Chapter 7: Interrogatories

Interrogatories let an advocate obtain discoverable information from another party through prepared questions — economical, flexible, party-binding written discovery that, used selectively under Rules 26 and 33, locates witnesses and documents and particularizes the factual and legal bases of pleadings.

Chapter 7

■ ■ ■

What hath God wrought?

Numbers 23:23

Quoted by Samuel F.B. Morse on the discovery of the telegraph

§ 7.1 Introduction

You may never have the opportunity to submit interrogatories to a deity, but you can obtain discoverable information from another party through prepared questions. This Chapter analyzes and explains discovery rules, tactics, and strategies relating to interrogatories.

The applicable rules of the jurisdiction determine the availability and usefulness of interrogatories. Some jurisdictions permit a broad and liberal use of interrogatories. Other jurisdictions restrict their availability and use.

Federal Rules 26 and 33 govern when information needs to be disclosed and how interrogatories may be used. The federal rules and some state court rules require a party to affirmatively disclose information early in a case in support of claims or defenses. Opposing parties do not need to submit interrogatories seeking this information.

The federal rules also control the timing of interrogatories. Parties may only serve interrogatories after they have conferred to discuss discovery issues and may not automatically submit interrogatories with pleadings. The federal rules further limit the number of interrogatories a party may serve to a maximum of 25 questions. Many state jurisdictions have imposed similar restrictions on interrogatories.

In many cases, interrogatories are used routinely, and in other cases only selectively. Attorneys and judges have a variety of views regarding the usefulness of interrogatories depending on the type of case involved. Some believe interrogatories can be used selectively with successful results. They understand that the best use of interrogatories is to seek specific, objective information. Others believe that interrogatories are difficult to effectively compose or often result in unhelpful or qualified answers. Some practitioners prefer to use document production requests and depositions instead of interrogatories to obtain most information. Other lawyers cooperate with each other and exchange information without the need for submitting any or numerous interrogatories.

The rules of all jurisdictions permit parties to use interrogatories, and advocates should continue to use them when needed and when no other discovery request is available to produce the necessary information. Arbitration rules and administrative regulations also allow the use of interrogatories in many arbitrations and administrative cases. The approaches discussed in this Chapter reflect the more effective uses for interrogatories and responses in all tribunals.

§ 7.1.1 Advantages

As a discovery device, the interrogatory has several benefits:^[1]^

• It can be an economical, simple, speedy, and efficient discovery method.
• It is a flexible method. You can ask different types of questions in different sets at different times during the pendency of a case.
• It is a homing device. It will find specific information and the best source, witness, employee, agent, or other person who has relevant knowledge.
• It can locate documents. It can determine the existence of and location of discoverable and difficult to find documents.
• It is the intended method to particularize the factual and legal bases of pleadings.
• It considers nothing sacred. It draws on the collective knowledge of the other party and employees and agents and will discover information known to the other attorney.
• It complements other methods of discovery. Answers received can be used to determine the best persons for later depositions or the best documents and e-discovery for a subsequent request for production.
• It reveals information that will put the parties in realistic and informed positions from which to negotiate a settlement or stipulate to agreed facts.

§ 7.1.2 Disadvantages

Of course, interrogatories have limitations and risks, including:^[2]^

• They may be directed only to parties to the action.
• They are limited in number.^[3]^
• They permit less than satisfactory responses. The other party and attorney may draft answers to make that party look like a saint.
• They do not permit spontaneity. You cannot easily ask follow-up questions.
• They can be difficult to draft. You have to submit concise, precise questions that even a resurrected Clarence Darrow or Clara Shortridge Foltz would have to answer fully and objectively.
• They may become uneconomical if your overzealous opponent responds with defensive tactics that require motions and memos.
• They can help the opposition. A comprehensive set may require an opponent to better prepare a case in order to fully respond.

§ 7.1.3 Parties Can Be Questioned

Interrogatories may be served only upon another party to the action, not upon non-party witnesses.^[4]^ The party need not be an adverse party but may be a third party, co-party, wild party, whatever. Likewise, interrogatories must be addressed to a party, not to an officer or employee agent or an attorney.^[5]^ They may be addressed to a prospective party for purposes of perpetuating testimony under the rarely used auspices of Rule 27. Improperly addressed interrogatories may be objected to, stricken, or even ignored by opposing counsel.

§ 7.1.4 Timing of Interrogatory Submissions

The applicable rules of the jurisdiction determine when interrogatories may be served on other parties. The federal rule is that interrogatories may not be served until the parties have met and conferred to discuss discovery issues as required by Federal Rule 26(f) and a discovery schedule is established. The general rule in most state court jurisdictions is that interrogatories may be served by a plaintiff with a summons and complaint or may be served by any party at any time after commencement of an action. Some jurisdictions have local rules that expand or restrict the timing of interrogatories.

The applicable rules of the forum also determine whether attorneys may agree to establish their own interrogatory schedule. Federal Rule 29(b) requires court approval for a stipulation by counsel that varies the timing of interrogatories if the timing interferes with a court deadline for completing discovery. Federal judges and many state judges prefer to control the timing of discovery, including the use of interrogatories.

Responses by a party to interrogatories are usually due within 30 days. More time may be necessary to acquire the responsive information. The parties may agree to a longer or shorter period for response, or the court may order a different time period.

Interrogatories may be submitted periodically during a case. A second set of questions is often required to clarify or expand on answers received in the first set or from a deposition or document. It is sometimes helpful to submit follow-up revised questions after receiving objections or inadequate responses to a previous set. The number of sets can be limited if the interrogatories exceed the allowed number or if numerous sets become burdensome or harassing.

A second aspect of timing is that interrogatories are often used in the early stages of discovery to obtain general information. Interrogatories frequently precede depositions in the discovery process, and allow the discovering attorney to decide whom to depose, what areas merit inquiry, and whether documents might be available (through a Rule 34 request) or at the deposition (by Rule 30 or 45). Interrogatories may also precede a complete document production request by disclosing the existence of certain documents.

§ 7.2 Subject Matter of Interrogatories

§ 7.2.1 Available Information

The federal rules and some state court rules require parties to affirmatively disclose specific information to all other parties without the need for interrogatories seeking this information. Federal Rule 26(a):

(1) Requires initial disclosures of specific information regarding witnesses, documents, damages, and insurance. See § 5.3.

(2) Imposes on parties the disclosure of information about expert testimony and reports in advance of trial to allow opponents reasonable time to prepare for trial based on this evidence. See § 5.9.

(3) Requires parties to disclose trial evidence.

Federal Rule 26(a) limits these automatic disclosures to information that the disclosing party may use to support claims or defenses. Parties need not voluntarily disclose other information, including information unsupportive of their position. An opposing party who does not receive required voluntary disclosures may seek a court order compelling compliance with [Rule 26](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0), or could submit interrogatories seeking such information if the interrogatory numerical limit will not be exceeded.

Certain types of information should not be sought through interrogatories if the information can be more effectively obtained through other discovery devices. Evidence based upon testimony or interpretive explanations and information dependent on the demeanor and credibility of a person may be better sought through depositions. Material regarding the content of documents may be better left to document production requests. Some factual statements may be obtained through responses to requests for admissions. Categories of information that interrogatories can disclose in an effective and economical way include specific, objective types of information. The following sections explain these categories.

§ 7.2.2 Primary Information

In state court jurisdictions that do not follow the federal rules, the following information can be sought through interrogatories. In federal cases, much of this information is required to be voluntarily disclosed without the need for interrogatories. Information not required to be disclosed in federal cases can be sought through Rule 33 interrogatories, including the following:^[6]^

• The identity (name, address, email, and phone number) of every person likely to have discoverable relevant information and the identification of the subject matter of this information.
• The existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of relevant documents and electronically stored information, including emails, social network communications, witness statements, data compilations, materials, and tangible things.
• Specific information about damages sought, the computation of these damages and a description of any documents and materials supporting the damages and computations.
• The existence and coverage of liability or other insurance.
• The identities of expert witnesses who will testify at trial, are employees of a party, or have been retained or specially employed.
• Specific information about expert trial witnesses including their opinions, basis of opinions, and information relied on by the expert, identification of exhibits used by the expert, identification of reports completed by the expert, qualifications of the expert, a list of publications authored by the expert, compensation paid to the expert, and a listing of other cases in which the expert has testified as an expert witness at trial or by deposition.

These categories of information can and should be sought in cases when disclosure rules do not apply or when there is a reasonable concern whether the appropriate disclosures have been made.

§ 7.2.3 Objective Information

Interrogatories may be effectively submitted relating to the following categories in all jurisdictions:^[7]^

• Information about persons, witnesses, documents, materials, and insurance that were not voluntarily disclosed by other parties and that are relevant to claims or defenses;
• Specific information explaining pleading allegations in detail, including facts, existence of documents, quantitative data, and supportive evidence;
• Identities of persons providing a party with statements;^[8]^
• Persons with relevant information who have been discovered during investigations;^[9]^
• Facts elicited from a witness who gave no written statement and who has become unavailable;^[10]^
• Information concerning letters, memoranda, notes, emails, blog posts, websites, and other materials that a party or witness has written, composed, signed, or read;
• Social network communications that contain relevant information, pictures, photos, or videos;
• Summary explanations of technical data and statistics, manuals, reports, studies, and materials containing technical information;
• Other contacts or transactions between or relating to the parties before or after the events of the case;^[11]^
• Same or very similar incidents, complaints, problems encountered by third persons and related to the subject matter of the case;^[12]^
• Business and corporate information concerning the principal place of business, date of corporation, state of incorporation, and states that license the business;
• Financial information, including financial status of a business and income, assets, and liabilities of parties;^[13]^
• Financial worth of a defendant facing a punitive damage claim;
• Government licenses that regulate facets of a party’s conduct;^[14]^
• Measurements, including accurate answers or best estimates of time, distance, speed, location, and other dimensions;
• Information relevant to a writ of execution under Rule 69;
• Facts supporting the court’s jurisdiction;^[15]^
• The opposing lawyer’s world polo status or contract bridge ranking.

§ 7.2.4 Additional Information

Other subject areas are ripe for interrogatories. We offer some explanation as to their efficacy and limitations.

• The specific information that a party knows about a case may be obtained if the request is properly phrased.^[16]^ But such requests may be broad or vague; the information sought may appear in a printed statement; responses may be self-serving and unsatisfactory; and so, depositions often provide a much better vehicle to obtain this information. A request for the summary of the “substance or subject matter” known by a witness may even be difficult or impossible to be helpfully answered.^[17]^ It may be productive to limit this request to what a person specifically knows about specific details.
• Interrogatories may request that documents or electronically stored information be provided in lieu of an answer to a specific question, although Federal Rule 34 is a more appropriate vehicle for obtaining these materials. Further, these questions can be phrased as an instruction statement and placed in the introduction, saving an interrogatory. Rule 34 is also more appropriate since no numerical limits may exist on requests for documents unless imposed by rule or court order. It is a common practice among many lawyers to combine a Rule 34 request with Rule 33 interrogatories to obtain documents as well as answers, utilizing the best of both methods.
• Interrogatories may be phrased as an admission, because often a question is both a proper interrogatory and an appropriate request for admission. In that case, it is wise to use Rule 36 admission requests because there likely are no numerical limits. Not all questions can be rephrased, though. The interrogatory, “State all facts upon which you base your claim of failure to warn in Paragraph 3 of the Complaint,” may be much preferable to the request for admission, “You know of no facts upon which you base your claim for failure to warn."^[18]^
• Interrogatories may ask whether the party will agree to supplement the answers to all or certain questions. These types of questions also may be phrased as statements and included in the preface, or even asked in an email or cover letter with the interrogatories. Federal Rule 26(e) details which, if any, answers need to be supplemented. Some attorneys will supplement responses if asked regardless of the dictates of the rule. Others rely on the rule requiring supplementation without using an interrogatory.
• The names and identities of witnesses who will testify at the trial may be requested in an interrogatory. Federal Rule 26(b) has no language either allowing or disallowing such information. The majority of courts reviewing the propriety of lists of trial witnesses have ruled that the information need not be disclosed because it is a pretrial, rather than a discovery, matter.^[19]^ And the responding lawyer can accurately respond: “To be determined after discovery completed.”
• Questions asking why a party did or did not do something, or could or could not have accomplished something, can be effective. For example, the following interrogatories may be asked:

1. Why did you drive your car into the left rear of the classic 1957 classic Chevrolet Bel-Air convertible on the date of the collision?
2. In what way could you have avoided the collision?^[20]^

But responses to such questions are often not particularly revealing. The answer to the first question may be “The Chevy failed to move forward” without disclosing anything useful. The answer to the second question might reveal something, but is better reserved as a deposition question. A later section (§ 7.6) discusses the propriety of responses.

• Interrogatories may seek to identify persons who prepared or who were consulted with regard to the answers. This type of question is proper if it seeks the identity of any person who assisted with the response and who has knowledge of the information in the response. But questions may be improper if they search for the identity of all persons who participated in the mental processes and strategies involved in drafting responses, since this involves obtaining information of nondiscoverable mental impressions and work product, categories excluded by Federal Rule 26.^[21]^

§ 7.2.5 Opinions and Contentions

Federal Rule 33(a)(2) explains the propriety of interrogatories that inquire into opinions and contentions:

An interrogatory may relate to any matter that may be inquired into under Rule 26(b). An interrogatory is not objectionable merely because it asks for an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to fact, but the court may order that the interrogatory need not be answered until designated discovery is complete, or until a pretrial conference or another time.

Interrogatories may be used effectively to obtain information relating to a party’s contentions*.*^[22]^ For example, “Do you contend that plaintiff was contributorily negligent regarding the accident on June 21?” This question will usually be followed with a question seeking the basis for the contention: “State all facts upon which you base such contention."^[23]^ Not all courts favor contention interrogatories.^[24]^ Some will restrict them to situations where no other more practical discovery device will produce the sought after information.

Rule 33(a)(2) resolves some problems surrounding the scope of permissible questions:

• Interrogatories may seek factual opinions and conclusions;^[25]^
• Interrogatories may obtain answers that pursue contentions or relate the application of law to facts;^[26]^
• Interrogatories seeking purely legal conclusions unrelated to the facts will be improper;^[27]^
• Valid objections may be interposed to objectionable questions, and that implies that questions can be objectionable;
• A judge has the discretion to postpone compelling answers to some questions if the circumstances warrant a postponement (e.g., it is too early in the case to expect the party to fully respond).

Unresolved are two major questions. First, in what situations will questions be proper or objectionable? Second, what is the difference between a question that relates the application of law to fact and one that is a pure legal conclusion?

With regard to the first, it seems clear that interrogatories are proper that seek opinions and conclusions that: (1) relate to an “essential element” of a case, like a prima facie element; (2) pursue an answer that would serve a substantial purpose in the litigation, like enabling the party to determine the extent of proof required or narrowing the issues; (3) search for disclosures about issues the responding party has raised as a claim or defense; or (4) constitute requests for the factual basis supporting the responding party’s conclusory claims.^[28]^

Examples of such proper interrogatories include:

1. What acts of negligence were committed by defendant?

1(A). In addition to these alleged acts of negligence, upon what other grounds does plaintiff base the claim asserted in paragraph 3 of the Complaint?^[29]^

It seems unclear why minor variations in language transform an improper conclusory question into a proper opinion interrogatory. The question “Why did the material fall from or above the defendant’s property onto North St. on December 3” was held inappropriate; but the interrogatory “How, if you know, did the material fall . . .?” was considered to be proper.^[30]^

With regard to the second unresolved question, it is clear that an interrogatory that seeks a legal conclusion unrelated to the facts is improper.^[31]^ An interrogatory that seeks a legal conclusion but that relates such contention to the facts is appropriate. It is proper, for instance, for a party to ask whether a defendant finance company was an “assignee” of plaintiff’s promissory notes from a co-defendant.^[32]^ It is also appropriate for a party to ask whether the opponent is relying upon some presumption of fact or law regarding a situation in a case and, if so, the nature of that presumption.

An interrogatory may properly ask whether a party contends that a certain claim or defense applies to the case, but may not ask whether such legal claim or defense is legally controlling or dispositive of the issues. It is proper for a plaintiff to ask whether the defendant contends anyone observed plaintiff commit an act believed criminal in nature, but not whether plaintiff committed a criminal act.^[33]^ It appears inappropriate for one party to ask another party’s opinion regarding the legal competency of a potential witness as this has been held to be strictly a question of evidence best left to the trial court.^[34]^

It is unclear how some courts distinguish between “pure” legal questions and “mixed” questions of law and fact. Some courts distinguish between form and substance, ala Plato. A legal question that seeks general legal information is improper, whereas a question that requires an answer mixing law with facts of the case is proper.^[35]^ For example, the following question was held proper as an application of law to facts:

In respect to each act and/or utterance listed in response to interrogatory 1, above, explain the manner in which each said act and/or utterance (a) violated plaintiff’s responsibility toward [defendants] and (b) interfered with [defendants] performance of their respective legal or contractual obligations.

The same court declared that the following, similar question improperly sought a pure legal conclusion unrelated to the facts:

In respect to each and every constitutional provision listed in response to Interrogatory 2, state and explain the reason why each provision is not effected [sic] by operation of 29 U.S.C.A. § 411(b). . . .^[36]^

Still another court required a party to specify the foreign law relied upon in its claims and defenses, by explaining the substance of the law and including authority citations.^[37]^ It seems clear that interrogatories drafted to include some facts of the case and to seek some contention of the party will be appropriate within the meaning of [Rule 33(a)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N4CB6E640B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N4CB6E640B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). But it remains difficult to articulate specific criteria. Maybe, like another elusive standard, the judges know it when they read it.

§ 7.3 Interrogatory Format

The document containing the interrogatories commonly includes several parts: a preface, instructions, and definitions, followed by the questions themselves. Not all formats require the first three components, but there is usually good reason to include them. Many courts have set forth rules regulating certain aspects of the proper interrogatory form.

The format and contents of interrogatories are commonly derived from form interrogatories successfully used in prior cases. Section 7.4.4 discusses this common practice and how it can be used most effectively. LLMs can assist with the makeup and composition of the format and accompanying questions. See § 1.2.7.

§ 7.3.1 Preface

The preface explains the basis of the request. For example:

Plaintiff requests that the defendant answer the following interrogatories in writing and under oath pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and that the answers be served on the plaintiff within thirty (30) days after service of these interrogatories.

There is no requirement under the rules that this statement be included, but tradition and professional custom favor the use of an explanatory preface. Some jurisdictions require that the initial paragraph include certain information, such as the number of interrogatories propounded.

§ 7.3.2 Instructions

Instructions may be included in the introduction to inform the other party about certain conditions in answering the interrogatories. Federal Rule 33 explains the process of answering, and instructions can restate these required procedures and suggest additional processes.

An instruction can clarify the nature and source of the information sought:

In answering these interrogatories, furnish all information, however obtained, including hearsay, that is available to you and information known by or in possession of yourself, your agents, and your attorneys, or appearing in your records.

[Rule 33(b)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N4CB6E640B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N4CB6E640B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) requires a corporate or government organization to furnish information through its officers and agents. This instruction paraphrases that rule. Case law and common practice very likely require a party to disclose such information even if not listed in an instruction.^[38]^

Another instruction can remind the recipient of the duty to conduct a reasonable investigation. Answers to interrogatories must contain all information possessed by the party.^[39]^ This reminder may prod an opponent into greater diligence and may clarify mutual expectations.

An instruction may also explain what to do if the party does not have information:

If you cannot answer the following interrogatories in full after exercising due diligence to secure the complete information to do so, state and answer to the extent possible: specifying your inability to answer the remainder, stating whatever information or knowledge you have concerning the unanswered portion, and detailing what you did in attempting to secure the unknown information.

Again, there is case law requiring a party to include such an explanation in response to a question that cannot be fully answered, even if this instruction is omitted.^[40]^

Another instruction can suggest an alternative to detailed written answers:

A question that seeks information contained in or information about or identification of any documents or electronically stored information (ESI) may be answered by providing a copy of such document or ESI file for inspection and reproduction or by furnishing a copy of the document or ESI without a request for production.

[Rule 33(d)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N4CB6E640B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N4CB6E640B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) expressly allows a responding party the option of supplying “business records” in answer to an interrogatory. This instruction reminds the other side that records, documents, and electronically stored information may be provided as an alternative or supplemental response.

Neither the rule nor this reminder permits the opposition to respond with a blizzard of incomprehensible documents or ESI. The [Rule 33(d)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N4CB6E640B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N4CB6E640B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) option is not a procedural device with which to evade the duty to supply information. Rather, the interrogated party must state specifically and identify precisely those documents and ESI that will provide the information sought by the interrogatories. Indeed, the rule explicitly states that the specification of documents and ESI must be detailed enough that the interrogating party can identify the records “as readily as can the party served.” “Here is the room, here is the computer, open the files, and try to find the materials” is totally inappropriate.

Another instruction may require supplementary answers:

These interrogatories shall be deemed to be continuing until and during the course of trial. Information sought by these interrogatories that you obtain after you serve your answers must be disclosed by supplementary answers.

This statement does not automatically make such questions continuing, unless the information must be supplemented pursuant to Rule 26(e) or unless the other party agrees to provide such information. However, the statement may encourage the updating of answers even if it does not compel such updating.

You may want to add another instruction specifying the time period relevant to the questions:

Unless otherwise indicated in an interrogatory, the questions shall refer to the time period from August 1 until August 16.

Additionally, an instruction can direct the party answering to provide some identifying information pursuant to Rule 33(b):

The person or persons who provide information in answer to the following interrogatories must each identify which answers have been provided and furnish name, title, identification, email, phone, and address for the respective answer or answers.

The practice in some cases may ignore the separate identification of all individuals who provided information contained in an answer. Often, only the party named or an individual or agent for a corporation signs the answers. Sometimes the signature of the party’s attorney appears on the answers. Rule 33(b) requires more specificity than that, however, and a requesting party needing such specificity can successfully enforce this rule.

Finally, other instructions may be added for other purposes, including the definition of certain terms.

§ 7.3.3 Definitions

Definitions may precede the interrogatories to define certain words or phrases used in the questions.^[41]^ They serve several purposes.

First, definitions specify the exact meaning of a word that may mean different things to different attorneys:

Describe: This word means to specify in detail and to particularize the content of the answer to the question and not just to state the reply in summary or outline fashion.

Definitions also identify a word or phrase that is peculiar to or commonly used throughout the interrogatories:

August 15 Contract: This term refers to the contract signed by both the plaintiff and the defendant on August 15, 2025, and attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint.

Third, definitions aid economy by shortening the questions, avoiding the need to repeat the meaning of a much-used term, such as:

The word document means any written, electronic, digital, recorded, printed, imprinted, digitized, video, photographic, or graphic matter, whether produced, reproduced, preserved, or stored on papers, cards, files, tapes, computer systems, electronic storage devices, disk drives, flash drives, hard drives, platforms, networks, cloud systems, websites or any other medium in your possession, custody, or control or known by you to exist, and including originals or copies and reproductions of originals.

This is a short version of the definition. Some examples fill a full page. A supplementary definition may include the identification of documents the other party disclosed in its initial disclosures mandated by Federal Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii). See § 5.3.5.

Finally, definitions can mask the exact number of questions asked by defining one term to include several subtopics. For example:

The word identify or identity, when used in reference to a natural person means to state that person’s full name, title, present business and home addresses, email address, phone numbers, present employer and position with employer, and the relationship, business or otherwise, between this person and the answering party.

This technique does have its moments. Excessive use of such definitions may result in a seemingly reasonable number of interrogatories being rendered excessively burdensome and thereby subject to a successful motion to strike all or a portion of the interrogatories. Some attorneys refrain from employing some definitions, viewing their use as an inadequate substitute for well-drafted individual questions.

§ 7.4 Drafting Interrogatories

§ 7.4.1 Effective Techniques

Interrogatories should contain clear, precise, direct questions. They should neither be vague, nor too broad, nor overly inclusive. As with nearly every legal task, LLMs can help with the development and content of effective questions. The questions should have the other attorney immediately thinking, “Yes, I understand what they want to know.” Such thinking comes easier for some lawyers than others.

Interrogatory drafting must take into consideration the myriad responses different advocates may make to seemingly straightforward, innocent questions. There are the responders, the ramblers, the self-servers, the quibblers, the evaders, and the objectors. Their responses to a simple interrogatory vary:

State the name of your spouse.

Responders: Roger S. Haydock.

Ramblers: My spouse retained his original name after our marriage. Roger means wise and courageous in Teutonic. Haydock means calling for medical help in English.

Self-Servers: Roger Haydock, but his income consists of law school wellness benefits, which are exempt from execution on a judgment against me in this case.

Quibblers: By name, do you mean first, middle, maiden, birth, baptismal, confirmation, sur-, or nick-?

Objectors: The answer is readily known to his favorite grandchildren and is privileged under newly proposed Evidence Rule 501™.

The adversary system allows attorneys to take advantage of situations involving questions that are not reasonable, clear indications of the information sought. Poorly drafted interrogatories inevitably produce poor responses on the principle that if you ask a foolish question, you should expect, and will receive, a foolish answer. Poorly drafted interrogatories may also allow your opponent to strike your interrogatories in their entirety.^[42]^ You can avoid this situation by playing the devil’s advocate after drafting your interrogatories:

• Consider whether a question can be redrafted more simply.
• Ask yourself how the answer to each interrogatory will provide you with information helpful to the case.
• Decide whether some questions can be eliminated or consolidated.
• Determine ways the responses to your questions could be fudged and then redraft the interrogatories to eliminate the fudge.
• Consider whether another discovery device would be more effective at producing the sought after information.

Remember that properly drafted interrogatories pursuing properly discoverable information must be answered in a properly responsive fashion. One of the rewards of careful drafting is a successful motion for Rule 37 sanctions if your opponent has been improperly non-responsive.

One effective drafting technique, particularly suitable for interrogatories, is the “ladder” or “branching” approach. A broad question is asked and then followed by specific questions relating to one or more of the possible responses. For example:

State whether defendant is a corporation or a partnership. If a corporation, identify the members of the board of directors. If a partnership, identify all the partners.

There are occasions when such drafting techniques may waste an interrogatory. A branching interrogatory may be phrased to receive a yes or no response followed by specific questions, but you may know, or be fairly certain, that the response will be yes, and be able to save an interrogatory. For example, a pleading may reveal that a defendant is a corporation. Rather than asking “State whether defendant is a corporation,” and then asking follow-up questions, merely ask the follow-up question, “State the date and state of defendant’s incorporation and its principal place of business.”

LLMs can help craft precise, case-specific interrogatories by integrating legal analysis with factual details. By analyzing relevant case law, statutes, and regulations—coupled with the case’s complaints, answers, and counterclaims—GenAI can identify key elements of each claim and defense, ensuring that interrogatories seek information directly relevant to proving or disproving essential points. LLM-backed tools can also extract critical facts from client documents, discovery materials, and interview summaries, refining questions to strengthen your case (and fill holes) while minimizing ambiguity and objections. Additionally, GenAI can shape targeted interrogatories that expose gaps or inconsistencies in the opposing party’s pleadings.

Beyond drafting, LLMs can also help prevent evasive or vague responses by simulating how an opposing party might answer and suggesting revisions—allowing the drafter to craft the interrogatories in a way that eliminates ambiguity. Using this Devil’s Advocate approach, GenAI can permit shadow boxing: Anticipating potential objections and refine questions to ensure clarity and expedient responses. As such, LLMs can help allow attorneys to draft interrogatories that are more strategic, precise, and resistant to evasion—maximizing their effectiveness.

§ 7.4.2 Number of Interrogatories

Drafting to conserve the number of interrogatories is a good idea in itself and is necessary in many cases. Federal Rule 33(a)(1) limits interrogatories to “no more than 25 written interrogatories, including all discrete subparts.” This limit applies to each party, and not to each side of a case.^[43]^ Many state courts also limit the number of interrogatories to no more than 20 or 40 interrogatories.

Some federal and state judges have issued orders further limiting the number of interrogatories that may be submitted. These modifications if reasonable and consistent with the purposes of discovery will be enforceable. Even if no strict numerical limit applies, serving an excessive number of interrogatories may create an undue demand on your opponent’s resources and allow a successful objection on the basis of disproportionateness or burdensomeness.^[44]^

Limiting the number of interrogatories in a case may deprive one or more parties of a sufficient opportunity to obtain relevant and necessary information from the opposition. This argument, or another good cause argument, can be advanced before a court, which then usually grants leave to submit additional questions.^[45]^ But not always, if more questions are unwarranted.^[46]^ The attorneys themselves can agree to respond to more interrogatories without court approval. Consequently, a court order or, more typically, a stipulation should permit a sufficient number of interrogatories in a case.

The rationale supporting limitations is to coerce attorneys into drafting relevant and concise interrogatories and to prevent the misuse, burden, and abuse that the submission of 1,246½ interrogatories creates for the responding party.^[47]^ This rationale justifies the limitations placed on the number of interrogatories in most cases. And although these numbers may seem firm on their face, there are conflicting opinions about what constitutes “one” interrogatory, even though we all learned in boarding pre-school that 1 + 1 = Mine. Rules, cases, and interpretations provide assistance in answering the question “How many is one?”

Federal Rule 33(a)(1) counts as one interrogatory “all discrete subparts.” This standard means that information sought about a specific event, transaction, or communication should be treated as a single interrogatory even though it requests the time, place, persons present, and contents or explanation for each such event, transaction or communication. A fair reading of the federal rule indicates that interrogatories may seek 25 separate kinds or distinct categories of information without violating the numerical limit restriction.

Some state rules, particularly those that limit interrogatories to a lower number, such as 20, count as one interrogatory a question with subparts that relate directly to the subject matter of the question. The interpretation of this rule, of course, focuses on what is or is not related directly—no simple interpretation. Other state rules provide that each subdivision or separate question will be counted as an interrogatory. The interpretation of this rule, similarly, focuses on what is or is not a subdivision of what is or is not a separate question. Some commentators have interpreted “subdivisions:”

Separate subdivisions may be found either by multiple questions or questions which are subparts of other questions. For example, the following would consist of four questions: “State where the defendant’s automobile was located at the time defendant first saw plaintiff’s automobile, the location of plaintiff’s automobile, the speed of defendant’s automobile, and the speed of plaintiff’s automobile.” The same question can be posed with subdivisions: “Did defendant see plaintiff’s automobile prior to the accident? If so, state: (a) where the defendant’s automobile was located at that time; (b) where plaintiff’s automobile was located; (c) the speed of defendant’s automobile; (d) the speed of plaintiff’s automobile."^[48]^

The latter example may count as one or possibly five questions. Alternatively, the inquiry could be composed to ask: “State the location and speed of both plaintiff’s automobile and defendant’s automobile when defendant first saw each one”? Does this example constitute only one question? Or two? Or four? Does a “subdivision” of a “separate” question include different topics? Distinct clauses? Does the use of a generic term to identify information, rather than listing specific types or examples, solve the problem of multiple-phrased questions? Aren’t you glad you took all those math and philosophy classes?

§ 7.4.3 Designing Techniques

Those of you who enjoyed reading the previous section can create your own penumbras. Those of you who have not yet become paranoid about interrogatory limits should consider yourselves fortunate. There are ways to minimize the potential paranoia.

First, you can rely on successful interrogatories used in prior cases that met the numerical limits. Questions from similar past cases that produced helpful information or avoided objections are a helpful precedent.

Second, the practice among many lawyers is to respond to interrogatories that may exceed the limitation, as long as they are not numbered over the limit and if they seem reasonable in length and scope.

Third, you can negotiate with the other attorney to obtain answers to questions beyond the limit. The other lawyer may also want to submit more questions, or may want information that you can provide in return. The federal rules require attorneys to confer and discuss discovery issues, including the number of interrogatories. You should seldom need court approval for additional interrogatories, unless a court order so demands.

Fourth, perhaps you should have added additional parties to the case. The rules usually allow you to submit the maximum number of interrogatories to each party in a case, and a pleading consideration can be the inclusion of legitimate parties, to take advantage of that allowance.

Fifth, you can try to convince a judge to permit more interrogatories, by employing such good cause arguments that the subject matter is complex, the case involves more discoverable information than a typical case, the other side has not cooperated in providing information, or you just can’t count very well. Some judges routinely grant these orders, while others require a showing of a legitimate need for the information.

Sixth, you can submit successive sets of interrogatories, reserving some questions until you review answers to previous ones. Most of the rules permit this flexibility. You can submit all your questions to a party at one time, or half each time, or one-fifth each time, as long as the total number does not exceed the limit and the number of different sets does not become harassing. Service of 50 different questions on 50 different days would be harassing, as well as silly, which is always a poor excuse.

Seventh, you can carefully draft your questions with the resolve and intent to package as much as possible in a single interrogatory and still compose a simple, direct, and precise question. The following techniques may help you achieve the drafting goals explained above:

• Avoid prefacing sublistings with letters or numbers. The use of (a), (b), (c) and (1), (2), (3) may create a subdivision when in fact there is no separate subdivision. Just list the subtopics.
• Do not separate subtopics conspicuously, with conjunctive or disjunctive words or with unnecessary punctuation. Avoid using and, or, the, semicolons, and colons. Do not ask:

“Please state the name and address and the district number of the following educational institutions that plaintiff has attended: nursery school, kindergarten, grade school, high school, college, law school, and vocational school.”

Rather, ask: Identify all schools that plaintiff has attended.

• Reduce a clause or lengthy phrase to one word or a concise phrase. Try to reduce all species of a thing to the basic genus. Do not ask:

“Please state the color, number of wheels, size of windows, and texture of the bumpers of defendant’s self-propelled vehicular all terrain motor machine.”

Rather, ask: Describe in detail defendant’s Jeep. Or submit a Rule 34 request for a 360 degree video.

• Avoid multiple questions seeking multiple answers. Do not ask:

“State the names of the setter, swingperson, follower, chalker, and scorer of the Faculty Skittlepool Team.”

Rather, ask singular questions that require multiple answers, such as: Identify all members of the Faculty Skittlepool Team by name and position.

• Employ questions that pursue only one possible response from a list of alternative suggested answers, unless you do not want to suggest any answers. Ask:

State whether plaintiff is a descendant of an Australopithecus robustus, a Dryopithecus africanus, or a homo habilis.

Do not ask: “And just where did you come from?”

• Include necessary specifications or exact details in the interrogatory by using related words and subtopics and by detailing the several species of a common genus. Ask:

Describe plaintiff’s hair, including but not limited to the color, style, number of grey hairs, approximate length of sideburns, color of the roots, and the curvature in degrees of the cowlick.

Or, ask for the identity of the hair stylist who knows for sure.

• Use instructions and definitions when introducing interrogatories. A preceding section (§ 7.3) explains these uses.

These techniques can apply to situations in which the interrogatory rule limits the questions or counts subdivisions as separate questions.

LLMs can help leverage past successful questions, optimizing structure and content. By analyzing prior cases, GenAI can help identify interrogatories that avoided objections and produced substantive responses, refining them to fit the current case’s legal and factual context. LLM-backed tools can also rephrase multi-part questions to comply with numerical limits while maintaining clarity, eliminating redundancy to maximize efficiency. To prevent evasive answers, LLMs can flag ambiguous phrasing and refine wording to force precise, single-response answers (rather than vague or multi-faceted replies). With GenAI-backed tools, attorneys can craft effective interrogatories that elicit meaningful responses, all while minimizing objections and discovery disputes.

§ 7.4.4 Form Interrogatories

As previously described, interrogatories are commonly crafted by using and relying on previously used questions. These form or standardized interrogatories may be obtained from previous cases, may be required by court rules, or may be sought from colleagues or reliable LLM programs.

Previous success foretells future success, and if questions in other cases previously produced responsive answers, avoided objections, or survived motions challenging their use, then they can be employed with current success. Some courts require specific interrogatories to be used in certain cases, and those can be obtained directly from the applicable rules. Another good source will be practitioners. They may have time honored and court tested questions which may only require a change of names.

Other sources can provide standardized interrogatories. Internet searches, website postings, and form books can result in the production of ready-made or custom crafted questions. Identical sets of interrogatories may be used again and again in similar cases.

There are caveats. Systemized sets of interrogatories may not all be applicable to a case. Lawyers who indiscriminately use these forms face objections, receive answers that will be limited in scope, and face the wrath of judges who, too politely, consider such practice “undesirable.” Some courts have prohibited the use of standardized interrogatories, while others have adopted required forms. One court has condemned the use of ill-conceived form interrogatories, finding them all “produced by some word-processing machine’s memory of prior litigation."^[49]^

On the other hand, correctly used form questions can assist an attorney in efficiently and economically drafting questions. Standardized questions should be selectively used and mixed and matched with custom-made interrogatories to achieve a proper and appropriate balance.^[50]^ It can be especially helpful in practice to rely upon the ideas of others, particularly when such interrogatories have been drafted by experienced attorneys, have been accepted locally, and have been tested and approved by a bar committee or a court.^[51]^ You should review such forms and decide, interrogatory by interrogatory, which will be appropriate for your cases, which can be modified, and which must be discarded.

§ 7.5 Objections to Interrogatories

Federal Rule 33(b) requires a party who has been served with interrogatories either to answer or to object to the questions, usually within 30 days after service. The first tactical consideration involved in responding concerns the availability of appropriate and strategic objections. The second consideration is composing the answers themselves. If a party fails to respond timely, objections to any interrogatories will be waived, and the party will have to answer all the questions.^[52]^

Two factors limit the impact of the waiver. A court has the discretion to ignore an unintentional waiver and refuse to compel an answer to an interrogatory that is grossly improper.^[53]^ And an objection based upon privileged information or work product may not be waived by failure to respond in a timely fashion.^[54]^

The tactical considerations involved in objections are discussed in this section. Those surrounding the answers are discussed in § 7.6 below.

§ 7.5.1 Interposing Objections

Objections to interrogatories must be stated with specificity and must usually include all grounds to support the objection.^[55]^ Federal Rule 33(b)(4) requires that: “The grounds for objecting to an interrogatory must be stated with specificity. Any ground not stated in a timely objection is waived unless the court, for good cause, excuses the failure.” The objections may be served with the document containing answers to other interrogatories (which is the most common way) or in a separate document, and must be signed by the attorney.

Objections cannot be broad, blanket refusals to answer, but must be precise, valid reasons highlighting the deficiency of the question. A party may object legitimately to an entire set of inappropriate interrogatories, although a Rule 26 protective order may be the preferred remedy.^[56]^ Appropriate objections in federal cases with specific grounds include:

• Rule 26 objections, such as irrelevant or beyond the scope of Rule 26(B).
• Information sought disproportionate to the importance of the issues in the case.
• Improper legal conclusions, research, or explanations requested, and not the application of law to facts.
• Vague, ambiguous, unclear, confusing.
• Overly broad, searching for the identification of “all documents . . . which mention or pertain” to the issues.^[57]^
• Excessive detail and number (2,736).^[58]^ And how.
• Unduly burdensome, which the courts consider in the context of the following factors:

(a) The amount of research and time required and costs incurred (eight interrogatories that require researching 10,000 answers held burdensome);^[59]^

(b) The necessity for the information (compelling reasons in the case for burdensome answers);^[60]^

(c) Whether the benefit gained by the requesting party outweighs the burden placed on the responding party (interrogatories requesting information about a span of 20 years reduced to questions covering eight years);^[61]^

(d) The extent to which answers to the questions prepare the case of the requesting party (answers to questions about eyewitness observations could be obtained by the requesting party from the witnesses and by inspecting the accident site);^[62]^

(e) Whether the information was sufficiently disclosed in responses to other discovery requests (testified at a deposition).

• Privileged or trial preparation materials. This objection and grounds may need to be supported by a description of the information withheld. Rule 26(b)(5) requires the objecting party to describe the source of information or documents claimed to be privileged or trial preparation materials. See § 5.5.8.
• Documents, verbatim contents, or quantitative data sought are available by a Rule 34 production request.

The availability of this last objection depends more on custom and practice than on the law. Rule 34 only requires a “written request” to obtain access to documents and things. The same discovery document may properly contain interrogatories and a Rule 34 document production request. It is common practice in some locals to combine such requests in the same discovery submission. It is not acceptable practice in other areas, where two separate requests are expected.

§ 7.5.2 Ineffective Objections

Ineffective objections, usually not proper as determined by historic case law, include:

• The information is already known to the requesting party,^[63]^ though not all courts agree.^[64]^
• The information is equally available to the requesting party. If a party has the information, it should be disclosed regardless of its source and availability.^[65]^ But the cases are split on the matter. If the responding party does not have custody of the information,^[66]^ or if the answers are in the public domain, the responding party need not provide the answers.
• The response would be inadmissible at trial.^[67]^ Even though discovery relevancy is broader than trial relevancy, a question may pursue unusable information, although a response leading to the discovery of admissible evidence will be required.
• The scope of discovery is limited to a restricted interpretation of the issues and facts. The responding party cannot limit discovery to its own understanding of the facts or to its distinct theory of a case.^[68]^
• The interrogatory seeks an admission. Interrogatories, though identical to a request for an admission, must be answered.^[69]^
• The information can be obtained through a deposition. If otherwise proper, an interrogatory must be answered, even though answers at a deposition could provide adequate responses.^[70]^
• The question seeks factual opinions, conclusions, or legal contentions related to facts.^[71]^ These may be objected to if they are premature.
• The interrogatory invades work product. This general objection is not specific enough and ineffective.^[72]^
• The answer “does not seem to be any business” of the questioning party. Flippant responses are usually held improper, regardless of how much fun they can be to submit.^[73]^

§ 7.5.3 Objection Procedures

The party objecting to an interrogatory has the burden in any subsequent court proceeding to show the validity of the specific objection. This burden requires the party initially to state particular grounds for the objection.^[74]^ A bare refusal to answer an interrogatory or an objection on the grounds that the interrogatory is “improper” will usually not be recognized as an objection, but rather may be deemed as no response and a waiver of any objection.^[75]^ Subsequently, in a court proceeding, the objecting party has to show, by specific facts or by persuasive legal argument, the validity of the objection.^[76]^

Broadly based generalizations have long been held to be insufficient to sustain an objection burden. The amount of detail necessary for a proper and complete showing depends on the nature of the objection. For examples: An objection based upon Rule 26(b) may require only a legal memorandum discussing the relevancy standards. An objection based on burdensomeness may require a detailed affidavit by a business party, indicating the amount of work required to answer the question, including number of hours, number of employees, cost, extent of materials, and other factors.^[77]^ An objection based upon privileged information may require the judge to privately inspect the alleged privileged sources in camera. Unfounded objections subject a party and the attorney to appropriate sanctions.

LLMs can help streamline the objection process by identifying valid objections while filtering out improper or ineffective ones. By analyzing each interrogatory, GenAI can flag potential objections based on Rule 26, privilege protections, undue burden, vagueness, and other legitimate grounds. LLM-backed tools can then generate precise, well-supported objections tailored to the specific interrogatory, ensuring compliance with discovery rules. Additionally, GenAI can detect (and avoid) objections historically rejected by courts, reducing the risk of sanctions or compelled responses. As such, LLMs can help attorneys maintain credibility while effectively limiting overbroad or improper discovery requests.

§ 7.5.4 Response Options

Questions that are objectionable on legitimate grounds should still be answered in some situations. If the answer will not prejudice or harm a client’s case, it is usually advisable to answer the question, instead of wasting time and money objecting and facing the prospects of enforcement. This becomes even more advisable if disclosure of the information in an answer will strengthen a case for negotiation or other purposes.

If a question can be modified or qualified to avoid the objectionable feature, it may well be advisable to prepare a limited or partial answer. A broad, vague question may be interpreted narrowly and result in a limited answer. A question calling for mixed discoverable and non-discoverable information may be answered in part, by disclosing only the discoverable data.

The responding attorney has discretion either to respond partially to improper questions or to interpret some questions in a reasonable manner that will result in some response. Occasionally, objecting to a question, with a subsequent Rule 37 proceeding, may require a party to reveal more damaging information than a prompt answer. Strategically, objections to borderline interrogatories may also cause the opponent to object to borderline questions submitted by the objecting party.

§ 7.6 Answers to Interrogatories

A party must provide complete answers to interrogatories that are not objectionable in whole or in part. If an interrogatory is only objectionable in part, the non-objectionable part of the interrogatory must be answered. Interrogatory answers must be in writing and under oath signed by the party providing the information, and usually the attorney. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b) explains the precise details. The rules of many jurisdictions require that the question be stated before each answer.

The rules and strategic considerations should prompt the consideration of several approaches to interrogatory responses:

• Obtaining information from knowledgeable sources.
• Conducting a reasonable investigation for information.
• Assisting in preparing and drafting answers.
• Interpreting questions in a reasonable and rational manner.
• Answering questions with accurate and complete information.
• Qualifying responses with partial information.
• Fairly composing answers in the best possible way on behalf of the party.
• Reasonably disclosing as little harmful information as possible, or perhaps disclosing as much favorable information as possible.
• Pursuing an extension of time.
• Considering the ethical ramifications of alternative responses.
• Having a nightmare.

LLMs discussed in Section 1.2.7 can assist with strategic choices and potential responses.

§ 7.6.1 Sources of Information

Whoever answers individual interrogatories must have the knowledge or information to provide. Interrogatories addressed to an individual party must be answered by that party. Interrogatories addressed to a corporate, governmental, or other organizational entity must be answered by any officer or agent or employee who has the requisite information. Identical sets of interrogatories submitted to several parties may be jointly answered by whoever has such information.

[Rule 33(b)(5)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N4CB6E640B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N4CB6E640B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) requires the answers to be signed by the “person making them.” This could include a party, an agent, or an attorney. There is some doubt whether an organization need disclose the identity of all the persons assisting in the preparation of the answers or the source of particular information.^[78]^ Someone must sign for a corporate party; and it is usually sufficient that the officer, agent, or employee, or an attorney who acted as an officer or agent and collated the information, sign, rather than numerous individuals who assisted in the preparation and contributed bits and pieces of the final response.^[79]^ An organization may wish to disclose specific sources, if the information is obtained from third persons and the entity does not want to vouch for, or be bound by, the statements.

The disclosures of multiple sources may well be unduly burdensome. If an individual provided the information contained in a specific interrogatory, the name of that individual should be listed as the source of that response. If an entity collectively provided answers, it may be sufficient to list the executive or supervisor in charge of collecting the information. Who needs to or should sign depends on the circumstances, common sense, and compliance with the rules.

Parties must reveal whatever information they or their employees, officers, subsidiaries, and other agents:

• Know.
• Learned through hearsay.
• Believe to be true.
• Have in their records, documents, or electronically stored information.
• Have in their possession.
• Have control over.
• Can obtain through a séance.

A party must make a conscientious endeavor to make available all information that does not require undue labor or expense, although a party need not engage in outside research. The party should also be sure to inform the interrogating party of the effort expended, if the responding party is unable to respond fully to the interrogatory. This may eliminate the need for court intervention later, when the interrogating party alleges willful obfuscation of the issues.

LLMs can help facilitate interrogatory responses by searching discovery materials, pleadings, and client interviews to ensure accuracy and strategic framing. By analyzing documents, emails, and electronically stored information (ESI), GenAI can locate responsive details and summarize key evidence while minimizing unnecessary disclosures. LLM-backed tools can also cross-reference relevant claims, elements, and defenses, and prior discovery responses—all to maintain consistency and detect contradictions that could lead to inadvertent admissions. Additionally, GenAI can extract relevant details from interview transcripts and notes, structuring responses based on firsthand witness accounts for clarity and factual precision. Beyond fact-gathering, LLMs can help attorneys qualify responses strategically by suggesting precise language that fully answers the interrogatory, limits harmful admissions, and emphasizes favorable information.

§ 7.6.2 Duty to Investigate

A party has a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation to obtain information not readily available. This obligation does not prevent a responding party from answering “I don’t know” to a question, but it does limit the situations in which such a negative response will be appropriate. A business or other organizational party must search with its staff and through its documents for answers.

An interrogatory asked early in litigation may properly invoke an “I don’t know yet” response because it is premature, although the preferred answer is that the “investigation has not yet been completed.” The party who declines to answer a question because of little or no information needs to describe in the response the nature of the completed investigation, so that the requesting party can determine whether the investigation appears sufficient or whether additional investigation should be attempted.

The investigation need not be extensive to the point of being unreasonable. An answer indicating a lack of knowledge and no means of obtaining knowledge is appropriate. The responding party needs a good faith basis for declining to conduct a reasonable investigation, and a party whose response indicates a lack of knowledge must supplement that response if the party later acquires knowledge.^[80]^

§ 7.6.3 Reasonable Interpretation

Some questions permit more than one reasonable interpretation. The question may not be precisely drafted, the words or phrases may have more than one meaning, or the question may be objectionable in part. An attorney must interpret an interrogatory as a reasonable lawyer in good faith would read and understand the interrogatory. Unreasonable extrapolations, petty quibbling, and stretched interpretations have no place in determining what information an interrogatory pursues. Parties and their counsel must be responsive and forthcoming in their answers.^[81]^

An attorney may rely upon an authoritative source for assistance in interpreting words and phrases, including statutes, case law, custom, practice, treatises, articles, dictionaries, and other reliable and recognized sources—but not classical legal comics, cartoon books, or acrostics. Some attorneys are more prone to use these latter sources and apply uncommon sense in responding to interrogatories. Fortunately, all but a handful of advocates resist the temptation to act unreasonably. Unfortunately, though, the handful is still practicing.

§ 7.6.4 Preparation of Answers

The attorney can and should take an active role in drafting the answers. Indeed, the attorney is expected to assist in composing the answers for the party’s signature. A party or representative generally has to provide the requisite information but the lawyer can mold and shape the information into an appropriate and accurate response. A sample email or letter counsel can send to an individual client to obtain information is:

We are enclosing a copy of interrogatories served on us by the attorneys for [name of plaintiff or defendant] in this action. The law requires that you answer these questions fully, accurately, and in sufficient detail.

We have marked the questions that you should answer. We will answer the other questions on your behalf, based on the information that you provided us and that we have obtained. Please go over each question carefully and answer it as best you can. Do not guess. If the question calls for information contained in electronic records or paper files you have, locate and use those documents in preparing your answer or provide us with those identified materials and data. If the question calls for information that you do not have, describe your efforts in determining you do not have the information.

Please provide your numbered answers on a separate document or return them to us with these interrogatories. You may email or have them delivered to us. We will review your answers, supplement them with other available information, and send the final answers to you for your signature (or contact you for an appointment to discuss the matter further, *or *schedule a time for you to come to our office to sign). When completed, the answers will be provided to the [plaintiff/defendant] and may be filed with the court.

The rules require that these answers must be served within 30 days of _____, 20. Please prepare your answers and return them to us no later than _____, 20. This will allow us time to review and prepare the final responses. If you have any questions or problems in preparing these answers, please contact me.

Attorney

It is the advocate, and not the client, who best understands the tactics involved in answering interrogatories. Moreover, some questions require the attorney directly to provide the information. This is appropriate. The lawyer’s knowledge is part of the collective knowledge from which the party must supply answers. Such requests may be for information counsel knows (e.g., information contained in the file that the party does not know) or information solely within the lawyer’s expertise (the law or legal theory applicable to the facts).

§ 7.6.5 Composing Answers

An attorney can construct an answer by selecting words, phrases, clauses, and grammar that comprise a favorable yet honest response, a supportive yet responsive answer. One can promote the best interests of a client by phrasing answers in the best possible light leading to the best possible interpretation on behalf of a client, but such responses should not be unnecessarily self-serving or disingenuous. A lawyer may be able to describe, with integrity and legitimacy, the same events or circumstances in different terms from those of the opposing counsel, without distorting the information.

All responses must be interpreted with the same degree of reasonableness used in interpreting interrogatories. Parties who interpret a response in an unreasonable or hyper technical way cannot later claim prejudice because of their reliance on the unreasonable interpretation.^[82]^

§ 7.6.6 Qualifying Answers

Answers cannot be evasive, incomplete, or deceptive. Situations arise when a party cannot respond in whole or in part to a question, or may wish to qualify a response.

• If a party is unable to answer because of lack of information or for other reasons, that party must explain the reasons.^[83]^
• If a party does not know an answer at the time the responses are due, the party may explain so in a response and provide the information later in a supplementary answer.
• If a party bases a response upon documents, records, electronically stored information, or other sources of information, that party can preface a response with an explanation, such as: “According to records maintained by the defendant at its San Diego office. . . .”
• If a corporate, governmental, or other organizational party has difficulty determining who best knows responsive information, the answering party may explain the scope of its inquiry, with language such as “All employees of the plaintiff involved in the August 15 gas test reviewed this interrogatory and have no further (or the following) information.”
• A party may prefer to answer one interrogatory by referring to a previous response. This is appropriate as long as that prior response does answer the later interrogatory. A related problem involves reference to information obtained through another source, such as a deposition transcript or a pleading. Neither of these sources may be a sufficient referral, depending on the circumstances.
• If a party discloses hearsay information, the nature of the information can be explained.^[84]^ For example: “I do not personally have any firsthand information concerning this question, however I have been informed by . . .” or “Upon information and belief. . . .”
• A party not wishing to vouch for the accuracy of some information or to be bound to a response as an admission can explain the source of the information or its uncertain status.^[85]^ The response can be prefaced by wording such as: “The following information in response to this question was obtained from . . .” or “We do not know the answer to this question, but we have received information that. . . .”

LLMs can help ensure that qualifying answers are complete, accurate, and legally sound by flagging vague or evasive qualifications that may invite objections. GenAI can suggest precise language when a party lacks full information, offering proper qualifications while minimizing unnecessary admissions. LLM-backed tools can also cross-check responses against prior discovery and pleadings, maintaining consistency and avoiding contradictions. As such, LLMs can help counsel craft qualifying answers that are both strategic and compliant.

§ 7.6.7 Ensuring Complete Responses

Answers must be full and complete. All information known to the answering party must be disclosed, whether it is helpful, neutral, or harmful. An attorney compiling the information must be satisfied that it is accurate and complete. The following are examples of answers, in response to proper interrogatories, held to be insufficient by courts. These precedential cases continue to inform advocates regarding how to properly answer questions.^[86]^

1.* Interrogatory:* Please state in detail each action or omission the plaintiff claims constituted the negligence complained of in paragraph designated 4 of the complaint in this action.

Answer: Plaintiff is not able to answer interrogatory 2 inasmuch as he was under anesthesia at all times during the operation complained of in his complaint.

Held: Plaintiff must disclose the specific acts of negligence relied upon in the case.^[87]^

2. Interrogatory: State to whom you announced your intention of running for the office of business representative.

Answer: The announcement was made to a group of the members of defendant’s local gathered informally at the Sky-High Tavern.

Held: Insufficient. Must disclose names of individuals present.^[88]^

3. Interrogatory: Requested identification of and location of documents.

Answer: Plaintiffs know the location of the documents referred to in interrogatory #3 and have same, except for such of said documents as may have been destroyed by fire, which occurred at the Annex Theatre Building in August.

Held: Incomplete. Must disclose identity of documents in existence and those destroyed.^[89]^

4.* Interrogatory:* State the date on which shipment was accepted by the respondent.

Answer: The bill of lading shows the goods were receipted for an October 31 date.

5. Interrogatory: State whether a dock receipt was issued at the time of receipt of the shipment and why or why not.

Answer: A search is being made for any dock receipt given.

Held: Both answers incomplete and not responsive, and the specific questions must be answered.^[90]^

6. Interrogatory: Requested details of claims asserted in complaint.

Answer: Referred defendant to books and records of the plaintiff and of the defendant that may contain this information.

Held: Wholly insufficient. Must provide detailed answer.^[91]^

7. Interrogatory: Requested income information for a specific year.

Answer: Referred to some testimony at a previous deposition.

Held: Unsatisfactory answer. Must answer interrogatory.^[92]^

8. Interrogatory: Requested information concerning sales of bolted steel tanks made outside of the United States by Black, Sivalls Inc.

Answer: None, because there were no bolted steel tanks made outside of the United States by Black, Sivalls Inc.

Held: Deliberate misconstruction of the interrogatory. The interrogatory taken in the context of the other interrogatories referred to sales made outside of the United States, not the construction location of the tanks.^[93]^

§ 7.6.8 Disclosing Harmful and

Helpful Information

An attorney needs to consider the effect a response has upon a client’s case. Harmful information needs be disclosed to the extent reasonably necessary, given the nature and scope of the interrogatory. Helpful information may be added to clarify the meaning of an answer. For instance, responses that may also constitute an admission can result in damaging information, unless disarmed or tempered in the drafting. Even interrogatories that request routine information can often yield distorted or unreasonably unfavorable answers unless some additional information is added. Lawyers need to compose accurate and complete responses as required by the rules, in good faith, and consistent with their ethical obligations.

§ 7.6.9 Extension of Time

An attorney may and sometimes must seek an extension of time to respond to interrogatories. The questions may have been served at an early stage in the case, and the formulation of some responses may not yet be possible, or the 30 days may not be sufficient time to collect, compile, draft, and submit answers. It is common practice both to request and acquiesce in a reasonable extension of time as long as it does conflict with deadlines imposed by the court.

It is also a response by some delinquent attorneys to delay, sometimes negligently, sometimes intentionally, the service of answers until the other side serves a Rule 37 motion and notice of motion compelling answers. Such churlish delaying tactics have no place in the discovery process. If more time is needed, an extension should be agreed to and confirmed, and that deadline should be met punctually.

GenAI can, of course, expedite the interrogatory response process, perhaps mitigating the need for any extension request. Since GenAI-backed tools can organize and summarize responses so quickly, perhaps you can meet more of these deadlines, making extension requests less necessary. Save your powder for extensions that you really need (e.g., grandmothers’ funerals, worldwide pandemics, bad hair days).

§ 7.6.10 Ethical Appraisal

The highest standards of ethical conduct and integrity must guide lawyers in submitting and responding to interrogatories. The adversary system and the role of an advocate must be balanced with the Rules of Professional Conduct and a lawyer’s sense of reasonableness and cooperative conduct. Taking the high road is usually best.

Practicalities and economics affect an attorney’s decision whether to answer, object, or equivocate. One test to determine whether your response meets the reasonableness standard of Federal Rule 33 is the nightmare test. And, no, it has nothing to do with final exams. Imagine that the opposing counsel has brought a Rule 37 motion before a judge whom you have recently skunked in ping pong and that the judge asks you, “How in the discovery world can you justify your response?” If you defend with a winning retort, your interrogatory response is reasonable. If you start to sweat, you need to redraft your response.

§ 7.7 Business Records and Electronically Stored

Information (ESI)

Federal Rule 33(d) specifically permits a party to answer an interrogatory by producing business records or electronically stored information in lieu of a detailed factual response by “specifying the records that must be reviewed in sufficient detail to permit the interrogating party to locate and to identify them as readily as the responding party could.” This rule, as explained previously, does not license a responding party to play hide-and-seek with discovery information. The burden on finding the exact answer in response to the interrogatory must be the same for both parties.^[94]^ If the burden would be greater for the interrogating party, the responding party must collate the information and respond in writing.^[95]^ The responding party must designate which specific printed or electronic documents answer what question.

Once the responding party specifies the appropriate documents, the burden then shifts to the requesting party to uncover the information. The specification must be in sufficient detail for the requesting party to locate the answers readily from the provided documents or the electronically stored information in a readable format. The responding party cannot merely refer to “a mass of records as to which research is feasible only for one familiar with the records."^[96]^

A responding party faced with a decision whether to use this option is also faced with some strategic decisions. Would examining the records and compiling the answers be valuable, helping to understand the case better? Would the time saved in not compiling the information outweigh any advantage gained by reviewing the records? Do the records contain other information, which should not be disclosed to the other party? Would allowing the other party to explore the records produce more helpful information than the interrogatories seek? Are the records susceptible to varying interpretations, and so should the responding party impose its interpretation through the answer, instead of allowing unfettered access to the records?

The responding party should also consider alternative ways to respond. The responding party could draft an answer providing some data while allowing access to certain records for other information. Finally, the answering party could refer to previously disclosed documents or discovery information for such answers.

§ 7.8 Subsequent Responses

Interrogatories may have to be answered before investigation has been completed in a case, before a party has firmly decided upon a particular legal theory, or before a party has planned an overall strategy. A party is not necessarily bound to an early response that subsequently becomes incomplete or inaccurate.^[97]^ Nor does an interrogatory answer automatically bar a party from taking a different position at trial.^[98]^ A party must respond as well as possible in answering an interrogatory, giving whatever information is available or whatever judgment has been made. The trial judge has the discretion at trial to resolve any conflicts between answers to interrogatories and proffered testimony.^[99]^

§ 7.8.1 Amending Responses

The rules do not resolve the issue of whether a responding party can later voluntarily submit another response amending a previous answer. This situation arises when a party wants to change a response rather than supplement it. The rules seem to require a party to obtain a court order permitting such amendment, which then would require the party to present convincing reasons to the judge. The requirement of responding in 30 days also seems to preclude amended responses.

It is the practice of many lawyers to submit amended answers unilaterally, and the practice of opposing lawyers to accept these responses without objection, avoiding the need for a motion and order. These advocates reason that the court would likely grant such an order and, in any event, the party would testify to the change at trial. A party who is unduly prejudiced by amended answers, especially if the responses are provided shortly before a trial or settlement negotiation, may prefer to object to the amendments and pursue relief in court.

§ 7.8.2 Supplementing Responses

There are occasions when a party must update answers and supplement information, or face the exclusion of such evidence at trial or some other restriction. Federal Rule 26(e) determines whether answers need to be supplemented. The section on supplementary responses (§ 5.10) explains in detail the provisions of Rule 26 and controlling case law.

It is an unwise practice to refuse or neglect supplementing or updating answers, even if there is no specific rule or case requiring such disclosure. A conflict or inconsistency in factual matters, in legal theories, or in available witnesses may very well adversely impress the fact finder, who then has to resolve the conflict. Whatever the changes from previous disclosures, a lawyer must have quite persuasive and legitimate reasons to explain the inconsistency and to explain why such changes were not disclosed to the other party.

§ 7.9 Contesting Objections

The party submitting the interrogatories who faces an objection may challenge the objection by bringing a motion challenging the response. Federal Rule 37(a)(3)(B)(iii) authorizes a party submitting interrogatories to move for an order compelling an answer. The federal rules, and many state rules, also require that before bringing a motion the movant must confer with the objecting party in an effort to resolve the dispute. These efforts must be described in a certification attached to the moving papers.

The purpose for this rule is obvious: Court intervention should be resorted to if the parties are unable to resolve their differences after making good faith, reasonable efforts to do so. The attorneys may compromise. The requesting attorney may modify the interrogatory, or the objecting attorney may provide relevant information.

No time limit is specified within which such a motion must be brought. Some jurisdictional rules and almost all scheduling orders include a deadline, after which time the requesting party waives the right to obtain an answer or challenge an objection. The requesting party has the burden of scheduling the hearing on the contested responses. The responding party has the burden of showing that the answer or objection was proper. The judge then decides the propriety of the question and the response.

§ 7.10 Use of Responses

Federal Rule 33(c) provides that answers to interrogatories may be used at trial or a hearing “to the extent permitted by the rules of evidence.” State courts commonly have the same or similar rule. The responses can be used as admissions against interest and become admissible substantive evidence.^[100]^ They can be used by the opposing party for impeachment purposes without being offered in evidence.^[101]^ If introduced by the responding party as substantive evidence, however, interrogatory responses usually are not admissible, because they constitute self-serving hearsay statements and have not been subject to cross-examination.^[102]^ The Federal Advisory Committee Notes indicate that the use of answers to interrogatories at trial remains subject to the rules of evidence.^[103]^

Interrogatories and responses are not part of the pleadings. An attorney who wishes to use them in a hearing or trial must do something affirmatively to introduce or use them. They are not a proper subject for judicial notice.^[104]^ A jury need not consider answers conclusive in reaching a decision on an issue.^[105]^ A judge in a bench trial may base factual findings on interrogatory responses.

Answers to interrogatories may serve these or other functions in addition to providing discovery information. The drafting of the questions and the composing of the responses need to take into account their potential use for negotiation, trial, arbitration, or administrative hearing purposes.

Practice Problems and Assignments

Follow the directions from your professor in completing an assignment.

Planning Interrogatories

Consider what interrogatories you would draft and submit to the opposing party in the following case or cases, as assigned by your professor. Further, consider what type of questions or information sought would be more effectively obtained using another discovery method. And consider what you would discuss with opposing counsel in a meet and confer conference over potential disagreements.

1. You represent Hot Dog Enterprises in Hot Dog Enterprises v. Tri-Chem (Case A).

2. You represent Tri-Chem in Hot Dog Enterprises v. Tri-Chem (Case A).

3. You represent the defendants in Northern Motor Homes v. Danforth (Case J).

4. You represent the plaintiff in Northern Motor Homes v. Danforth (Case J).

5. You represent the plaintiff in Burris v. Warner (Case K).

6. You represent the defendant in Burris v. Warner (Case K).

7. You represent defendant Snow Cat in Miyamoto v. Snow Cat (Case C).

8. You represent the plaintiff in Vasquez v. Hot Dog Enterprises (Case F).

9. You represent the defendant Hot Dog Enterprises in *Vasquez v. Hot Dog Enterprises *(Case F).

10. You represent the plaintiff in Giacone v. City of Mitchell (Case D).

11. You represent the plaintiffs in Tymons v. Allgoods and Razzle (Case M).

12. You represent a party in a case assigned by your professor.

13. Prepare to discuss in class or online the procedures required by Federal Rule 33 for interrogatories.

14. Prepare to discuss in class or online the possible responses and answers to interrogatories under Federal [Rule 33](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N4CB6E640B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N4CB6E640B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0).

15. Research the differences and similarities between Federal Rule 33 and the state court rules regarding interrogatories applicable in the state of your law school. Prepare to discuss in class or online these differences and similarities.

Drafting Interrogatories

Draft a variety of types of interrogatories in the following cases, including questions directed toward discovery of facts, opinions, and application of law to fact, where appropriate. Presume the opposing party has not had to disclose and has not disclosed any of the information you seek. Form or standard interrogatories may be useful as guides in composing questions, but may not be used verbatim. The local court rules in Summit limit the number of interrogatories to fifteen (15). Your instructor may vary that number.

16. You represent Hot Dog Enterprises in Hot Dog Enterprises v. Tri-Chem (Case A). Draft interrogatories directed to the defendant.

17. You represent Tri-Chem in Hot Dog Enterprises v. Tri-Chem (Case A). Draft interrogatories directed to the plaintiff.

18. You represent the defendants in Northern Motor Homes v. Danforth (Case J). Draft interrogatories directed to the plaintiff.

19. You represent the plaintiff in Northern Motor Homes v. Danforth (Case J). Draft interrogatories directed to the defendants.

20. You represent the plaintiff in Burris v. Warner (Case K). Draft interrogatories directed to the defendant.

21. You represent the defendant in Burris v. Warner (Case K). Draft interrogatories directed to the plaintiff.

22. You represent the defendant Snow Cat in Miyamoto v. Snow Cat (Case C). Draft interrogatories directed to the plaintiff.

23. You represent the plaintiff in Vasquez v. Hot Dog Enterprises (Case F). Draft interrogatories directed to the defendant.

24. You represent the defendant Hot Dog Enterprises in *Vasquez v. Hot Dog Enterprises *(Case F). Draft interrogatories directed to the plaintiff.

25. You represent the plaintiff in Giacone v. City of Mitchell (Case D). Draft interrogatories directed to the defendant.

26. You represent the plaintiffs in Tymons v. Allgoods and Razzle (Case M). Draft interrogatories directed to the defendants.

27. You represent a party in a case assigned by your professor. Draft interrogatories directed to the opposing party.

Reconsidering and Redrafting Interrogatories

28. You represent the defendant Summit Insurance in Pozdak v. Summit Insurance Company (Case B). Pozdak has sued for breach of contract seeking to recover for the fire loss to the building and for the loss of its contents. You defend claiming Pozdak committed arson that bars recovery under the contract. A law firm associate prepares the following draft interrogatories:

(a) Identify all persons who know anything relevant to the claims and defenses of this case.

(b) Explain all reasons which support your factual and legal allegations and contentions in paragraph 2 of your Complaint that “Defendant Insurance Company breached its contract with the Plaintiff.”

(c) Why did you, several months before the fire, increase your coverage on your building to $250,000 and its contents to $1,000,000?

(d) Did you take any legal or illegal drugs during the month before the fire?

(e) If your answer to the previous Interrogatory is in the affirmative, explain:

The drugs taken;

The circumstances of each event;

The identity of all persons present;

Whether you ever received treatment for your problem and the time, location, and circumstance of such treatment.

(f) Describe the car you owned on the day of the fire, its mileage before you began your trip to Stacy Lindberg’s cabin before July 4, and its mileage after your return from the cabin after July 4.

(g) Explain in specific detail the following information about Jan McCulrone:

(1) When did you hire McCulrone as an employee?

(2) What were the job duties and responsibilities?

(3) How effective or ineffective was McCulrone’s work?

(4) When did you fire McCulrone and why?

(h) Explain the law applicable to your contention in paragraph 6 of the Complaint that states: “Clause 12 of the insurance contract between the Plaintiff and the Defendant that denies coverage if the insured commits arson is void based on public policy.”

(1) Which interrogatories would you not submit, and why?

(2) Presume you submit all, redraft those that need redrafting.

(3) What other interrogatories would you ask, and why?

(4) If you represented Pozdak and received this set of interrogatories, how would you respond to each question? Identify specific objections you would make.

Responding to Interrogatories

29. You represent the plaintiff in Northern Motor Homes v. Danforth (Case J). The defendants have submitted the following interrogatories to you and your client. Draft responses to them on behalf of your client:

(a) Describe all oral representations made to defendants by plaintiff regarding the Voyageur Motor Home on May 25.

(b) Describe all facts that support plaintiff’s statement, made by Sara Duncan to the defendants on May 25, that the Voyageur Motor Home would get 16 miles per gallon on the highway.

(c) Describe the facts and dates upon which you base your Complaint allegations that defendants have “defaulted” on the retail installment contract.

(d) Describe the defects with the Voyageur Motor Home that caused the problems with the electrical system, engine, transmission, and gas mileage that were allegedly repaired between June 13 and June 22 by Northern Motor Homes.

(e) Why did you not charge defendants for repairs done on July 11?

(f) What law supports plaintiff’s refusal to accept defendants’ revocation of acceptance of the Voyageur Motor Home? Why does the plaintiff continue to possess the camper in its service lot?

(1) Which interrogatories would you not submit, and why?

(2) Presume you decide to submit all, redraft those that need redrafting.

(3) What other interrogatories would you ask, and why?

(4) If you represented the plaintiff and received this set of interrogatories, how would you respond to each question? Identify any specific objections you would make.

30. You represent the defendants in Northern Motor Homes v. Danforth (Case J). The plaintiff has submitted the following interrogatories to you and your clients. Draft responses to them on behalf of your clients.

(a) Describe all facts upon which you base your Answer, denying the statement in paragraph 2 of the Complaint that defendants “have defaulted on the contract.”

(b) Describe all “statements” and “representations” plaintiff made to you as alleged in paragraph 3 of the Answer.

(c) Describe the specific amounts and types of actual, consequential, and incidental damages approximating the monetary damages alleged to have been incurred by defendants.

(d) Describe the amount and type of damages for lost vacation and leisure time alleged to have been suffered by defendants.

(e) Explain why you decided not to bring the Voyageur Camper to plaintiff for repairs on Monday, June 26.

(f) When and how did defendants revoke acceptance of the Voyageur Motor Home? What law supports defendants’ alleged revocation of acceptance?

(1) Which interrogatories would you not submit, and why?

(2) Presume you decide to submit all, redraft those that need redrafting.

(3) What other interrogatories would you ask, and why?

(4) If you represented the defendants and received this set of interrogatories, how would you respond to each question? Identify any specific objections you would make.

Drafting Interrogatories/Responses

31. You represent a party in a case assigned by your professor in which another student represents the opposing party.

(a) Consider what interrogatories you would draft.

(b) Draft a set of interrogatories directed to the opposing party.

(c) Draft responses to the interrogatories prepared by the student attorney who represents the opposing party.

(d) Plan to meet and confer with a student classmate representing the opposing party to discuss disagreements regarding interrogatories and responses in an effort to reach a compromise.

(e) Consider whether you would propose that a discovery mediator be assigned to assist with resolving any disagreements.

1. See [Axler v. Sci. Ecology Grp., Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I607072c653d211d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I607072c653d211d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 196 F.R.D. 210 (D. Mass. 2000)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I607072c653d211d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I607072c653d211d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
2. [Rhodes v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5529b6f8d7d311dbaba7d9d29eb57eff/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5529b6f8d7d311dbaba7d9d29eb57eff/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 2007 WL 840307 (E.D. Cal.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5529b6f8d7d311dbaba7d9d29eb57eff/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5529b6f8d7d311dbaba7d9d29eb57eff/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
3. [Adlerstein v. United States Customs & Border Prot.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0fe18cc03ec611edb57bce5ca5f2644e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0fe18cc03ec611edb57bce5ca5f2644e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 342 F.R.D. 269 (D. Ariz. 2022)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0fe18cc03ec611edb57bce5ca5f2644e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0fe18cc03ec611edb57bce5ca5f2644e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
4. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N4CB6E640B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N4CB6E640B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
5. • See, e.g., **[Thomas v. Pacificor, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I593775b989d011d98b51ba734bfc3c79/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I593775b989d011d98b51ba734bfc3c79/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)*[324 F.3d 1176 (10th Cir. 2003)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I593775b989d011d98b51ba734bfc3c79/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I593775b989d011d98b51ba734bfc3c79/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
6. [CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I94b60dab799411d99c4dbb2f0352441d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I94b60dab799411d99c4dbb2f0352441d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[235 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2000)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I94b60dab799411d99c4dbb2f0352441d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I94b60dab799411d99c4dbb2f0352441d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
7. [Pham v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I527be54653ce11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I527be54653ce11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 193 F.R.D. 659 (D. Colo. 2000)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I527be54653ce11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I527be54653ce11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
8. [Duluth Lighthouse for the Blind v. C.G. Bretting Mfg. Co.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8df8beac53dc11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8df8beac53dc11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 199 F.R.D. 320 (D. Minn. 2000)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8df8beac53dc11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8df8beac53dc11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
9. [T. Rowe Price Small-Cap Fund, Inc. v. Oppenheimer & Co.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5cc8f626566511d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5cc8f626566511d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 174 F.R.D. 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5cc8f626566511d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5cc8f626566511d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
10. [Surgery Ctr. at 900 N. Mich. Ave., LLC v. Am. Physicians Assur. Corp., Inc](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic6ec01a0b6cf11e6ac07a76176915fee/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic6ec01a0b6cf11e6ac07a76176915fee/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[., 317 F.R.D. 620 (N.D. Ill. 2016)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic6ec01a0b6cf11e6ac07a76176915fee/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic6ec01a0b6cf11e6ac07a76176915fee/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
11. [Pham v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I527be54653ce11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I527be54653ce11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 193 F.R.D. 659 (D. Colo. 2000](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I527be54653ce11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I527be54653ce11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I527be54653ce11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I527be54653ce11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
12. • See *Marker v. Union Fid. Life Ins. Co., 125 F.R.D. 121 (M.D.N.C. 1989). ↑
13. [CEH, Inc. v. FV Seafarer,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I51e5f137561b11d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I51e5f137561b11d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 153 F.R.D. 491 (D.R.I. 1994)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I51e5f137561b11d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I51e5f137561b11d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
14. • **[Strovgo v. BEA Assocs., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iaa58c61753de11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iaa58c61753de11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)*[199 F.R.D. 515 (S.D.N.Y 2011)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iaa58c61753de11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iaa58c61753de11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
15. [Wirtz v. Capitol Air Service, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0dcca53854cb11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0dcca53854cb11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 42 F.R.D. 641 (D. Kan. 1967)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0dcca53854cb11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0dcca53854cb11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
16. • **[Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1978b412bb8b11da97faf3f66e4b6844/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1978b412bb8b11da97faf3f66e4b6844/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)*[235 F.R.D. 494 (D. Kan. 2006)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1978b412bb8b11da97faf3f66e4b6844/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1978b412bb8b11da97faf3f66e4b6844/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
17. • See *Marens v. Carrabba’s Italian Grill, Inc., 196 F.R.D. 35 (D. Md. 2000). ↑
18. California Continuing Education of the Bar, California Civil Discovery Practice 333. ↑
19. • See* (for courts disallowing) [D’Onofrio v. SFX Sports Grp., Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8307eacbca2f11dca9c2f716e0c816ba/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8307eacbca2f11dca9c2f716e0c816ba/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 247 F.R.D. 43 (D.D.C. 2008)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8307eacbca2f11dca9c2f716e0c816ba/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8307eacbca2f11dca9c2f716e0c816ba/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0).

See (for courts allowing) McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 185 F.R.D. 70 (D.D.C. 1999). ↑ 20. [Pressley v. Boehlke](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If463693354c011d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If463693354c011d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 33 F.R.D. 316 (W.D.N.C. 1963)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If463693354c011d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If463693354c011d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 21. [Maritime Cinema Service Corp. v. Movies En Route,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I019973f7550d11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I019973f7550d11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 60 F.R.D. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I019973f7550d11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I019973f7550d11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 22. [Spacesaver Corp. v. Marvel Corp. Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I97d6ec3e4fa011deb08de1b7506ad85b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I97d6ec3e4fa011deb08de1b7506ad85b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 621 F. Supp. 2d 659 (W.D. Wis. 2009)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I97d6ec3e4fa011deb08de1b7506ad85b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I97d6ec3e4fa011deb08de1b7506ad85b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 23. [Ayers v. Cont’l Cas. Co.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib1ab3f5fa2fc11db9127cf4cfcf88547/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_344_226" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib1ab3f5fa2fc11db9127cf4cfcf88547/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_344_226)[ 240 F.R.D. 216, 226 (N.D. W. Va. 2007)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib1ab3f5fa2fc11db9127cf4cfcf88547/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_344_226" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib1ab3f5fa2fc11db9127cf4cfcf88547/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_344_226). ↑ 24. [Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5a38233b569311d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5a38233b569311d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 77 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (D. Minn. 1999)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5a38233b569311d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5a38233b569311d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 25. [In re Ishihara Chem. Co.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3a45429353d411d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3a45429353d411d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 121 F. Supp. 2d 209 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3a45429353d411d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3a45429353d411d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 26. [Steil v. Humana Kan. City, Inc.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3a52b01453d411d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3a52b01453d411d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 197 F.R.D. 445 (D. Kan. 2000)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3a52b01453d411d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3a52b01453d411d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 27. [Fisher v. Baltimore Life Ins. Co.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iaf6f4748c68011da89709aa238bcead9/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iaf6f4748c68011da89709aa238bcead9/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 235 F.R.D. 617 (N.D. W. Va. 2006)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iaf6f4748c68011da89709aa238bcead9/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iaf6f4748c68011da89709aa238bcead9/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 28. [Cornaglia v. Ricciardi,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If531d8f5551111d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If531d8f5551111d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 63 F.R.D. 416 (E.D. Pa. 1974)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If531d8f5551111d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If531d8f5551111d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 29. [Rogers v. Tri-State Materials Corp.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I62672c70550011d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I62672c70550011d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 51 F.R.D. 234 (N.D. W. Va. 1970)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I62672c70550011d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I62672c70550011d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 30. [Goodman v. I.B.M. Corp.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I019e55f2550d11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I019e55f2550d11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 59 F.R.D. 278 (N.D. Ill. 1973)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I019e55f2550d11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I019e55f2550d11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 31. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N4CB6E640B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N4CB6E640B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0), Notes of Advisory Comm.—1970 Amendments. ↑ 32. [Ferrell v. HUD](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I9431439e567111d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I9431439e567111d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 177 F.R.D. 425 (N.D. Ill. 1998)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I9431439e567111d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I9431439e567111d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 33. * See Ballard v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 67 (E.D. Pa. 1972). ↑ 34. [Spector Freight Systems, Inc. v. Home Indemnity Co., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I01a1d865550d11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I01a1d865550d11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[58 F.R.D. 162 (N.D. Ill. 1973)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I01a1d865550d11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I01a1d865550d11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 35. [Cotracom Commodity Trading Co. v. Seaboard Corp.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5a4bd243569311d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5a4bd243569311d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 189 F.R.D. 655 (D. Kan. 1999)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5a4bd243569311d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5a4bd243569311d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 36. [O’Brien v. Int’l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1663fcbc552611d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1663fcbc552611d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[443 F. Supp. 1182 (N.D. Ga. 1977)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1663fcbc552611d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1663fcbc552611d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 37. [Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia05077c454a711d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia05077c454a711d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 11 F.R.D. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia05077c454a711d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia05077c454a711d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 38. [8B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2177 (3rd ed.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia194d0b94b1211dab83abce0f17e0f80/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia194d0b94b1211dab83abce0f17e0f80/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 39. [Scaife v. Boenne,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I32e5507153b711d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I32e5507153b711d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 191 F.R.D. 590 (N.D. Ind. 2000)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I32e5507153b711d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I32e5507153b711d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 40. * See, e.g., Harlem River Consumers Co-operative, Inc. v. Associated Grocers of Harlem, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). ↑ 41. * **[Larson v. Correct Craft Inc., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifc6ffe86d56a11dc8dba9deb08599717/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifc6ffe86d56a11dc8dba9deb08599717/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[537 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (M.D. Fla. 2008)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifc6ffe86d56a11dc8dba9deb08599717/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifc6ffe86d56a11dc8dba9deb08599717/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 42. * See **[Pouncil v. Branch Law Firm, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5f2f395b261311e18da7c4363d0963b0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_344_649" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5f2f395b261311e18da7c4363d0963b0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_344_649)[277 F.R.D. 649 (D. Kan. 2011)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5f2f395b261311e18da7c4363d0963b0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_344_649" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5f2f395b261311e18da7c4363d0963b0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_344_649). ↑ 43. [Adlerstein v. United States Customs & Border Prot.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0fe18cc03ec611edb57bce5ca5f2644e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0fe18cc03ec611edb57bce5ca5f2644e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 342 F.R.D. 269 (D. Ariz. 2022)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0fe18cc03ec611edb57bce5ca5f2644e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0fe18cc03ec611edb57bce5ca5f2644e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 44. * See, e.g., *Boyden v. Troken, 60 F.R.D. 625 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (209 interrogatories containing 432 separate questions held oppressive and burdensome). ↑ 45. * See Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Aon Risk Servs. 187 F.R.D. 578 (D. Minn. 1999). ↑ 46. [Lykins v. Attorney General, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6e2873b8555b11d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6e2873b8555b11d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[86 F.R.D. 318 (E.D. Va. 1980)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6e2873b8555b11d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6e2873b8555b11d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 47. [Wirtz v. Capitol Air Service, Inc., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0dcca53854cb11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0dcca53854cb11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[42 F.R.D. 641 (D. Kan. 1967)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0dcca53854cb11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0dcca53854cb11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 48. 1 James Hetland & O.C. Adamson, Minnesota Practice 42; also see [Willingham v. Ashcroft, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I032f3cba6fc811d99d4cc295ca35b55b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I032f3cba6fc811d99d4cc295ca35b55b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[226 F.R.D. 57 (D.D.C. 2005)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I032f3cba6fc811d99d4cc295ca35b55b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I032f3cba6fc811d99d4cc295ca35b55b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 49. [Blank v. Ronson Corp., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I01a09e50556d11d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I01a09e50556d11d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[97 F.R.D. 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I01a09e50556d11d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I01a09e50556d11d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 50. * **[Superior Commc’ns v. Earhugger, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5875c8912f6511deb08de1b7506ad85b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5875c8912f6511deb08de1b7506ad85b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 257 F.R.D. 215 (C.D. Cal. 2005)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5875c8912f6511deb08de1b7506ad85b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5875c8912f6511deb08de1b7506ad85b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 51. * See *Pankola v. Texaco, Inc., 25 F.R.D. 184 (E.D. Pa. 1960). ↑ 52. * See [8B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2174 (3rd ed)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia194d0b04b1211dab83abce0f17e0f80/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia194d0b04b1211dab83abce0f17e0f80/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 53. [Williams v. Krieger, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I019702f5550d11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I019702f5550d11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[61 F.R.D. 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I019702f5550d11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I019702f5550d11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 54. [Bohlin v. Brass Rail, Inc., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icd9a221154b311d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icd9a221154b311d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[20 F.R.D. 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icd9a221154b311d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icd9a221154b311d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 55. See **[Brown v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I634c90d0560911edb76cb7da0976f622/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I634c90d0560911edb76cb7da0976f622/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 616 F. Supp. 3d 137 (D. Mass. 2022)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I634c90d0560911edb76cb7da0976f622/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I634c90d0560911edb76cb7da0976f622/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 56. * See **[Johnson v. Kraft Foods N.A., Inc., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id1b0daf7004a11dba223cd6b838f54f9/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id1b0daf7004a11dba223cd6b838f54f9/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[236 F.R.D. 535 (D. Kan. 2006)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id1b0daf7004a11dba223cd6b838f54f9/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id1b0daf7004a11dba223cd6b838f54f9/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 57. [Deering Milliken Research Corp. v. Tex-Elastic Corp., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie701bf89550111d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie701bf89550111d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[320 F. Supp. 806 (D.S.C. 1970)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie701bf89550111d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie701bf89550111d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 58. [In re United States Financial Securities Litigation, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If919f224551d11d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If919f224551d11d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[22 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 710 (S.D. Cal. 1975)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If919f224551d11d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If919f224551d11d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 59. [La Chemise Lacoste v. Alligator Co., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib79f01c5550c11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib79f01c5550c11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[60 F.R.D. 164 (D. Del. 1973)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib79f01c5550c11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib79f01c5550c11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 60. * See **Alexander v. Rizzo, *50 F.R.D. 374 (E.D. Pa. 1970). ↑ 61. [Professional Adjusting Systems of America, Inc. v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I19ec021b551211d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I19ec021b551211d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[373 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I19ec021b551211d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I19ec021b551211d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 62. [Reichert v. United States, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib930bbc3550011d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib930bbc3550011d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[51 F.R.D. 500 (N.D. Cal. 1970)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib930bbc3550011d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib930bbc3550011d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 63. Alberts v. Wheeling Jesuit Univ., 2010 WL 1539852 (N.D. W. Va. 2010). ↑ 64. *Weiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., *515 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1975). ↑ 65. [United States v. 58.16 Acres of Land, More or Less in Clinton County, State of Ill., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I555a84a0551511d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I555a84a0551511d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[66 F.R.D. 570 (E.D. Ill. 1975)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I555a84a0551511d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I555a84a0551511d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 66. * See **La Chemise Lacoste v. Alligator Co., *60 F.R.D. 164 (D. Del. 1973). ↑ 67. [Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court In and For Merced County,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4e409f2afadb11d98ac8f235252e36df/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4e409f2afadb11d98ac8f235252e36df/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 364 P.2d 266 (Cal. 1961)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4e409f2afadb11d98ac8f235252e36df/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4e409f2afadb11d98ac8f235252e36df/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 68. [United States v. Article of Drug Consisting of 30 Individually Cartoned Jars, More or Less, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0dcb1e9b54cb11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0dcb1e9b54cb11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[43 F.R.D. 181 (D. Del. 1967)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0dcb1e9b54cb11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0dcb1e9b54cb11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 69. [Evans v. Local Union 2127, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic9629dd054fe11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic9629dd054fe11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[313 F. Supp. 1354 (N.D. Ga. 1969)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic9629dd054fe11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic9629dd054fe11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 70. [DiGregorio v. First Rediscount Corp., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I763f5935906511d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I763f5935906511d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[506 F.2d 781 (3d Cir. 1974)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I763f5935906511d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I763f5935906511d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 71. * See *Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., *61 F.R.D. 127 (D.S.C. 1973), reversed and remanded [487 F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1973)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4c4c20ee901911d9bc61beebb95be672/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4c4c20ee901911d9bc61beebb95be672/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 72. [Lincoln Gateway Realty Co. v. Carri-Craft, Inc., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I587a5571550511d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I587a5571550511d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[53 F.R.D. 303 (W.D. Mo. 1971)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I587a5571550511d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I587a5571550511d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 73. [DiGregorio v. First Rediscount Corp., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I763f5935906511d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I763f5935906511d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[506 F.2d 781 (3d Cir. 1974)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I763f5935906511d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I763f5935906511d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 74. [In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I20b50f9d552811d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I20b50f9d552811d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 83 F.R.D. 260 (N.D. Ill. 1979)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I20b50f9d552811d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I20b50f9d552811d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 75. [Baxter v. Vick, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I9b08685654ba11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I9b08685654ba11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[25 F.R.D. 229 (E.D. Pa. 1960)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I9b08685654ba11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I9b08685654ba11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 76. * See generally *White v. Beloginis, *53 F.R.D. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). ↑ 77. See *United States Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, *80 F.R.D. 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). ↑ 78. * See **[Jiminez-Carillo v. Autopart Int’l, Inc., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic202259fed5111e1b11ea85d0b248d27/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic202259fed5111e1b11ea85d0b248d27/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[285 F.R.D. 668 (S.D. Fla. 2012)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic202259fed5111e1b11ea85d0b248d27/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic202259fed5111e1b11ea85d0b248d27/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 79. [Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib32b0be5910f11d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib32b0be5910f11d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[561 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1977)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib32b0be5910f11d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib32b0be5910f11d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 80. [Brennan v. Glens Falls Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iaafd0840a51211e2981ea20c4f198a69/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iaafd0840a51211e2981ea20c4f198a69/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[19 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 721 (N.D.N.Y. 1974)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iaafd0840a51211e2981ea20c4f198a69/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iaafd0840a51211e2981ea20c4f198a69/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 81. [Steir v. Girl Scouts of the USA,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0f68c3298bac11d99a6fdc806bf1638e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0f68c3298bac11d99a6fdc806bf1638e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 383 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2004)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0f68c3298bac11d99a6fdc806bf1638e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0f68c3298bac11d99a6fdc806bf1638e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 82. * **[Chatman v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ief0895cd9dde11dcbd4c839f532b53c5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ief0895cd9dde11dcbd4c839f532b53c5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[246 F.R.D. 695 (M.D. Fla. 2007)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ief0895cd9dde11dcbd4c839f532b53c5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ief0895cd9dde11dcbd4c839f532b53c5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 83. * **[EEOC v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc’y, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic50059d2ce5811dbaf8dafd7ee2b8b26/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_506_566" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic50059d2ce5811dbaf8dafd7ee2b8b26/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_506_566)[479 F.3d 566 (8th Cir. 2007)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic50059d2ce5811dbaf8dafd7ee2b8b26/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_506_566" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic50059d2ce5811dbaf8dafd7ee2b8b26/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_506_566). ↑ 84. [Riley v. United Air Lines, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1b34c47a54bf11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1b34c47a54bf11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 32 F.R.D. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1b34c47a54bf11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1b34c47a54bf11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 85. [Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3a2361c2565011d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3a2361c2565011d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 924 F. Supp. 1346 (D.N.J. 1996)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3a2361c2565011d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3a2361c2565011d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 86. For a case containing a lengthy discussion of various examples of proper and improper questions and answers, see Roberson v. Great American Ins. Cos. of N.Y., 48 F.R.D. 404 (N.D. Ga. 1969). ↑ 87. Bynum v. United States, 36 F.R.D. 14 (E.D. La. 2004). ↑ 88. Magelssen v. Local Union No. 518, Operative Plasterers’ & Cement Masons’ Int’l Ass’n. 32 F.R.D. 464 (W.D. Mo. 1963). ↑ 89. Grand Opera Co. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. 21 F.R.D. 39 (E.D. Ill. 1957). ↑ 90. [International Fertilizer & Chemical Corp. v. Brasileiro, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1ee893c654b611d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1ee893c654b611d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[21 F.R.D. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1ee893c654b611d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1ee893c654b611d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 91. [Nagler v. Admiral Corp., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I298380e454b811d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I298380e454b811d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[167 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I298380e454b811d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I298380e454b811d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 92. [Grimmett v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia047500c54a711d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia047500c54a711d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 11 F.R.D. 335 (N.D. Ohio 1951)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia047500c54a711d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia047500c54a711d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 93. [Hunter v. International Systems & Controls Corp.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib9315804550011d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib9315804550011d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 51 F.R.D. 251 (W.D. Mo. 1970)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib9315804550011d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib9315804550011d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0), opinion supplemented [56 F.R.D. 617 (W.D. Mo. 1972)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I55e11026550911d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I55e11026550911d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 94. [In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I20b50f9d552811d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I20b50f9d552811d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[83 F.R.D. 260 (N.D. Ill. 1979)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I20b50f9d552811d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I20b50f9d552811d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 95. [United States Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I64138f00552311d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I64138f00552311d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[80 F.R.D. 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I64138f00552311d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I64138f00552311d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 96. * **[Minter v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0e1022c318b211e2b343c837631e1747/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0e1022c318b211e2b343c837631e1747/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[286 F.R.D. 273 (D. Md. 2012)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0e1022c318b211e2b343c837631e1747/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0e1022c318b211e2b343c837631e1747/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 97. * See **Marcoin, Inc. v. Edwin K. Williams & Co., *605 F.2d 1325 (4th Cir. 1979). ↑ 98. [Pulsecard, Inc. v. Discover Card Servs., Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I43ef8d27565211d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I43ef8d27565211d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 168 F.R.D. 295 (D. Kan. 1996)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I43ef8d27565211d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I43ef8d27565211d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 99. [Walker v. Mulvihill, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iac8de4e492b011d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iac8de4e492b011d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[83 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 1996)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iac8de4e492b011d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iac8de4e492b011d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 100. [Gridiron Steel Co. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I291864368f6a11d9bc61beebb95be672/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I291864368f6a11d9bc61beebb95be672/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[361 F.2d 791 (6th Cir. 1966)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I291864368f6a11d9bc61beebb95be672/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I291864368f6a11d9bc61beebb95be672/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 101. [Meadows v. Palmer, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie74fcd09549411d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie74fcd09549411d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[33 F.R.D. 136 (D. Md. 1963)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie74fcd09549411d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie74fcd09549411d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 102. [Rosenthal v. Poland, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I044a6a83550a11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I044a6a83550a11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[337 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I044a6a83550a11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I044a6a83550a11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 103. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N4CB6E640B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N4CB6E640B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0), Notes of Advisory Comm.—1970 Amendments. ↑ 104. [Bracey v. Grenoble, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I03169342904311d98e8fb00d6c6a02dd/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I03169342904311d98e8fb00d6c6a02dd/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[494 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1974)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I03169342904311d98e8fb00d6c6a02dd/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I03169342904311d98e8fb00d6c6a02dd/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑ 105. [Duff v. Lobdell-Emery Mfg. Co., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If48d9ea8564e11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If48d9ea8564e11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[926 F. Supp. 799 (N.D. Ind. 1996)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If48d9ea8564e11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If48d9ea8564e11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑