ensure clarity without excessive complexity. Additionally, GenAI can generate well-structured instructions, specifying privilege log requirements, document sources, and electronic format accessibility—helping attorneys avoid discovery disputes and maximize the chances of compliance.

§ 8.13 Time, Place, Manner

Rule 34(b) requires that a stated time, place, and manner for inspection and copying be included in the production request. The date must be scheduled at least 30 days after service of the request as the other party has at least 30 days to respond. The place usually is the location of the documents^[40]^ and occasionally the situs of copying or duplicating equipment. The manner depends on the kind of items sought. It may be necessary for a party to arrange to see, examine, and copy paper documents. When such access is needed, the details should be included in the request. ESI documents may be more readily and easily transmitted.

The delineation in advance of a specific time, place, and manner can be difficult in some cases, and it is a common practice to use less definite statements in the request. It is sufficient if the requests include an alternative statement such as:

  • The time, place, and manner will be mutually agreed upon by the parties at a later date.
  • The responding party shall select a reasonable time and place and notify the requesting party.
  • The production and copying will occur at a specific time and specific place in a specific manner, but the responding party may contact the requesting party to arrange a more convenient time and place.
  • The responding party may make copies or duplicates of the documents and forward them to the requesting party with a proposed bill for the reasonable expenses.

If the requesting party wants responses to be produced in a particular format (e.g., as paper copies or in original electronic form), those specifications should be provided at the time of request. If no request is made, the responding party may produce them in any reasonable format. The most reasonable option regarding paper documents is to produce them in their written or printed form. The most reasonable option for electronically stored information may vary. The disclosing party may only have them available in a native format that is not easily convertible to another format readily accessible to the requesting party.^[41]^ Section 8.20 and subsequent sections explore ESI disclosure options and resolutions.

§ 8.14 Response

Rule 34 requires the party receiving the request to serve a response upon the requesting party (and all other parties) within 30 days after service of the request, but not earlier than 30 days after the parties have held their first discovery conference under [Rule 26(f)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). The responses must be delivered in a timely manner, and late responses are non-compliant.^[42]^ A party who is unduly prejudiced by delinquent responses may seek a Rule 37 sanction, including expenses or preclusion of evidence. The parties may agree on or an order may be issued upon a motion for a shorter or longer response time for reasonable cause.

The responding party may reply in one or more ways to the request:

  1. Abracadabra! Produce the requested items as suggested or according to the proposed time, place, and manner. A party must produce all materials sought that are discoverable in response to non-objectionable requests. Rule 34(b) specifically dictates how a party produces certain documents and provides that: “A party must produce documents as they are kept in the usual course of business or must organize and label them to correspond with the categories in the request.” For electronically stored information, the party must produce them in the format requested (or object to that format), or if no request is made, can produce them as normally maintained in their native format or in any other reasonable form.^[43]^ That’s why it is extremely wise to provide instructions regarding disclosure of the information and/or engage in discussions regarding formats. Rule 34(b)(2)(B) expressly permits the party to produce copies (or to agree to produce copies), and a party is not obligated to permit inspection of the documents. The mechanics of disclosure depends on the nature of the data. Duplicate paper documents can be provided. ESI can be revealed through transferred electronic files, or on a flash drive or other device.

  2. Provide the documents, but not in the way the other party has requested or expects. The requesting party, and not the responding party, may be required to organize documents from an accessible source if it would take a substantial amount of time to locate a large number of documents.^[44]^ A requesting party may also ask for too much. For example, a party may request compilations of data that the responding party has not collected. The responding party can then make available documents containing the readily accessible data, which the requesting party can then use to make the compilations. This response comports with the duty to respond under Rule 34.^[45]^ Further, providing ESI in a native format that is a readily accessible format but is not able to be accessed by the requesting party may place the burden on the requesting party to obtain a system that can translate the ESI. See § 8.20.

  3. Disclose the requested items but at another time, place, and manner agreeable to the requesting attorney. Discussions or email communications between counsel can avoid disagreements and reach reasonable accommodations.

  4. Serve a response upon the requesting party, stating that inspection and related activities will be permitted for the designated items or categories at the suggested or another time, place, and manner. Follow-up phone conversations and confirming email messages with counsel can, again, resolve differences regarding what is required by the rules and expected by counsel.

  5. Move for a protective order under [Rule 26(c)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) to safeguard the disclosure of certain items. See Section 5.10.

  6. Ignore the request—although this is not authorized by the rule nor advised by the authors and is usually a pathway to calamity.^[46]^

  7. Object to the production and state the reasons for the objection. If an objection is made to part of a request, the non-objectionable parts of the request must be satisfied by appropriate production. Typically, specific objections to noted requests need to be made explaining why the responding party is not under a duty to provide the sought-after documents. A broad objection to all requests is insufficient.^[47]^ When asserting an objection, the party must identify any documents that are being withheld. This notice informs the requesting party what potentially responsive documents have not been produced based on the objection, such as privileged or trial preparation materials. A log detailing the withheld documents along with the objecting grounds may be necessary, or not, depending on the case issues and types of documents.^[48]^

The first four responses comprise the typically cooperative response by an attorney. The fifth response has been discussed in Section 5.11 and may also be the subject of a stipulation between the attorneys.^[49]^ The sixth response is deplorable and is dealt with in Chapter 11 on enforcement of discovery requests. Aside from being not authorized, it usually results in unfortunate results for the deploying party. The seventh response has been discussed in the context of objections to interrogatories in Section 7.5, and many of the same considerations generally apply to objections to requests for production discussed in the next subsection. A party who fails to properly respond may be able to supplement and submit compliant responses, for good reasons.^[50]^

Rule 34 requires reasonable responses to reasonable requests.^[51]^ The rule does not countenance the deliberate or negligent mixture of critical documents with irrelevant documents to obscure the location and importance of the vital ones. The responding party is not to play games by disclosing edited information, or by providing truckloads of immaterial documents, or by submitting electronic data that is not identified or cannot be made searchable.^[52]^ Many cases involve substantial numbers of documents and a lot of information in electronic, computer, and cell phone formats. Options parties have regarding ESI information is discussed in Section 8.20 and subsequent sections.

§ 8.15 Objections

A responding party may object to part or all of an item or category requested for production and may withhold from discovery the objected-to documents. All objections must be bona fide and provide the responding party with substantial justification for the refusal to disclose.^[53]^ Even if there are valid technical or substantive objections, as a strategic matter you need first to determine whether the harm, if any, in disclosing an item justifies the effort required in opposing discovery, and second, to determine what impact your refusal to disclose may have upon the opposing lawyer’s willingness to cooperate with your requests for production.

Obviously, if documents are helpful to the case, you would very likely want to disclose them. In federal court, under Rule 26(a)(1)(A) you have a duty to disclose all documents that support your claim or defense, which helpful documents do. And, the attitude you display in responding to reasonable requests (cooperative or uncooperative) may be responded to in kind. But, there are reasons why objections can and ought to be made.

The more common objections to Rule 34 requests assert that the documents or items:

The party who interposes the objection must show its validity and grounds.^[68]^ This burden may be met by factual affidavits from a party or by legal memoranda from the attorney. In some cases, the requesting party may also have a burden. Courts may require a requesting party to show necessity for the [Rule 34](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) access if such a request creates a hazardous situation or produces minimally relevant information.

Objections to [Rule 34](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) requests, like objections to other discovery requests, must be made in good faith and with care.^[69]^ There exists a temptation, because of the difficulties inherent in complying with a Rule 34 request, to yell: “It’s impossible.” Overbroad objections based on purported undue burdens are usually insufficient to prevent discovery.^[70]^ It is often possible to provide relevant documents in reasonably affordable ways. It may take some work, but the rules likely require that effort. A responding party may have created part of the impossibility claimed, because of inadequate record management or poor filing systems or because the materials were maintained in a way that is undecipherable to the requesting party.^[71]^ Responding parties are required to produce documents in an orderly and understandable way.^[72]^

A response to a set of production requests may well include a variety of replies: some objections, some responsive documents, some denials, some requests for clarification, and other related responses. It may well be in the best interests of the responding party to disclose helpful documents that were not specifically requested. Or, it may well be that the requests are insufficient to justify the disclosure of certain documents.^[73]^ The failure to comply with the requests may result in a motion to compel the documents. And this motion will commonly require a conference between the disputing parties in an effort to reach a compromise.

The party who receives an objection to part or all of the request may redraft the request to eliminate the objections or may attempt to negotiate with the responding attorney to reach a compromise on disclosure. Judges, arbitrators, and ALJs look very kindly on these good faith efforts to resolve an objection and often mandate by rule that these efforts be made. A party seeking materials that may place too heavy a burden on the responding party can reduce the burden by offering assistance in collating or collecting materials or by paying the costs of their production.^[74]^ If these efforts fail, the requesting party may seek a Rule 37 order compelling production or may sulk in a corner of the law office.

As with interrogatory objections, LLMs can help attorneys identify and draft valid objections to document requests while ensuring rule compliance. By analyzing each request, GenAI can flag potential objections based on privilege, undue burden, proportionality, and other recognized legal grounds, generating precise and well-supported responses. LLM-backed tools can also help refine overly broad objections, making them more defensible, and suggest alternative phrasing to ensure objections are specific, justified, and less likely to be overruled.

§ 8.16 Conducting the Examination

The extent of your examination depends on the nature of the item. [Rule 34(a)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) provides you with the right to copy documents. The producing party may allow you to inspect, copy, test, and sample tangible things, or, more commonly, you will be provided copies or duplicates. This may be satisfactory unless you have reason to doubt the authenticity or reliability of the materials provided. And you may have the right to enter and inspect, measure, survey, photograph, test, or sample land and property and to observe machinery or manufacturing, production, distribution, and other business processes.

Your inspection and perusal of the requested documents and things should proceed with some primary considerations: (1) Has everything you requested been turned over to you? Or too little? Or too much? (2) Do records reveal there are other relevant documents and things out there?

You should maintain a reliable means of listing and identifying the exact documents and things examined. A good record or computer list can later quell any questions about what was produced when. You can create such a record with some distinctive mark, sign, or bar code. Your adversary usually has a similar interest and will cooperate in maintaining an accurate and complete record or spreadsheet.

Copying, duplicating, or recording is usually at your own expense. You can arrange to use the adversary’s copying or duplication equipment and reimburse your opponent or arrange for your own equipment. Some responding parties will absorb the costs on their own. Parties who seek relatively equal numbers of documents may provide materials at no cost to each other. Information may also be duplicated and exchanged as email attachments, on a flash drive, in a disk, on a website, or from cloud storage. You may wish to photo or tag some items as physical evidence. The manner of copying or recording is usually one of accommodation and cooperation between the attorneys and the availability and cost of the technical equipment needed.

§ 8.17 Interpreting Documents

The general evidentiary rule is that documents speak for themselves because their content may be readily interpreted from the expressed plain or legal language. This is why the original writings (a/k/a best evidence) rule requires that the original or a duplicate be admitted to prove the precise contents. [Fed. R. Evid. 1002](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N68204290B97011D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N68204290B97011D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). Modern documents may contain a variety of images, characters, and abbreviations that may require interpreting:

*Emoji: *This, as you know, is a small digital image or icon representing an idea or emotion, such as a smiley face. 😎 The Unicode Consortium regulates thousands of emojis and attempts to standardize their representations with established criteria.

*Emoticons: *These, as you also know, are representative facial expressions formed by keyboard character and symbol combinations, such as :-) (representing a smile). Possible emoticons reflect the numerous combinations of keyboard marks.

*Texting acronym/online abbreviations: *There are plentiful abbreviations and acronyms in the netspeak world. These categories include contracted colloquial language forms, including digital lingo and internet slang, such as LOL (laugh out loud). These messages are also known as chatspeak or cyber-slang.

Users employ these abbreviations, characters, and images for a variety of purposes in emails, texts, and documents: to confirm an agreement, explain a meaning, express a feeling, set a tone, make a point, establish a term, or enliven a message. A reference Internet dictionary, such as NetLingo, provides interpretations for these cryptic societal codes. This large assortment and range of possible meanings creates the challenge of discovering what the user meant, intended, or implied.

LLMs are quite good at decoding modern digital communication, such as emojis, emoticons, and online abbreviations. Because LLMs have effectively ingested the entire internet, GenAI can help provide accurate interpretations of otherwise-cryptic messages. LLM-backed tools can also analyze surrounding text to determine intent, assessing tone, sentiment, and possible multiple meanings that may impact discovery and litigation strategy. Additionally, GenAI can cross-reference that author’s similar language in other documents, helping attorneys identify inconsistencies or confirm intended meanings in disputed communications.

Discovery requests may produce helpful interpretive meanings. Interrogatories may seek answers to the representation of an image, character, or abbreviation. Deposition questions may probe and elucidate what a deponent composer intended to assert or convey. Admission requests may obtain declarative statements confirming a meaning. When in doubt, a discovery inquiry may produce a helpful or accurate description, meaning, or interpretation.

§ 8.18 Testing

You may have a right to test relevant items. The decision to test, according to one commentator, turns on a consideration of five questions:

  1. Is the test I am considering likely to do more harm than good, by destroying or materially altering evidence that, in its present condition, provides vivid proof of the point I am urging?

  2. Is it feasible to consider deferring testing until later, and conducting it as a video event or possible courtroom experiment?

  3. Will the disadvantages of my proposed testing outweigh whatever I may gain from it?

  4. Am I confident enough of the test results to stake my case on them?

  5. Even if my proposed tests are permissible under the rules of discovery, will the court receive them in evidence at the trial?^[75]^

Whatever testing of real evidence you do may need to be done with the full knowledge of the opponent. Your request for production should spell out in detail what and how you intend to test. It is wise to seek a stipulation or order detailing the testing procedure. This is mandatory if testing destroys or alters material evidence.^[76]^ Testing may then proceed along the lines dictated by the stipulation or order, with an exhaustive or video record made of everything that occurs during the testing.

It is also wise to obtain a test report so that you may later claim a privilege or work product protection for such information. It is not wise, however, to request two reports, one a slanted report to disclose to the opposing side, and the other a “confidential and candid report” for your purposes only. The contents of both reports may prove discoverable. The existence of both reports is certainly discoverable and a proper subject for further discovery. If a report appears to be incomplete or inadequate, a supplementary report can be requested. The discoverability of some test reports depends on the status of the testing expert.^[77]^ See § 5.9.

§ 8.19 Destructive Testing

Although most testing under Rule 34 consists of examinations and tests that can be repeatedly performed, it is sometimes advantageous or necessary to conduct destructive examinations. Parties typically require a specific order prior to the conducting of destructive tests.^[78]^ As a practical matter, a party desiring to conduct destructive testing of any evidence should want to obtain an order approving the testing. If an order is not procured, a compelling argument exists at the time of trial or hearing to exclude the evidence obtained from the testing on the basis of unfairness, since opposing parties have not had an opportunity to conduct such tests. The destruction itself of the evidence may give rise to an even stronger argument against the party destroying the evidence, and sanctions may be imposed.^[79]^

Two factors guide the discretionary decision whether a court order should be issued allowing destructive testing: the usefulness or need of the discovery to the party requesting it and the prejudice or problems that will occur to the party opposing destructive testing.^[80]^ The requesting party may bring a Rule 37 motion to compel testing, and a responding party may seek a Rule 26(c) protective order. Both motions are frequently brought and heard simultaneously.

An order seeks to balance the needs and interests of the disputing parties generally and may either deny the right of a party to conduct destructive testing, postpone such testing until shortly before trial, or most frequently, permit the testing under the provisions of a protective order.^[81]^ The terms of such a detailed protective order commonly include:

  • A testing plan.
  • An opportunity prior to testing for all other parties to examine and photo or video the article to be tested.
  • A notice to all parties of the testing.
  • The right of any party to be present at the testing, with consultants or experts if necessary.
  • Careful and thorough recording or video recording of test activities and test results.
  • The availability of test results to all parties.
  • The availability of reports by persons conducting the testing.
  • The right of other parties to take additional samples for similar testing, if material is available.
  • Whether the multistate bar exam is destructive testing.

Although the concern in destructive testing cases is generally toward preventing a party from being prejudiced by the destruction of crucial evidence, testing is sometimes also sought that threatens to cause monetary damage to the item being tested. If this situation occurs, the party conducting the testing should be held liable for damages.^[82]^ A practical solution to this problem may be the posting of an appropriate bond by the testing party to protect against any damage that might occur.^[83]^

§ 8.20 Electronically Stored Information

Electronically Stored Information (ESI) comprises the myriad types of documents and data created by computers, smart phones, laptops, tablets, recorders, and similar devices. ESI is the moniker that federal and state rules and case law designate for the information created, communicated, or stored in digital form that requires the use of computer hardware and software. Basically, ESI is defined as the content directly or indirectly generated as a series of binary bits on an electronic media or system. But you knew that already.

What is less well known, perhaps, is the enormous impact ESI has on discovery. Due to the abundance of electronically stored information and its adaptable nature, electronic discovery introduces diverse variables into the traditional discovery process. The geometric increase of ESI in the business world and in life and social experiences has spawned novel legal precedent and developing technological innovations. The discovery of ESI often requires specialized knowledge and tools to preserve it and to convert it to a reviewable format.

Electronically stored information is involved in virtually all types of cases, from the simple to the complex. All forums—judicial, arbitral, and administrative—deal with ESI. The rules, law, issues, concerns, and procedures are the same or similar in all tribunals.

Information created on computers and operating systems and stored in digital devices and storage clouds is readily discoverable as long as it is relevant. Emails, social network communications, instant messages, video and audio recordings, voice mail, blog postings, websites, and internet searches are an especially fertile ground for discovery.^[84]^ Individuals have their own personal devices that may also be used at work and for other purposes (known as BYOD—bring your own devices). Businesses commonly provide workplace located devices or provide employees with company owned personally enabled (known as COPE) devices. Lawyers need to be well prepared to seek electronic data from all sources and in all cases, from the simplest of actions to complex multi-district litigation.

Suitable requests for ESI resemble requests for paper documents and for oral communications. It is improper for a party to ask another party to disclose “every” document or “each” oral communication with another party. The proper request must narrow the scope to relevant and proportional discovery. Similarly, it is wrong to request “all” emails and texts between parties.^[85]^ Further, a party cannot ask to indiscriminately rummage through all the records of another party in the hopes of locating something relevant.^[86]^ And so a party cannot access the computer system of another party and search for anything relevant,^[87]^ unless establishing very good cause to do so and the available relevant files are restricted.^[88]^

§ 8.20.1 ESI Sources

There exist a variety of sources of electronically stored information. The data can be found on private and public computer intranet and extranet systems. The information can be located on web-based sites, files, messaging systems, and apps. ESI can be commonly stored in custodian created storage, virtual workgroup systems, business and enterprise platforms, and third party vendor sites. Software and litigation support services can identify, locate, compile, sort, and manage ESI.

Electronic information may be accessed from online and local hard drives and solid state drives (SSDs), near-line optical and magnetic disks and USB flash drives, offline magnetic tape systems (still operational), cloud storage, and other available sources. Courts usually draw a distinction between producing electronically stored information that is available and designing new computer programs to extract data: they will require the former and deny the latter unless there is no other way to obtain the information and the costs are affordable or borne by the requesting party. Parties can negotiate to share costs, and a party can seek judicial protection from excessive expenses.

The overall goals of e-discovery are the same as physical discovery. As with paper and printed documents, you will need to understand how to best preserve, disclose, request, and respond to ESI document production procedures. While a degree in computer science would help, you can learn to understand the existence and availability of ESI and how to direct and monitor ESI discovery. And you can also learn when it is necessary to consult with an expert in intellectual technology or computer forensics. To be a proficient and professional advocate, you or your law firm will need to have available a litigation support person or team or access to a consultant for assistance, unless you do have that ESI gene.

There are limits to the discoverability of ESI beyond its relevance and proportionality in a case. Federal Rule 26(b)(2)B) requires that ESI also has to be readily accessible and affordable. Its discovery cannot cause an undue burden or excessive costs on a responding party.^[89]^ The following subsections discuss these and other policies created by the rules, case law, and practice.

§ 8.20.2 ESI Policies

Before reviewing the law peculiar to ESI, understanding how ESI discovery is the same as paper, printed, and physical discovery (summarized for our purposes into “paper”) places this section in perspective. Often, the discovery rules that apply to both paper documents and ESI apply with equal force and effect to both types of mediums. Originally, the rule provisions were adopted only for paper documents as they were created at a time before the advent, or even conception, of ESI.

Overall, the policies underlying the discovery rules, case law, and relevant statutes are the same regardless of whether paper or ESI documents are involved. The discovery procedures to be used should be the ones that are: (1) most convenient, (2) the least burdensome, (3) the least expensive, and (4) proportional to the needs of the case.^[90]^ These general guidelines help in interpreting and applying the law to ESI discovery.

Pertinent civil procedure rules reflect differences between ESI and paper discovery. Federal and state rules contain specific references to electronically stored information. These specialized rules augment the traditional rules applicable to paper discovery. These rules will continue to be modified as ESI discovery evolves and technology changes.

Non-parties are protected from burdensome Rule 45 ESI subpoenas. A non-party should not have to expend unnecessary or inappropriate efforts responding to broad demands for ESI materials.^[91]^ Costs may be fairly apportioned between a party seeking information and the non-party custodian of the data, or be borne by the demanding party.^[92]^

Another overall policy relates to privacy and its scope and preservation. Modern technology and electronic devices make it relatively easy to convert traditional private and confidential information into public and easily accessible information. Further, the notion that “private” conversations, actions, and events will remain secret and unknown to other hearers and viewers is undone by the availability of ubiquitous video devices, social media networks, and access to computer systems. These sources significantly affect privacy expectations. What a person or business may have reasonably expected to remain private may very well be made public.

Privacy expectations evolve, as does the law regarding it.^[93]^ Parties may no longer be ensured of having their private information protected from discovery, because it may have entered the public domain. And parties may not rely on the law to enforce their expectations of privacy because the expectations are no longer reasonable.^[94]^

In discovery, a protective agreement and order can still be used to retain confidential information, and the law can protect and preserve this data. Parties with disagreements over the provisions of a stipulated protective order must meet and confer in an effort to reach an agreement.^[95]^ And parties must work together cooperatively regarding ESI disclosures and discovery.

Clients, lawyers, and witnesses should anticipate that seemingly private information and conduct could be made public or will be discoverable.^[96]^ Sources not controlled by the discovery rules and tribunals can and will disclose private information to the public. The more informed rubric to follow may be: if you compose, say, or do it, expect it to be revealed and then deal with the consequences.

§ 8.20.3 ESI Law

There are several legal sources controlling the discovery of ESI. Before reviewing the technological aspects and legal issues, an overview of these sources provide an introductory perspective.^[97]^

Rules of Civil Procedure: Federal Rules 26 (scope), 34 (document production), 37 (sanctions), and 16 (pretrial orders) as well as similar state court rules, have been amended to provide procedures that apply exclusively to ESI discovery. These rules add to or modify the existing procedures that govern all types of discoverable information. The ESI specific rules provisions are discussed in detail in Sections 8.22–8.27.

Other Rules: Additional procedural rules appear in court, arbitration, and administrative law rules and in orders issued by judges, arbitrators, and ALJs.^[98]^ These provisions obviously apply to cases venued in these jurisdictions and before these decision makers.

Case Law: Numerous federal and state court decisions govern the application of the discovery rules. Every federal circuit and all state appellate courts have issued some or many opinions determining what and how ESI is discoverable. These cases fall into at least six ESI categories: (1) preservation, (2) cooperation, (3) accessibility, (4) proportionality, (5) cost shifting, (6) and spoliation sanctions. Section 8.22 explores these categories and holdings. Seminal judicial decisions appear in footnotes.

Professional Responsibility Rules: The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and updated state rules list acceptable and unprofessional conduct regarding ESI discovery and evidence. Model Rule 3.4(b) covers the discipline of a lawyer who obstructs access to evidence when that action is unlawful. See § 1.10. This includes situations where the attorney acts in violation of a statute or where conduct would violate a prevailing order or rule-based obligation. Failing to produce evidence in discovery can be a form of unlawful obstruction. While this rule applies to all types of discoverable evidence, it has become especially applicable to ESI cases and the need for specific preservation hold policies, rules, and orders.

Statutes: Federal and state statutes also govern the obligations of lawyers and parties regarding ESI. An example of such legislative regulation is the federal Sarbanes-Oxley Act that makes it a duty to not destroy, alter, or fabricate any evidence that is involved in a federal investigation.^[99]^ Regulatory rules promulgated by the SEC further require that any documents sent, created, or received in connection with an audit or a review of financial information must be retained for a period of seven years.^[100]^ And, again, while these provisions apply to all categories of documents, they were created with ESI in mind.

Sedona Principles: The need for guidance on handling the added responsibilities of federal and state rule amendments regarding ESI and instructions on how to handle resultant litigation activities gave rise to a group known as The Sedona Conference.^[101]^ Sedona is a nonprofit legal policy research and education organization with a working group comprised of judges, attorneys, and electronic discovery experts dedicated to resolving ESI issues. The Conference has published documents concerning ESI, including the Sedona Principles,^[102]^ which are instructive with respect to electronic discovery issues.

Special Masters: To oversee and assist lawyers and their clients with ESI discovery issues, judges appoint neutrals with technological know-how or litigation experience.^[103]^ Attorneys may request the judge to do so, or the court on its own may designate a master.^[104]^ These experts can help the lawyers reach agreements on ESI protocols, monitor ESI discovery, and provide recommendations regarding ESI procedures.^[105]^ They can save the parties, lawyers, and decision makers substantial savings in costs and time. See www.courtappointedneutrals.org.

§ 8.21 ESI Systems

There are two prominent features related to ESI that need to be understood in order to seek and defend ESI requests. One concerns computer storage systems, and the other relates to software and data technology.

§ 8.21.1 ESI Computer Systems

Computers store their data on permanent media to preserve the information when the device is shut off. Electronic files are typically stored automatically on hard drives or disks. These files may also be preserved on a backup system, such as the cloud or a network or storage device. Numerous copies of an electronic record may be created. For example, when an email is sent that ESI appears on the computer’s hard drive, the hard drive of a server network, and a backup system. Further, if sent outside the network, it also appears on the internet provider’s email server as well as on the recipient’s computer, file server, and backup system. A similar process occurs with data recorded in a data file.

Another significant aspect of computer storage is that attempts to erase or delete ESI does not usually eradicate the record in its entirety. The contents may become invisible to the computer operating system but remain on the hard drive or server. Much of this data will be recoverable. Some information may be overwritten and lost. The type of hidden data determines its discoverability, depending on whether it is metadata, system data, backup data, or residual data.

§ 8.21.2 ESI Technical Terminology

The following terms are used frequently in e-discovery and ESI issues:

Source Media: This is the electronic device on which the ESI is stored. Source media includes computers, cell phones, portable hard drives, flash drives, web sites, social mediums, tablets, cloud storage, and Star Trek scanners. Individuals use these devices and sources to create billions of electronic documents daily. Some of what is being created is likely relevant to potential and actual litigation.

ESI Production Protocol: An ESI production protocol is an agreed upon format for the delivery of responsive files between parties. It is necessary to ensure compatibility of these deliverables with each party’s review methodology. A workable ESI protocol is crafted by lawyers and technological experts involved in the legal dispute. It is the way the parties agree to produce requested ESI and can be modified during the action to resolve ESI disclosure problems.

Native Format: Native refers to the source or original state of an electronically stored file. Throughout the discovery process, files may be converted to a variety of formats compatible with each party’s review platform, with PDF or TIFF being the most common. In general, retaining documents in their native format is highly recommended because this is the format ordinarily used to produce documents to opposing parties.^[106]^

Portable or Print Document Format (PDF): PDF is a file type allowing documents to be viewed through Adobe Acrobat Reader on any computer without the need for additional software or hardware. It is often used as a native file format and is difficult to alter. And, it is a commonly requested ESI production format. The PDF format is generally able to preserve more of an electronic document’s native characteristics than a TIFF image, and is usually larger in file size.

Tagged Image File Format (TIFF or TIF): The TIFF file is an image format that is widely supported by image viewing applications. It is a commonly used production format for ESI because it is compatible with most major review software. TIFF images are more difficult to alter than a native file. However, they cannot always capture the full content of a native file (e.g., they may omit the markup layers on electronic files).

*Other and Alternative Formats: *Some images, including photos and digital data, may be preserved with other available formats designed for various graphic needs. These include JPEG and PNG, as well as compression formats such as RAW and BMP. These options have their advantages and disadvantages and require expert assistance.

Metadata: For each action initiated on a computer, smart phone, tablet, or other device, a significant amount of information is captured and stored, including the user initiating the action, when it was performed, geographic location, and duration, among other data. This information is called metadata, because it is “data about data.” There are several types of metadata including: (1) system metadata (author, date, time information), (2) embedded metadata (hidden or internally linked data), (3) substantive (also known as application) metadata, (4) residual data (on media free space or in file slack space), and (5) ephemeral metadata (data overridden by new data, such as web searches). The amount and type of metadata stored varies with the type of device used, but it can be enormous. Computer forensic tools can often recover lost metadata.

*Forensic Imaging: *To prevent the destruction of electronic data during the collection of files from a source device, a forensic expert can create an exact duplicate of all files, including deleted files and metadata. This copy is called the forensic image, and is the source of documents for further analysis, review, and production.

Optical Character Recognition (OCR): There are several electronic file types that store potentially relevant information, but cannot be readily searched. OCR is a technology that effectively “reads” documents that do not contain easily searchable text and writes the text to a searchable format. For example, a non-searchable PDF attached to an email may contain communication critical to a case, but, without OCR, that information would not appear discoverable in an ordinary full-text search result.

Load File: This is the single file or directory of files containing all of the data necessary to ingest the collection into a desired review platform, including native files, TIFF images, metadata, OCR, and other extracted text. A load file format is specified by the agreed upon ESI Production Protocol to ensure compatibility with each party’s review platform. It contains the ESI that is produced. This is all a quite a load to remember.

§ 8.21.3 ESI Scenario

A scenario will help bring these concepts and definitions to life:

An employee creates a document containing a list of all her clients on a company computer in PDF format which document she names as Noworries.pdf. This electronic information appears on the hard drive of her computer and on the company storage server that serves as a backup source. She has just generated ESI and corresponding metadata, which captured the time the file was created, where it is stored, and when it was last accessed, among other data. She then transfers the PDF file to a flash drive, prints the PDF to paper, deletes the PDF, and quits her job. The flash drive is now the source media.

The next day, all of her clients stop sending work to her former employer, who becomes suspicious and hires a forensic team to investigate ESI documents she has authored. The team creates a forensic image of her hard drive and cloud storage, and analyzes recently created or deleted files. They locate Noworries.pdf, among other responsive files, and notify the employer, who contacts legal counsel to initiate suit against the former employee. Because the files have not been converted to another format, they are considered native files. The law firm then relies on its IT staff with expertise in computer forensics to prepare the discovery for review.

The IT experts convert the native PDF file to TIFF Image, then performs OCR on the image to ensure case participants are able to search and review the potential evidence in a format compatible with their review software, according to the agreed on ESI Production Protocol drafted by the lawyers and technical advisers. The TIFF and OCR are then exported to an electronic load file, which is provided from the employer party to her attorney. This process provides the litigating parties with ESI and allows them to search and produce relevant disclosable and discoverable information.

§ 8.22 ESI Life Cycle

ESI discovery has a life cycle. There are nine key phases to a typical time chart that aid in understanding the e-discovery process.

  1. Legal Hold

Parties have the same obligation to preserve possible relevant ESI as they do for other document formats.^[107]^ This preservation request or demand has been described in Sections 1.4 and 5.3.12 and is triggered by an actual dispute or the reasonable expectation of litigation or by government inquiries. Lawyers representing parties to potential or actual litigation commonly provide a “litigation hold” notice to their clients.

This hold correspondence entails a prompt notification to custodians of potentially relevant documents, including ESI, and advises them not to tamper with or delete such data. The custodians need to understand that nothing can be deleted and everything needs to be preserved. These files and the accompanying data can be placed by each custodian in a separate electronic file to be provided the lawyer issuing the legal hold and, if discoverable, opposing parties.

The preservation hold correspondence sent by a lawyer may be discoverable to determine its scope and propriety.^[108]^ The legal hold usually overrides an existing document retention/destruction policy. Routine document retention/destruction policies may have properly deleted previous ESI.^[109]^ Severe sanctions may be imposed for improper ESI spoliation.^[110]^ See Section 8.27.2.

  1. Identification

Lawyers on their own or pursuant to a Federal or State Rule 26(f) will discuss and identify the types, locations, and sources of potential discovery. Parties typically agree to terms limiting the scope of the ESI collection to a reasonable breadth proportional to the issues or damages sought in the case. As with paper documents, the scope of discoverable ESI needs to comply with the governing legal relevancy and proportionality standards.

3.* Preservation and Recovery*

Data preservation is obviously critical to its collection. At this point, responsive custodians and devices have been identified, but the data has not yet been sequestered from its native location. Like non-electronic information, preserving the original attributes of evidence is essential. Unlike paper information, ESI is volatile and requires specific technological processes to maintain its integrity. Spoliation may occur in the form of the deliberate or accidental deletion of potentially incriminating emails or files by a custodian or an automated computer system. Reasonable measures need to be taken to prevent these erasures and to maintain existing discoverable information.

A primary issue regarding data recovery is: can the deleted data be recovered? The initial answer is: it depends. It depends on the type of data, how it was deleted or overridden, the resources and money available to attempt to recover it, and the ability of the computer forensic recovery tools. So, some data can easily be recovered; much can be recovered through reasonable efforts; and some will not be recoverable.

4.* Collection*

After potential evidence has been identified, it must be collected from its source media or device for review. The goal of forensic collection is to extract potentially relevant ESI from the identified source media and, without effecting its content or metadata, create a duplicative forensic image. Proper forensic collection can involve cracking passwords, decrypting files, and recovering deleted or tampered files. Just like in the movies.

Due to the sensitivity of forensic data and the finality of a mistake, it is critical that collection is performed quite carefully and precisely. The product of the collection is usually placed on a hard drive or in secure cloud storage containing an exact duplication of the potentially relevant information on the source media. This mirror image of the data preserves the information in a protected medium and prevents the inadvertent destruction while the materials are being collected. The forensic image can subsequently be filtered to further identify information for analysis.

5.* Analysis*

After a collection has been performed, the producing party usually performs an analysis of the files before providing them to opposing counsel. Irrelevant or privileged information and other non-discoverable data will need to be identified and withheld. The attorneys can mutually agree on criteria to cull non-responsive documents from the responsive information. This process can involve keyword search hits (e.g. emails between a custodian and their counsel), relevant date ranges, and responsive system files. Effectively filtering a collection by such criteria requires collaboration by the lawyers in the case and experts in data analytics to operate the filtration technology.

6.* Processing*

While the potentially relevant ESI has now been collected from the source media, each file is still vulnerable to spoliation. Simply accessing a file in its current state would modify its metadata to reflect the current user and date, damaging or overwriting the original evidence. The first step in the processing phase is to extract each file’s metadata and searchable text and store it in a static database linked to the corresponding source file. The second step of processing is to convert each file into a reviewable format as set forth by the production protocol agreed upon by the attorneys. Common formatting protocols include:

*Numbering: *Assigning each document a unique identifying number by electronic stamp (known as bates stamp) or filename.

OCR: For documents that did not contain text, OCR is necessary to make them searchable.

Conversion: If requested in the production protocol, native files are converted to TIFF images or PDF files. Images may also be compressed via JPEG or PNG formats.

This work effectively “freezes” all electronic content, and converts it into a format useful for review. After data is processed, it is exported to a load file and is then delivered to all responsive parties. The majority of the processing phase will be performed by a litigation support person or team or a retained vendor.

7.* Review*

After a load file is created for internal review or is received from the other side, it needs to be imported into a document review platform. At minimum, a review platform is software that allows lawyers to view electronic documents and store pertinent information. Typically, the interface consists of a document viewer pane, a list of the original metadata, and a coding pane consisting of fields and designations used to record relevant information about each document. A “pane” is a region of the software’s interface with a dedicated purpose. Most major review platforms may be accessed through secure websites, allowing multiple attorneys to review documents from any location with Internet access.

Review workflows vary for each case, but usually involve an administrator assigning batches of documents to each reviewer, who analyzes each document and records relevant information. The reviewing person may also be looking for privileged documents to exclude from the review or to redact privileged content from documents. This review phase is typically a linear process and could take a few days or weeks—yes, you read that correctly**—**depending on the volume of discovery.

7A.* TAR Review*

Technologically assisted reviews (TAR) may be an efficient and effective way to identify relevant discoverable information in very large document sets, and perhaps the only feasible way to do so.^[111]^ Properly designed search terms and a responsive computerized system may be the best and only affordable way to review the reams of available ESI information.^[112]^ Using a predictive coding system, attorneys first review a sample of the document universe, assigning designations for relevance and other key attributes. Based on these decisions, the computer performs an algorithmic analysis of the entire document universe and assigns each document a designation: e.g., hot, background, junk. After the computer codes the documents, a sample is generated to verify its accuracy. The system can then be “trained” to produce a desirable accuracy level and error threshold. At that point, the lawyers can then prioritize the document review or accept the produced results as final. A variation of TAR is ZIP, which allows compression and archiving commands with search capabilities. These systems incorporate AI processes, which can be directed to assist in identifying and locating relevant data and in separating irrelevant information.

7B.* Manual Review*

Individuals looking on their own for relevant information is another option, but the enormity of the task often requires a technological assist. A combination of both methods is required at some point with interested individuals reviewing the information identified by TAR or an alternative predictive coding method. Another option is sampling, with the TAR or coding system reviewing selective ESI.^[113]^ If that review produces relevant information, than expanded sampling or more extensive reviews would be warranted. Parties need to fully comply with the selected search terms, or face the consequences of having to redo the review.^[114]^

8.* Production*

After the review phase is complete, documents deemed responsive to the dispute are assigned unique identifying production numbers, transferred or exported from the review platform to a separate new file, and delivered to counsel according to their pre-defined ESI production protocol. Based on the type of data being produced and each party’s review methodology, the protocol may include production of native files, TIFF Images, PDFs, and load files.

A well-designed ESI production protocol can make this process relatively easy and affordable. Often, a protocol may require unnecessary steps that can be burdensome and costly to both sides. For example, a protocol requiring only bates-stamped TIFF images may seem to simplify the process at the time of the agreement, but it could add a significant amount of unnecessary time and cost to the production. On the other hand, if redactions were made in the review platform, TIFF images or PDFs must be produced to prevent privilege exposure. The best way to minimize costs and risk to both sides is to identify variables preemptively and tailor the protocol to the case.

9.* Presentation*

There are several commercial and proprietary software platforms designed for the presentation of electronic evidence. After the evidentiary set has been identified, a litigation support specialist can provide the technical means necessary to prepare the evidence for the deposition, hearing, or trial. Lawyers need to work closely with their technical support to ensure that the presentation satisfies their needs and meets their standards for presentability. Bar codes and other scanning methods can be used to identify and locate documents.

And now you know, almost for sure, that you’ll need an AI technology adviser to help you to get all this right, unless you are one yourself.

§ 8.23 ESI Discoverability

The scope of ESI discovery is the same as other information under the federal or state rules. Federal Rule 26(b) and similar state rule standards of relevancy and proportionality apply to ESI information. Federal and state courts have interpreted and applied these rules and developed various approaches to ESI discovery.^[115]^

§ 8.23.1 Procedural ESI Rules

Federal Rule 26(a)(1) specifically makes electronically stored information subject to the same initial disclosure requirements for paper documents. Federal Rule 26(b)(2)(B) explicitly extends discovery to electronically stored information. This rule specifies: “A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost,” unless there exists good cause for such production.^[116]^

This latter rule introduces two specific factors when considering ESI discovery: its reasonable “accessibility” and any “undue burden or cost” incurred in its production.^[117]^ Types of ESI that may not be discoverable include data from obsolete computer devices (have you heard of Wang?), deleted information (not spoliation), and other data that is not electronically searchable (where’s Hal?). Good cause may be established in an effort to recover this data because the benefit of the disclosed information outweighs the burden and expense of producing it or because the relevant data is not available from any other source.^[118]^

Federal Rule 34(a)(1)(A) provides that ESI must be produced as “stored in any medium from which information can be obtained either directly or, if necessary, after translation by the responding party into a reasonably usable form."^[119]^ And [Rule 34(b)(2)(A)(ii)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) states that “a party must produce [ESI] in a [format] in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a reasonably usable [format]” and only in one format."^[120]^ Often, it is disclosed in the existing native format.

Further, [Rule 34(b)(1)(C)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) allows the requesting party to specify the form in which ESI is to be produced.^[121]^ [Rule 34(b)(2)(D)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) permits the responding party to object to the proposed format. If no form is specified or if there is an objection, the responding party must identify the intended format to be used for disclosure. Metadata may be sought, instead of a downgraded format, when relevant and available.^[122]^

Additional rules govern privilege and work product data that may have been inadvertently or mistakenly produced. ESI may well contain privileged or confidential information that is obvious or is encrypted and that is mingled with or attached to discoverable information and documents. Federal Rule 26(b)(5)(B) details the procedure for asserting claims of privilege and other work product protections and the requirements on the receiving party to return, sequester, or destroy the non-discoverable or protected information. Issues relating to the waiver of claims may be resolved by the parties or by a judge, arbitrator, or ALJ.

These rules require the responding party to furnish ESI in a manner understandable to the requesting party and to bear the cost and expense of compiling the data and translating it into a readable printout or some other machine-readable format.^[123]^ The rules also allow the responding party to refuse to provide ESI if it is not readily accessible either because it is too burdensome to produce or because it costs too much to produce.^[124]^ The parties may confer and mutually agree on a limited scope of ESI discovery or split the costs of production. If unable to agree, the parties may bring a Rule 37 motion for production enforcement and a Rule 26(c) request for a protective order.^[125]^

Federal Rule 26(f) encourages parties to discuss and resolve these ESI matters at the early stages of the case during discovery planning discussions as well during the ongoing litigation.^[126]^ Rule 16(b)(3)(B)(iii) references electronically stored information as part of the overall disclosure and discovery process. Similar state court, arbitral, and administrative rules provide parties with the same or similar duties, rights, and procedures.

§ 8.23.2 Judicial ESI Factors

Courts have crafted factors especially applicable to electronically stored information which augment the above civil procedure rules. Courts recognize that practical factors, such as expense and accessibility, affect whether parties can realistically afford to search ESI for data.^[127]^ Judges take into consideration these reasons in determining whether ESI needs to be disclosed or discovered.^[128]^ The following list synthesizes and summarizes the numerous factors. Courts vary in relying on or ranking these inclusive grounds.^[129]^ The applicable precedent and the facts and circumstances of cases determine which of these factors apply and control the outcome.

Scope and Costs^[130]^

  • The breadth of the request and the extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover helpful information.
  • The availability of the information from other available sources.
  • The cost of production in total expenses and as compared to the amount in controversy.
  • The resources of each party compared to the cost of discovery.
  • The relative abilities and incentives of parties to control costs.
  • Whether a translation, if necessary, is too burdensome or costly.
  • Whether the requesting party offers to pay production costs.^[131]^

Relevance and Materiality^[132]^

  • The relevance of the data and benefits to the party seeking the data.^[133]^
  • The importance and materiality of the issues.
  • The complexity of the case.
  • The need to protect privileged information, work product, trade secrets, or other confidential information.
  • Whether the information or software needed to produce the data is proprietary or invades confidential business data.

Accessibility and Compliance^[134]^

  • The ease of accessing the data.
  • The extent to which the production would disrupt normal operations of the responding party.
  • Whether the ESI is in a readily accessible format or needs to be translated into another format.
  • Whether the data is stored in a way that is not reasonably warranted by legitimate personal or business reasons.
  • Whether the data was stored in a manner to defeat discovery.
  • Whether the responding party was properly aware of potential or actual litigation in storing or discarding data.
  • Whether back-up data is readily available and accessible.^[135]^
  • Whether the responding party has violated any protocols or rules regarding preservation or spoliation.^[136]^

Arbitrators and ALJs may consider these factors in their determination of ESI discoverability.

§ 8.24 Preserving ESI

Parties to potential or pending lawsuits, official government proceedings, and reasonably foreseeable litigation have an obligation to preserve documents, paper, and electronically stored information.^[137]^ This obligation commonly extends to arbitration and administrative cases as well. The use of preservation holds to retain and not destroy or delete information has been previously described in Sections 1.4 and 5.3.12.

These duties extend to all parties and their employees and agents and to their lawyers, in house or retained. Generally, the preservation hold applies to backup mediums that are accessible, but not to inaccessible systems that include backups maintained solely for the purpose of disaster recovery. These preservation obligations override document retention/‌destruction policies that, in effect, become suspended.^[138]^

The rules now require that preservation of ESI be addressed in the discovery conference and discovery plan in accord with Rule 26(f). Preservation hold correspondence sent by lawyers may be discoverable to determine its scope and propriety.^[139]^ Even without this rule requirement, prudent lawyers would strive to reach agreement on document preservation protocols to avoid disputes that could be exceeding distracting if they arose after evidence was not preserved. An effective preservation program prevents spoliation problems.

Because of the nature of ESI, these obligations are especially vital to preserving relevant and potentially discoverable information. Courts are imposing severe sanctions for failures to comply with these responsibilities and for spoliation.^[140]^ Because of these developments, the wisest practice is to err on the side of preserving and not deleting or destroying documents, even if there is a reasonable document destruction policy in place.^[141]^ Even if ESI is not required by the law to be preserved, fact finders and decision makers are likely to conclude that the deleted or destroyed data may have contained information harmful to the discarding party. These adverse inferences and spoliation penalties may be imposed by the law.

A party may be able to have a third person or business not a party to a case retain and not discard ESI.^[142]^ Federal Rule 45 and similar state rules allow a party to subpoena documents, including electronically stored information, from a non-party. A lawyer for a party can send a preservation request to a non-party asking that certain documents be preserved before the subpoena is issued and served. The non-party may or may not have a duty to do so, and adverse consequences for not complying may be insignificant. But, non-parties will often comply to be fair and to avoid becoming embroiled in litigation to retrieve that data from them.

§ 8.25 ESI Cooperation, Accessibility, Affordability, Proportionality

Four dominant policies that regulate the scope and cost of ESI discovery are: cooperation, accessibility, affordability, and proportionality.^[143]^

*Cooperation. *Discovery rules, judicial opinions, and best practices have developed protocols for lawyers and their clients to seek mutual cooperation and reach reasonable agreements regarding the production of ESI. Meet and confer rules, pretrial orders, discovery plans developed by lawyers, and special master appointments are effective ways to reach cooperative solutions to the myriad of problems inherent in ESI discovery. Participants include experts in technology and computer forensics to develop ways and means producing accessible and affordable ESI.^[144]^

*Accessibility. *As explained previously, the key to usable ESI discovery is its accessibility. A responding party has an obligation to provide ESI in a readily accessible format. This may be the native format of the ESI or another format that is cost effective.^[145]^ Because of the various formats that comprise ESI the specific disclosure format is based on what the requesting party has reasonably suggested, any objections by the responding party, what form the data is in, what format may be able to translate the data, and the costs associated with these processes.

*Affordability. *Also as discussed previously, the expense involved with ESI discovery is often a factor in its discoverability. Ordinary document production can be quite a costly endeavor, and ESI discovery can easily add extensive costs to this process. The federal and state rules that provide parties with protections against unduly expensive procedures can be used to control these costs. If the parties and their lawyers cannot mutually agree on ways to reduce expenses, a judge, arbitrator, or ALJ can intervene to determine what is fair, affordable, and proportional given the issues at stake.^[146]^

*Proportionality. *The scope of discoverable information is based on relevance and proportionality factors: the materiality and significance of the information sought and the costs involved in producing it relative to merits of the claims and defenses. Small cases may justify limited discovery; and large cases will support extensive discovery.^[147]^ If the process and expenses outweigh the benefits of the sought after information, the doctrine of proportionality provides that such information, which may be relevant, is not discoverable. Factors courts rely on in determining proportionality include:

  • The total cost of production compared to the amount in controversy or the significance of the legal issues.
  • The total cost of production compared to the resources available to each party.
  • The financial ability of a party to afford the expenses compared to the value of the information to the other party.^[148]^
  • The outcome of these balancing tests rests on the specific needs and interests of each case.^[149]^

§ 8.26 ESI Cost Shifting

One way to alleviate affordability and proportionality issues is to share expenses depending upon the financial wherewithal of the parties or shift production costs to the requesting party.^[150]^ Federal and state rules explicitly empower the parties, their lawyers, and the court to determine what is the fairest way of distributing costs.^[151]^ Factors that have been developed to provide a fair and balanced approach include:

  • How much can a party afford to pay for discovery?
  • Is it fair to impose extensive ESI discovery costs on the responding party or the requesting party?
  • Which party, if any, is more responsible for the problems involved with ESI production?
  • What is the fairest way to share, split, or impose discovery expenses?

Judges, arbitrators, and ALJs may consider these factors in assessing and allocating costs for ESI discovery.^[152]^

§ 8.27 ESI Sanctions

A variety of sanctions may be imposed on parties for the failure to comply with ESI rules and obligations.^[153]^ Penalties may be enforced for failing to abide by discovery procedures and orders. And adverse measures may be taken against parties for the destruction and spoliation of ESI materials.

§ 8.27.1 Available Sanctions

The goal of a sanction is to make it commensurate with the nature of the violation. A common sanction is the imposition of costs.^[154]^ A party may also be required to comply with the original discovery plan and agreement and, this time, do it right.^[155]^ Rule 37 sanctions are available for ESI discovery violations. See § 11.5. Cost sanctions also are available for ESI spoliation.

§ 8.27.2 Spoliation Sanctions

Parties and their lawyers have always been under a duty to preserve and not destroy relevant documents. It is possible, but more difficult, to get rid of paper evidence; usually it requires shredding, burning, or other forms of physical destruction. These processes are more difficult to do privately or without the assistance of others. Electronically stored information can much more easily be deleted in private and through seemingly non-discoverable ways. The temptation to do so may too tempting resulting in the spoliation of otherwise discoverable information. Although the ability of ESI to have been transferred to other databases or retained on flash drives mitigates this danger, it does not eliminate the risk.

Courts have been made aware of these realities and have responded with sanctions imposed against such improper conduct.^[156]^ The sanctions are authorized by the inherent power of the court and pursuant to Federal Rule 37 and similar state rules. Usually, spoliation sanctions will be considered if there was a clear duty to preserve, if there exists a culpable failure to do so, and if there is a reasonable probability that the loss of evidence will materially prejudice the adverse party. Courts typically design a sanction to deter parties from engaging in spoliation, place the risk of losing on the party who wrongfully created the risk, and restore the prejudiced party to the position the party would have been in but for the wrongful destruction.

Sanctions, in some jurisdictions, have been severe.^[157]^ Adverse inferences may be drawn from the spoliation of evidence.^[158]^ Sanctions have been imposed not only on parties but also on their lawyers. There are a variety of sanctions that may be available, as explained further in Section 11.5. The various federal circuit courts and state appellate courts have developed their own precedent.^[159]^

A key factor in determining the nature of the sanction is intent. If the actions of a party result in willful deceptive destruction of ESI, severe penalties are proper. If the actions are grossly negligent, the degree of severity will depend upon the extent of the negligence. If the conduct is inadvertent or innocent, then less severe or no sanctions are appropriate.

The applicable rules and case law may exonerate a party if ESI has been deleted or discarded. Federal Rule 37(e) states that a court may not impose sanctions if the electronically stored information was destroyed or lost unless the party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it and it cannot be restored or replaced. It is proper to periodically modify, overwrite, or delete ESI in the normal course of events. Businesses and individuals may do so in the ordinary course of their work or life. Companies commonly have retention/destruction policies to properly eliminate old and unnecessary documents. The rules do not intend to punish them for routine, good faith practices.^[160]^ A preservation hold can override these practices and place a potential party on notice that litigation is foreseeable. It may come down to: what do they know and when did they know it?

§ 8.28 Independent Actions

Federal Rule 34 and Rule 45 are not the exclusive ways to obtain documents and property from a party or a person not a party. Rule 34(c) makes clear that the rules do not preclude an independent action against a non-party person for the production of documents and things and for permission to enter lands. Federal courts have also recognized the availability of such an action.^[161]^ Some state advisory committee notes indicate that an action in the nature of a bill in equity is available.^[162]^ These approaches are seldom available, and even less seldom used. You can learn about them when you study for your LL.M. in Discovery.

§ 8.29 Production from Non-Parties

While Rule 34 discovery is available only against parties, Federal Rule 45 allows for the use of a subpoena to compel the production of documents, ESI, materials, and things from non-party witnesses.^[163]^ The subpoena may be issued separately or may be joined with a demand that the non-party appear at a deposition, hearing, or trial with the documents. This procedure is not an ex parte effort and all parties must be notified of the subpoena. In some jurisdictions, this subpoena is known as a subpoena duces tecum.

Former Federal Rule 45 only permitted the production of documents at a deposition, hearing, and trial. This requirement continues to exist under many state civil procedure rules. But, in a federal case and in some state court cases, a non-party may be ordered to produce documents at the offices of a lawyer without having any deposition scheduled. Oftentimes, non-parties will cooperate and produce documents without having to appear in person.

§ 8.29.1 Subpoena

Rule 45 protects non-parties from indiscriminate use of discovery procedures, from improper searches and seizures, and from intrusive fishing expeditions. A party should resort to a Rule 45 subpoena only if the documents are unavailable from an adversary or not otherwise available through the requester’s own efforts.^[164]^ A party cannot use a subpoena to obtain documents from a nonparty if a party has those documents available.^[165]^ The scope of discovery under a subpoena is the same as that applicable to Rule 34.^[166]^ The scope and timing of the subpoena must be sufficient to permit adequate opportunity for the non-party to comply with the requests.^[167]^

In federal cases, an attorney may issue and sign a subpoena, or a clerk may issue and sign a subpoena in blank to a party who completes it before service. In many state jurisdictions, subpoenas may only be issued by the court administrator, and not a lawyer. In federal cases, subpoenas may be served by any person who is not a party and is not less than 18 years old. The rules of state jurisdictions vary regarding who can serve a subpoena, ranging from the federal standard to allowing lawyers to only permitting public officials (sheriff, deputies) to serve. Arbitration and administrative law rules may authorize the arbitrator or ALJ or an administrator to issue a subpoena.

Service of a subpoena on a person, under the federal rules, must be accompanied by the fees for one day’s attendance and the mileage allowed by law.^[168]^ State rules have similar requirements. The fees range from $25 to over $50 and the mileage is commonly 50 cents or more per mile from the house or business of the person to the subpoena place.

In addition to these costs, the rules and judicial decisions commonly require that a non-party be tendered the reasonable expenses reimbursing the non-party for the time and costs to locate, gather, and produce the documents.^[169]^ These expenses include efforts it takes to search for documents, the time measured in hours of the personnel needed to produce the documents, and travel and related expenses.^[170]^ A non-party may receive from the requesting party reasonable costs and hourly fees that reimburse the production expenses.^[171]^ See § 8.29.4.

The document production subpoena has to describe the documents, ESI, or other records to be produced. The request may seek information that is relevant, proportional, and in compliance with the Rule 26 scope of discovery.^[172]^ The drafting practices followed for or involved with Rule 34 requests apply to subpoenas too. A requesting lawyer should mix general and specific descriptions of documents with “reasonable particularity,” even though this term does not appear in Rule 45. Thus, as with a Rule 34 request, an attorney can specify documents and things and command the production of all documentary information relating to a specific issue.

LLMs can help subpoena drafting by ensuring compliance with jurisdiction-specific rules, orders, and other requirements. By analyzing discovery rules, GenAI can refine document descriptions to balance specificity and breadth, reducing objections and compliance disputes. LLM-backed tools also help assess whether a subpoena request is proportional under Rule 26, flagging overly broad demands that may be challenged as improper fishing expeditions. Additionally, GenAI can assist in evaluating the burden imposed on non-parties, drafting potential cost-sharing proposals.

§ 8.29.2 Obtaining Materials

There are three methods for obtaining desired documentary materials and ESI from non-parties: (1) A Rule 45 subpoena of the documents held or controlled by a nonparty witness can either seek documents alone or can be used in conjunction with a deposition of the nonparty witness. (2) A motion hearing can be scheduled and a subpoena served upon a person, ordering the non-party to bring designated items. (3) A court may issue an order requiring a party to produce documents and things at other times and places including at trial.^[173]^

Counsel may prefer to depose the nonparty witness regarding document searches, record keeping, missing materials, altered data, or other matters. Often, such depositions will work best when they occur after counsel has thoroughly reviewed the documents provided pursuant to a Rule 45 subpoena and a Rule 34 request submitted to a party. A complete review of what documents exist or may exist before a deposition of a custodian deponent make the deposition more complete.

§ 8.29.3 Reach of Subpoena

Although the federal rule does not limit where a deposition may be taken, the rule provisions governing the geographic effectiveness of a subpoena have limitations. Rule 45(a)(2) specifies that a subpoena for discovery, either for a deposition or only for document production, must issue from the court where the deposition is to be held or the production to occur. The place of non-party discovery is generally the location of the non-party’s residence or place of business, not where the action is pending. See § 6.1.8.

Rule 45(b)(2) provides that a subpoena may be served anywhere within a district issuing the subpoena or at a point within 100 miles of the place of the deposition or document production. As explained below, Rule 45(d)(3)(A) directs a court issuing a subpoena to quash it if it requires a non-party to travel more than 100 miles from where that person resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business. These practical limits restrict the distance a non-party need travel to produce information, and generally require a party to go to where the non-party lives, works or does business. A state court subpoena is only effective in that state.

§ 8.29.4 Responses to Subpoena

A person receiving a subpoena has a number of duties and options that need to be accomplished in a timely manner:^[174]^

  • The non-party may comply with the document production request. Federal Rule 45(a)(1)(A)(iii) states that the subject of the subpoena is required to produce materials within that person’s control. Rule 45(d)(1)(A) also requires a non-party to produce materials as they are kept in the ordinary course of business, or to organize and label them to correspond with the categories in the demand. Many state rules have similar requirements. The person responding does not need to reorganize the documents but cannot provide them in a way that is disorganized.
  • The individual subpoenaed may appear at the deposition, hearing, or trial and testify. A lawyer may represent the non-party and help prepare for the proceeding.
  • The non-party may contact the requesting party and negotiate the disclosure of some of the requested materials or obtain a change in the location and time for providing the information.
  • Documents, ESI, and other records may be withheld on a claim of privilege or other protected category. Federal Rule 45(d)(2) and similar state rules require that such a claim be made expressly and be supported by a description of the nature of the documents not produced sufficient to allow the requesting party to contest the claim.
  • Electronically stored information may be produced on flash drives, DVDs, or from other sources as long as the format is readily accessible to the subpoenaing party. The requirements and process are the same or similar to the procedures used in responding to Rule 34 ESI requests. See § 8.14.
  • Objections may be made to all or some of the subpoena requests.
  • The non-party may seek to recover reasonable costs to comply with the subpoena.^[175]^
  • A motion to quash or limit the scope of the subpoena may be interposed.

§ 8.29.5 Motion to Quash

The rules provide specific protections to a non-party who wishes to object to disclosures of data.^[176]^ Rule 45(d) expressly states that the duty of a lawyer serving a subpoena is to “take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena.” Rule 45(d)(3)(A) goes on to enumerate specific types of information that a non-party should not normally be expected to produce, and Rule 45(d)(3) directs the court to quash a subpoena seeking this information.

Rule 45(d)(3)(A) & (B) provides both procedural and substantive protections allowing a non-party to quash or limit a subpoena:^[177]^

(A) When Required. On timely motion, the court for the district where compliance is required must quash or modify a subpoena that:

(i) fails to allow a reasonable time to comply;

(ii) requires a person to comply beyond the geographical limits specified in Rule 45(c);

(iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies; or

(iv) subjects a person to undue burden.

(B) When Permitted. To protect a person subject to or affected by a subpoena, the court for the district where compliance is required may, on motion, quash or modify the subpoena if it requires:

(i) disclosing a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information; or

(ii) disclosing an unretained expert’s opinion or information that does not describe specific occurrences in dispute and results from the expert’s study that was not requested by a party.

(C) Specifying Conditions as an Alternative. In the circumstances described in Rule 45(d)(3)(B), the court may, instead of quashing or modifying a subpoena, order appearance or production under specified conditions if the serving party:

(i) shows a substantial need for the testimony or material that cannot be otherwise met without undue hardship; and

(ii) ensures that the subpoenaed person will be reasonably compensated.

The grounds for obtaining an order quashing the subpoena or limiting its scope mimic the objections available to a Rule 34 request for production,^[178]^ including objections on irrelevancy and disproportionality grounds.^[179]^ Additional objections may also include two grounds: (1) the discovering party should seek documents from a party through a Rule 34 request before employing a Rule 45 request against a non-party,^[180]^ and (2) a non-party’s privacy outweighs a party’s need for the data.^[181]^

The burden to establish that the subpoena should be quashed or modified is on the person seeking the order.^[182]^ The non-party witness served with a subpoena clearly has standing to quash or limit it. A party to the action may also have standing if that party has some personal right or privilege in the subject matter of the subpoena.^[183]^ Rule 45(g) provides that the failure of a party “without adequate excuse” to obey a subpoena may be deemed contempt of court.

A non-party may seek a remedy against a party who fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 45.^[184]^ Sanctions may also be imposed on a lawyer representing the requesting party for non-compliance.^[185]^ Judges, arbitrators, and ALJs seek to protect non-parties from unnecessary or burdensome subpoenas.

The requesting party usually needs to reasonably compensate the non-party for the costs of complying with the subpoena, as explained earlier. Compensation defrays expenses incurred by the non-party in having to make the time and efforts to provide documents.^[186]^ This rule recognizes that a person or business not involved in the litigation need not bear the entire costs of document production.^[187]^ Cost shifting may be imposed on parties that are able to bear such expenses.^[188]^

LLMs can assist counsel in challenging subpoenas by identifying valid objections and drafting well-supported motions to quash. By analyzing Rule 45 protections, GenAI can flag issues such as privilege, undue burden, and geographical limitations, helping ensure that objections are properly framed. LLM-backed tools can also help assess whether a subpoena is proportional under Rule 26, generating arguments that the subpoena is overly broad, irrelevant, or should have been directed at a party instead of a non-party. Additionally, GenAI can evaluate the financial and operational burden of compliance, drafting motions for cost-shifting or production limitations. When subpoenas are issued in bad faith, LLMs can analyze case law trends and assist in requesting sanctions against improper discovery tactics.

§ 8.29.6 Complying with Subpoena

Rule 45(e) establishes the requirements imposed on a person served with a subpoena and the duties that must be discharged. These responsibilities require that documents be produced “as they are kept in the ordinary course of business” or must be organized and labeled to correspond with the categories in the demand. Further, a privilege log may need to be produced if documents are withheld on the basis of privilege.

§ 8.30 Production from the Government

Parties involved in litigation with the federal, state, or local governments have the same discovery opportunities they would have with non-governmental parties. If a government agency is a party, it is subject to all discovery methods and must produce the requested information or documents, including deposition testimony by government representatives. If a government office is a non-party, it is subject to a proper Rule 45 subpoena and must comply.

The Federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)^[189]^ provides an additional means of obtaining access to governmental records not available in most lawsuits. The Freedom of Information Act was enacted as a means of bringing government activity into the public eye and creating an informed community and an open government. Statutes similar to the FOIA exist in many states, giving parties access to documents in the hands of state agencies.^[190]^

The FOIA allows broad disclosure of documents held by the government and mandates that the governmental agencies must release any identifiable agency records in the agency’s possession to “any person.” No reason need be given for a request under the FOIA. Access to records is provided either by publication in the Federal Register, or from the agency’s headquarters, or by making copies available upon request. Data is often disclosed by an agency’s designated information officer.

The act contains specific exemptions to disclosure, and these exemptions are given narrow interpretations by the court in order to effectuate the broad purposes of the FOIA. The exemptions include: classified defense and national security documents, confidential inter-agency and intra-agency files, privileged financial institution information, trade secret commercial data, personnel and medical files, and law enforcement investigatory records.

The FOIA establishes a simple procedure to request agency documents and requires the agency to respond within 10 days. An appeal is permitted from an adverse disclosure decision, and the agency must decide an administrative appeal within 20 working days. A party may commence a lawsuit to reverse an adverse decision and obtain records.^[191]^

Perhaps the biggest advantage of using FOIA for discovery is that the government may put together a vast collection of helpful information and make it available relatively inexpensively, although not usually in a timely fashion. The FOIA is also useful in that it permits “discovery” to take place even prior to the commencement of an action. For a party contemplating litigation with the government, the use of a request for documents under FOIA may be a very useful tool for investigation.

Practice Problems and Assignments

Follow the directions from your professor in completing an assignment.

Planning Requests for Production

Plan Rule 34 requests for production of whatever documents, electronically stored information, materials or things you deem appropriate in the following situations. Plan to discuss these requests in class or online. Consider what objections opposing counsel may have to these requests.

  1. You represent Hot Dog Enterprises in Hot Dog Enterprises v. Tri-Chem (Case A). Plan requests for production directed to the defendants.

  2. You represent Tri-Chem in Hot Dog Enterprises v. Tri-Chem (Case A). Plan requests for production directed to the plaintiff.

  3. You represent the defendants in Northern Motor Homes v. Danforth (Case J). Plan requests for production directed to the plaintiff.

  4. You represent the plaintiff in Northern Motor Homes v. Danforth (Case J). Plan requests for production directed to the defendants.

  5. You represent the plaintiff in Burris v. Warner (Case K). Plan requests for production directed to the defendant.

  6. You represent the defendant in Burris v. Warner (Case K). Plan requests for production directed to the plaintiff.

  7. You represent the plaintiff in Vasquez v. Hot Dog Enterprises (Case F). Plan requests for production directed to the defendant.

  8. You represent the defendant in Vasquez v. Hot Dog Enterprises (Case F). Plan requests for production directed to the plaintiff.

  9. You represent the plaintiffs in FJE Enterprises v. Arbor Vineyards (Case L). Plan requests for production directed to the defendant.

  10. You represent the defendant in FJE Enterprises v. Arbor Vineyards (Case L). Plan requests for production directed to the plaintiffs.

  11. You represent the plaintiffs in Tymons v. Allgoods and Razzle (Case M). Plan requests for production directed to the defendants.

  12. You represent Igor Investor and others who lost money placed under the control of TechTrust Wealth Management (Case P) and want to collection information that you believe will demonstrate TechTrust’s substandard conduct and direct cause of loss to the “Investor Class.” How does the ESI and AI/LLM nature of most of the TechTrust archives affect your analysis?

  13. You represent a party in a case assigned by your professor.

(a) Plan requests for production directed to the opposing party.

(b) Plan to meet and confer with a student classmate representing the opposing party to discuss the details of your proposed plan in an effort to agree on a mutually acceptable plan.

(c) Consider whether you would propose that a discovery mediator or special master be assigned to assist with production and how so.

Drafting Requests for Production

Draft Rule 34 requests for production of whatever documents, electronically stored information, materials or things you deem appropriate for the following situations. Form or standard requests may be useful as guides in composing requests but cannot be used verbatim and need to be appropriately customized to the issues in the respective case. Presume the opposing party has not had to disclose any of the documents you seek. Draft a reasonable number of requests. Your instructor may specify numerical limits.

  1. You represent Hot Dog Enterprises in Hot Dog Enterprises v. Tri-Chem (Case A). Draft requests for production directed to the defendant.

  2. You represent Tri-Chem in Hot Dog Enterprises v. Tri-Chem (Case A). Draft requests for production directed to the plaintiff.

  3. You represent the defendants in Northern Motor Homes v. Danforth (Case J). Draft requests for production directed to the plaintiff.

  4. You represent the plaintiff in Northern Motor Homes v. Danforth (Case J). Draft requests for production directed to the defendants.

  5. You represent the plaintiff in Burris v. Warner (Case K). Draft requests for production directed to the defendant.

  6. You represent the defendant in Burris v. Warner (Case K). Draft requests for production directed to the plaintiff.

  7. You represent the plaintiff in Vasquez v. Hot Dog Enterprises (Case F). Draft requests for production directed to the defendant.

  8. You represent the defendant in Vasquez v. Hot Dog Enterprises (Case F). Draft requests for production directed to the plaintiff.

  9. You represent the plaintiffs in FJE Enterprises v. Arbor Vineyards (Case L). Draft requests for production directed to the defendant.

  10. You represent the defendant in FJE Enterprises v. Arbor Vineyards (Case L). Draft requests for production directed to the plaintiffs.

  11. You represent the plaintiffs in Tymons v. Allgoods and Razzle (Case M). Draft requests for production directed to the defendants.

  12. You represent Mike Mullarkey in his dispute with Denial Mutual Insurance (Case N). Draft Rule 34 requests directed toward the insurer.

  13. You represent a party in a case assigned by your professor.

(a) Draft requests for production directed to the opposing party.

(b) Plan to meet and confer with a student classmate representing the opposing party to discuss the details of your draft requests in an effort to agree on a mutually acceptable production.

(c) Consider whether you would propose that a discovery mediator or special master be assigned to assist with production and how so.

  1. Draft a combined set of five (5) interrogatories and five (5) requests for document production in Northern Motor Homes v. Danforth (Case J).

(a) For the plaintiff, directed to the defendants.

(b) For the defendants, directed to the plaintiff.

Requests for Production Responses

  1. You represent a party in a case assigned by your professor. Respond to the requests for production prepared by the student attorney representing the opposing party by:

(a) Indicating which documents, electronically stored information, materials or things you would provide.

(b) Asserting any objections to other requests and explaining the basis for the objections.

(c) Proposing alternative responses to the requests.

(d) Plan to meet and confer with a student classmate representing the opposing party to discuss the details of your proposed responses in an effort to agree on a mutually acceptable production.

(e) Consider whether you would propose that a discovery mediator or special master be assigned to assist with production and how so.

Inspection and Testing

  1. You represent the plaintiff in Burris v. Warner (Case K). Draft a request for production and inspection of the automobile owned by defendant.

  2. You represent the defendant in Burris v. Warner (Case K). Draft a request for production and inspection of the motorcycle owned by plaintiff.

  3. You represent the defendant in Tymons v. Arbor Vineyards (Case L).

(a) Plan a request to review and inspect the commercial and residential properties owned by the plaintiffs.

(b) Draft a request to review and inspect the commercial and residential properties owned by the plaintiffs.

  1. You represent the defendant in Burris v. Warner (Case K).

(a) Through an interrogatory answer you discover that the manufacturer of the helmet (Stirling Helmets) failed to have that model helmet certified to meet the Department of Transportation’s safety standards. You want to inspect the helmet’s post-accident condition to assess its conformity with DOT impact-resistance standards. The plaintiff’s lawyer has told you that they also wish the helmet to be inspected by an expert. Your expert advises you the only accurate test is a process that impacts the helmet onto a flat anvil that might crush and destroy the helmet.

(1) Plan a request for production and destructive testing of the helmet.

(2) Draft a request for production and destructive testing of the helmet.

(3) Plan a stipulated agreement between the parties for a destructive test of the helmet.

(4) Draft a stipulated agreement between the parties for a destructive test of the helmet.

(5) Plan a proposed court order anticipating plaintiff’s objection to a destructive testing procedure.

(6) Draft a proposed court order anticipating plaintiff’s objection to a destructive testing procedure.

(b) You want to substantiate the evidence that the motorcycle headlight might not have been working while the plaintiff was riding that day on Oak Avenue. Your expert advises you that inspection and testing of the headlight could determine if the light was on at the time it shattered on impact.

(1) Plan a request for production, inspection, and testing of the headlight of the motorcycle

(2) Draft a request for production, inspection, and testing of the headlight of the motorcycle.

Research and Reflections

  1. Research the civil procedure rules and case law relating to the production of documents and electronically stored information in the state where your law school is located. Compare these provisions and procedures to the federal rules of civil procedure and federal case law. Prepare to discuss the differences and similarities between the state and federal approaches.

  2. The federal rules of civil procedure relating to document production were initially drafted to deal only with paper and physical documents, well before the advent of electronically stored information. Review the current federal rules and consider what additional revisions you would make to these rules to deal with the issues and problems of ESI discovery. Prepare to discuss in class or online these suggestions and your reasoning supporting the revisions.

  3. In *HDE v. Tri-Chem, *you believe that a special master or discovery mediator needs to be appointed to assist with discovery, especially for document production. What specifically would have this master/mediator do? What experience would you want this person to have? Plan to discuss in class or online.

(a) You represent HDE.

(b) You represent Tri-Chem.

  1. This case is a federal civil rights case in which the plaintiffs have sued to recover damages for the death of their husband and father, Broderick Hauser, who was shot and killed by police in a factory in the Uptown section of Mitchell on June 1, 20XX. The complaint alleges that the police officers and their superiors unjustifiably and without provocation shot Mr. Hauser during the course of a chase. The defendants have answered claiming they had probable cause to arrest Mr. Hauser, he appeared to be armed, the police heard shots, and the police reasonably believed they were in danger of serious injury. The police department conducted an extensive investigation of the shooting producing the following documents and items:

(a) Police radio and video recordings of the incident.

(b) Physical evidence from the scene of the shooting.

(c) Physical evidence from the home of the decedent after his death.

(d) The reported analysis of the physical evidence by the police.

(e) Autopsy Report.

(f) Photographs of the scene of death.

(g) Written unsigned statements from eyewitnesses to the shooting.

(h) Written signed statements by eyewitnesses to the shooting.

(i) Police report written by the officers on the scene.

(j) Police internal affairs investigation report about the shooting.

(k) Police reports of prior criminal incidents involving Hauser.

(l) The clothes Hauser wore when he was shot.

(m) The gun that was used to shoot him.

(n) Ballistics reports by the police.

(o) Results of polygraph examinations conducted by the police of the police officers involved.

The plaintiffs have served requests for production that request the disclosure of all these materials and items.

  1. You represent the plaintiffs. What other information would you seek? How?
  2. You represent the defendants. Which information do you believe discoverable? Would you disclose any information you believe non-discoverable for tactical reasons? Why or why not?

Reconsidering and Redrafting Requests

  1. You represent the Defendant Summit Insurance Company in Pozdak v. Summit Insurance Company (Case B). Fran Pozdak has sued for breach of contract seeking to recover $825,000 for the fire loss to the building and $1,250,000 for the loss of its contents. You defend claiming Pozdak committed arson which bars recovery under the contract. An associate in your firm prepares the following draft of document production requests:

Defendant requests that the Plaintiff provide the following documents:

(a) A purchase agreement, financing papers, tax records, and all documents relating to the value of the real property at 560 Wesley.

(b) Bills, invoices, receipts, photos, and all documents with information about the value of the contents of the property destroyed in the fire.

(c) All documents that contain information concerning the liabilities and assets of the Plaintiff as of July 3.

(d) Copies of all insurance documents providing coverage to the real property and personal property at 560 Wesley on July 3.

Defendant also requests that Plaintiff permit Defendant to:

(a) Visit the remnants of the fire located at 560 Wesley.

(b) Photograph the car Plaintiff owned on July 3.

(1) Which of these requests would you not submit, and why?

(2) Redraft those you would submit.

(3) What other requests would you submit, and why?

(A) Plan those requests

(B) Draft those requests

(4) If you represent Plaintiff Pozdak and received these requests, how would you respond? Identify any specific objections.

Bridget: 38. You represent Mike LaBelle in Miyamoto v. Snow Cat (Case C). You have sued the Snow Cat Company for negligence, product liability, and breach of warranty. Snow Cat denies all allegations. An associate in your firm prepares the following draft of document production requests:

Plaintiff Mike LaBelle pursuant to the rules of civil procedure submits the following requests on Defendant Snow Cat. These requests are continuing in nature. You must promptly provide the opportunity for Plaintiff to inspect and copy the following materials:

(a) All written statements, notes, and memoranda that include statements provided by any and all witnesses to this case.

(b) The sales contract and all documents provided Mariko Miyamoto when she bought the snowmobile from Defendant.

(c) All electronically stored information, any social or professional network communications, and any emails or text messages regarding the accident and related events to the accident in the possession, custody, or control of Defendant or composed, sent, received, or forwarded by managing agents of the Defendant.

(d) All photos, film, movies, videos, and other graphic representations taken by the Defendant of the scene of the accident and the snowmobile involved in the accident.

(e) All tests, reports, and documents prepared by an expert, by an employee of the Defendant, or in the possession of the Defendant relating to the throttle mechanism of the Snow Cat snowmobile.

Plaintiff further demands that the Defendant make available to the Plaintiff the following opportunity as soon as possible:

(a) A visit to the factory in which the Snow Cat snowmobile was manufactured.

(b) An inspection of the offices of Snow Cat Company to review files containing engineering, manufacturing, and marketing information and customer complaints about the Snow Cat snowmobile.

(1) Which of these requests would you not submit, and why?

(2) Redraft those you would submit.

(3) What other requests might you submit, and why?

(A) Plan those requests

(B) Draft those requests

(4) If you represent Defendant Snow Cat and received these requests, how would you respond? Identify any specific objections.

Rule 45 Subpoena

  1. You represent a party in a case assigned by your professor. Who would you serve a Rule 45 subpoena on? Explain what you would search for, and explain how you would seek the information or documents.

  2. You represent Hot Dog Enterprises in Hot Dog Enterprises v. Tri-Chem (Case A). Draft a Rule 45 subpoena directed to:

(a) Joseph Piranha, the general contractor on the Kansas restaurant project.

(b) Margaret Pei, the architect who designed the Kansas restaurant building.

  1. You represent the defendants in Northern Motor Homes v. Danforth (Case J).

(a) Plan a Rule 45 subpoena directed to the Mitchell National Bank to obtain relevant financial documents from the bank.

(b) What discovery advantages do you gain if you made Mitchell National Bank a party to the lawsuit with Northern Motor Homes?

  1. You represent the defendant in FJE Enterprises v. Arbor Vineyards (Case L). Draft a Rule 45 subpoena directed to Branch Busters.

  2. You represent a party in a case assigned by your professor. Who would you serve a Rule 45 subpoena on? Draft a Rule 45 subpoena on that person or entity.

Production from the Government

  1. You represent Hot Dog Enterprises in *Hot Dog Enterprises v. Tri-Chem *(Case A). Draft a FOIA request to a federal or state government department of your choosing seeking agency documents relating to Tri-Chem.

  2. You represent Tri-Chem in *Hot Dog Enterprises v. Tri-Chem *(Case A). Draft a FOIA request to a federal or state government department of your choosing seeking agency documents relating to HDE.

Production Presentation

  1. You have been requested by Summit Continuing Legal Education to make a presentation at its annual Document and ESI CLE Program. Prepare a concise outline of your presentation regarding the topic:

(A) How to Effectively Discover ESI Information.

(B) How to make ESI Discovery Affordable and Accessible.

(C) ESI Discovery for Dummies and Non-Nerd Advocates.

(D) Whether and when to have a discovery mediator or special master appointed in a case.

Additional Exercises

  1. You represent ProTectCo Property & Casualty Insurance in its dispute with Gravitas Grinch (Case O). Draft appropriate documents for assessing whether Grinch is complicit in the death of Dara Domestic and supporting the insurer’s declaratory judgment action against Grinch.

  2. Pursuant to its duty to defend policyholders from liability claims, ProTectCo assigns you as defense counsel for Gravitas Grinch (Case O). Draft document requests directed toward the Estate of Dara Domestic. Notwithstanding the insurer’s coverage disputes with Grinch, you as defense counsel for Grinch owe him a vigorous defense, leaving coverage litigation to separate counsel.

  3. As counsel for TechTrust Wealth Management (Case P), draft Rule 34 requests directed to Igor Investor.

Additional problems relating to e-discovery and electronically stored information appear at www.fundamentalspretriallitigation.com. These assignments provide you with the opportunity to investigate, disclose, and discover ESI information from an electronic database that contains ESI and that can be searched for documents. Your professor may assign some of these problems, or you can visit this website and conduct document searches on your own.

  1. A whaling term meaning to begin the attack. Not related to a children’s game “Keep Away.” ↑
  2. [Steele Software Sys. Corp. v. DataQuick Info. Sys. Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ibbf07c2e549d11dbb0d3b726c66cf290/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ibbf07c2e549d11dbb0d3b726c66cf290/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 237 F.R.D. 561 (D. Md. 2006)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ibbf07c2e549d11dbb0d3b726c66cf290/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ibbf07c2e549d11dbb0d3b726c66cf290/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  3. [Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0792789014e711e79eadef7f77b52ba6/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0792789014e711e79eadef7f77b52ba6/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 852 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2017)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0792789014e711e79eadef7f77b52ba6/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0792789014e711e79eadef7f77b52ba6/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  5. [Mintel Int’l Grp., Ltd. v. Neergheen,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1511a2ef022f11dfa7e0c40c26bf1b92/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1511a2ef022f11dfa7e0c40c26bf1b92/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 2010 WL 145786 (N.D. Ill.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1511a2ef022f11dfa7e0c40c26bf1b92/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1511a2ef022f11dfa7e0c40c26bf1b92/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  6. [British Telecommunications v. IAC/Interactive Corp](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I449dd8504a3811e987fd8441446aa305/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I449dd8504a3811e987fd8441446aa305/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[., 330 F.R.D. 387 (D. Del. 2019)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I449dd8504a3811e987fd8441446aa305/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I449dd8504a3811e987fd8441446aa305/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  7. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  9. [Dellums v. Powell, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib307092d910f11d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib307092d910f11d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib307092d910f11d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib307092d910f11d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0), on remand [490 F. Supp. 70 (D.D.C. 1980)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6e24ca39555b11d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6e24ca39555b11d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0), judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part [660 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1981)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I72cea034928511d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I72cea034928511d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  10. See **[Takeda Pharm. Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5af073f2868e11dfbe8a8e1700ec828b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5af073f2868e11dfbe8a8e1700ec828b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 2010 WL 2640492 (D. Del.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5af073f2868e11dfbe8a8e1700ec828b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5af073f2868e11dfbe8a8e1700ec828b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  12. [Micro Chem. Inc. v. Lextron, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ide1210e553cc11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ide1210e553cc11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 193 F.R.D. 667 (D. Colo. 2000)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ide1210e553cc11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ide1210e553cc11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
    • See* James L. Underwood, A Guide to Federal Discovery Rules 128. ↑
  14. [Harris v. Athol-Royalston Reg’l Sch. Dist. Comm.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie7ef753a53e011d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie7ef753a53e011d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 200 F.R.D. 18 (D. Mass. 2001)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie7ef753a53e011d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie7ef753a53e011d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  16. [Jones v. Hernandez,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I73bb0f60835411e7b7978f65e9bf93b3/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I73bb0f60835411e7b7978f65e9bf93b3/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 322 F.R.D. 411 (S.D. Cal. 2017)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I73bb0f60835411e7b7978f65e9bf93b3/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I73bb0f60835411e7b7978f65e9bf93b3/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  17. [In re Legato Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie0f49ef653ee11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie0f49ef653ee11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 204 F.R.D. 167 (N.D. Cal. 2001)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie0f49ef653ee11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie0f49ef653ee11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  18. [8B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2210](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia19545e54b1211dab83abce0f17e0f80/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia19545e54b1211dab83abce0f17e0f80/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  20. See **[Camiolo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie9fb079889e111d9903eeb4634b8d78e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie9fb079889e111d9903eeb4634b8d78e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[334 F.3d 345 (3d Cir. 2003)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie9fb079889e111d9903eeb4634b8d78e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie9fb079889e111d9903eeb4634b8d78e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  21. [Noaimi v. Zaid,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I54b7b6cba1a411e1b11ea85d0b248d27/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I54b7b6cba1a411e1b11ea85d0b248d27/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 283 F.R.D. 639 (D. Kan. 2012)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I54b7b6cba1a411e1b11ea85d0b248d27/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I54b7b6cba1a411e1b11ea85d0b248d27/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  22. [W.R. Grace & Co. Conn. v. Zotos Int’l Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8ddac8a753d711d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8ddac8a753d711d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 2000 WL 1843258 (W.D.N.Y.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8ddac8a753d711d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8ddac8a753d711d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  23. [Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div., United Aircraft Corp.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3dd61e1c551f11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3dd61e1c551f11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 74 F.R.D. 594 (D. Conn. 1977)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3dd61e1c551f11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3dd61e1c551f11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  24. See **[Harris v. Athol-Royalston Reg’l Sch. Dist. Comm.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie7ef753a53e011d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie7ef753a53e011d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 200 F.R.D. 18 (D. Mass. 2001)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie7ef753a53e011d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie7ef753a53e011d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  25. [Bingle v. Liggett Drug Co.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I58a0a6fa54a911d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I58a0a6fa54a911d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 11 F.R.D. 593 (D. Mass. 1951)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I58a0a6fa54a911d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I58a0a6fa54a911d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  26. [Costa v. Kerzner Int’l Resorts, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia584b048124711e1a4dda8d3ae9c068b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia584b048124711e1a4dda8d3ae9c068b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 277 F.R.D. 468 (S.D. Fla. 2011)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia584b048124711e1a4dda8d3ae9c068b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia584b048124711e1a4dda8d3ae9c068b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  27. [Meridian Laboratories, Inc. v. OncoGenerix USA, Inc., 333 F.F.D. 131 2019 WL 4674588 (N.D. Ill. 2019)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I7e9f4ce0e05211e9a624fda6cf7cce18/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I7e9f4ce0e05211e9a624fda6cf7cce18/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  28. [A. Farber & Partners v. Garber](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If691272fadd811da8ccbb4c14e983401/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If691272fadd811da8ccbb4c14e983401/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 234 F.R.D. 186 (C.D. Cal. 2006)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If691272fadd811da8ccbb4c14e983401/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If691272fadd811da8ccbb4c14e983401/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  29. Prebena Wire Bending Mach. Co. v. Transit Worldwide Corp., 45 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). ↑
  30. [James v. Wash Depot Holdings Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I55d4ac15700511dba10be1078cee05f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I55d4ac15700511dba10be1078cee05f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 240 F.R.D. 693 (S.D. Fla. 2006)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I55d4ac15700511dba10be1078cee05f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I55d4ac15700511dba10be1078cee05f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  32. [SEC v. Am. Beryllium & Oil Corp](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I43c06a2a54ce11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I43c06a2a54ce11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[., 47 F.R.D. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I43c06a2a54ce11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I43c06a2a54ce11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  34. [8B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2211](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia19545e84b1211dab83abce0f17e0f80/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia19545e84b1211dab83abce0f17e0f80/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  35. See **[Nei v. Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic485a6c0917311e89fc9c0a8a8f09d21/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic485a6c0917311e89fc9c0a8a8f09d21/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 326 F.R.D. 652 (D. Mont. 2018)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic485a6c0917311e89fc9c0a8a8f09d21/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic485a6c0917311e89fc9c0a8a8f09d21/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  36. Paiewonsky v. Paiewonsky, 50 F.R.D. 379, 381 (D.V.I. 1970). ↑
  37. *See *Wesley Corp. v. Zoom T.V. Prods., LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5068 (E.D. Mich.). ↑
  38. [Balistrieri v. O’Farrell](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I04536b30550a11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I04536b30550a11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 57 F.R.D. 567 (E.D. Wis. 1972)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I04536b30550a11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I04536b30550a11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  39. Larson v. Correct Craft Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78028 (M.D. Fla.). ↑
  40. [Superior Commc’n v. Earhugger, Inc.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5875c8912f6511deb08de1b7506ad85b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5875c8912f6511deb08de1b7506ad85b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 257 F.R.D. 215 (C.D. Cal. 2009)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5875c8912f6511deb08de1b7506ad85b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5875c8912f6511deb08de1b7506ad85b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  41. See **[Covad Commc’ns Co. v. Revonet, Inc.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I22125f7ed34011ddbc7bf97f340af743/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I22125f7ed34011ddbc7bf97f340af743/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 254 F.R.D. 147 (D.D.C. 2008)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I22125f7ed34011ddbc7bf97f340af743/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I22125f7ed34011ddbc7bf97f340af743/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  42. [Qualcomm Inc. v. Apple, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2145acf0301d11e9bed9c2929f452c46/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2145acf0301d11e9bed9c2929f452c46/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 2019 WL 585352 (S.D. Cal.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2145acf0301d11e9bed9c2929f452c46/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2145acf0301d11e9bed9c2929f452c46/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  43. [Calixto v. Watson Bowman Acme Corp](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If80cea26d3b911de8bf6cd8525c41437/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If80cea26d3b911de8bf6cd8525c41437/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[., 2009 WL 3823390 (S.D. Fla.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If80cea26d3b911de8bf6cd8525c41437/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If80cea26d3b911de8bf6cd8525c41437/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  44. [United States for Use and Benefit of Schneider, Inc. v. Rust Eng’g Co.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I7d977990551a11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I7d977990551a11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 72 F.R.D. 195 (W.D. Pa. 1976)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I7d977990551a11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I7d977990551a11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  45. [Roadcloud v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I95240698b05011dba10be1078cee05f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I95240698b05011dba10be1078cee05f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 2007 WL 219791 (E.D. Pa.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I95240698b05011dba10be1078cee05f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I95240698b05011dba10be1078cee05f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  46. See **[Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifc3c4921981711da97faf3f66e4b6844/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifc3c4921981711da97faf3f66e4b6844/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[436 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2006)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifc3c4921981711da97faf3f66e4b6844/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifc3c4921981711da97faf3f66e4b6844/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  47. See **[Ogden v. All-State Career Sch.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I22eec5ffccb411e39488c8f438320c70/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I22eec5ffccb411e39488c8f438320c70/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 299 F.R.D. 446 (W.D. Pa. 2014)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I22eec5ffccb411e39488c8f438320c70/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I22eec5ffccb411e39488c8f438320c70/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  48. [Rowan v. Sunflower Elec. Power Corp.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iee15d680498711e687dda03c2315206d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iee15d680498711e687dda03c2315206d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 2016 WL 3743102 (D. Kan.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iee15d680498711e687dda03c2315206d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iee15d680498711e687dda03c2315206d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
    • See* §§ 4.10 & 4.11.1 for discussion of the use of protective orders and stipulations respectively. ↑
  50. [Apex Tool Grp., LLC v. DMTCO, LLC,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2721ba60bf3211e59dcad96e4d86e5cf/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2721ba60bf3211e59dcad96e4d86e5cf/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 2016 WL 212962 (S.D. Ohio)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2721ba60bf3211e59dcad96e4d86e5cf/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2721ba60bf3211e59dcad96e4d86e5cf/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  51. [Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Co.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I68a9aae989c611d9ac45f46c5ea084a3/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I68a9aae989c611d9ac45f46c5ea084a3/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 59 Fed. Appx. 830 (7th Cir. 2003)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I68a9aae989c611d9ac45f46c5ea084a3/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I68a9aae989c611d9ac45f46c5ea084a3/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  52. See **United States v. N.M. State Univ., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161421 (D.N.M.). ↑
  53. [Douglas v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icf27606007b811e6aa51de8c0a70fd8b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icf27606007b811e6aa51de8c0a70fd8b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 2016 WL 1588651 (M.D. Fla.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icf27606007b811e6aa51de8c0a70fd8b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icf27606007b811e6aa51de8c0a70fd8b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  58. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  59. [United Cigar-Whelan Stores Corp. v. Philip Morris, Inc.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icd864bf454b311d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icd864bf454b311d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 21 F.R.D. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icd864bf454b311d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icd864bf454b311d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  60. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  61. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  62. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  63. Baskerville v. Baskerville, 246 Minn. 496, 75 N.W.2d 762 (1956). ↑
  64. [Biliske v. Am. Live Stock Ins. Co.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I94c2c5c6551f11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I94c2c5c6551f11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 73 F.R.D. 124 (W.D. Okl. 1977)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I94c2c5c6551f11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I94c2c5c6551f11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  65. Flickinger v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 37 F.R.D. 533 (W.D. Pa. 1965). ↑
  66. [Belcher v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I812318f0918111d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I812318f0918111d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 588 F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1978)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I812318f0918111d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I812318f0918111d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
    • *See Kenneth B. Hughes & Carol E. Anderson, Discovery: A Competition between the Right of Privacy and the Right to Know, 23 U. Fla. L. Rev. 289 (1971). ↑
  69. [Fischer v. Forrest](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia46971c0fe8811e69a9296e6a6f4a986/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_999_3" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia46971c0fe8811e69a9296e6a6f4a986/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_999_3)[, 2017 WL 773694, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia46971c0fe8811e69a9296e6a6f4a986/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_999_3" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia46971c0fe8811e69a9296e6a6f4a986/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_999_3). This decision is quite informative and intriguing on response shortcomings. It begins with “Let us count the ways the defendants have violated the rules.” ↑
  70. [Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I78ff7d009bad11ddb7e683ba170699a5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_344_358" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I78ff7d009bad11ddb7e683ba170699a5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_344_358)[253 F.R.D. 354, 358 (D. Md. 2008)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I78ff7d009bad11ddb7e683ba170699a5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_344_358" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I78ff7d009bad11ddb7e683ba170699a5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_344_358). ↑
  71. See **[Enron Corp. Sav. Plan v. Hewitt Assocs., LLC, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic6576a02194c11debc7bf97f340af743/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic6576a02194c11debc7bf97f340af743/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[258 F.R.D. 149 (S.D. Tex. 2009)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic6576a02194c11debc7bf97f340af743/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic6576a02194c11debc7bf97f340af743/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  72. [Brooks v. Macy’s Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifa104a657c7e11e0a8a2938374af9660/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifa104a657c7e11e0a8a2938374af9660/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 2011 WL 1793345 (S.D.N.Y May 6, 2011)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifa104a657c7e11e0a8a2938374af9660/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifa104a657c7e11e0a8a2938374af9660/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  73. [Bankdirect Capital v. Capital Premium Financing, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1682c4c0f42b11e8a174b18b713fc6d4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1682c4c0f42b11e8a174b18b713fc6d4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[343 F. Supp. 3d 742 (N.D. Ill. 2018)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1682c4c0f42b11e8a174b18b713fc6d4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1682c4c0f42b11e8a174b18b713fc6d4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  75. Quoted from Walter Barthold, Attorney’s Guide to Effective Discovery Techniques 187–88. ↑
  76. See City of Kingsport v. SCM Corp., 352 F. Supp. 287 (E.D. Tenn. 1972). ↑
  77. See Leininger v. Swadner, 279 Minn. 251, 156 N.W.2d 254 (1968). ↑
  78. [Cameron v. District Court For First Judicial Dist.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iab01a5e4f79511d9bf60c1d57ebc853e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iab01a5e4f79511d9bf60c1d57ebc853e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 193 Colo. 286, 565 P.2d 925 (1977)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iab01a5e4f79511d9bf60c1d57ebc853e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iab01a5e4f79511d9bf60c1d57ebc853e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  79. [Tucker v. OHTSU Tire & Rubber Co.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0584fc58568911d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0584fc58568911d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 49 F. Supp. 2d 456 (D. Md. 1999)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0584fc58568911d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0584fc58568911d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  81. [Mirchandani v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6e51f25df1c011dab3be92e40de4b42f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6e51f25df1c011dab3be92e40de4b42f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 235 F.R.D. 611 (D. Md. 2006)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6e51f25df1c011dab3be92e40de4b42f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6e51f25df1c011dab3be92e40de4b42f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  82. [Fisher v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1b4ede908ec711d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1b4ede908ec711d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[246 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1957)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1b4ede908ec711d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1b4ede908ec711d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  84. See **[PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib4f26f8462fc11dcab5dc95700b89bde/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib4f26f8462fc11dcab5dc95700b89bde/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 2007 WL 2687670 (N.D.N.Y.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib4f26f8462fc11dcab5dc95700b89bde/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib4f26f8462fc11dcab5dc95700b89bde/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  85. [Palma v. Metro PCS Wireless, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3b9d169cda0c11e390d4edf60ce7d742/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3b9d169cda0c11e390d4edf60ce7d742/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 18 F. Supp. 3d 1346 (M.D. Fla. 2014)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3b9d169cda0c11e390d4edf60ce7d742/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3b9d169cda0c11e390d4edf60ce7d742/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  86. [Simon Prop. Grp. L.P. v. mySimon, Inc.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I52637b4d53ce11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I52637b4d53ce11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 194 F.R.D. 639 (S.D. Ind. 2000)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I52637b4d53ce11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I52637b4d53ce11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  87. [A.M. Castle & Co. v. Byrne,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I542e2a0d41ac11e5b86bd602cb8781fa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I542e2a0d41ac11e5b86bd602cb8781fa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 123 F. Supp. 3d. 895 (S.D. Tex. 2015)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I542e2a0d41ac11e5b86bd602cb8781fa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I542e2a0d41ac11e5b86bd602cb8781fa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  88. [FCA US LLC v. Bullock,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib21a9e401b8511e98f4d8d23fc0d7c2b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib21a9e401b8511e98f4d8d23fc0d7c2b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 329 F.R.D. 563 (E.D. Mich. 2019)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib21a9e401b8511e98f4d8d23fc0d7c2b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib21a9e401b8511e98f4d8d23fc0d7c2b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  89. *See **Moore v. Abbott Lab., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94330 *(S.D. Ohio). ↑
  90. [Kirschenman v. Auto-Owners Ins.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3ee733d35d2811e18b1ac573b20fcfb7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3ee733d35d2811e18b1ac573b20fcfb7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 280 F.R.D. 474 (D.S.D. 2012)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3ee733d35d2811e18b1ac573b20fcfb7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3ee733d35d2811e18b1ac573b20fcfb7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  91. [Integrated Serv. Solutions, Inc. v. Rodman,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I7464e79cab5611dd9876f446780b7bdc/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I7464e79cab5611dd9876f446780b7bdc/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 2008 WL 4791654 (E.D. Pa.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I7464e79cab5611dd9876f446780b7bdc/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I7464e79cab5611dd9876f446780b7bdc/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  92. Universal Del., Inc. v. Comdata Corp., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32158 (E.D. Pa). ↑
  93. [In](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1b0d886754cf11e085acc3f6d5ffa172/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1b0d886754cf11e085acc3f6d5ffa172/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1b0d886754cf11e085acc3f6d5ffa172/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1b0d886754cf11e085acc3f6d5ffa172/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[re](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1b0d886754cf11e085acc3f6d5ffa172/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1b0d886754cf11e085acc3f6d5ffa172/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1b0d886754cf11e085acc3f6d5ffa172/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1b0d886754cf11e085acc3f6d5ffa172/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[Cunnius](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1b0d886754cf11e085acc3f6d5ffa172/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1b0d886754cf11e085acc3f6d5ffa172/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 770 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (D. Wash. 2011)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1b0d886754cf11e085acc3f6d5ffa172/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1b0d886754cf11e085acc3f6d5ffa172/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  94. [Wood v. Town of Warsaw,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie7ab7e4b302311e1aa95d4e04082c730/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie7ab7e4b302311e1aa95d4e04082c730/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 2011 WL 6748797 (E.D.N.C.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie7ab7e4b302311e1aa95d4e04082c730/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie7ab7e4b302311e1aa95d4e04082c730/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  95. [Miller v. York Risk Servs. Grp.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id4ac50ffc53811e39ac8bab74931929c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id4ac50ffc53811e39ac8bab74931929c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 2014 WL 1456349 (D. Ariz.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id4ac50ffc53811e39ac8bab74931929c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id4ac50ffc53811e39ac8bab74931929c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  96. [Mezu v. Morgan State Univ.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I41741f46e11b11dfb5fdfcf739be147c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I41741f46e11b11dfb5fdfcf739be147c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 269 F.R.D. 565 (D. Md. 2010)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I41741f46e11b11dfb5fdfcf739be147c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I41741f46e11b11dfb5fdfcf739be147c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  97. [Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I78ff7d009bad11ddb7e683ba170699a5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I78ff7d009bad11ddb7e683ba170699a5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 253 F.R.D. 354 (D. Md. 2008)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I78ff7d009bad11ddb7e683ba170699a5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I78ff7d009bad11ddb7e683ba170699a5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  98. Thomas Y. Allman, The Sedona Conference Inst., E-Discovery in Federal and State Courts After the 2006 Amendments. ↑
  99. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in sections of Titles 15 & 18 of United States Code). ↑
  100. [17 C.F.R. § 210.2–06 (2012)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N583A7F208B3011D98CF4E0B65F42E6DA/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N583A7F208B3011D98CF4E0B65F42E6DA/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  101. The Sedona Conference®, https://www.thesedonaconference.org. ↑
  102. The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Principles: Best Practices Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production (Jonathan M. Redgrave et al.). ↑
  103. [PIC Group, Inc. v. Landcoast Insulation, Inc.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id8a62785a9d911e08bbeb4ca0e5b8ed9/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id8a62785a9d911e08bbeb4ca0e5b8ed9/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 2011 WL 2669144 (S.D. Miss.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id8a62785a9d911e08bbeb4ca0e5b8ed9/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id8a62785a9d911e08bbeb4ca0e5b8ed9/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  104. [L.H. v. Schwarzenegger,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I91d926df12e211debc7bf97f340af743/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I91d926df12e211debc7bf97f340af743/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 645 F. Supp. 2d 888 (E.D. Cal. 2008)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I91d926df12e211debc7bf97f340af743/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I91d926df12e211debc7bf97f340af743/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  105. [Tierno v. Rite Aid Corp.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6cdf96fe705011dd9876f446780b7bdc/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6cdf96fe705011dd9876f446780b7bdc/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 2008 WL 3876131 (N.D. Cal.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6cdf96fe705011dd9876f446780b7bdc/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6cdf96fe705011dd9876f446780b7bdc/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  106. [Aguilar v. ICE](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I56b30febc05d11ddb5cbad29a280d47c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I56b30febc05d11ddb5cbad29a280d47c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 255 F.R.D. 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I56b30febc05d11ddb5cbad29a280d47c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I56b30febc05d11ddb5cbad29a280d47c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  107. [Mintel Int’l Grp., Ltd. v. Neergheen,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1511a2ef022f11dfa7e0c40c26bf1b92/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1511a2ef022f11dfa7e0c40c26bf1b92/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 2010 WL 145786 (N.D. Ill.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1511a2ef022f11dfa7e0c40c26bf1b92/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1511a2ef022f11dfa7e0c40c26bf1b92/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  108. Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68128 (D. N.J.). ↑
  109. [Gippetti v. UPS, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I16795ba467b011ddb7e583ba170699a5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I16795ba467b011ddb7e583ba170699a5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 2008 WL 3264483 (N.D. Cal.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I16795ba467b011ddb7e583ba170699a5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I16795ba467b011ddb7e583ba170699a5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  110. [Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5bc519e6542411d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5bc519e6542411d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5bc519e6542411d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5bc519e6542411d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  111. [In re Biomet M2a Magnum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I85a9ef0b611911e3a659df62eba144e8/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I85a9ef0b611911e3a659df62eba144e8/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[., 2013 WL 6405156 (N.D. Ind.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I85a9ef0b611911e3a659df62eba144e8/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I85a9ef0b611911e3a659df62eba144e8/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  112. See **[Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe & MSL Grp.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib10a9f02616511e1ac60ad556f635d49/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib10a9f02616511e1ac60ad556f635d49/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 287 F.R.D. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib10a9f02616511e1ac60ad556f635d49/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib10a9f02616511e1ac60ad556f635d49/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  113. [Republic of Ecuador v. Hinchee, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I267feb1d681b11e39ac8bab74931929c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I267feb1d681b11e39ac8bab74931929c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[741 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2013)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I267feb1d681b11e39ac8bab74931929c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I267feb1d681b11e39ac8bab74931929c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  114. See **[City of Rockford v. Mallinckrodt ARD, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic8ca8f709c1311e8809390da5fe55bec/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic8ca8f709c1311e8809390da5fe55bec/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 326 F.R.D. 489 (N.D. Ill. 2018)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic8ca8f709c1311e8809390da5fe55bec/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic8ca8f709c1311e8809390da5fe55bec/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  115. [Point Blank Solutions v. Toyobo Am., Inc.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1da9cef0681311e0a8a2938374af9660/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1da9cef0681311e0a8a2938374af9660/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 2011 WL 1456029 (S.D. Fla.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1da9cef0681311e0a8a2938374af9660/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1da9cef0681311e0a8a2938374af9660/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  116. Star Direct Telecom, Inc. v. Global Crossing Bandwidth, Inc., 2012 WL 1067664 (W.D.N.Y.). ↑
  117. Clean Harbors Env’l Servs. v. ESIS, Inc., 2011 WL 1897213 (N.D. Ill.). ↑
  118. Camesi v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 2010 WL 2104639 (W.D. Pa.). ↑
  119. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1)(A)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  120. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(D)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N69CE1AA0B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0); *see also *Covad Commc’n Co. v. Revonet, Inc., 267 F.R.D. 14 (D.D.C. 2010). ↑
  121. Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 271 F.R.D. 96 (E.D. Pa. 2010). ↑
  122. [In re Payment Card Interchange Fee Anti-Trust Litig](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I20bbea2aa7ca11dbab489133ffb377e0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I20bbea2aa7ca11dbab489133ffb377e0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[., 2007 WL 121426 (E.D.N.Y.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I20bbea2aa7ca11dbab489133ffb377e0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I20bbea2aa7ca11dbab489133ffb377e0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  123. [Adams v. Dan River Mills, Inc.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I55e6dc84550911d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I55e6dc84550911d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 54 F.R.D. 220 (W.D. Va. 1972)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I55e6dc84550911d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I55e6dc84550911d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  124. See **[Ogden v. All-State Career Sch.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I22eec5ffccb411e39488c8f438320c70/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I22eec5ffccb411e39488c8f438320c70/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 299 F.R.D. 446 (W.D. Pa. 2014)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I22eec5ffccb411e39488c8f438320c70/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I22eec5ffccb411e39488c8f438320c70/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  125. [Susquehanna Commercial Fin., Inc. v. Vascular Res., Inc.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4d819c3e035811e0aa23bccc834e9520/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4d819c3e035811e0aa23bccc834e9520/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 2010 WL 4973317 (M.D. Pa.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4d819c3e035811e0aa23bccc834e9520/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4d819c3e035811e0aa23bccc834e9520/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  126. [In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icfdb7960535c11e2a531ef6793d44951/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icfdb7960535c11e2a531ef6793d44951/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 2012 WL 6738343 (N.D. Cal.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icfdb7960535c11e2a531ef6793d44951/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icfdb7960535c11e2a531ef6793d44951/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  127. [Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ieeb484bb53ee11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ieeb484bb53ee11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ieeb484bb53ee11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ieeb484bb53ee11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  128. [Zubulake v. UBA Warburg LLC,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia4ccd865540811d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia4ccd865540811d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia4ccd865540811d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia4ccd865540811d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  129. [Point Blank Solutions v. Toyobo Am., Inc.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1da9cef0681311e0a8a2938374af9660/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1da9cef0681311e0a8a2938374af9660/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 2011 WL 1456029 (S.D. Fla.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1da9cef0681311e0a8a2938374af9660/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1da9cef0681311e0a8a2938374af9660/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  130. [Parsi v. Daioleslam, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I66e11a9db16111e4a807ad48145ed9f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I66e11a9db16111e4a807ad48145ed9f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[778 F.3d 116 (D.C. Cir. 2015)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I66e11a9db16111e4a807ad48145ed9f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I66e11a9db16111e4a807ad48145ed9f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  132. See **[Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Exec. Office of the President](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic07787f25f5911dd9876f446780b7bdc/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic07787f25f5911dd9876f446780b7bdc/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 2008 WL 2932173 (D.D.C.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic07787f25f5911dd9876f446780b7bdc/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic07787f25f5911dd9876f446780b7bdc/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  133. See **[Adair v. EQT Prod. Co.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie2e6c99308d811e28757b822cf994add/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie2e6c99308d811e28757b822cf994add/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 285 F.R.D. 376 (W.D. Va. 2012)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie2e6c99308d811e28757b822cf994add/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie2e6c99308d811e28757b822cf994add/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  134. See **[Morgan Hill Concerned Parents Ass’n v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id11c8ea0e9de11e6b79af578703ae98c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id11c8ea0e9de11e6b79af578703ae98c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[., 2017 WL 445722 (E.D. Cal.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id11c8ea0e9de11e6b79af578703ae98c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id11c8ea0e9de11e6b79af578703ae98c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  135. [Starbucks Corp. v. ADT Sec. Servs, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2eb791e2e71711de9988d233d23fe599/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2eb791e2e71711de9988d233d23fe599/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 2009 WL 4730798 (W.D. Wash.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2eb791e2e71711de9988d233d23fe599/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2eb791e2e71711de9988d233d23fe599/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  136. Goodman v. Praxair Servs., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 494 (D. Md. 2009). ↑
  137. [Micron Tech. v. Rambus (“Mircon II”), ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If5c420dc7d7211e0a34df17ea74c323f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If5c420dc7d7211e0a34df17ea74c323f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[645 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2011)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If5c420dc7d7211e0a34df17ea74c323f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If5c420dc7d7211e0a34df17ea74c323f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  138. [Gippetti v. UPS, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I16795ba467b011ddb7e583ba170699a5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I16795ba467b011ddb7e583ba170699a5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 2008 WL 3264483 (N.D. Cal.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I16795ba467b011ddb7e583ba170699a5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I16795ba467b011ddb7e583ba170699a5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  139. Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68128 (D. N.J.). ↑
  140. [Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5bc519e6542411d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5bc519e6542411d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5bc519e6542411d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5bc519e6542411d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  142. Columbia Pictures v. Bunnell, 245 F.R.D. 443 (C.D. Cal. 2007). ↑
  143. Merriman v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., 2012 WL 3834872 (7th Cir.). ↑
  144. [S2 Automation LLC v. Micron Tech., Inc.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I45e1c65ef11f11e1b11ea85d0b248d27/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I45e1c65ef11f11e1b11ea85d0b248d27/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 2012 WL 3656454 (D.N.M.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I45e1c65ef11f11e1b11ea85d0b248d27/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I45e1c65ef11f11e1b11ea85d0b248d27/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  145. White v. Graceland Coll. Ctr. for Prof’l Dev. & Lifelong Learning, Inc., 586 F.R.D. 1250 (D. Kan. 2008). ↑
  146. See **[McNulty v. Reddy Ice Holdings, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3e88e9971ffa11e0aa23bccc834e9520/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3e88e9971ffa11e0aa23bccc834e9520/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 271 F.R.D. 569 (E.D. Mich. 2011)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3e88e9971ffa11e0aa23bccc834e9520/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3e88e9971ffa11e0aa23bccc834e9520/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  147. [Eastman Kodak Co. v. Sony Corp.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6f1d0fb4198211db8ac4e022126eafc3/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6f1d0fb4198211db8ac4e022126eafc3/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 2006 WL 2039968 (W.D.N.Y.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6f1d0fb4198211db8ac4e022126eafc3/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6f1d0fb4198211db8ac4e022126eafc3/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  148. [In](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ieeffdb0cf42411e0a9e5bdc02ef2b18e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ieeffdb0cf42411e0a9e5bdc02ef2b18e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ieeffdb0cf42411e0a9e5bdc02ef2b18e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ieeffdb0cf42411e0a9e5bdc02ef2b18e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[re](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ieeffdb0cf42411e0a9e5bdc02ef2b18e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ieeffdb0cf42411e0a9e5bdc02ef2b18e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ieeffdb0cf42411e0a9e5bdc02ef2b18e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ieeffdb0cf42411e0a9e5bdc02ef2b18e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[Aspartame Antitrust Litig.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ieeffdb0cf42411e0a9e5bdc02ef2b18e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ieeffdb0cf42411e0a9e5bdc02ef2b18e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 817 F. Supp. 2d 608 (E.D. Pa. 2011)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ieeffdb0cf42411e0a9e5bdc02ef2b18e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ieeffdb0cf42411e0a9e5bdc02ef2b18e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  149. [Chenault v. Dorel Indus., Inc. (In re Chenault)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id873fec0a16a11dfa7f8a35454192eb4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id873fec0a16a11dfa7f8a35454192eb4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id873fec0a16a11dfa7f8a35454192eb4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id873fec0a16a11dfa7f8a35454192eb4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[2010 WL 3064007 (W.D. Tex.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id873fec0a16a11dfa7f8a35454192eb4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id873fec0a16a11dfa7f8a35454192eb4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  150. [Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Brudnicki,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I7e2571c3d74311e2a98ec867961a22de/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I7e2571c3d74311e2a98ec867961a22de/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 291 F.R.D. 669 (N.D. Fla. 2013)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I7e2571c3d74311e2a98ec867961a22de/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I7e2571c3d74311e2a98ec867961a22de/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  151. Plantronics, Inc. v. Aliph, Inc., 2012 WL 5269667 (N.D. Cal.). ↑
  152. [Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2003975de86611e1b60bb297d3d07bc5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2003975de86611e1b60bb297d3d07bc5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 285 F.R.D. 331 (E.D. Pa. 2012)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2003975de86611e1b60bb297d3d07bc5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2003975de86611e1b60bb297d3d07bc5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  153. [Parsi v. Daioleslam, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I66e11a9db16111e4a807ad48145ed9f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I66e11a9db16111e4a807ad48145ed9f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[778 F.3d 116 (D.C. Cir. 2015)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I66e11a9db16111e4a807ad48145ed9f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I66e11a9db16111e4a807ad48145ed9f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  154. [Sexton v. Lecavalier,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iedd3f4e6c18c11e381b8b0e9e015e69e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iedd3f4e6c18c11e381b8b0e9e015e69e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 11 F. Supp. 3d 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iedd3f4e6c18c11e381b8b0e9e015e69e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iedd3f4e6c18c11e381b8b0e9e015e69e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  155. [Venture Corp. Ltd. v. Barrett,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic9883060562211e48a659e8e19b67796/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic9883060562211e48a659e8e19b67796/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ Case No. 2014 WL 5305575 (N.D. Cal.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic9883060562211e48a659e8e19b67796/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic9883060562211e48a659e8e19b67796/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  156. [Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I25fd6424425911df9988d233d23fe599/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I25fd6424425911df9988d233d23fe599/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 2010 WL 1336937 (S.D. Cal.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I25fd6424425911df9988d233d23fe599/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I25fd6424425911df9988d233d23fe599/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  157. [Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5bc519e6542411d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5bc519e6542411d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5bc519e6542411d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5bc519e6542411d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)(imposing cost and fee-shifting as well as an adverse inference instruction). ↑
  158. See **[Paisley Park Enterprises, Inc. v. Boxill,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8ddcfdf03fbd11e987fd8441446aa305/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8ddcfdf03fbd11e987fd8441446aa305/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 330 F.R.D. 226 (D. Minn. 2019)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8ddcfdf03fbd11e987fd8441446aa305/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8ddcfdf03fbd11e987fd8441446aa305/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  159. [Victor Stanely, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I24f3db24c72611df84cb933efb759da4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I24f3db24c72611df84cb933efb759da4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 269 F.R.D. 497 (D. Md. 2010)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I24f3db24c72611df84cb933efb759da4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I24f3db24c72611df84cb933efb759da4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  160. [Ferron v. Echostart Satellite, LLC](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I164ebea2140b11e080558336ea473530/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I164ebea2140b11e080558336ea473530/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 410 Fed. App’x. 903 (6th Cir. 2010)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I164ebea2140b11e080558336ea473530/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I164ebea2140b11e080558336ea473530/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  161. [United States v. 25.02 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Douglas Cnty., State of Colo., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I213ba579905411d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I213ba579905411d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[495 F.2d 1398 (10th Cir. 1974)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I213ba579905411d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I213ba579905411d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
    • See, e.g., *Minn. R. Civ. P. 34, Advisory Committee’s Notes. ↑
  163. [Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0792789014e711e79eadef7f77b52ba6/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0792789014e711e79eadef7f77b52ba6/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[852 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2017)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0792789014e711e79eadef7f77b52ba6/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0792789014e711e79eadef7f77b52ba6/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  164. [In re Modern Plastics Corp., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia412499049aa11e89d46ed79fb792237/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia412499049aa11e89d46ed79fb792237/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[890 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 2018)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia412499049aa11e89d46ed79fb792237/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia412499049aa11e89d46ed79fb792237/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  165. [Nidec Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5ab9e194301511dcaba8d9d29eb57eff/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5ab9e194301511dcaba8d9d29eb57eff/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 249 F.R.D. 575 (N.D. Cal. 2007)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5ab9e194301511dcaba8d9d29eb57eff/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5ab9e194301511dcaba8d9d29eb57eff/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  167. [Snow v. Knurr](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id4122380abbc11e8a5d58a2c8dcb28b5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id4122380abbc11e8a5d58a2c8dcb28b5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 2018 WL 4101519 (W.D. Mo.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id4122380abbc11e8a5d58a2c8dcb28b5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id4122380abbc11e8a5d58a2c8dcb28b5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  168. [Fla. Media, Inc. v. World Publ’ns, LLC,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id9b2de382b3911dbb0d3b726c66cf290/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id9b2de382b3911dbb0d3b726c66cf290/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 236 F.R.D. 693 (M.D. Fla. 2006)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id9b2de382b3911dbb0d3b726c66cf290/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id9b2de382b3911dbb0d3b726c66cf290/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  169. Koopman v. Robert Bosch LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88332 (S.D.N.Y.). ↑
  170. [Guy Chem. Co. v. Romaco AG](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3d29708f0b9911dcaf8dafd7ee2b8b26/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3d29708f0b9911dcaf8dafd7ee2b8b26/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 243 F.R.D. 310 (N.D. Ind. 2007)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3d29708f0b9911dcaf8dafd7ee2b8b26/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3d29708f0b9911dcaf8dafd7ee2b8b26/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  171. [Seattle Times Co. v. LeatherCare, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I96188f60d86411e6960ceb4fdef01e17/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I96188f60d86411e6960ceb4fdef01e17/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 232 F. Supp. 3d 959 (E.D. Mich. 2017)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I96188f60d86411e6960ceb4fdef01e17/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I96188f60d86411e6960ceb4fdef01e17/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  172. [Miceli v. Mehr](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ibd151e70cd9111e8afcec29e181e0751/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ibd151e70cd9111e8afcec29e181e0751/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 2018 WL 4925689 (D. Conn.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ibd151e70cd9111e8afcec29e181e0751/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ibd151e70cd9111e8afcec29e181e0751/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  174. [Williams v. Big Picture Loans, LLC,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I58d630802b6a11e8a03499277a8f1f0a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I58d630802b6a11e8a03499277a8f1f0a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 303 F. Supp. 3d 434 (E.D. Va. 2018)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I58d630802b6a11e8a03499277a8f1f0a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I58d630802b6a11e8a03499277a8f1f0a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  175. See **[Legal Voice v. Stormans Inc., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4c2203c5722911e38913df21cb42a557/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4c2203c5722911e38913df21cb42a557/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[738 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2013)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4c2203c5722911e38913df21cb42a557/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4c2203c5722911e38913df21cb42a557/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  176. See **[In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I70f4882a00b411ddb595a478de34cd72/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I70f4882a00b411ddb595a478de34cd72/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 249 F.R.D. 8 (D. Mass. 2008)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I70f4882a00b411ddb595a478de34cd72/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I70f4882a00b411ddb595a478de34cd72/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  177. [Europlay Capital Advisors LLC,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie1c56a701df311e885eba619ffcfa2b1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie1c56a701df311e885eba619ffcfa2b1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 323 F.R.D. 628 (C.D. Cal. 2018)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie1c56a701df311e885eba619ffcfa2b1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie1c56a701df311e885eba619ffcfa2b1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  178. [EEOC v. Tex. Roadhouse, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4a7d6c2339a811e4a795ac035416da91/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4a7d6c2339a811e4a795ac035416da91/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 303 F.R.D. 1 (D. Mass. 2014)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4a7d6c2339a811e4a795ac035416da91/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4a7d6c2339a811e4a795ac035416da91/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  179. [Cascade Yarns, Inc. v. Knitting Fever, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie853c109f87d11e39488c8f438320c70/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie853c109f87d11e39488c8f438320c70/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 755 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2014)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie853c109f87d11e39488c8f438320c70/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie853c109f87d11e39488c8f438320c70/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  180. [Bada Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If46b7f8654c011d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If46b7f8654c011d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 32 F.R.D. 208 (S.D. Cal. 1963)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If46b7f8654c011d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If46b7f8654c011d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  181. [Premium Serv. Corp. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I05ad2036909111d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I05ad2036909111d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[511 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I05ad2036909111d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I05ad2036909111d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  182. See **[Allender v. Raytheon Aircraft Co.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I9e9240bc541d11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I9e9240bc541d11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 220 F.R.D. 661 (D. Kan. 2004)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I9e9240bc541d11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I9e9240bc541d11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  183. [Total Rx Care, LLC v. Great N. Ins. Co.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3330533003d211e79f02f3f03f61dd4d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3330533003d211e79f02f3f03f61dd4d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 318 F.R.D. 587 (N.D. Tex. 2017)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3330533003d211e79f02f3f03f61dd4d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3330533003d211e79f02f3f03f61dd4d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  184. Deuss v. Siso, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121464 (N.D. Cal.). ↑
  185. [Auto. Inspection Servs., Inc. v. Flint Auto Auction, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifb756683913d11dcbd4c839f532b53c5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifb756683913d11dcbd4c839f532b53c5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 69 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 431 (E.D. Mich. 2007)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifb756683913d11dcbd4c839f532b53c5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifb756683913d11dcbd4c839f532b53c5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  186. See **[Valcor Eng’g Corp. v. Parker Hannifin Corp.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia5f8a0b0a44a11e8a5d58a2c8dcb28b5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia5f8a0b0a44a11e8a5d58a2c8dcb28b5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 2018 WL 3956732 (C.D. Cal.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia5f8a0b0a44a11e8a5d58a2c8dcb28b5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia5f8a0b0a44a11e8a5d58a2c8dcb28b5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  187. [State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Elite Health Centers, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib885e140cdb011e88037ff68a1223ab1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib885e140cdb011e88037ff68a1223ab1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 364 F. Supp. 3d 758 (E.D. Mich. 2018)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib885e140cdb011e88037ff68a1223ab1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib885e140cdb011e88037ff68a1223ab1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  188. See **[Mount Hope Church v. Bash Back, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I166641c438c111e28a21ccb9036b2470/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I166641c438c111e28a21ccb9036b2470/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[705 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 2012)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I166641c438c111e28a21ccb9036b2470/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I166641c438c111e28a21ccb9036b2470/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  189. [5 U.S.C.A. § 552](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N80B2C7604A0911E69C0FE30FEF04D3AC/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N80B2C7604A0911E69C0FE30FEF04D3AC/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
  190. For a compilation of state acts relating to access to governmental information, *see *Guidebook to the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts, App. C (Robert F. Bouchard & Justin D. Franklin eds.). ↑
  191. [5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(3)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N80B2C7604A0911E69C0FE30FEF04D3AC/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N80B2C7604A0911E69C0FE30FEF04D3AC/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑