Chapter 5: Scope

Discovery is an important part of judicial, arbitral, and administrative processes — a 'disclovery' regime in which automatic disclosures, written requests, and an honor-system approach equip advocates to know nearly as much about a case as the opposition before settlement, hearing, or trial.

Chapter 5

■ ■ ■

Ask and you shall receive. Seek and you shall find.

Matthew 7:7

§ 5.1 Purposes of Discovery

Discovery rules and procedures serve many functions in the dispute resolution process, including:

• Supplementing pleading allegations.
• Exchanging information by all parties.
• Promoting negotiated and mediated settlements, as seasonably as preferred or possible.
• Equalizing some of the investigative resources of parties, without allowing a party to take undue advantage of another.
• Allowing reasonable exploration into the adversary’s camp to discover opposing perceptions of the facts and law.
• Uncovering and conserving testimony and exhibits.
• Identifying, locating, and preserving documents.
• Isolating issues and undisputed facts.
• Obtaining admissions.
• Fostering decisions based on accurate information, not on surmise and surprise.
• Providing a suitable process for obtaining outcomes.
• Encouraging the use of ADR methods to resolve disputes.

Discovery is an important part of judicial, arbitral, and administrative processes. For the vast majority of lawyers, discovery constitutes an effective, efficient, and economical means of assisting a client involved in a dispute. Discovery for other attorneys seems to be the best way to avoid or delay obtaining a final result, and this attitude accounts for its share of the misuse of discovery procedures. Discovery for other counsel promotes an outcome for a client through motions, a hearing, or a trial, recognizing that the decision maker will know enough to make an informed, wise decision.

Discovery allows an attorney to know as much about a case, with limitations, as the opposing counsel knows. The facts, opinions, conclusions, theories, and documents are there for the asking. Discovery permits a lawyer to review and probe the good, the bad, and the indifferent before settlement or before a hearing or trial. A reasonable use of discovery allows advocates to serve the best interests of their clients and our civil justice system.

§ 5.1.1 “Disclovery”

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require the disclosure of information to opposing parties and the exchange of information by parties. In federal court cases, a party: (1) must automatically disclose (without any specific request) certain supportive information and (2) must respond to discovery requests from an adversary. We call this process “disclovery.”

The primary purpose of disclosure rules is to require parties to reveal information to other parties without the need for discovery requests. These disclosures are to provide opposing parties with information about witnesses, documents, and experts that relate to claims and defenses. These rules promote and accelerate the early exchange of supportive information between parties and eliminate the need for some discovery requests. Many states have similar rules.

The primary purpose of discovery rules is to mandate the exchange of information between parties. Responses to discovery requests provide relevant facts, witnesses, documents, evidence, and other information about a case. These efforts promote settlements because parties can evaluate cases and also prepare counsel for a hearing or trial. All states have these rules.

Discovery production is based on an honor system. Attorneys are entrusted to uphold their professional responsibilities and obligations to follow the rules and respond as required and expected by the law.^[1]^ Federal Rule 26(g) and similar state rules authorize in extraordinary circumstances discovery seeking the extent of discoverable efforts made by an opponent. The party seeking such discovery must establish a sufficient factual basis regarding the insufficiency of an opponent’s responses.

The formalized “disclovery” system also fosters the use of informal informational exchanges by attorneys. The very existence of the rules encourages lawyers to use more efficient and economical means to exchange information. Bilateral trading of documents, cooperative bartering of information, mutual alteration of procedures, and informal enforcement of the rules, all occur in part because the formal discovery rule procedures are somewhat more costly and more time consuming.

§ 5.1.2 Discovery in Arbitration

and Administrative Cases

Disclosures are common in arbitration and administrative law cases, and parties typically have to reveal relevant supporting information. Discovery is also available in arbitral and administrative cases, with the general rule being that relevant and reliable information is reasonably discoverable. Applicable rules and regulations often provide parties with the same or similar discovery provided by judicial rules, and arbitrators and administrative law judges (ALJs) have similar authority. Sometimes discovery is more limited than in court cases, and occasionally restricted, with limitations placed on its scope and methods as discussed in this and later chapters.

§ 5.1.3 Zen and the Art of Discovery Practice

Discovery has proven to be a two-edge sword. It has its advantages: It may provide valuable information permitting the evaluation of the claims and defenses of the parties. It may be the only means to obtain vital information and documents. It can yield crucial evidence for hearing and trial. And it can foster settlements. Without it, our civil dispute resolution system would not be as fair, impartial, balanced, and just.

Discovery also has its disadvantages: It can be expensive and cause delay and may provide marginal unexpected information. It may prompt opponents to react with additional discovery, and force the other side to more painstakingly prepare a case. And it can be abused. The true cost of it includes the actual time and expenses incurred in conducting discovery plus the indirect efforts expended by parties diverting them away from their personal and business lives. It is common for the most substantial part of the cost of litigation to come from the discovery process.

Advocates need to be skilled practitioners of the art of discovery. The successful use of discovery requires an understanding of the reasons underlying the applicable rules and best practices, as explained in this Chapter.

§ 5.2 Discovery

Federal Rule 26 governs disclosures and the scope of discovery. Section 1.2.7 describes how LLMs can assist with all phases and types of discovery. Subsections of Rule 26 and similar state provisions contain the rules relating to:

Federal rules obviously govern discovery in federal courts, and state rules in state proceedings. Federal courts in diversity cases apply federal discovery rules, although a court may take state procedural laws into account in the interest of federal-state comity. And arbitration codes of procedure and administrative rules govern discovery, respectively, in arbitrations and administrative cases.

Federal, state, arbitral, and administrative discovery have much in common. The vast majority of rules and procedures are identical or very similar. But there are some differences. Federal rules require a party to voluntarily disclose supportive information, and arbitral and administrative rules often have similar requirements. Many state court rules have this disclosure requirement, while others do not.

The scope of discovery is limited by applicable rules, practical limitations, economic considerations, and strategic decisions. Some rules specifically limit what is discoverable by restricting discovery to reasonable amounts of information and documents. Judges are encouraged to monitor the use of discovery so it does not result in overuse or abuse.^[2]^

Parties usually only have the resources and time to exchange relevant and helpful information. Lawyers often decide to restrict discovery to essential facts and materials so the dispute can be more promptly resolved by settlement. It is common in some cases that much of what is discovered is already known or is of very little use. The key to successful discovery is seeking to uncover vital information, critical documents, and relevant evidence.

§ 5.2.1 Timing and Sequence of Discovery

Federal Rule 26(d) explicitly states that most formal discovery may not commence until the parties have conferred to discuss discovery and other issues. Rule 26(f) explains the timing of this conference and further provides that discovery may be accelerated by agreement of the parties or a court order if circumstances support early discovery.^[3]^ Rule 26(d) also states that methods of discovery may be used in any sequence and the use of one method by a party does not delay the use of another method by another party. State court rules and arbitral and administrative proceedings commonly allow discovery to begin after pleadings have been exchanged.

§ 5.2.2 Methods of Discovery

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure initially require parties to affirmatively disclose information to each other without the need for any discovery request. The scope and type of information to be disclosed is explained in § 5.3.1. Federal and all state jurisdictions, and many arbitral and administrative rules, permit several major discovery devices:

1. Production of documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things. Rule 34.

2. Depositions upon oral examinations or written questions. Rules 30, 31, & 32 (governing use of depositions at trial).

3. Written interrogatories. Rule 33.

4. Requests for admissions. Rule 36.

5. Physical and mental examinations. Rule 35.

6. Non-party Subpoenas. Rule 45.

7. Production of Documents. A party may require another party to provide documents—including electronically stored information (ESI), records, emails, and social media and other communications—and tangible materials and things for inspection and copying or to permit entry onto land or access to property for inspection, testing, or sampling. A party may be able to obtain the same access to documents and things from a non-party through a subpoena under Federal Rule 45.

8. Depositions. A deposition consists of statements made by a witness under oath or affirmation. The deponent may be a party or any person who has relevant information. The examining attorney verbally asks questions of the deponent, and lawyers for other parties participate and may also ask questions. Everything is recorded, by video or stenographic recording, and may be later transcribed.

9. Written Interrogatories. Interrogatories are questions submitted to a party to be answered in writing under oath. This discovery device is particularly suitable for information seeking specific objective data, facts supporting pleading assertions, and the identity of witnesses and experts.

4.* Requests for Admissions.* Responses to requests for admissions determine the truth of specific facts and the genuineness of documents and ESI. This device not only discovers information, but also narrows the disputed issues for trial.

5. Physical and Mental Examinations. A party may be able to obtain a physical or mental examination of another party if the condition of that person is in controversy and if there exists good cause. These types of examinations commonly occur in personal injury litigation.

6. *Non-Party Subpoenas. *Parties may obtain information from individuals and entities who are not parties to a case. They may be served with subpoenas requiring them to produce relevant documents and/or to attend a deposition and be questioned about what they know.

Subsequent chapters explain each of these methods in detail. Provisions relating to the scope of discovery apply, with some exceptions, with equal force to all of these devices. The extent of what is and what is not discoverable is virtually the same, regardless of the method used to obtain the information. Each device has some inherent limitations that affect the practical scope of discovery, and what cannot be obtained through one discovery device can usually be obtained through another.

LLMs and AI-backed tools can significantly enhance the discovery efficiency and accuracy. In document reviews and production, AI can help rapidly analyze large volumes of electronically stored information (ESI), such as emails, contracts, and social media, identifying concepts in relevant documents while flagging privileged or confidential material. GenAI, if coupled with search engines and other databases, can also assist with non-party subpoenas by suggesting relevant third parties, and drafting subpoena language.

GenAI can also help with depositions and written discovery. For example, LLMs can help transcribe, summarize, and extract key insights from deposition transcripts, allowing attorneys to quickly identify inconsistencies or admissions. In addition, GenAI can generate targeted interrogatories by analyzing pleadings and prior discovery responses, ensuring precise and effective questioning.

Similarly, the technology can draft tailored requests for admissions by leveraging important elements as identified by case law, coupled with previously disclosed facts, helping parties narrow disputed issues. LLMs can also summarize complex medical reports and cross-reference findings with expert opinions, saving attorneys time in reviewing voluminous medical records. Lastly, AI-backed tools can enhance e-discovery by classifying documents, detecting patterns, and identifying anomalies, making large-scale discovery faster and more manageable.

§ 5.2.3 Arbitration and Administrative Discovery Methods

In many arbitration cases, discovery is available through document requests, depositions, and written questions.^[4]^ The extent and scope of these methods may be limited by applicable arbitration rules. Requests for admissions and requests for physical exams are less common, but are accessible in appropriate cases. In some arbitrations, discovery methods are available by order of the arbitrator.

In many administrative cases, discovery is available only through document requests. In other cases, depositions and interrogatories are allowed. The applicable rules of the administrative forum determine the accessible methods.

§ 5.3 Disclosure and Discovery

Federal Rule 26 includes two kinds of discoverable information: Rule 26(a) covers the mandatory disclosure of information by a party and 26(b) covers the scope of information that may be discovered by a party through the use of the major discovery methods. The rules of other jurisdictions and forums need to be reviewed to determine their coverage.

§ 5.3.1 Disclosure Information

Federal Rule 26(a) requires specific categories of information to be affirmatively disclosed by a party without the need for a discovery request from another party:

1. Rule 26(a)(1) mandates initial disclosures of specific information regarding witnesses, documents, damages, and insurance agreements. The remainder of this section explains these disclosures. Section 5.8.2 explains these obligations.

2. Rule 26(a)(2) imposes on parties the duty to disclose information regarding expert testimony and expert reports sufficiently in advance of the trial to provide opposing parties a reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial based upon this expert testimony. Section 5.8.3 explains this duty to disclose and its timing.

3. Rule 26(a)(3) imposes on parties an additional duty to disclose evidence that may be offered at trial. Section 5.11.2 explains these pretrial disclosures and their timing.

All these disclosures required by Rule 26(a) must be in writing, signed, and properly served on all other parties.^[5]^

§ 5.3.2 Initial Disclosures

Federal Rule 26(a)(1)(A) requires early disclosure of four types of basic information.^[6]^ This rule eliminates the need for certain discovery requests and mandates parties to exchange this required information:

(i) The name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable information—along with the subject of that information—that the disclosing party may use to support claims or defenses. See § 5.3.4.

(ii) A copy—or a description by category and location—of all documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things that the disclosing party may use to support claims or defenses. See § 5.3.5.

(iii) A computation of each category of damages claimed by the disclosing party—who must also make available for inspection and copying the documents or other evidentiary material, unless privileged or protected from disclosure, on which each computation is based, including materials supporting injuries suffered. See § 5.3.8.

(iv) Any insurance agreement under which an insurance company may be liable to satisfy all or part of a possible judgment in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment. See § 5.3.9.

The failure to properly and timely disclose this information may result in adverse consequences, including the inability to introduce related evidence at a hearing or trial.^[7]^

§ 5.3.3 Exempt Actions

There are nine major categories of federal proceedings excluded from the requirements of these initial disclosures by Federal Rule 26(a)(1)(B) and other federal rules: administrative appeals, habeas cases, pro se prisoner proceedings, efforts to quash administrative summonses or subpoenas, actions by the United States to recover benefit payments or collect on government guaranteed student loans (who knew?), proceedings ancillary to proceedings in other courts, actions to enforce arbitration awards, and in rem forfeiture proceedings. These categories were selected based on a determination that there is little or no discovery commonly used in these types of cases. It is estimated that these categories total approximately one-third of all federal civil filings.

§ 5.3.4 Disclosure of Individuals

Federal Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(i) requires the disclosure of the names of all witnesses and all persons who have knowledge of relevant information. All persons must be disclosed whom a party may use to support the position of the disclosing party, unless to be used solely for impeachment.^[8]^ Individuals need not be disclosed who only know of information not supportive of a claim or position asserted by the disclosing party. A court may exclude any witness not so disclosed unless the failure to disclose was substantially justified, or was harmless, or the existence and relevance of a witness was otherwise known by an opposing party.^[9]^

§ 5.3.5 Disclosure of Documents

Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) mandates the disclosure of all relevant documents, electronically stored information, and things in the possession, custody, or control of a party. This rule replaces the need for a party to submit routine document production requests to the other party. All documents, ESI, and things which a party may use to support claims or defenses must be disclosed, unless to be used solely for impeachment.

A disclosing party must either provide a copy or reproduction of these documents or a description of the documents, ESI, and things sufficient to allow opposing parties to make an informed decision concerning which materials might need to be examined. If a disclosing party chooses only to identify their existence and not to provide copies, the other party may require the disclosing party to produce the materials in accord with Rule 34. See § 8.3.

The requesting party may include in the Rule 34 request the description provided by the disclosing party. This practice eliminates squabbles over Rule 34 definitions and descriptions. A party disclosing the existence of documents, ESI, or things under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(ii) does not waive a right to object to the production of this information pursuant to a Rule 34 request on the basis of privilege, work product, or other applicable objection. This provision reduces the chances that a disclosing party will balk at revealing the existence of materials claimed to be protected.

§ 5.3.6 Impeachment Uses

[Federal Rules 26(a)(1)(A)(i) and (ii)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) exclude from the disclosure requirement information about individuals, documents, and ESI that is to be used “solely for impeachment."^[10]^ Many witnesses and materials that are to be used for impeachment may also be offered for other evidentiary reasons, limiting the practical use of this exclusion. For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) permits a prior statement by an adverse party to be admissible for its substantive truth in addition to its impeachment value.

Disclosing counsel needs to be careful in determining what may or may not be subsequently used exclusively for impeachment. If a witness, documents, or ESI is not mandatorily disclosed, the information can be provided as a supplemental disclosure in accord with Federal Rule 26(e)(1). Otherwise, the information may be presumptively excluded under Rule 37(c)(1), and trial counsel may be unable to use helpful evidence.

§ 5.3.7 “Use” to Support Claims and Defenses

The federal disclosure rules narrow the required information to be disclosed to information “the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses.” The Federal Advisory Committee Notes explain that “use” includes any use at a pretrial conference, to support a motion, in a hearing, or at trial as well as any intended use in discovery. The Notes further explain that the “claims and defenses” phrase “requires a party to disclose information it may use to support its denial or rebuttal of the allegations, claim, or defense of another party.”

Several major factors influence what needs to be disclosed:

1. How a Party Pleads the Case. A party can avoid disclosing supporting information if a claim or defense is not included that would force the disclosure of this information. This event seems legally counter-intuitive because it would require counsel to avoid pleading a supportive claim or defense.

2. The Conference. Federal Rule 26(f) commands that the parties discuss the nature and basis of the claims and defenses to make or arrange for [Rule 26(a)(1)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) disclosures, to develop a proposed discovery plan, to preserve ESI documents, and to discuss the possibility of a settlement or other resolution of the case. This conference may be done in person or by video conference or phone. Courts commonly insist on some interactive conversation—the exchange of voicemail, email, or text messages does not suffice. During these talks the scope of disclosures are discussed and resolved.

3. Supportive Evidence. It makes practical sense that a party wants an opposing party to understand the strengths of a case by disclosing positive, affirmative evidence that supports claims or defenses. It also makes strategic sense for a party to disclose information that supports that party’s case by weakening the opponent’s case. This information may negate, refute, invalidate, or otherwise damage the factual and legal positions of an opponent, which a party usually gladly and eagerly wants to disclose.

4. Common Sense and Good Judgment. Attorneys need to and should use common sense and good judgment in determining the scope of disclosures. The use of these sensible approaches will reduce potential discovery problems. The development of the appropriate level of common sense and reasonable judgment begins long before law school and is hopefully further developed there.

§ 5.3.8 Damages

Federal Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iii) also compels a party initially to disclose information about damages.^[11]^ This rule imposes a burden on a plaintiff, or on a counter-claimant, who seeks damages to disclose the specific damages, how the damages were computed, and documents and materials that support the computation.^[12]^ The rule restricts the disclosure of documents to materials that are relevant and not privileged or protected by work product and to those that are reasonably available to a party.^[13]^ A disclosing party may choose to provide a duplicate of the documents and materials or to permit the other parties to inspect and copy the originals.

§ 5.3.9 Insurance Agreements

Federal Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv) requires a disclosing party to provide “any insurance agreement under which an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a possible judgment” or which may “indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment."^[14]^ Section 5.6 explains this rule.

§ 5.3.10 Voluntary Disclosures

Some state court and other forum rules do not commonly mandate the same disclosures the federal rules require. But there are tactical reasons why parties may voluntarily disclose similar information in these tribunals. Parties may prefer to disclose, for reasons explained earlier, all supportive sources of information including witnesses, documents, ESI, damage computation, and insurance. This information, presumably helpful to a party, will advise opposing parties of the strengths of the disclosing party’s case, promoting a more informed evaluation and a more likely favorable settlement or outcome.

§ 5.3.11 Timing of Disclosures

Federal Rule 26(a)(1)(C) mandates that the initial disclosures, unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the court, shall be made within 14 days after the parties confer in accord with [Rule 26(f)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). The timing of the conference is generally left to the parties as long as the meeting is held at least 21 days before a scheduling conference is conducted or before a scheduling order is due under Federal Rule 16(b). The conference commonly occurs early in a case.^[15]^ See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(D).

The presumptive disclosure date does not apply if a party objects to the initial disclosures during the 26(f) conference and states the objections in the 26(f) discovery plan. This provision allows an objecting party pleading a claim or defense not to disclose information until the court reviews the objection. The basis for the objection is whether disclosure would be “inappropriate in the circumstances of the action,” an objection that is unlikely to be available in many cases. The objecting party needs to have a very good reason why disclosure is inappropriate.

§ 5.3.12 Scope of Investigation

Federal Rule 26(a)(1)(E) explains the investigation efforts parties must undertake before and while complying with the disclosure requirements and provides: “A party must make its initial disclosures based on the information then reasonably available to it. A party is not excused from making its disclosure because it has not fully investigated the case or because it challenges the sufficiency of another party’s disclosures or because another party has not made its disclosures.” This provision compels a party to complete the investigation of the case before it makes disclosures and eliminates two potential excuses for not disclosing information: that the other party has not made this disclosure or that it has not made sufficient disclosures.

Counsel has or should have advised a client about the need to preserve information and materials that may be discoverable in a potential action.^[16]^ A preservation hold demand needs to be timely emailed, sent, or provided to the client and party representatives by inside or outside counsel advising them they cannot destroy or otherwise eliminate information, documents, and electronically stored information that may be relevant to a dispute.^[17]^ See § 1.4. The preservation hold commonly suspends any retention/destruction policy a client has, maintaining the materials. Part of the preliminary investigation will be to gather and review the preserved information and documents.

A party must make a reasonable inquiry into the facts of the case. What is reasonably available to a party depends upon a number of factors: (1) the complexity of the issues, (2) the location, number, and availability of witnesses, documents, and electronically stored information, (3) any prior working relationships between the attorney and the client, and (4) how long the party has to conduct an investigation. A party is not excused from the duty of disclosure merely because an investigation remains incomplete. A party must make initial disclosures based on the pleadings and the information reasonably available at the time. Supplemental information obtained as the investigation continues is to be later disclosed in accord with [Rule 26(e)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). See § 5.10.

GenAI can streamline early-stage investigations and compliance with disclosure obligations. LLM-backed tools can help generate preservation hold notices, ensuring timely issuance and monitoring compliance. The technology can also analyze company databases to locate relevant electronically stored information (ESI) and flag potentially responsive documents before formal discovery begins.

GenAI can also summarize large data sets, helping attorneys assess available evidence efficiently. LLMs can also identify key witnesses by analyzing communications, contracts, and case-related documents. By leveraging case facts and pleadings, GenAI can assist in drafting initial disclosures and tracking ongoing investigations, flagging missing information, and suggesting follow-up inquiries. As new evidence emerges, LLMs can also help facilitate drafting supplemental disclosures.

§ 5.3.13 Modifications

It is especially important for attorneys to realize that they can mutually agree to modify any or all of the disclosure requirements in a particular case. This situation requires the agreement of all the parties and their counsel, which requirement may reduce the practical availability of agreements. Nonetheless, if the disclosure rules are or appear to be inappropriate for a particular case, the lawyers can create their own set of rules to apply. See Federal Rule 29. Or, a party may seek relief from a judge, arbitrator, or ALJ to modify disclosures in a specific case.

§ 5.3.14 Disclosure Violations

Parties are subject to a sanction for a failure to properly disclose. The factors courts review in exercising their discretion to impose a sanction are: (1) the importance of the evidence, (2) the prejudice to the opposing party of including the evidence, (3) the possibility of curing such prejudice by granting a continuance, and (4) the explanation for the party’s failure to disclose.^[18]^ A party who is unduly prejudiced by the failure to comply with the disclosure requirements may seek an appropriate Rule 37 sanction, ranging from the reimbursement of actual expenses caused by the misconduct to the preclusion of evidence.^[19]^ Further, information that should have been disclosed but has been destroyed or deleted may subject a recalcitrant party to a spoliation sanction, as previously explained.

§ 5.4 Relevancy and Proportionality

§ 5.4.1 Relevancy

The scope of discovery is designed to provide parties with information reasonably necessary to afford a fair and affordable opportunity to develop, evaluate, and present a case.^[20]^ Federal courts and some state courts have the same standard of relevancy. Many state courts have a definition of relevancy broader than the federal rule. Arbitral and administrative rules reflect the federal rule or a more restrictive standard.

Federal Rule 26(b)(1) explains what is discoverable:

(1) Scope in General. Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.^[21]^

This standard controls the extent of what is discoverable and is specifically limited by the proportionality requirement.^[22]^ The provision explicitly restricts discovery to non-privileged matters, which means that privileged information is not readily discoverable.^[23]^ Section 5.5 describes and explains the scope of privileged information.

A further limitation applies to electronically stored information.^[24]^ [Rule 26(b)(2)(B)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) provides that a party need not provide ESI from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. The party objecting to the disclosure of such ESI has the burden to establish these grounds.

Federal Rule 26(b)(1) establishes a more limited scope of discovery than prevailed previously and adopts the standard “relevant to any party’s claim or defense,” replacing the former broader scope of “relevant to the subject matter.” Some state rules continue to use the “subject matter” standard. See § 5.4.4. Defenders of the federal change to a “claim or defense” standard contend that the former provision was too broad and encouraged too much discovery. Parties who want or need more discovery can still seek and obtain it, but they will need a good reason and the consent of the opposing party or the consent of a judge, arbitrator, or ALJ.^[25]^

Not all relevant information may be discoverable.^[26]^ Marginally relevant information is not discoverable.^[27]^ Courts rightfully require that discovery inquiries be limited to claims and defenses and not the general subject matter.^[28]^ Judges, arbitrators, and ALJs have reasonably broad discretion in determining discovery relevancy.^[29]^

LLMs can transform relevancy determinations through their understanding of semantics. Unlike traditional keyword searches, GenAI can recognize conceptual relationships between documents and specific claims or defenses, potentially identifying relevant materials that keyword searches might miss. These tools can rapidly assess massive document collections, mapping evidence directly to pleaded matters while flagging potentially privileged information for attorney review.

This technology can dramatically cut review time and improve accuracy in distinguishing between marginally relevant information and truly discoverable material. GenAI can also generate tiered relevancy rankings to prioritize review of the most pertinent materials and automatically redact privileged or non-relevant portions while preserving necessary context. While attorneys should experiment with leveraging LLMs for initial assessments, they should always maintain their critical judgment: Relevancy is too important to outsource completely.

§ 5.4.2 Sources of Information

The primary sources of discoverable information are people and documents. Individuals who are involved in an incident, transaction, accident, or relationship likely did, saw, or heard something and have first-hand information relevant to a claim or defense. They may also have second-hand information that is equally discoverable. It is sufficient if they have knowledge about a relevant matter, which information may be hearsay.^[30]^

Documentary sources of relevant information include the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of documents and tangible things, and identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. Documents include paper materials and records, as well as electronically stored information. Computerized document identification, review, and management systems can uncover and locate relevant documents. Tangible things include personal and real property and related matters. Chapter 8 explains the scope of discoverable sources.

Social media communications and electronically stored information provide sources for the discovery of relevant information. These “documents” appear in various digital and virtual locations. If they are relevant and the party has access to them, they are discoverable. They are quite likely not readily obtainable from the communication service or network.^[31]^ ESI documents that impose undue burden or costs on a party may need not be disclosed, as previously explained. See Rule 26(b)(2)(B).

Facts and various types of information will be readily discoverable under the current rule. Matters involving liability and damages and jurisdiction and venue are clearly relevant. Inquiries into the financial status of a party will usually be disallowed unless there is a specific claim of punitive damages for reckless or wanton misconduct. Information about past acts may be discoverable if the habits, prior conduct, or former practices of a party are directly in issue.

Opinions, contentions, and conclusions relating to the claims or defenses of a case are also discoverable.^[32]^ The “claim or defense” standard under Rule 26 includes the discovery of relevant opinions and conclusions. This type of discovery is also allowed under related rules. Federal Rule 33(b) specifically provides that an interrogatory will not be objectionable merely because a question involves an opinion or contention, and Federal Rule 36 permits requests for admissions that seek opinions or contentions.

Other sources and types of discoverable information include information exclusively within the knowledge or possession of the other side and information already known to the discovering party, as well as some information available to the interrogator as a matter of public record. A request for known information is consistent with the discovery theory that knowing what others know and what they know that others know may be useful and appropriate information. This type of information has been held to be discoverable not because it necessarily produces new information but because it permits a party to verify facts and obtain admissions, an equally valid discovery purpose.^[33]^

The discovery standard of relevancy is not limited by the evidentiary standard of relevancy.^[34]^ Rule 26(b)(1) expressly allows the discovery of information that is not admissible as evidence and is broader in scope than [Fed. R. Evid. 403](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N5CA04210B96D11D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N5CA04210B96D11D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). Discovery relevancy encompasses information that relates to claims or defenses in the case regardless of its admissibility at a hearing or trial. Discoverable information includes any type of evidence, including impeachment information, and reasonable sources regarding potentially relevant evidence.^[35]^

LLMs offer practitioners additional methods for identifying potential sources of discoverable information through computational analysis of case documents. These systems can process client discovery, pleadings, and preliminary documents to identify individuals likely possessing relevant first-hand or second-hand information. This preliminary mapping of knowledge sources can create efficiency in the discovery planning process by highlighting potential witnesses before formal discovery commences.

GenAI’s pattern recognition can detect relationships, revealing networks of individuals with potentially relevant knowledge that traditional manual review might overlook. Initial document analysis can also uncover references to information repositories across multiple formats, including audio recordings, video files, and specialized digital storage systems.

Source identification becomes increasingly important as information proliferates across varied digital platforms. GenAI can search social media communications using semantic understanding rather than simple keyword matching. Organizational data mapping can interpret corporate structures, helping identify potential ESI repositories and their custodians. LLMs connected with search engines can identify public records, including government databases, news archives, and other publicly available information. When it comes to identifying potential sources, the medium (e.g., LLMs) is the message.

§ 5.4.3 Proportionality

The standard of proportionality has always been a factor in determining the scope of discovery.^[36]^ Federal Rule 26(b)(1) establishes six self-defining proportionality elements: (1) the importance of the issues at stake in the action, (2) the amount in controversy, (3) the parties’ relative access to relevant information, (4) the parties’ resources, (5) the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and (6) whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.^[37]^ The six factors are elastic—for example, a case may involve substantially important issues despite having little dollar value.^[38]^ And they are adaptable to specific circumstances—for further example, the importance of the requested discovery can be balanced with the comparative benefits and costs.^[39]^

§ 5.4.4 Historical Standards

Three previous standards that were removed from the present federal relevancy standard were: (1) relevant to the “subject matter” of the case, (2) “information reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence”, and (3) “good cause.” While these clauses are no longer included in Rule 26(b), they may influence the scope of the present standards. Some federal judges and lawyers are used to relying on these factors in determining what is discoverable, and their experiences may affect how they interpret and apply the current factors. And, state court rules may include and apply these provisions. Good cause continues to be a factor in determining whether a federal or state court protective order is appropriate. It is difficult to define the standard of relevant discoverability systematically because the wide variety of cases foster an infinite number of variables and factual and legal issues.

§ 5.4.5 Relevancy Limits

Discovery does have its limits. The U.S. Supreme Court has reminded the federal courts to " ’not neglect their power to restrict discovery where appropriate.’^[40]^ The rules do not permit a party ’to roam in shadow zones of relevancy and to explore matter which does not presently appear germane on the theory that it might conceivably become so.’ “^[41]^ These limitations reflect the balanced discovery philosophy that if a party wants to go discovery fishing, that party ought to catch no more than a reasonable and sufficient limit.^[42]^ The Supreme Court has emphasized the need for reasonable restraints by declaring that the discovery provisions must be applied " ’to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.’ “^[43]^

Courts balance the competing interests of parties in deciding whether to order disclosure of certain information. The interests of one party may outweigh the discovery interests of another party, especially when the use of the discoverable information serves only a limited purpose and is disproportional to the needs of the case.^[44]^ Courts have been and are willing to restrict discovery.^[45]^

§ 5.4.6 Practical Discovery Limits

Practice, experience, and economics influence the realities of the extent of discovery. These practicalities in turn frame several specific approaches to what is discoverable.

First, you can ask for everything relevant you want to discover, whether you professionally believe it to be discoverable or not. The experience of many attorneys confirms that what one lawyer thinks to be discoverable, another lawyer believes never to be discoverable. Sometimes there will be a collective opinion regarding some information, confirmable in a published judicial decision.^[46]^ More often, the experiences of practitioners and the views of individual judges, arbitrators, and ALJs influence the scope of discovery. Your doubts about the discoverability of something may not match the doubts of your adversary or the decision maker. Ask and you may receive.

Second, you should ask only for those things you have the time and money to pursue.^[47]^ Your time and your client’s finances will determine the practical extent of discovery in a case. The theoretical scope of discovery will be limited by the actualities of economics and strategy. There can often be an enormous amount of information contained in electronically stored materials, emails, social network communications, websites, and other sources that could take months or longer to recover and review. Good judgment and reasonable discretion must guide the search for truly relevant information. What you ask for may well be asked of you in return.

Third, you may seek discovery through cooperative and collaborative approaches with opposing counsel, as the rules mandate advocates meet and confer regarding the case and discovery. Courts expect counsel to be reasonably cooperative with each other.^[48]^ The age of electronic discovery compels attorneys to agree on issues such as search terms, formats, and protocols. Being reasonable may foster and advance reasonableness.

Fourth, you can ask for information you need to obtain through a court order if your request is refused by opposing counsel—and only if it’s really worth the time, money, and effort. Many judges, when confronted with the issue of whether to allow discovery, tend to permit it for several reasons.^[49]^

A. Reported opinions over the years allowing discovery outnumber cases prohibiting discovery, and judges like to go with the numbers.

B. An attorney who takes the time and effort to prepare a motion, memorandum, and proposed order must be convinced that the information is worth it, and judges may respect that conviction.

C. Courts recognize that the value of the information sought may outweigh the burden placed on the responding party, and judges like to weigh things.

D. There may be less likelihood of being reversed on appeal if discovery is permitted, and judges do not like to think themselves wrong.

Seek and you may find, or not. You can obtain the services of a court appointed neural in appropriate cases or a discovery mediator in other cases to assist you and opposing counsel in agreeing on a compromise discovery program.

As GenAI improves, it could further redefine practical discovery limits. For example, LLMs can transform resource-intensive tasks into manageable processes. GenAI applications can map judicial tendencies in specific jurisdictions, assessing the likelihood of success for contested discovery motions based on previous rulings by individual judges. This capability can allow practitioners to make informed decisions about which discovery battles merit the investment of time and client resources, shifting the decision-making process from intuition-based hunches to data-driven analyses.

Substantive discovery’s practical boundaries also expand significantly through computational assistance. Document collections that previously defied comprehensive review due to volume constraints can now yield to automated analyses that can process millions of documents within reasonable timeframes.

GenAI can enhance meet-and-confer preparations by generating proposed discovery protocols specifically tailored to electronic materials and complex data sets, facilitating more productive collaboration between opposing counsel. As courts increasingly expect meaningful cooperation in discovery planning, these tools can generate compromise proposals that balance competing interests while satisfying proportionality requirements.

What once exceeded practical limits—comprehensive review of massive data sets, identification of semantically important evidence, detailed analysis of judge-specific tendencies—might increasingly fall within the realm of practical possibility.

§ 5.5 Privilege

§ 5.5.1 Analysis

Federal Rule 26(b)(1) expressly declares privileged matter to be non-discoverable. Privilege in discovery contexts is the same as that defined by the law of evidence.^[50]^ No general privilege secures a person from providing information, but evidence law has established specific privileges that permit a person to withhold information in certain reasonably well-defined circumstances. What is and what is not privileged for discovery purposes is defined by constitutional rights, statutory provisions, common law, rules of evidence, and cases interpreting them.

This section outlines privileged information encountered in discovery in both federal and state proceedings. Detailed analysis of federal case law, state decisional and statutory laws, and rules on privileges appear in considerable detail elsewhere.^[51]^ The existence of a privilege is one of the few assertions that will legitimately stonewall discovery inquiries. Attorneys therefore need to become familiar with the limits of privilege to determine just what information can properly be sought and when objections and refusals to respond can properly be interposed.

The rules of privileges provide protection to communications occurring in confidential relationships. The following elements usually need to be present to create a privilege, though they neither apply in all situations nor to all privileges:

1. The communication must originate in confidence with an understanding that the information will not be disclosed.

2. The element of confidentiality must be essential to a full and satisfactory maintenance of a relationship between individuals or must serve a vital governmental or public need.

3. This relationship or need must be one that in the opinion of the community ought to be fostered.

4. The injury that would occur by disclosure must outweigh the benefit gained by the disposition of the case based upon the information.^[52]^

The following questions and responses explore these factors. Not all privileges or situations will involve these listed issues. The succeeding queries and replies provide a framework to analyze the existence and applicability of a privilege.

1. Was the Information Intended to Be a Confidential Communication? The basic rationale for privileges is the need to retain the confidential character of the information. Confidentiality must usually be present to support the existence of a privilege, although, for example, it need not be present to create a marital testimonial privilege between spouses.^[53]^

2. Was the Privilege Properly Asserted? A party must usually refuse to reveal the information voluntarily. The disclosure of such data, even with an objection, may well constitute a waiver of the privilege.^[54]^ A party may not assert a privilege during discovery and plan to waive that privilege at trial.

3. Who Is the Holder of the Privilege? The privilege is a personal right and usually belongs to the person who communicates the information.^[55]^ Some privileges will belong to someone else. The holder can assert the privilege, and often the individual or organization that received the information can assert it on behalf of that person. For example, the client is the holder of the attorney-client privilege, and either the client, or the attorney on behalf of the client, may assert the privilege.

4. Is the Information Discoverable from Another Source? Information that is communicated in a confidential manner may be obtainable from another source. An attorney may not be compelled to disclose facts a client has communicated, but the client may be deposed regarding such facts.^[56]^

5. Are the Data Discoverable Through Another Discovery Device? Information obtainable through a discovery device that does not breach a confidence will be preferred to a method that delves into privileged communications.^[57]^

6. Does Another Privilege Protect the Data? Information not sheltered by one privilege may be protected under another privilege. For example, the attorney-client privilege may not protect certain communications, while the privilege against self-incrimination may.

7. Has the Party Claiming the Privilege Maintained the Confidential Information? The privileged data will lose its protected status if the party claiming the privilege voluntarily discloses such information to a non-privileged source.

8. Has the Privilege Been Waived in Whole or in Part Through Some Disclosure? The person who holds the privilege is the one who may waive it. Inadvertent disclosure may or may not result in a waiver. Partial disclosure of the subject matter of a topic will usually constitute a waiver of the entire subject matter. Parties and lawyers need to be careful to shelter confidential information and to avoid conduct that may result in waiver.^[58]^ Some situations will permit selective declaration of a privilege. For example, the privilege against self-incrimination may be able to be selectively asserted.^[59]^ See Section 5.5.9.

9. Which Party Has the Burden to Establish the Existence of the Privilege? The party claiming the privilege has the burden to show its existence and application.^[60]^

10. Is the Motion Seeking Disclosure or Protection Properly Before the Court? The party seeking disclosure will bring a Rule 37 motion. A party seeking protection will seek a Rule 26 motion. Courts usually require the attorneys to attempt to resolve the dispute before seeking judicial relief.

11. Has the Requesting Party Proved a Need for the Information? The information must otherwise be discoverable under the provisions of Rule 26(b), and it may be necessary for the party seeking the information to explain why the information is relevant.

12. What Are the Interests of the Party Seeking Discovery? Usually, the requesting party needs the information to pursue or defend a case. The party’s interest is that of having access to information to be able to assess the case accurately and to prepare the issues for trial properly.

13. What Are the Interests of the Party Claiming the Privilege? These interests likely parallel the public interest in keeping certain communications sheltered: to preserve the integrity of relationships or to further governmental or societal interests.

14. What Are the Interests of the Public? Exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental principle that “the public has a right to [everyone’s] evidence."^[61]^ A countervailing public interest may be promoted by protecting certain communications. These conflicting public interests must be evaluated.

15. Which Interests Prevail? The existence and applicability of privileges will be carefully construed. They should be applied only in situations where the rationale for non-disclosure transcends the “normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth."^[62]^ The courts will weigh the competing interests and decide what is protected and what must be disclosed.

16. Have the Parties Provided Enough Information Through Affidavits and Memos Regarding the Privilege? Parties can assist judges in weighing these competing interests by providing the court with the facts of the situation and by explaining their legal positions.

17. Is an In-Camera Inspection of the Privileged Matter Necessary? A judge may need to review the communicated information to determine whether indeed it falls within a privileged classification. [Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N34D75250B96D11D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N34D75250B96D11D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) authorizes this procedure, allowing judges and court appointed neutrals to review the allegedly protected communications and to excise privileged matter from non-privileged matter.^[63]^

18. Is the Privilege Absolute or Qualified? The application of a privilege to a specific situation usually renders that privilege qualified and not absolute. The court determines the extent of the qualifications in its assessment of the competing interests of the parties and public.

19. Will a Protective Order Permitting Limited Disclosure Protect the Privileged Information? Rule 26(c) provides the court with discretion to issue an order limiting the disclosure of privileged information.

20. *What Privilege Law Applies? Common Law? Federal Statutory Law? State Law? *[Federal Rule of Evidence 501](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N43587220C0F511D8A8CA80DCF7582C6A/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N43587220C0F511D8A8CA80DCF7582C6A/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) and similar state rules provide the answers along with case law.

21. Has the Party Asserting the Privilege Met Its Burden? The party who asserts the privilege has the burden of demonstrating the existence and legitimacy of the privilege. Specifically, a party must demonstrate^[64]^

(A) The identity of the privilege. For example, in an attorney/client privilege, the identity of the client who is asserting the privilege must be disclosed, although that may be obvious from the circumstances.

(B) The confidential nature of the information. For example, in an attorney/client privilege claim, the information must involve private legal conversations or advice.

(C) The persons involved in the confidential communication. For example, in an attorney/client privilege, the information needs to be a communication between a lawyer and client and not independent third persons.

(D) The timely and proper assertion of the privilege and the absence of any intentional or inadvertent waiver. It may not be necessary for a party claiming a privilege that it has not been waived, but it is wise for a party to assert that the confidential communication has been continuously maintained.

22. Has the Party Claiming a Privilege Produced a Privilege Log? A party asserting a privilege must provide descriptive information, usually in a privilege log.^[65]^ Applicable rules may require a log to be maintained and provided. The following information is usually sufficient:^[66]^

(A) The specific privilege claimed, including a citation to the supporting statute, rule, or other legal authority.

(B) The title of the document or topic of the communication.

(C) The date the communication occurred or the date the document was created.

(D) The general subject matter of the document or communication, including the basis of the confidential nature of the contents and the primary purpose of the communication or document. This information needs to be sufficiently detailed to support each element of the privileged asserted.

(E) The identity (name, title, status) of the author and of each recipient of the document or communication, including the relationship between and among the recipients.

(F) Any other information necessary to determine the applicability of the claimed privilege.

(G) Why you think it is a real privilege to be a lawyer.

23. *Has the Requesting Party Followed Proper Procedures? *A party can include in the preface to a document production request and interrogatory request a description/definition of what is to be disclosed for each document or communication claimed to be privileged. A party can also seek this detailed information voluntarily from an opposing party in a protective order agreement and/or a stipulated order, and the opposition may be willing to do so because the same information may be responsive to their discovery requests. Or, if an agreement cannot be reached, a party can seek an order from a judge requiring this information.

24. Why Was This Case Assigned to Me in the First Place? Judges review these and related questions in determining the existence and applicability of a privilege.

The following subsections explain the sources of privileges in the federal system. [Federal Rule of Evidence 501](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N43587220C0F511D8A8CA80DCF7582C6A/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N43587220C0F511D8A8CA80DCF7582C6A/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) lists the various sources of privilege for federal cases:

1. The United States Constitution.

2. Acts of Congress.

3. Rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.

4. Common law interpreted in light of reason and experience.

§ 5.5.2 Privilege Under the United

States Constitution

Privileges based upon constitutional rights include protection against self-incrimination, the right of privacy, and governmental secrecy.^[67]^

The Fifth Amendment privilege is a personal privilege and allows a person to refuse to provide individual testimony or materials. The privilege does not protect a party’s information or documents in the possession of a third party.^[68]^ The production of documents may involve self-incrimination issues and, if so, they need not be produced.^[69]^ The self-incrimination privilege may well be absolute and, if so, a Rule 37 motion brought by the requesting party will be denied.

The privilege may not be claimed by a corporation. Former employees of a corporation may or may not be able to assert a self-incrimination privilege against the disclosure of corporate documents depending on the circumstances. A current employee may not assert a personal Fifth Amendment privilege claim against the revealing of corporate documents in the possession of the employee. A former corporate officer may successfully assert the self-incrimination privilege with regard to certain corporate documents because a former employee is not an agent of the corporation and records retained by the employee may be in a personal and not a representational capacity.

The self-incrimination privilege applies to both parties and witnesses. Non-party witnesses may refuse to disclose information if that information may incriminate them. A non-party deponent or a person responding to a subpoena may decide not to disclose incriminating materials.

A party may or may not be able effectively to assert a self-incrimination privilege in a civil suit. Though a party can never be forced to waive a privilege, courts have held that a party cannot both seek affirmative relief and assert a privilege to block inquiries about those affirmative claims.^[70]^ These cases hold that a witness cannot testify on direct examination and then claim a privilege on cross-examination about matters made relevant by the direct. This doctrine is based on the rationale that a party cannot assert a privilege as a shield if the party is using the information to wield a sword. The assertion of a privilege by a party may not automatically justify dismissal of a claim. While some courts have imposed such a sanction against a party seeking affirmative relief, others have balanced the interests of the competing parties and imposed less restrictive alternatives.^[71]^

The right to privacy forms a more obscure source of privilege rights. In practice, the right to privacy may be raised as an objection to a discovery question seeking information about a party’s personal or financial matters. In theory, the right stems from a variety of constitutional provisions, including the First and Fifth Amendments. Those courts that have considered privileges based upon privacy balance those privacy rights with the opposition’s legitimate need to obtain the information. The typical balancing tests employ several factors:

1. The scope of the invasion of privacy. The broader the breach of confidentiality, the less likely discovery will be permitted; the narrower the breach of privacy, the more likely it will be allowed.

2. The needs of the opposition for the information. The more necessary the information is, the more likely it will be obtainable; the less vital it is, the less likely it will be available.

3. The status of the person or business claiming the privilege. If the claimant is a party (especially a plaintiff), it is more likely that discovery will be allowed; if not a party, it is less likely to be allowed.

4. The availability of the information from another source. If a source is exclusive, it is more likely that the source will be required to disclose the information; if there are other sources, it is less likely the requested source will be forced to reveal the data.

5. The specific kind of privacy invaded. The more significant the right, the less likely it will be revealed; the less vital the interest, the more likely it will be revealed. A significant right might include freedom of the press and rights of reporters not to divulge sources. A less vital interest might be private financial records.

Discovery that has sought access to government information has been opposed by governmental claims of constitutional privileges. Typical claims include national security secrets, executive privilege, and military secrets. The Supreme Court has recognized that these claims are not absolute.^[72]^ Such information is discoverable under limited circumstances and can be protected through the provisions of a protective order.

§ 5.5.3 Privilege Under Acts of Congress

and State Legislatures

Congress and state legislatures have adopted and will continue to adopt statutes creating privileges in certain specific situations. Many of these statutes do not directly create an evidentiary privilege, but rather prohibit governmental agencies or employees from disclosing reported information to individuals or the general public. Specific categories include: accident reports, trade secrets, confidential information, statistics, “insider” information, immunity, information about national defense and security, and the privacy and identity of the reporter of information. These privileges are usually qualified and not absolute, and some but not all such information may be discoverable.^[73]^

§ 5.5.4 Privilege Under Supreme Court Rules

The United States Supreme Court and state supreme courts have promulgated rules which limit the disclosure of information that have the same or similar effect as a privilege. Various sections of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure restrict the disclosure of discovery information in a way that parallel the characteristics of a privilege. Rule 26(b)(3) limits the scope of discovery involving trial preparation materials and work product. Rule 26(b)(4) governs discoverable information concerning experts. Rule 26(c) provides a court with discretion to protect a party from discovery causing annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.

A Rule 35 physical or mental examination of a party operates as a waiver of the common law physician-patient privilege. State civil procedure rules have similar provisions. These rules cannot be properly identified as privileges, but they have been described as providing “qualified immunity from discovery."^[74]^ By whatever name, they continue to restrict certain types of information from disclosure.

§ 5.5.5 Common Law Privileges

[Federal Rule of Evidence 501](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N43587220C0F511D8A8CA80DCF7582C6A/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N43587220C0F511D8A8CA80DCF7582C6A/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) establishes privileges based on “the common law as interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.” This evidentiary rule provides courts with the flexibility to develop federal privileges on a case-by-case basis."^[75]^

The following subsections summarize the extent of the attorney-client privilege specifically and outline the status of other specific privileges derived from common law, state statutes, and state decisional law.

§ 5.5.6 Attorney-Client Privilege

The attorney-client privilege is perhaps the oldest of the privileges involving confidential communications. The privilege encourages “full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and promote[s] broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.” It recognizes that “sound legal advice or advocacy . . . depends upon the lawyer being fully informed by the client."^[76]^ If the primary purpose of communicating information is not for legal advice or counseling, but for a non-legal purpose, no privilege may attach even if directed by an attorney.^[77]^

The privilege exists between a client and the client’s attorney and staff. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications with a lawyer or a representative of the lawyer. The nature of this privilege raises several questions regarding its applicability and extension, with the following answers:

1. Is the Information That Is Communicated Privileged? No. A client can be questioned about what the client knows, even though that knowledge has been communicated to the lawyer, unless, of course, there exists another claim of privilege, such as self-incrimination. The mere fact that a client communicates certain information to an attorney does not enshroud that information with the privilege.^[78]^ The privilege only protects disclosure of communications: it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communicated with the attorney.^[79]^ For example, a client deponent may not be asked a question: “What did you tell your lawyer about how you spent the amount claimed as a business expense?” But a client deponent may be asked: “How did you spend the amount claimed as a business expense?”

2. Does the Privilege Extend to the Identity of a Client? Not normally, but the identity is privileged if disclosure would implicate the client.^[80]^

3. Does the Privilege Cover Fee Arrangements Between an Attorney and a Client? Not usually, but the privilege will protect fee information to avoid incriminating the client.^[81]^

4. Are Written Communications Privileged? Yes, to the extent that any of the contents are privileged. The mere transfer of materials or documents or tangible things from a client to a lawyer does not render these items confidential.^[82]^ A Rule 34 request for production will compel the production of discoverable documents whether they are in the attorney’s possession or the client’s possession.

5. Are Communications by the Lawyer Privileged? Yes, if the requirements of the rule are fulfilled. The privilege normally extends both to the client’s communication and to the attorney’s responses and advice.^[83]^ [Federal Rules 33 and 36](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N4CB6E640B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N4CB6E640B96511D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) do allow discovery concerning matters that relate the law applicable to the facts involved.

6. Are Acts of the Client Observed by the Client’s Attorney Privileged? Usually. Information communicated in any form will be privileged as long as the other facets of the privilege rule are met.^[84]^ The act of rolling up a sleeve to show a lawyer a hidden scar is a privileged communication.

7. Does the Privilege Extend to Communications Inadvertently Overheard by Eavesdroppers? Perhaps. The client may be able to invoke the privilege to prevent testimony by a third person who accidently overhears a communication intended to be confidential, depending on the circumstances.

8. Who May Claim the Privilege? The privilege belongs to and is for the benefit of the client, not the attorney. The client controls when the privilege is to be asserted or waived. The lawyer may and typically does raise it on behalf of the client.^[85]^

9. In What Situations Does the Privilege Not Exist? No privilege arises in situations in which a client seeks legal advice to commit a crime or fraud, a lawyer commits malpractice, or a client fails to pay an attorney for professional services.^[86]^

10. When Does the Attorney-Client Privilege Terminate? The privilege generally stays in effect after the attorney-client relationship ends and even after the client’s death, unless exceptional circumstances require its disclosure. The client or a personal representative may waive all or part of the privileged communications. Certain conduct by a client will also operate as a waiver; for example, a client who reviews documents to refresh recollection for a deposition, hearing, or trial waives the privilege as to those documents.^[87]^

§ 5.5.7 Attorney-Corporate Client Privilege

A corporate client functions differently from an individual client, and this fact affects communications and confidentiality and the existence of the privilege. Corporations may have many individuals of different status with relevant information about a case; much of this information involves both business and legal concerns; and corporate agents, as well as the employees, may be eyewitnesses to an event. Courts have developed a number of alternative approaches to apply the attorney-client privilege to corporate clients:

1. The Unlimited Approach. All confidential communications between a corporate officer, employee, or director with an attorney create a privilege.^[88]^

2. The Subject-Matter Test. Communications are privileged if: (a) an employee makes the communication at the direction of a supervisor, and (b) the subject matter is related to the employee’s job duties.^[89]^

3. The Modified Subject-Matter Test. Several requirements may establish the attorney-client corporate privilege:

(a) The communication is made for the purpose of securing legal advice.

(b) The employee making the communication does so with the direction of the employee’s corporate superior.

(c) The superior makes the request so that the corporation could secure legal advice.

(d) The subject matter of the communication is within the scope of the employee’s corporate duties.

(e) The communication is not disseminated beyond those persons who need to know its contents.^[90]^

4. The Upjohn Approach. The Supreme Court has established a corporate client privilege that resembles a modified subject matter approach without delineating specific factors. The Court declined to establish a firm rule concerning the scope of the privilege and squarely rejected the control group test.^[91]^ In Upjohn, the communications protected by the Court were matters within the employee’s corporate duties and were elicited through confidential interviews with lawyers. The concurring opinion suggested the following detailed criteria as creating a privilege:

The attorney must be one authorized by the management to inquire into the subject and must be seeking information to assist counsel in performing any of the following functions: (a) evaluating whether the employee’s conduct has bound or would bind the corporation; (b) assessing the legal consequences, if any, of that conduct; or (c) formulating appropriate legal responses to actions that have been or may be taken by others with regard to that conduct.^[92]^

The application of a privilege to “in house” counsel may turn on the role of the lawyer. The keys to the existence of the privilege for house counsel are identical to the standards applicable to the general privilege and depend upon: (1) the status of the corporate representative, (2) the role of the lawyer, and (3) the nature of the information. Confidential communications between a chief administrator or managing director and a lawyer from the company’s legal department involving legal advice or services is obviously going to be protected by an attorney/client privilege.^[93]^

The general job description and place in the company of the lawyer influences the existence of the privilege. The primary purpose of the intended communication also affects the application of the privilege. Discussions at board meetings about company business and policies may not be protected by an attorney/client privilege, even if, as commonly occurs, these issues involve legal matters. Discussions between board members and a company lawyer will be protected if they involve the legal discussion of pending or anticipated litigation.

§ 5.5.8 Other Specific Privileges

The following privileges apply in the various situations that give rise to confidential communications. Not all these privileges are recognized by all jurisdictions. The privileges designated 1 through 12 below represent the more commonly accepted privileges in federal and state courts. The remaining privileges represent situations that act as a bar to disclosure in some state jurisdictions:

1. Marital spousal privileges are of two types: a privilege not to testify against a spouse regarding any information, and a privilege not to disclose confidential communications between spouses. The first privilege is available only to the witness spouse, and the other spouse can neither compel nor foreclose testimony. The second and more common privilege affords protections to all confidential marital communications with neither spouse being able to disclose information without the consent of the other.^[94]^ There are four prerequisites to be met to establish the second privilege also known as the confidential communications privilege: a communication between spouses, a valid marriage, a communication made in confidence, and no waiver.^[95]^

2. Confidential communications with clergy will be deemed privileged to protect the confidence of the disclosures.^[96]^

3. Trade secrets and other similar private business communications will be protected by privileged status.^[97]^

4. Political vote privileges protect a voter from disclosing a vote.^[98]^

5. The required-report privilege protects the confidentiality of reports and returns required by law to be filed with the government.^[99]^

6. Governmental privileges exist for: (a) military, diplomatic, and national and state secrets, (b) governmental opinions and recommendations, (c) investigatory law enforcement files, (d) and freedom-of-information exemptions.^[100]^

7. The identity of an informer is privileged.^[101]^

8. A general physician-patient privilege has been created by case law and statute. Many exceptions to this privilege narrow its scope.^[102]^

9. A limited psychotherapist-patient privilege covers confidential personal revelations of a patient.^[103]^

10. A grand-jury privilege provides protection and secrecy to grand-jury testimony.^[104]^

11. Tax returns enjoy a qualified privilege, protecting against disclosure, unless such information is vital and unavailable from any other source.^[105]^

12. A judicial privilege protects persons engaged in judicial decision-making processes (including judges, jurors, arbitrators, and ALJs) from disclosing the mental processes employed in formulating decisions.^[106]^

13. The hospital-and-medical-review-committee privilege is applicable to staff discussions evaluating the adequacy of provisions for hospital care.^[107]^

14. The teacher-pupil privilege restricts disclosures of communications between teachers and their students.^[108]^

15. The social service and juvenile worker privilege protects communications between government workers and children.^[109]^

16. A counselor-pupil privilege applies to communications between licensed counselors and school students.^[110]^

17. An accountant-client privilege applies to communications between a professional accountant and a client.^[111]^

18. A scholar’s privilege promotes the free flow of confidential information and sources necessary to scholarly research.^[112]^

19. Business privileges protect confidential business contracts, customer lists, and other business matters.^[113]^

20. Qualified privileges exist for news sources, usually based on “shield” laws or First Amendment protections.^[114]^

21. A President may claim and retain presidential immunity over protected communications that occurred while in office.^[115]^ The privilege protects the office and not the individual, and it may extend to presidential advisers. Congress may subpoena records that are not privileged.^[116]^

§ 5.5.9 Objections to Claims of Privilege

The mechanics of how a party objects to a discovery request depends upon the type of privilege and the applicable procedural law. Federal Rule 26(b)(5) requires that an objecting party identify and describe the privileged information and materials being withheld without revealing the underlying protected information. A description that reveals the existence of the privileged document or information, the identity of the person who created the document or who knows the information, the time when the document was created or when the information became known, and the purpose for its existence would be an adequate description. This data may be contained in a log.^[117]^ See § 5.1 No. 22.

In federal cases and many state cases, a broad umbrella objection is insufficient to properly assert and preserve privileges. A party needs to describe the privileged documents, individually by name, or reasonably grouped by category. A party cannot merely say: “I have so many privileged documents I cannot begin to identify them.” The privilege needs to be established on a document by document basis and perhaps on a sentence by sentence basis. In all jurisdictions, a party may bring a motion challenging the legitimacy of the objection and seeking an order disclosing the information claimed to be privileged.

LLMs can enhance privilege objection workflows through targeted automation. GenAI systems can identify potentially privileged communications by recognizing attorney-client relationships and privilege indicators within document contexts. GenAI applications can help generate privilege logs by extracting metadata and creating descriptions that satisfy rule requirements without revealing protected content.

When evaluating opposing counsel’s privilege claims, LLM-backed tools can identify objection vulnerabilities and locate relevant judicial precedents addressing similar disputes. Court-mandated document-by-document and sentence-by-sentence reviews become more manageable with automated systems that perform granular assessments across large document collections. Lastly, computational assistance can transform privilege management from an exclusively manual process into an approach that’s more systematic and defensible.

§ 5.5.10 Waiver of Privileges

A party waives a privilege by knowingly and voluntarily disclosing the information. What if an opposing party receives privileged information during discovery? Federal Rule 26(b)(5)(b) provides that after being notified of the privilege nature of the materials, the party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the information. The rule further states that the producing party must preserve the information until the claim is resolved by the parties or the court. Many state courts have a similar rule.

Further, case law has developed approaches to privileged materials that have been inadvertently waived. There are three approaches courts have adopted regarding inadvertent waivers.

The first approach is the “never waived” approach, which holds that an inadvertent disclosure can never constitute a waiver because the holder of the privilege lacks the subjective intent to disclose the information.^[118]^ In other words, the party may be sloppy but not willful, and the severe consequences of revealing confidential information do not follow from this level of negligence.

The second approach, at the other end of the spectrum, is the “strict accountability” approach, which holds that the inadvertent waiver is a fully effective waiver of the privilege.^[119]^ This approach makes clear the consequences, however severe, to the negligent client and encourages clients and lawyers to be ever careful and vigilant, or else. Some courts will enforce this blanket waiver and its harsh results to the surprise and regret of those who were not sufficiently vigilant.

The third, and middle ground, approach is the “balancing of circumstances” test which considers: (1) the reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosures, (2) the amount of time it took for the producing party to recognize the error, (3) the scope of the production, (4) the extent of the inadvertent disclosure, and (5) the overriding interest of fairness and justice.^[120]^ A judge can apply these five criteria and determine whether, on balance, the inadvertent disclosure does or does not result in a waiver.^[121]^

Of the three approaches, the balancing, middle ground approach seems to be most often adopted and represents the wiser and more considerate approach.^[122]^

Two methods that may reduce the effect of inadvertent waivers are a stipulated protective order and a confidentiality agreement order. Parties may obtain a protective order that establishes when inadvertent disclosure occurs and the consequences that flow from negligent disclosures. Parties may also acquire a confidentiality order that provides claw-back procedures for what happens if inadvertent disclosures are made and a provision that such disclosures do not constitute a waiver of applicable privileges and other Rule 26 protections.^[123]^

§ 5.6 Insurance Agreements

Relevant insurance information must be disclosed. Federal Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iv) requires a party to affirmatively disclose any insurance agreements covering the events or transaction of the case, including liability insurance policies.^[124]^ A party may provide a copy of the insurance policy or make a policy available for inspection or copying. State rules typically allow opposing parties to seek discovery information by submitting a discovery request. Interrogatory questions may uncover more information about the extent of the insurance coverage. A Rule 34 request for production will reveal the policy itself if it has not been disclosed.

Yes, Santa Claus is discoverable. Why? Because: (1) insurance is an asset created to satisfy a claim; (2) the insurance company ordinarily controls the defense of a defendant policyholder; (3) information about coverage is available only from the defendant or insurer; and (4) disclosure does not involve a significant invasion of privacy.^[125]^ The amount of coverage will affect the timing of settlement and the avoidance of unnecessary cases. A moderate coverage policy will encourage a settlement not exceeding its limits. A large coverage policy may delay a reasonable settlement. Available money has a way of strengthening the merits of some cases.

These rationales do not extend to other potential assets of a party. Other sources that may be available to satisfy a judgment become a proper subject for discovery only after the trial in a supplementary proceeding to enforce the judgment.

§ 5.7 Trial Preparation Materials

§ 5.7.1 Work Product

Courts over the past decades have considered discovery requests seeking the disclosure of every imaginable type of information. Cases considering these requests include the seminal decision of Hickman v. Taylor,^[126]^ which spawned the “work product” doctrine. Subsequent judicial decisions developed the scope of work product by applying other doctrines such as “qualified privilege,” “good cause,” “relevancy,” and “litigation materials."^[127]^ Subsequent amendments to the discovery rules codified these decisions and created the present “trial preparation materials” rule.

There can be some confusion regarding what is and what is not discoverable from efforts made and materials prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial. This uncertainty stems in part from the use and misuse of various terms, including work product. This term may mean different things to different lawyers, judges, and justices.^[128]^

The Supreme Court in a review of the work product doctrine stated that Federal Rule 26(b) substantially incorporates and codifies the doctrine."^[129]^ Accordingly, Rule 26(b) encapsulates the holding of Hickman v. Taylor into the federal rules and endorses the Court’s approach to protecting trial preparation materials as well as attorney mental impressions. Lawyers can conduct investigations, create materials, and consider strategies while sheltering protected information from disclosure.

There are two levels of protection under the work product doctrine: one level protects “fact” assessments and the other covers “opinion” analyses.^[130]^ Factual materials contained in litigation preparation documents are subject to limited discovery upon a showing of need and hardship, as explained later.^[131]^ Legal assessments generally relate to attorney mental impressions and are likely never discoverable, also explained later.^[132]^

This section will minimize semantic confusion by employing the terminology defined in Rule 26(b)(3) and by avoiding other less helpful terms.^[133]^ We begin with a true/false analysis of this matrix and continue with an elaboration of Rule 26 provisions.

True or False?

1. Trial Preparation materials are documents and tangible things prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial.

True. Anyone who can think knows that.

2. Trial preparation materials are discoverable only upon a showing of substantial need and undue hardship under Rule 26.

True. Anyone who can read knows that.

3. Documents, electronically stored information, and things not trial preparation materials are discoverable through a Rule 34 request.

Maybe. Maybe not. Some documents, ESI, and tangible things may not be discoverable because they are irrelevant, privileged, or protected. Other materials will be discoverable merely for the asking.

4. Materials containing the impressions, conclusions, opinions and legal theories of an attorney are never discoverable through discovery.

True. Well, almost never.

5. A party or witness cannot obtain a copy of a statement made by that party or witness.

*False. *They can.

6. Witness statements and investigative file materials are not discoverable.

Some are. Some are not. It depends.

§ 5.7.2 The Who, When, Why Rule

Federal Rule 26(b)(3) and parallel state rules define trial preparation materials that are not generally discoverable:

“Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents and tangible things “that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative (including the other party’s attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent). . . .”

The definition seems circular: trial preparation materials are materials prepared for trial or in anticipation of litigation. The definition encompasses electronic and paper materials comprising a case file, including investigation matters, witness statements, file memos, correspondence, emails, attachments, legal memoranda, lawyer notes, client communications, case notebooks, and other documents and tangible things.^[134]^ The rule itself does not detail specific criteria that determine which materials will be classified as trial preparation materials. Case law has developed factors to determine what documents and things are trial preparation materials.

These factors can be categorized into three questions:

WHO assembled the materials?

WHEN were the materials gathered?

WHY were the materials collected and for whom?

A court may consider all three factors in determining whether some requests seek trial preparation materials or may decide that one of the factors controls.

The WHO. The key figure is the lawyer. The presence or involvement of an attorney in the investigation process is a significant factor in classifying the materials.^[135]^ The presence of a lawyer is not a requirement; documents created and gathered by non-lawyers may be trial preparation materials; the involvement of an attorney does not automatically convert documents into trial preparation matters.^[136]^ However, the inclusion of a lawyer may cause materials to be considered to have been prepared in anticipation of litigation.^[137]^

The WHEN. The time when materials were prepared will affect their classification. Documents created during litigation usually become trial preparation materials. Documents and tangible things prepared after a cause of action has arisen but before litigation has commenced may or may not be trial preparation matters. Information assembled before the maturation of a legal claim may be trial preparation materials depending on how imminent the claim was and the timing of subsequent litigation.^[138]^

The WHY. The Federal Advisory Committee Notes add some gloss to the definition of trial preparation materials by excluding three categories based on their assembled purpose: (1) materials assembled “pursuant to public requirements,” (2) materials assembled in the “ordinary course of business,” and, naturally, (3) materials assembled “for nonlitigation purposes."^[139]^ The first category excludes as trial preparation materials documents that are prepared under a duty pursuant to statute or regulation or other government mandate.^[140]^ The second category eliminates materials because the inherent nature of a business or activity makes such document preparation useful or necessary regardless of the existence of litigation or because such materials are customarily collected other than for litigation.^[141]^ The third category by definition excludes materials if the primary reason they were preserved was for a non-litigation purpose including documents that are not adversarial or partisan in composition or may serve a dual purpose.^[142]^

The primary reason why materials and documents were created must be for litigation or trial purposes.^[143]^ If another factor is the dominate reason why materials were created, gathered, or maintained, then the information will likely not be sheltered. Documents primarily prepared for a governmental or business reason usually are discoverable. The above listed factors determine whether specific materials fall within or without the ambit of protected documents.

§ 5.7.3 Substantial Need and Undue Hardship

Some trial preparation materials that contain factual information are discoverable in very limited situations. [Rule 26(b)(3)(A)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) establishes a two-fold test to determine whether those materials may be discovered:

(i) they are otherwise discoverable under [Rule 26(b)(1)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0); and

(ii) the party shows that it has substantial need for the materials to prepare its case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial equivalent by other means.”

A requesting party has the burden to demonstrate both “substantial need” and “undue hardship” to obtain access to the materials.^[144]^ A party must show substantial need by demonstrating that the materials are very important and vital to the preparation of the case,^[145]^ and must also show that the substantial equivalent cannot be obtained without undue hardship.^[146]^ This latter factor has been met in a few situations. Courts have ordered trial preparation documents to be disclosed when witnesses became unavailable,^[147]^ memories of witnesses faded over time, reports were made contemporaneously with or shortly after an event, witnesses became hostile and antagonistic, or the opposing party possessed surveillance videos made of a party.^[148]^ Courts have ruled that parties fail to demonstrate undue hardship if other sources are available to provide the information.^[149]^

§ 5.7.4 Objections to Trial

Preparation Materials

Federal Rule 26(b)(5) requires the party who objects to a request for materials to specifically identify the protected materials withheld. The rule commands this party withholding the materials based on a trial preparation claim to provide specific information identifying the materials.^[150]^ The purpose of this rule is to allow the opposing party seeking the information to determine whether the documents appear to be the materials sought and whether they are protected.^[151]^ Some state court rules do not require a specific description of the materials withheld and permit a general objection.

The extent of the description required by the federal rules depends upon the information sought to be protected. In most cases, a description that reveals the existence of the materials, the identity of the person who created them, the time when they were created, and the purpose for their creation would be an adequate description. In some cases, this description would reveal underlying protected information and a narrower depiction would suffice. A party may maintain a log of protected materials, similar to a privilege log. See § 5.1 No. 22.

§ 5.7.5 Waiver of Protections

The considerations involved in the disclosure and waiver of privileges apply generally to trial preparation materials.^[152]^ An opposing party who receives protected documents must, upon notification of their status, return, sequester or destroy them. Federal Rule 26(b)(5)(b). A party who inadvertently discloses them may not have waived the protections if the balancing of circumstances protect the materials.^[153]^ Usually, the waiver of the protection for one document does not result in the waiver of other documents regarding the same subject matter, as distinguished from waivers involving privileged material.^[154]^ See § 5.5.10. A party may seek to “claw back” the documents by having the other party return them. Often, these procedures are detailed in an agreement or a stipulated protective order.

§ 5.7.6 Witness Statements

Witness statements can be considered trial preparation materials, depending on their composition and content. Federal Rule 26(b)(3)(C) explicitly makes two types of statements discoverable merely for the asking and without having to show substantial need and undue hardship: (1) a party can obtain the party’s own statement from another party; and (2) a witness can obtain a copy of the witness’s statement from any party. This provision of the rule also defines a statement as either “a written statement that the person has signed or otherwise adopted or approved” or as “a contemporaneous stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording—or a transcription of it—that recites substantially verbatim the person’s oral statement.” These definitions include the following types of statements, among others:

1. A statement written and signed by the party or witness.

2. A statement printed by someone else and signed by the party or witness.

3. A statement prepared by a third person and initialed by a party or witness.

4. A statement written by someone else and corrected by a party or witness.

5. An audio or video recorded conversation of a party or witness interview.

6. A telephone recorded interview of a party or witness.

7. A statement of a party or witness in the presence of a court reporter that is later transcribed.

8. Diagrams, drawings, or graphics made by a party or witness.

Who writes or prepares the statement is not controlling; the individual need only sign, adopt, initial, or approve it.^[155]^ The rationale is that if a person acknowledges a statement, that person will have reviewed and approved it. Whether the individual is aware of being recorded is irrelevant for purposes of this rule. Whether the statement is made in anticipation of litigation or trial is also immaterial.

Witness statements come in various designs and shapes. They can be informal statements written in long hand, scribbled on a pad, keystroked on a laptop, sent in an email, composed in a word document, or otherwise preserved in writing or print or digitally. Or they may be a formal statement made: (1) before witnesses or in an (2) affidavit or (3) declaration.^[156]^

(1) A statement may have a line or two at the end for an independent person(s) to sign who acknowledges that indeed the witness signed the witness statement.

(2) Witness statements may be formatted as an affidavit that includes statements that are made under oath before a notary public. Typically, the notary determines the identity of the witness, has the witness swear or affirm an oath, and observes the witness sign the affidavit. The specific requirements differ among the states.

(3) Or a witness could sign a declaration which includes a preface: “I declare the following statements to be true under penalty of perjury,” or words to that effect. A declaration need not be witnessed by a notary or anyone. The federal rules authorize declarations to be used in addition to or lieu of affidavits in discovery and motion documents.

Investigation decisions determine whether a party or witness statement falls within one or the other categories of this rule. If a recorded statement is made during an interview, that statement or a later transcript becomes discoverable. If a recorded statement is not made, a written statement can be prepared after the interview and later signed, adopted, or approved by the witness, making it discoverable. It is an important tactic to decide whether a statement should be preserved and whether it should be conserved in a form that becomes discoverable. This decision will depend upon several factors in a case, including the type of witness (friendly, neutral, or adverse), the timing of the statement, its purpose, the content, and tactical options.

A party who seeks to obtain the party’s own statement from an opponent is entitled to a duplicate as a matter of right under the rules.^[157]^ Witness statements that support a party’s claim or defense have to be disclosed in accord with Rule 26(a). Typically, a party secures, preserves, or possesses a statement because it is favorable and discloses it. Other statements may be obtained from an opponent after a showing of need and hardship. Alternatively, a party can obtain a copy of any witness statement from a witness by persuading the witness to request a copy from an opposing party and obtaining the statement.

LLMs can help facilitate and expedite witness statement processing. For example, GenAI can help identify and extract relevant information from massive communication datasets, consolidating each witness’s particular perspective on the collected evidence. LLM-backed systems can locate witness accounts embedded within emails, text messages, and various digital communications that might otherwise require extensive manual review.

GenAI applications can also transcribe audio and video recordings of witness interviews with high accuracy, converting spoken testimony into searchable text while preserving speaker identification and contextual elements. This capability proves particularly valuable when processing contemporary witness statements that increasingly appear in recorded rather than written formats.

GenAI can also be multi-modal. These systems can work with witness-created diagrams or drawings, integrating them with corresponding textual statements, creating comprehensive witness statements. For multilingual witnesses, or witnesses for whom English isn’t their first language, these tools can help process statements in different languages, providing translations while preserving the original content for verification purposes.

§ 5.7.7 Practice Considerations

The party claiming that materials are trial preparation materials has the burden to show they are protected.^[158]^ The party who claims substantial need and undue hardship has the burden to show the materials should be discoverable.^[159]^ Judges, arbitrators, or ALJs who need information about the status of documents and tangible things have the discretion to review such materials in camera (privately) before making a decision.^[160]^

The following inquiries help in determining the nature and scope of protected or discoverable materials:

Do the documents requested constitute materials prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial? If so, they are trial preparation materials protected from discovery absent further demands by the other party.

Does the other party claim a substantial need for such materials, which can only be otherwise obtained through undue hardship? If so, such material will be discoverable excluding attorney mental processes.

Does the other party or a witness seek their own statement? If so, it will be discoverable.

Do the materials sought constitute the mental impressions, opinions, conclusions, or legal theories of an attorney or legal representative? If so, they are protected from discovery.

§ 5.8 Attorney Mental Impressions

§ 5.8.1 Protected Information

Lawyer prepared materials, legal ideas, and case strategies are usually exempt from disclosure. Federal Rule 26(b)(3)(B) provides in part that a court must protect against disclosure of the “mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party’s attorney or other representative concerning the litigation.” What a lawyer thinks about the issues, the case, its factual strengths, its legal weaknesses, possible settlement positions, and pretrial or prehearing matters is strictly protected. This doctrine is known as the attorney mental impression doctrine. State court rules commonly provide these same protections from discovery.

The categories included in this rule reflect the holding of the Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor, which declared secure the mental impressions, beliefs, and opinions of an attorney.^[161]^ This doctrine safeguards the effectiveness of the lawyer’s work by protecting such thoughts, considerations, and materials from discovery.^[162]^ The notion is that lawyers ought to be able to think whatever they want about a case, without it having to be revealed to opposing parties. No showing of substantial need or undue hardship will justify disclosure.

The impressions, ideas, or tactics may appear in various sources. They may be written, keystroked, or printed statements composed by a lawyer on a legal pad, in a file, in a word document, on a napkin, in an email, or a formal memo to the case. Some information obtained from witnesses may not be discoverable. Oral statements made to an attorney by a witness contained in the lawyer’s notes or memoranda are not discoverable. The Supreme Court has declared this information protected as part of “the attorney’s mental processes in evaluating the communications."^[163]^

The “mental impressions” of an attorney need to be distinguished from factual trial preparation materials and privileged matter. Material that includes factual data, as distinguished from attorney evaluations, is trial preparation material discoverable upon a showing of substantial need and undue hardship, whereas the attorney’s views about the facts remain exempt from discovery. Matters discussed between an attorney and a client may be privileged under the attorney-client privilege, whereas mental impressions of an attorney remain protected under Rule 26(b)(3).

§ 5.8.2 Extent of Coverage

The provisions of Federal Rule 26 and case law holdings raise several issues regarding attorney mental impression protections:

1. Is This Protection Absolute? Almost certainly,^[164]^ but no one knows for sure. The Supreme Court faced this exact question and declined to answer it. The Court, in Upjohn Co. v. United States, held that an attorney’s mental impressions “cannot be disclosed simply on a showing of substantial need and inability to obtain the equivalent without undue hardship."^[165]^ The Court left open the question whether attorney mental impressions may be discoverable in a rare situation.

2. Does This Protection Have Limits? There are restrictions placed upon an attorney’s ability to create exempt material. Facts that a client tells a lawyer do not fall within this protection.^[166]^ Factual information gathered through an attorney’s efforts is discoverable. A lawyer cannot protect a verbatim signed witness statement from disclosure by including its text in an evaluative memorandum prepared for litigation.^[167]^

3. *Does the Protection Cover Work with Others? *A lawyer needs to be involved in the creation of the protected materials, although courts have concluded that an attorney’s involvement in creating information does not automatically convert such data into exempt information. The work of legal representatives and assistants that produces materials, ideas, and theories is also protected. The selection and compilation of information and documents and discussions with expert consultants by a lawyer will be protected as thought processes.^[168]^

4. Does This Protection Extend to Non-Written, Intangible Matters? The Supreme Court in Upjohn appears to make no distinction between the forms of the attorney’s mental impressions as affecting their discoverability. The materials sought to be discovered in Upjohn were lawyer notes and memoranda made of oral witness interviews.^[169]^ The Court protected these materials because they revealed an attorney’s mental processes. The rationale underlying this protection would apply to discovery requests seeking to reveal the attorney’s memory of the oral interviews, through interrogatories or deposition questions.

Case law has extended the protection afforded a lawyer’s mental impressions, opinions, conclusions, and legal theories to other discovery methods including depositions.^[170]^ It is uncommon for lawyers to be deposed in a case, unless they have personal knowledge of facts. Courts have established guidelines detailing the scope of the questioning of a lawyer deponent. These guidelines prohibit questions about any matter that would reveal “counsel’s mental impression” concerning the case, including specific areas and general lines of inquiry discussed by counsel with the deponent, and any facts to which counsel appeared to have considered of particular significance during conversations with the deponent.

While Rule 26(b)(3) explicitly exempts legal conclusions and theories from discovery, Rules 33 and 36 expressly permit the discovery of interrogatory contentions and admissions relating the application of law to the facts. See §§ 7.2 and 10.4.

5. Can This Protection Be Waived? The general rule is that this doctrine cannot be waived.^[171]^ Some situations will require the disclosure of attorney mental impressions.^[172]^ The claims or defenses in a lawsuit may make the materials relevant. For example, if the mental processes of an attorney are a direct issue in a case, such as in a legal malpractice action, they will be discoverable.

Case law has restricted the extent of waivers by holding that the subject-matter waiver doctrine does not always apply to these protections. This doctrine declares that partial or inadvertent disclosure of some information constitutes a waiver of all information relating to the subject matter. The subject-matter doctrine is applicable to the attorney-client privilege and to trial preparation materials that do not contain an attorney’s mental impressions, opinions, conclusions, or legal theories.^[173]^

Courts have not applied the subject-matter waiver to mental impression materials because they have found that inadvertent or partial disclosure can be controlled and that the public policy supporting protection continues to operate even if the protection has been reduced.^[174]^ This means that protected information could be disclosed selectively or inadvertently without constituting a waiver of the protection afforded the preserved materials.

§ 5.8.3 Status of Protections

Some information and materials may be exempt from discovery for more than one reason. For example:

• A lawyer may investigate a dispute and compose notes detailing the facts obtained from witnesses. That memo is a trial preparation document.
• The lawyer may also describe in the file the lawyer’s views of the credibility of the witnesses. Those descriptions are attorney mental impressions.
• And, the lawyer may discuss with the client the contents of the memo and the credibility assessments. Those conversations are attorney-client privileged communications.

Each source and document needs to be analyzed to determine the applicable kind of protection afforded by one or more of these categories. Parts of the materials or portions of the information obtained may be protected. The assessment may need to done word by word, line by line, or topic by topic.

§ 5.9 Expert Discovery

§ 5.9.1 Categories of Experts

Discovery concerning experts frequently includes discovery of their identity, their opinions, and the facts known to them. Additionally, discovery may pursue background information on the bases for any conclusions and other matters relating to what the experts know. This information is commonly obtained through interrogatory answers, document production responses, and deposition testimony.

In state courts, the nature and extent of discoverable expert information varies depending upon the applicable rules of the jurisdiction. In federal court, Rule 26 governs the discoverability of expert information. Section 5.9.2 provides an analysis useful in determining the discoverability of expert information in state court jurisdictions. Section 5.9.3 explains what is discoverable from experts in federal court cases. LLMs may assist with expert discovery issues. See § 1.2.7.

§ 5.9.2 Types of Experts

The rules of civil procedure applicable in a state court case determine what is discoverable from an expert and how it is discoverable. The rules range from very liberal rules that permit a wide range of discovery to more restrictive rules that narrow available discovery. A method of analyzing what is and what is not discoverable includes a determination of the type of expert involved in a case.^[175]^ There are several major types of experts:

Trial Experts. A trial expert is an individual who will testify at trial or who is identified by a party as an expert who is likely or expected to testify at trial.^[176]^ The general rule has been that a party can discover nearly everything relevant about this type of expert including the expert’s identity, experience, opinions, and bases of opinions. This and related information will commonly be obtained through expert reports and depositions. Some jurisdictions may expand or restrict the scope and methods available.

Retained or Specially Employed Experts. This type of expert is an individual who is retained or specially employed by a party in anticipation of litigation or to assist in the preparation for trial.^[177]^ Information about this type of expert is generally very limited, if anything is permitted to be discovered. Many jurisdictions only permit the discovery of the identity of this type of expert and nothing more. The reason supporting such restrictive disclosure is that this expert assists the attorney and does not have any factual information or any opinions that will be evidence in the case. If this expert were to testify, the expert would be a trial expert and much more information would be discoverable.

Employee Experts. Experts who are employees of a party are generally treated as any other employee of a party for discovery purposes. Typically, broad discovery is available from any party agent or employee, including an employee who is an expert or who has expert information.^[178]^ An employee expert may be a full-time or part-time employee. An expert who is an independent contractor would more likely be categorized as a retained or specially employed expert.

An “Actor” Expert. Witnesses who acquire their information as participants or viewers involved in the occurrence or transaction giving rise to the lawsuit are “actor” experts.^[179]^ They may be an eyewitness who also provided expert services (e.g., a medical doctor who provides treatment and care). Often, they are parties to the case, and their expertise or conduct is in issue (e.g., a defendant accountant in an accounting malpractice case). An actor expert may be called upon to serve three possible roles during discovery that of: an adverse party or agent, a witness, or an expert. The general rule is that their identities and facts known to them will be discoverable and that their opinions may or may not be discoverable depending upon the specific role they play in the case.

Informally Consulted Expert. An “informally consulted” expert is an expert who has been approached by a party for some information or an initial opinion but who will not testify at trial, has not been retained or specially employed, is not an employee of the party, and is not an actor in the case.^[180]^ It is common for a party or attorney to discuss a case and informally consult with an expert to determine the expert’s opinion and whether it is favorable. The general rule is that nothing is discoverable from or about an informally consulted expert.

*Determining Discoverability. *After an expert has been categorized and the nature of the testimony assessed, the attorneys should review the applicable rules and determine what is discoverable and how the information is to be discovered from such an expert.^[181]^ Experts may initially fall within one category, and subsequently have their role changed which affects their discovery status.^[182]^ These generic types of experts also apply in federal court cases.

§ 5.9.3 Expert Discovery

Federal Rule 26 includes two sections regarding expert information and testimony: Rule 26(a)(2) provides for the disclosure of expert testimony, and Rule 26(b)(4) provides for the discovery of information from experts. The term “expert” for disclosure and discovery is the same term used under the Federal Rules of Evidence defined as: an individual with scientific, technical, and other specialized knowledge gained by education, training, skill, or experience. See [Fed. R. Evid. 701 and 702](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NEC4C3220B96D11D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NEC4C3220B96D11D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0).

In state courts, the nature and extent of discoverable expert information varies widely, depending on the applicable rules of the jurisdiction. In federal court, Rule 26 governs the discoverability of expert information, materials, and reports. The extent of expert disclosures and discovery occur in the context of expert testimony at trial. What may be introduced as expert evidence is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence 702 through 706. The seminal case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals both reflects and expands on these rules.^[183]^

Federal Rule 702 explicitly includes the requirement established in *Daubert and subsequent cases that expert testimony is to be based on reliable scientific methodologies. This rule clarifies that the proponent of the expert testimony has the burden of proving that the testimony meets this substantial standard by a preponderance of the evidence. [Rule 702(d)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N000E29606D0B11EE8985FABF62AE15E3/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N000E29606D0B11EE8985FABF62AE15E3/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) also accentuates the requirement that the opinions of an expert *are to be based on reliable applications of scientific methods and principles. Judges, in exercising their gatekeeping function, must examine both the expert’s methodologies and the connection between those methodologies and the expert’s opinions.

Federal Rule 26(a)(2) requires a party to reveal two specific types of required disclosures:

1. Rule 26(a)(2)(A) mandates that a party “disclose to the other parties the identity of any witness it may use at trial to present evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703, or 705.” This subdivision requires the disclosure of the identity of any potential trial expert. The definition of who a trial expert is to be is resolved by a reference to the rules of evidence governing expert testimony.

2. Rule 26(a)(2)(B) commands that a disclosure “be accompanied by a written report—prepared and signed by the witness—if the witness is one retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or one whose duties as the party’s employee regularly involve giving expert testimony.” This subdivision requires a report to be prepared by those trial experts who are retained or specially employed or who are employees of the party, and this report must be disclosed. This rule mandates that the report must contain:

(i) a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them;

(ii) the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them;

(iii) any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support them;

(iv) the expert’s qualifications, including a list of all publications authored in the previous 10 years;

(v) a list of all other cases in which, during the previous 4 years, the witness testified as an expert at trial or by deposition; and

(vi) a statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony in the case.”

Now that is full disclosure. The purpose of this disclosure is to provide the other parties with a thorough understanding of the testimony to be presented by the trial experts and all documentary evidence as well as to eliminate unfair surprise to the opposing party.^[184]^ The report, complete with all documents and exhibits, must be signed by the witness and should be composed in a way that reflects the testimony that will be given by the expert.^[185]^ Rule 26(b)(4)(B) protects from discovery “drafts of any report or disclosure required under Rule 26(a)(2), regardless of the form in which the draft is recorded.”

Rule 26(e)(2) requires the disclosure of any material changes made in the opinions of an expert from whom a report is required, including changes in the report or testimony given at a deposition. A disclosing party has a substantial incentive to comply with this disclosure rule because Rule 37(c)(1) contains the sanction that the party will not ordinarily be permitted to use any expert testimony on direct examination not disclosed in accord with Rule 26.

Rule 26(b)(4) governs the discoverability of additional expert testimony:

1. Rule 26(b)(4)(A) states that: “A party may depose any person who has been identified as an expert whose opinions may be presented at trial.” This rule specifically permits the deposition of all trial experts, which reflects best practices. This subdivision specifies that a deposition shall not be conducted of an expert who is required to provide a written report in accord with 26(a)(2)(B) until that report is provided. This requirement ensures that the deposition will occur after the expert has prepared testimony and supporting documentation.

2. Rule 26(b)(4)(D) allows a party through interrogatories or by deposition to discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party and who is not expected to testify at trial upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. This rule is infrequently invoked because few cases involve these specific requirements.

3. Rule 26(a)(2)(B)(vi) compels the disclosure of the compensation of trial experts. Rule 26(b)(4)(E) creates a presumption that a party obtaining discovery from experts will pay fees incurred by the expert including reimbursement for the reasonable time expended by the expert in responding to discovery. The discovering party should not be expected to pay a higher rate for the expert’s work than paid by the party retaining the expert.^[186]^

The parties by stipulation can modify these disclosure requirements. A court has discretion to waive or impose additional obligations.

In addition, Rule 26(b)(4)(C) also gives trial preparation materials and work product protection to not only the expert’s report but also communications between the party’s attorney and any witness required to provide a report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), regardless of the form of the communication. The rule delineates three exceptions for information that remains discoverable:

1. Compensation for the expert’s work and testimony.

2. Facts or data the attorney provided to the expert for the expert’s consideration in forming the opinions the expert intends to present at trial.

3. Assumptions regarding the case that the lawyer provided to the expert and upon which the expert relied in forming opinions.

There are limits to the scope of expert discovery. A witness who is hired as an expert has to disclose all factual information known as any other witness.^[187]^ And, an expert may be disqualified because of a conflict of interest. To do so, a moving party must show that a confidential relationship exists between the expert and a party and that the party disclosed confidential information to the expert.^[188]^

LLMs can support expert report preparation in various ways. For example, GenAI can access scientific and industry publications to verify assertions and identify potential methodological weaknesses before attacks by opposing counsel. This process might include comparing proposed methodologies against established scientific practices relevant to Daubert reliability standards. Gap analysis between opinions and supporting data can reveals areas where additional documentation might strengthen the reports or where inconsistencies require resolution before finalization.

GenAI can map the relationship between opinions and their stated bases, identifying conclusions that lack sufficient foundation. Similar analysis might connect expert conclusions and supporting exhibits. This verification process can address procedural requirements while simultaneously identifying potential vulnerabilities that might otherwise lead to exclusion motions or testimony limitations.

§ 5.10 Supplementation

Federal Rule 26(e) and similar state court rules impose a continuing duty to supplement discovery responses.^[189]^ The rule commands a party to supplement disclosure information and discovery answers that are “incomplete or incorrect” in “some material respect” and if the additional corrective information has not “otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing.” A lawyer has a responsibility to conduct a reasonable inquiry into determining whether responses submitted by a party comply with the supplementation rules and to supplement discovery responses.^[190]^ See Federal Rule 26(g). There may be no obligation to provide complete or correct information if other parties learn about the supplemental information from a reliable source.^[191]^

Rules 26(e)(1) and 26(a)(2)(B) establish a duty to supplement or correct a prior response to an interrogatory, a request for production, a request for admission, and an expert report and deposition testimony. This duty does not extend to deposition testimony of a party or lay witness,^[192]^ which may be corrected as permitted by the applicable rules. See § 6.8.5. A deponent who testifies differently at a trial or hearing may be impeached.

[Rule 26(e)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) requires that supplementation be done “timely,” which term depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.^[193]^ Supplementation needs to be made at suitable intervals during the discovery period and with appropriate promptness as a trial or hearing date approaches.^[194]^ A party who delays for several months the disclosure of supplemental information may be barred from doing so because it is not timely. The more the supplemental responses affect a party’s trial preparation and presentation, resulting in undue prejudice, the more likely a court will determine a supplementation is untimely.^[195]^ A scheduling order may specify the time or times when supplementation needs to be made. See [Rules 26(a)(2)(e)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) and (26(g).

A party can use additional discovery requests for obtaining supplemental information and make certain that responses are complete and correct. A party may serve additional discovery requests including interrogatories and requests for production. Or, an attorney may stipulate with opposing counsel to supplement and update all or selected previous discovery requests. Or, a party may seek a court order during a pretrial conference or hearing requiring additional supplemental disclosures.

Strategically, it is usually wise for a party to provide opposing parties with complete and accurate information, unless of course there are sound reasons for not doing to. If the rules do not require supplementation and the information is not supportive, then withholding the information may be appropriate. If the rules do not require disclosure and the information is favorable, it most likely is informative for other parties to learn about this constructive information.

The courts in their sound discretion interpret the rules and enforce supplementation obligations.^[196]^ A party who fails to comply with the supplementation rules will likely incur a sanction for such non-compliance, including the preclusion of relevant evidence.^[197]^ In cases where it is uncertain whether some information ought to be disclosed and a party wants to provide disclosure, a court appointed neutral or discovery mediator can be helpful with exchanging supplemental information.

LLM-backed tools can help lawyers by identifying when supplementation is necessary. For example, as new evidence arises (e.g., documents, deposition testimony), LLMs can recursively compare that new information against prior disclosures, interrogatory responses, and expert reports—determining whether the new evidence requires discovery supplementation. GenAI tools can also cross-reference deposition transcripts and document productions to highlight areas where counsel may need to make new disclosures. These capabilities reduce the risk of overlooking critical supplementation obligations.

Beyond identifying supplementation, LLMs can also streamline the drafting process. Rather than manually drafting, attorneys can use GenAI to generate initial drafts of supplemental disclosures. LLM-backed tools can programmatically incorporate newly acquired evidence into revised interrogatory responses, expert reports, and other discovery materials. By automating this process, GenAI can reduce lawyers’ administrative duties and permit them to ensure that supplementation aligned with case strategy occurs promptly.

§ 5.11 Protective Orders

§ 5.11.1 Introduction

The general rule is that parties may seek information discoverable in accord with the scope of Federal Rule 26 using any of the available discovery methods. In addition, parties and their lawyers have general access to discovered information.^[198]^ Restrictions may be placed on the scope of discovery, the methods used, and who may have access to discovery.^[199]^ The provisions of Federal Rule 26(c) and parallel state rules provide controls and limitations on discovery.^[200]^

The discovery rules include a provision protecting participants from each other and restricting or modifying discovery. [Rule 26(c)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) permits a party, or anyone involved in a discovery request, to bring a motion seeking an order and protection from some aspects of discovery. Detailed examples of protective orders may be found online and in form books and case files.

A sample motion resembles the following form:

[Caption]

[Party] moves this Court for an order pursuant to [Rule 26(c)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) [describe relief sought]. A copy of a proposed order is attached to this motion.

There exists good cause to support this motion in that [explain reasons for the order such as annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense].

This motion is based upon the notice, pleadings, records, and files in this action; the supporting affidavits of [party, or witness, or attorney]; the attached memorandum of law [if necessary or appropriate]; and oral and documentary evidence to be presented at the hearing on the motion [if anticipated].

Before a party may bring a Rule 26(c) motion in federal court the movant must confer with the other parties in a good faith effort to resolve the discovery dispute.^[201]^ The movant must explain these efforts in a written certification that accompanies the protective order motion.^[202]^ The purpose of this provision is to encourage the parties to resolve their differences without the need for court intervention and to seek an order only if the parties are unable to mutually resolve their problems.^[203]^ A discovery mediator or court appointed neutral can assist parties in reaching a mutual agreement. A party seeking a protective order needs to do so in a timely manner, before any confidential information has been disclosed.^[204]^

The movant has the burden to show “good cause” why justice requires the issuance of a protective order. The rule balances one party’s need for information with another party’s right to certain protections.^[205]^ In so doing, courts apply the provisions of [Rule 26(b)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) including matters of relevancy and proportionality.^[206]^

Information obtained by a party through the discovery process may be used in any way that the law permits, subject to the provisions on protective orders.^[207]^ “The implication is clear that without a protective order, materials obtained in discovery may be used by a party for any purpose. . . ."^[208]^ The failure to comply with a rule that commands counsel to confer with the opposing party in good faith to resolve issues before filing motions raises the risk of the protective order being denied on a procedural basis.^[209]^

Attorneys will often stipulate to provisions protecting discovery information, and “blanket” protective orders may be routinely used in civil cases. This stipulated proposed order seeks protection for material the parties designate as confidential without a showing to the court that such material requires confidential treatment, conserving judicial resources and protecting the privacy of parties.^[210]^ Reasonable attorneys are able to accommodate the interests and needs of their clients through stipulations without becoming involved in contested motions for protective orders, or they may seek the assistance of a mediator or neutral. Courts may summarily or carefully review the stipulation before issuing an order depending on the significance of the issues and the proposed terms.

Federal Rule 26(c) lists a number of available protective orders. The following subsections discuss them.

§ 5.11.2 Restricting Discovery or Disclosure

Courts have granted protective orders prohibiting discovery of parties and witnesses if they suffer from ill health; if an untimely discovery request prejudices a party; and if discovery questions do not pursue legitimate needs.^[211]^ Discovery may be precluded from one person until other individuals who appear to have more knowledge of the facts have been examined.^[212]^ Courts will restrict discovery where a party provides sufficient reasons why it should not be had.^[213]^

§ 5.11.3 Specifying Terms and Conditions

Courts have explicit power to control the time and place of conducting discovery if the parties themselves are unable to reach agreement.^[214]^ This authority allows courts to consider and impose reasonable cost-shifting from one party to another.^[215]^ Courts have also scheduled the sequence of discovery in appropriate circumstances, by requiring the taking of a deposition before the disclosure of documents and by requiring responses to interrogatories before the taking of depositions.^[216]^ Simultaneous submission of interrogatories and requests for production may be coordinated in cases involving multiple defendants.^[217]^ Likewise, simultaneous disclosure of discovery information will be ordered, in certain cases, if the information would influence either side’s responses.^[218]^

Discovery responses need not and cannot be filed in federal courts and in state courts that have the same restrictions. Federal Rule 5(d)(1) prohibits the filing of discovery requests and responses until they are to be used in a proceeding or otherwise ordered by the court. The philosophical reason supporting this rule is that discovery information is private until it is needed in a public proceeding.^[219]^ The practical reason is that the courthouses are too small or the server devices too restricted to hold all this material. The effect of this rule keeps this information private, until the media or someone interested may try to obtain the information.^[220]^

Parties may seek protective orders preventing the dissemination of discovery information to the media and public.^[221]^ Courts recognize the privacy interests of parties and the public interest in limiting the use of discovery to the litigation process and not permitting the use of discovery to obtain information for other purposes.^[222]^ The right to confidentiality is balanced against the constitutional rights of the media and the public to know what appears in court records and files.^[223]^ The claimed right of free access to discovery materials has been rejected, and court orders may be issued to protect the valid interests of parties to keep discovery confidential.^[224]^ In the absence of a protective order, discovery materials may be able to be disseminated.

§ 5.11.4 Prescribing Methods or Inquiries

Courts may restrict the method of discovery sought to be used for good cause.^[225]^ Courts are also inclined to substitute one mode of discovery for another to protect someone’s health.^[226]^ Courts base their choice of a discovery device in part upon the interest to be served by the information sought.^[227]^

Discovery requests may be limited to specific topics. Inquiries into privileged matter or burdensome or oppressive requests will be restricted by protective orders.^[228]^ Discovery issues may be limited to those claims and defenses raised in a motion for summary judgment.^[229]^

§ 5.11.5 Designating or Limiting

Persons Present

Courts have the authority to control who attends depositions, and may exclude parties and witnesses.^[230]^ The exclusion of a party should be rarely granted, but may be necessary to protect a party from embarrassment or ridicule.^[231]^ Witnesses may be precluded from attending the depositions of other deponents because of the sensitive issues of the case.^[232]^ Restricting attendance at depositions helps control the dissemination of discovery information when deemed necessary.^[233]^

Restrictions may be placed on who may have access to certain discovery information, and limitations may be placed on what can happen to information discovered by participants in a case. For example, the disclosure of discovery information can be restricted exclusively to a party’s counsel for use in trial preparation because of the extremely confidential nature of the information. Other courts have ordered information to be disclosed selectively to other participants, such as experts.^[234]^

An example of a written assurance signed by a participant who has access to restricted discovery follows:

[Caption]

I, [insert name, position, and address], declare under penalty of perjury that:

1. I reside at [address].

2. I have read and fully understood the Protective Order dated _____, 20.

3. I am engaged as a [insert description of position] on behalf of _______ in the preparation or conduct of the action entitled [title of action].

4. I am fully familiar with and agree to comply with and be bound by the provisions of the order.

5. I will not divulge to persons other than those specifically authorized by the order, and will not duplicate or use, except solely for the purpose of this action, any information obtained pursuant to the order except as expressly permitted by the court.

6. For the purposes of enforcing compliance with this order, I irrevocably submit to the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the [district].

[Signature of Declarant]

Non-parties have challenged protective orders that denied them access to certain information. Government investigators, who were denied access to discovery information restricted by a court order, have challenged protective orders. Courts balance the government’s need for the information with a party’s need for privacy.^[235]^ Parties also have sought to prevent discovery disclosure to non-party individuals on the grounds that such disclosure may foment additional litigation. Some courts have rejected this view and declared that collaboration among lawyers and other persons to distribute discoverable information is appropriate, may reduce time and money expended in similar proceedings, and promotes “effective, speedy, and efficient representation."^[236]^

§ 5.11.6 Restricting Information

Courts may issue protective orders that require discovered information be sealed and filed with the court.^[237]^ This procedure prevents unnecessary disclosure of confidential responses or private deposition testimony and exhibits.^[238]^ Courts balance the same considerations regarding these orders as previously described.^[239]^

Judges may also restrict access to trade secret information until such disclosure is necessary to adjudicate the case.^[240]^ The primary factor judges consider in determining the appropriateness of this type of protective order is the degree to which the disclosure of confidential information will place a party in a significant competitive disadvantage with another party or with competitors including: “(1) the extent to which information is known outside the business; (2) the extent to which information is known to those inside the business; (3) measures taken to guard the secrecy of the information; and (4) the value of the information to the business and its competitors."^[241]^

§ 5.11.7 Protective Order Summary

Any party may seek a protective order based on the above-enumerated provisions.^[242]^ A non-party in an appropriate case may obtain permission to intervene for the limited purpose of supporting, opposing, or modifying a protective order.^[243]^ Judges consider various factors when exercising their discretion including: (1) the harm caused by the disclosure of information must be substantial and serious; (2) the protective order must be drawn precisely; (3) there must be no alternative way of protecting the interest of the party seeking the protective order; and (4) the difficulty in monitoring or enforcing a protective order.^[244]^ The extent of the burden the movant has will vary depending on the type of relief sought. The more protective the relief, the more persuasive the good cause showing must be. Judges balance the conflicting interests of the various parties and attempt to fashion a remedy that reflects those interests.^[245]^

Courts also have discretion to modify a protective order.^[246]^ The party or persons seeking modification must either show that the original order was granted improvidently or show some extraordinary circumstance or compelling need requiring disclosure. Parties and witnesses should be entitled to rely upon the enforceability of an original protective order. Courts also have the inherent power to review information in camera or to permit opposing counsel to participate in such confidential proceedings.^[247]^

Rule 26(c) motions for protective orders will often be a response to a motion under Federal Rule 37 brought by the opposition seeking an order compelling discovery.^[248]^ Rule 37(a) allows the court to enter a protective order upon the denial of a motion to compel discovery even if the objecting party does not move for such a protective order. Sanctions may be imposed against a party and counsel for the failure to honor the terms of a protective order.^[249]^ State courts have similar applicable rules.

Protective orders may also be issued by arbitrators and administrative law judges when necessary. In arbitration, privacy rights and safeguards may protect against disclosures. In administrative cases, the public nature of the issues may not support an order.

§ 5.12 Overall Discovery Strategy

§ 5.12.1 Discovery by Agreement

A substantial amount of discovery is exchanged by agreement of attorneys. Federal Rule 29 and parallel state rules encourage mutual arrangements, other than those changing certain time limits set by the court. A stipulation may be equivalent to a court order. Rule 29 provides:

Unless the court orders otherwise, the parties may stipulate that:

(a) a deposition may be taken before any person, at any time or place, on any notice, and in the manner specified—in which event it may be used in the same way as any other deposition; and

(b) other procedures governing or limiting discovery be modified—but a stipulation extending the time for any form of discovery must have court approval if it would interfere with the time set for completing discovery, for hearing a motion, or for trial.

This rule allows lawyers to agree to conduct discovery to meet the needs of their clients. Specific provisions of discovery rules may also provide attorneys with explicit authority to vary discovery procedures. Counsel may disclose information, exchange documents, and schedule depositions without formally complying with the rules of civil procedure.

These agreements may need to be memorialized in a stipulation or may be enforceable by an oral agreement between the attorneys, depending upon the applicable rule. A written stipulation is a document containing the agreement and signed by all the parties or by all the lawyers representing the parties. A confirming email or letter sent by one attorney to another is not a formal stipulation, although it may be a basis to prove that the receiving attorney agreed to a change and waived any objection to the non-compliance with a rule. Stipulations between attorneys are frequently used to allow additional interrogatories, permit physical examinations, exchange expert reports, and regulate depositions.

Discovery agreements are especially common in complex and multi-litigation cases. The number of parties and lawyers involved and the nature of the complicated issues make such arrangements a necessity. Court appointed neutrals or discovery mediators are commonly involved assisting with the development and implementation of these stipulations.

Judges, arbitrators, and ALJs generally favor the use of stipulations because they allow the parties to fashion an efficient and economical discovery plan and because they reduce the need for intervention. The primary limitation placed on the use of stipulations is the inability of attorneys to extend time limits for certain discovery responses. The reason for this restriction is to prevent parties from unnecessarily prolonging a case and to reserve to the judge, arbitrator, or ALJ the power to control scheduled proceedings.

Attorneys who approach discovery with a cooperative attitude may readily obtain reasonable and affordable discovery through stipulated agreements. An effective step in a discovery plan may be asking the opposing lawyer mutually to agree on specific terms and conditions. The worst that can happen is that your ideas will be rejected. It will not have been the first time, nor will it be anywhere near the last.

§ 5.12.2 Planning a Discovery Program

Federal rules and many state rules establish specific procedures for the regulation of discovery, including its scope, sequence, and timing. Some state cases proceed without any set schedule, with discovery exchanges occurring randomly. Other cases involve an informal, unwritten schedule resulting in productive discovery exchanges.

Federal Rule 26(f) compels parties to confer and develop a discovery plan. This plan is to contain a mutual agreement by the parties or their separate, different views concerning:

• What and when disclosures will be made.
• What discovery requests will be served.
• The specific sequence and timing of discovery.
• When responses are due and discovery completed.
• The documents that will be exchanged or inspected and copied.
• How ESI will be provided.
• What digital exhibits and evidence exist.
• What changes will be made in any of the discovery procedures.
• What additional pleadings may be served.
• What motions may be brought and when.
• Any other issues that affect litigation, including the use of AI.
• Why the lawyers decided to become litigators.

All attorneys of record and all unrepresented parties must meet and confer in an attempt in good faith to agree on a discovery plan. The rule requires this conference to occur as soon as practical after the case has been filed and served; and, typically, it transpires within 60 to 90 days after the complaint has been served.

A sample discovery plan report may look like this:

REPORT OF THE PLANNING MEETING

1. The following persons participated in a Rule 26(f) conference on date by state the method of conferring:

(e.g., names representing the parties.)

2. Initial Disclosures. The parties [have completed] [will complete by date] the initial disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1).

3. Discovery Plan. The parties propose this discovery plan:

(Use separate paragraphs or subparagraphs if the parties disagree.)

(a) Discovery will be needed on these subjects: (describe.)

(b) (Dates for commencing and completing discovery, including discovery to be commenced or completed before other discovery.)

(c) (Maximum number of interrogatories by each party to another party, along with the dates the answers are due.)

(d) (Document production requests procedures, including ESI protocols.)

(e) (Maximum number of depositions by each party.)

(f) (The schedule for depositions.)

(g) (Dates for exchanging reports of expert witnesses.)

(h) (Maximum number of requests for admission, along with the dates responses are due.)

(i) (Dates for supplementations under Rule 26(e).)

4. Other Items:

(a) (A date if the parties ask to meet with the court.)

(b) (Appointment of a discovery mediator or neutral.)

(c) (Requested dates for pretrial conferences.)

(d) (Final dates for the plaintiff to amend pleadings or to join parties.)

(e) (Final dates for the defendant to amend pleadings or to join parties.)

(f) (Final dates to file dispositive motions.)

(g) (Explain the prospects for settlement.)

(h) (Identify mediation or other dispute resolution process.)

(i) (Final dates for submitting Rule 26(a)(3) witness lists, deposition videos, and exhibit lists.)

(j) (Final dates to file objections under Rule 26(a)(3).)

(k) (Suggested trial date and estimate of trial length.)

(l) (Other matters.)

Parties may be unable to agree on a discovery plan for a number of reasons. If the reasons are legitimate, the submitted report should indicate the differences. If the reasons appear to a party to be illegitimate, that party may seek sanctions against the offending party in accord with Rule 37(g). In some cases, disagreements may exist because the conference between the attorneys occurs too early and an extension or delay of the issuance of the final report may result in a subsequent agreement.

Technology-assisted litigation support systems provide ways to create and maintain discovery and document management programs. Counsel in complex and multi-district actions can create a coordinated plan for all parties, lawyers, and cases. Court appointed neutrals and discovery mediators can help in the creation of these cooperative plans.

LLMs can help streamline discovery planning in various ways. For example, they can analyze a lawyer’s past cases, identifying common disputes, and use those to suggest compromise solutions. GenAI can generate structured drafts of Rule 26 reports, allowing parties to focus on substantive negotiations. LLM-backed tools can also flag ambiguous language in discovery requests to help prevent objections and disputes. In complex and multi-district litigation, GenAI can consolidate various parties’ proposed discovery plans, ensuring consistency and compliance across the various parties.

After the parties submit a discovery plan and report to the court, a judge will typically issue a scheduling order establishing deadlines for discovery, motions, and pretrial disclosures. The initial discovery and case plan will be affected by subsequent matters and proceedings. As a case approaches trial, the parties will need to exchange additional information about evidence and procedures. The details of these pretrial orders depend upon the applicable rules and previous orders issued in a case.^[250]^

Federal Rule 26(a)(3) and similar state rules require specific pretrial disclosures that require parties to provide each other with the following evidentiary information: (1) the name, address, phone number, and email of each witness the party may call at trial, (2) the designation of those witnesses whose testimony is expected to be presented by means of a deposition, and (3) an appropriate identification of each document or other exhibit including summaries of evidence that may be offered at trial. These disclosures must be made at least 30 days before trial, unless otherwise directed by the court, which may commonly occur through a scheduling or pretrial order. The timing of the disclosures represents an effort to provide sufficient time for final trial preparation for cases that do not settle and to allow lawyers to bring motions a reasonable time before trial challenging the introduction of some of this evidence.

Arbitral and administrative law cases may involve similar planning processes. Cases that involve multiple parties and issues may require cooperative planning. Arbitrators and ALJs encourage or expect such coordination and will become involved as actively as necessary, similar to judicial judges, to control and monitor the progress of the case.

§ 5.12.3 Factual Stipulations

The process of discovery may be supplanted or supplemented by stipulations between attorneys regarding the facts. The decision whether to suggest, accept, reject, or modify a fact stipulation proposal depends upon the accuracy and completeness of the stipulation, the amount of time and expenses saved, and the impact such a proposal has upon strategic considerations. Stipulations may be drafted as formal, written agreements, or read into a deposition transcript, or included as part of a pretrial agreement, or reserved for the trial or hearing record. The attorneys are free to reach any reasonable agreement regarding the effect the stipulation has on evidentiary, trial, hearing, and other case elements.^[251]^ The components of such agreements may include one or more of the following alternative statements, in addition to factual recitals:

1. The witness, if asked the proper questions, would testify that. . . .

2. The facts may be received as evidence at the trial without any additional foundation.

3. The documents are authentic, genuine, and admissible as evidence.

4. The contents of the stipulation constitute evidence for the hearing and may be introduced as evidence by either party.

5. Neither party may object to the introduction or receipt of the facts as evidence.

6. The parties waive all objections to the introduction and receipt of the contents of the stipulation as evidence.

7. The contents of this stipulation may be received in evidence on behalf of any party as permitted by the Federal Rules of Evidence, to the same extent as if the witness testified at a deposition or motion hearing or trial.

8. The facts recited in this stipulation remain subject to evidentiary objections interposed by either party.

The primary goals of stipulated facts are to identify non-disputed facts, to reduce some of the time and expense of a hearing or trial, and to bolster case settlement prospects.

§ 5.13 Pre-Complaint Discovery: Rule 27

§ 5.13.1 Introduction

A rarely used rule may be invoked to help in extraordinary discovery situations. There are two situations in which it would be helpful, if not essential, to engage in some discovery prior to the formal initiation of a case. One circumstance involves insufficient information with which to frame a pleading. Another involves the preservation of evidence that may not be available later. The rules do not provide any mechanism to obtain discovery in the former situation, but do provide a pre-litigation device to preserve testimony through Rule 27.

The traditional rubric is that Rule 27 does not exist to permit “fishing expeditions” searching for possible claims or defenses.^[252]^ Rule 27 is not available to obtain facts with which to base a complaint where there exists no prospective loss of testimony. Courts have continually denied petitions under Rule 27 on the grounds that the rule cannot be used for the purpose of ascertaining facts to be used in composing a complaint.^[253]^

In accord with the requirements of Federal Rule 11, counsel may be able to serve and file a complaint, seek discovery, and amend a complaint to add issues or parties. In exceptional circumstances, Rule 27 does permit the taking of a pre-complaint deposition for the purpose of perpetuating testimony and preserving evidence.^[254]^ Federal courts will grant a petition, properly presented with sufficient detail, to perpetuate testimony for use in future civil proceedings.^[255]^ A Rule 27 proceeding may prevent a delay of justice by preserving testimony that would otherwise be lost before the matter to which it relates can become ripe for a judicial or other determination.^[256]^

§ 5.13.2 Procedure and Content

Three specific procedural conditions must be met before Rule 27 provisions become operational:

1. The expected action must fall within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.

2 The petition must be filed in the district court of the district where any expected adverse party resides.

3. The petition must contain a caption with the name of the petitioner and related matters. An accepted form is: “In the Matter of the Petition of Yoda to perpetuate the testimony of the Force.”

The petitioner must allege in the petition that the petitioner expects to be a party to a future action, is presently unable to bring the action, and has an interest in the subject matter of the expected action. The petition also needs to include: the facts to be established by the proposed testimony, the reasons supporting the perpetuation of the information, the identity of persons expected as adverse parties, the persons to be examined and the substance of their testimony, and the relief sought. The petitioner must ask for an order authorizing the petitioner to proceed with a deposition to be taken orally or by written interrogatories.

These extraordinary circumstances seldom arise, resulting in the rare use of Rule 27.

Practice Problems and Assignments

Follow the directions from your professor in completing an assignment.

1. Prepare to discuss in class or online the categories of information and documents that must be affirmatively disclosed by a party in federal court:

(a) Regarding witness information.

(b) Regarding documents and electronically stored information.

(c) Regarding computation of damages.

(d) Regarding expert information.

2. Prepare a concise outline listing the categories of information and documents that must be affirmatively disclosed by a party in federal court:

(a) Regarding witness information.

(b) Regarding documents and electronically stored information.

(c) Regarding computation of damages.

(d) Regarding expert information.

3. Prepare to discuss in class or online the categories of information and claims and defenses a party may seek from another party through discovery requests and methods in federal court.

4. Prepare a concise outline listing the categories of information and types of subject matter a party may seek from another party through discovery requests and methods in federal court.

5. Prepare a time chart listing the timing and deadlines of required disclosures and the use of discovery methods in federal court cases.

6. Research the discovery rules of civil procedure applicable in the state where your law school is located. Compare the differences and similarities between those rules and the federal rules and prepare to discuss in class or online these differences and similarities.

7. Review the complaint and the answer and counterclaim appearing in Northern Motor Homes v. Danforth (Case J). Presume the federal rules of civil procedure apply to this case. Determine what affirmative disclosures each pleading party must make under Federal Rule 26(a).

8. During the litigation of Hot Dog Enterprises v. Tri-Chem (Case A), the plaintiff HDE submits interrogatories to defendant Tri-Chem seeking the following information relating to its claims based on fraud and products liability and actual and punitive damages:

(a) Information regarding all complaints which buildings owners, contractors, and architects have communicated to the defendant about Bond-Mor since its development.

(b) The names of all building owners that defendant knows who own buildings constructed with Bond-Mor.

(c) The names of all contractors Tri-Chem has solicited to use Bond-Mor.

(d) Financial information showing the net worth of Tri-Chem.

(e) All communications, including those exchanged on social or professional networks, between Casey Pozdak, HDE Chairperson, and any and all Tri-Chem Board of Directors.

(f) Documents and electronically stored information relevant to the claims and defenses and the subject matter of the case in the possession, custody, or control of Tri-Chem.

(1) What reasons would you advance on behalf of the defendant Tri-Chem that this information is irrelevant and not discoverable?

(2) What reasons would you advance on behalf of the plaintiff HDE that this information is relevant and discoverable?

(3) How would you have planned to discuss and resolve with opposing counsel in a meet and confer conference your disagreements?

(4) If you were the judge, how would you decide and why?

(5) What other ways might these requests be drafted to make the request more clearly relevant and discoverable?

9. Tri-Chem deposes Casey Pozdak, HDE Chairperson (Case A), and asks questions seeking the following information:

(a) Whether Pozdak has ever been arrested or convicted of any criminal or traffic offense.

(b) Information regarding other lawsuits HDE has been involved in over the past 10 years.

(c) All information regarding the construction of the HDE restaurant buildings in Kansas.

(d) The names of all HDE employees who have worked in the restaurant in Kansas.

(e) What social or professional networks or media has Casey Pozdak, HDE Chairperson, used to communicate any information about Tri-Chem relating to the dispute with HDE.

(1) What reasons would you advance on behalf of the plaintiff HDE that this information is irrelevant and not discoverable?

(2) What reasons would you advance on behalf of the defendant Tri-Chem that the information is relevant and discoverable?

(3) How would you have planned to discuss and resolve with opposing counsel in a meet and confer conference your disagreements?

(4) If you were the judge, how would you decide and why?

(5) What other ways might these requests be drafted to make them more clearly relevant and discoverable?

10. In Vasquez v. Hot Dog Enterprises (Case F), the attorney for HDE deposes Juanita Vasquez and asks her questions seeking the following information:

(a) The names, addresses, and phone numbers of all men whom she has dated socially since she was 18.

(b) Whether she has had sexual relations or otherwise been intimate with any former or current employees of HDE.

(c) Information regarding any counseling or treatment she has received from any psychiatrist, psychologist, or other counselor.

(d) Facts to support her claim that she has suffered emotional distress.

(e) Whether she has used email, text messages, or social media to communicate information about her work at HDE and the identity of those individuals with whom she has had those communications.

(1) What reasons would you advance on behalf of the plaintiff Vasquez that this information is irrelevant and not discoverable?

(2) What reasons would you advance on behalf of the defendant HDE that this information is relevant and discoverable?

(3) How would you have planned to discuss and resolve with opposing counsel in a meet and confer conference your disagreements?

(4) If you were the judge, how would you decide and why?

(5) What other ways might these requests be drafted to make the request more clearly relevant and discoverable?

11. In Giacone v. City of Mitchell (Case D), Martha Giacone individually meets with her attorney in her attorney’s office and discusses the following:

(a) Facts regarding her utility services and bills.

(b) Facts regarding her communications with employees of the Department of Water with the City of Mitchell.

Defendant City of Mitchell submits interrogatories asking the following questions:

(a) Explain everything you told your lawyer regarding your utility bills and utility services.

(b) Describe all communications you had with any employee of the City of Mitchell Department of Water regarding your utility bill and services.

(1) Is this information discoverable? Why or why not?

(2) How can these requests be drafted to make them more relevant?

12. During the client interview between Martha Giacone and her attorney, her lawyer renders legal advice about her situation and alternative remedies (Case D).

(a) Is this information discoverable? Why or why not?

(b) What type of legal information may be discoverable?

(c) What discovery devices are available to obtain appropriate types of legal information?

(d) Presume Ms. Giacone seeks legal advice about her legal claims from Internet websites that offer explanations about the law relevant to her litigation, is this information discoverable? Why or why not? How?

13. Martha Giacone, prior to first visiting her attorney, prepares a written statement detailing the facts of her utility dispute and gives this statement to her attorney who places it in the law office file (Case D).

(a) Is this memo discoverable? Why or why not?

(b) If, during the course of the attorney-client interview, the lawyer obtains additional facts from the client and composes a memo in a computer file, is the file or that portion of the file discoverable? Why or why not?

(c) Presume that her lawyer maintains a blog and posts on this blog comments and observations about the facts and law relating to the case that Ms. Giacone may have against the City of Mitchell. Does the posting of this information affect the privileged status of the facts Ms. Giacone told her lawyer in private? Does the posting of this information affect the privileged status of the legal advice Ms. Giacone’s lawyer gave her?

14. Before Hot Dog Enterprises sues Tri-Chem (Case A), the following occurs:

(a) The attorney for HDE dictates into a computer file a summary of the client interview with Pat LaBelle, HDE’s CEO.

(b) The attorney for HDE has a conference with a law partner regarding the facts, legal theories, and strategies of a potential law suit and subsequently prepares a word document summarizing the discussion and preserves it on a confidential computer hard drive.

(c) The attorney has the same discussion with a paralegal with the law firm.

(d) The attorney has the same discussion with an expert witness retained by HDE and the law firm to help investigate a potential lawsuit.

(e) During the course of computer legal research, the attorney prints out citations, case notes, and summaries of the law.

(f) The HDE attorney complains on a social media network about the Tri-Chem litigation describing the Tri-Chem defenses as “frivolous” and “bad faith” and stating that the defenses are “really criminal in nature brought by a %$#@! that cares nothing about whom it kills or maims.”

(1) Is any of this information discoverable by Tri-Chem? Why or why not? Through interrogatories, requests for production, or depositions?

(2) Does the disclosure of the information affect the privileged or confidential status of information not posted but related to the postings?

15. After HDE retains an attorney, but before a lawsuit is brought against Tri-Chem, the attorney begins an investigation by interviewing some eyewitnesses, visiting the restaurant buildings, and summarizing the information in a computer file memo (Case A).

(a) Is that memo or any portion of the file discoverable? Why or why not?

(b) Is the information somehow discoverable from the attorney?

(c) Is the information somehow discoverable from the eyewitnesses interviewed by the attorney? How?

(d) The attorney hires an independent private investigator who conducts the investigation and prepares an email memo for the attorney. Is that memo or any portion of it discoverable from the attorney?

(e) If the private investigator retains a copy of the email memo and places it in an electronic file in the investigator’s computer, is a copy of the memo discoverable from the investigator? Why and how, or why not?

16. At HDE’s restaurant in Kansas, some of the bricks that fell hit a customer (Case A). Government regulations require HDE to investigate the accident and prepare a report, which is then filed in the company’s records and with the government. Is that report discoverable by the customer from HDE in a subsequent lawsuit brought by the customer against HDE? Explain your answer.

17. HDE has a policy of keeping personnel, evaluation, and termination computer records that are prepared and maintained by supervisors and kept on a hard drive on the company’s computer system. HDE fires an employee who subsequently sues HDE claiming job discrimination. Are the records maintained by HDE regarding that employee discoverable by that employee in this litigation? Explain your answer.

18. The Vice President for Production of Hot Dog Enterprise receives a telephone call from a vendor complaining that the vendor did not receive payment for hot dog ingredients delivered to HDE. The Vice President asks the manager to investigate and prepare an email report directed to the Vice President detailing whether the supplies were received and whether or not they were paid. Several months later the vendor sues HDE for breach of contract. Is the email report discoverable by the vendor in this litigation with HDE? Explain your answer.

19. While cutting grass one sunny Saturday afternoon, Casey Pozdak witnessed an accident in which a neighbor, Mark, is injured by a lawn mower operated by another neighbor, Helen. Mark retains a lawyer who contacts both Casey and Helen and interviews them.

(a) The attorney for Mark prepares a statement in Casey’s own handwriting, which Casey signs, and he has Helen write out her story in her own handwriting and date it, but does not have her sign it. Subsequently, Mark sues Helen for negligence. Can Casey or Helen obtain a copy of their own statements? Why and how, or why not?

(b) Suppose that the attorney does not obtain a written statement from Helen. The attorney returns to the attorney’s office and composes a memorandum from interview notes on the office laptop. Is a printed copy of the memorandum discoverable by Helen? Why or why not?

(c) Suppose that the attorney does not obtain a written statement from Helen. Instead, the attorney contemporaneously records the conversation with Helen with an audio recording without her knowledge or permission. Is the recording or a transcript of the recording discoverable by Helen?

(d) Immediately after the accident, Mark sends this email message to a directory list of ten neighbors: “Crazy Helen at last got back at me for our kids smashing her pumpkins last Halloween. I’m ok but mad at Helen from Hell.” How does Helen go about obtaining this email? What are her options?

(e) The evening of the accident, Mark sends a Tweet message on his smart phone to his best friend saying: “I got sure way 4 me to send our kids to priv skool. I may been hurt bad by u no who nxt door.” How does Helen go about obtaining this message? What if Mark deletes the message that same evening? What are Helen’s options?

(f) The day after the accident, Mark posted on his social network communication page the following” “Get this. The witch next door is an incompetent lawn mower operator. Helen from Hell—her moniker—injured me while mowing. That’s my story and I’m sticking to it and sticking her with it. This will have a very ‘rich’ ending.” Helen attempts to access Mark’s posting, but she is blocked. Is this posting entry discoverable by Helen? Why and how?

(g) Over the course of a week after the accident, Mark has numerous conversations in person and over the phone with his work colleagues, friends, and families about the accident. He has told them his version of what happened, and said derogatory things about Helen, claiming she injured him, maybe intentionally. What, if anything, may be discovered from these conversations? Why? How?

(h) One day after posting the above entry on his Facebook page, Mark deletes it and all traces of it from his laptop where he created it, he hopes. What, if anything is discoverable by Helen? Why and How? What are her options?

(i) Helen, during the litigation, takes a video of Mark playing tackle football with his kids and family members in his yard, seemingly able to do things he claims in his lawsuit he can no longer do. She posts the video on a social media video network. Mark has access to the video and claims it has been altered and edited to make him look bad. Is the original video discoverable by Mark from Helen? Is the posted video obtainable from Helen? Why and How?

(j) One day after posting the above video on YouTube, Helen takes it down and deletes the video from her smart phone. What, if anything, is discoverable by Mark? Why and How? What are his options?

(k) Mark’s lawyer maintains a blog entitled “The Law Forum.” Before the lawsuit against Helen is served, Mark’s lawyer posts the following: “I got a case from hell, well, involving Hell, but no names to protect the civilly guilty. Occasionally you get a case that will make some money and make a defendant miserable. It’s ethical, of sorts, and really lots of fun.” What, if anything, is discoverable by Helen? Why and how? What are defenses to its discoverability by Mark’s lawyer?

(l) After the lawsuit is commenced, Helen’s lawyer, not to be outdone, also maintains a blog and posts: “Only in America can a shameless, lying neighbor bring a frivolous case by a should-be-disbarred-lawyer. “Mark” my words, this is a crime. More later when I can chat with impunity.” What, if anything, is discoverable by Mark? Why and how? What are defenses to its discoverability by Helen’s lawyer?

20. A worker at the manufacturing plant of Hot Dog Enterprises is injured on the job. A co-worker observes the accident and, at the request of an HDE manager, composes an email summarizing her eyewitness account and signs it with her electronic signature, and sends it to the manager, who forwards it to the workers compensation department of the company. The injured worker brings an action against HDE for the injury. Can the co-worker’s statement be obtained by the plaintiff through discovery? Why and how, or why not?

21(a). During the annual July 4th softball tournament at the national headquarters at Hot Dog Enterprises, an employee, Silve, starts a fight with Pat LaBelle, HDE’s CEO, after Pat slides into the employee at second base. An HDE attorney suggests that Pat compose a report of the incident and file it in the employee’s personnel file. Pat does so. Subsequently, HDE fires the employee. The employee sues HDE for breach of employment contract. Is Pat LaBelle’s report discoverable by the employee during discovery? Explain.

21(b). The employee, Silve, after the accident and lawsuit texts on his smart phone, sends in an email message, posts on a social media network, and enters on his blog the following: “Strike 3 for LaBelle the Felon. I know he is a criminal and fired me before I could blow the whistle. Now I will. Stay tuned.” What, if anything, is discoverable by Pat Labelle from Silve? Why and How? Which of these formats would be the most efficient and effective way to obtain the information? How can Pat LaBelle have these postings, if at all, removed from their sites to prevent them from being further distributed.

21(c). Pat LaBelle, during the litigation, texts on a smart phone, sends in an email message, posts on a social media network, and enters on a blog the following: “Our ex-employee will pay dearly for slanderous statements. All because of a bad slide. Firing is only the beginning.” What, if anything, is discoverable by Silve? Why and How? Which of these formats would be the most efficient and effective way to obtain the information? How can Silve have these postings, if at all, removed from their sites to prevent them from being further distributed?

21(d). During the litigation, an HDE staff person, who was at the softball game, took a video of part of the game, including the fight and second base slide. How can either party discover this video? Why and How?

21(e). If the HDE staff person posted the video on a social media network site and then had it deleted from that site, is there another way the video can be obtained? Why and How?

22. In Hot Dog Enterprise v. Tri-Chem (Case A), the defendant submits interrogatories to the plaintiff seeking the following information:

(a) All individuals interviewed by or contacted by the plaintiff regarding this litigation.

(b) The identities of all witnesses who provided information or statements to the plaintiff.

(c) All persons who have knowledge relating to the claims or defenses of this case.

(d) The names of all witnesses that plaintiff will call to testify at the trial.

(e) A description of all electronically stored information relevant to the case that the plaintiff has.

(f) All Internet websites searched for potential witnesses and for information about witnesses.

(1) How would you have planned to discuss and resolve with opposing counsel in a meet and confer conference your disagreements over discoverability?

(2) You are the judge. Which, if any, of this information is discoverable and why?

23. Tri-Chem has monthly management meetings involving the company president, general counsel, six division managers, and a secretary. They discuss company matters at these meetings, and an electronic memorandum of each meeting is prepared by the secretary and distributed by email to the eight attendants.

In October, Hot Dog Enterprises sent a letter by mail to the president of Tri-Chem alleging that damages to HDE’s restaurant buildings in Kansas were caused by the failure of Bond-Mor and detailed the factual basis and legal consequences of HDE’s claims. The president of Tri-Chem jotted notes on the letter, indicating reactions to the contents, and distributed copies to the general counsel and the six division managers.

The president placed two matters on the agenda for the November meeting: (1) Tri-Chem’s general advertising campaign regarding Bond-Mor, and (2) the October letter from HDE. Both matters were discussed during the November meeting, and the subsequent meeting memorandum contained paragraphs summarizing the discussions.

During December, the general counsel of Tri-Chem requested an email memo from the advertising manager of Tri-Chem regarding a response to the claims in the HDE letter. The product manager from Tri-Chem received a copy of the letter from Tri-Chem to HDE and wrote in the margins:

“This is the same old problem we’ve always had. We need to get these bricks and mortar back for testing, or at least to secrete the real damaging evidence.”

The advertising manager asked each of the three supervisory advertising personnel to submit confidential individual email memos with their reactions to the HDE letter, which had been distributed to them. The advertising manager received all three email memos in December and composed one email summary memo in January to the Tri-Chem general counsel.

In February, HDE sued Tri-Chem in federal court, claiming violation of federal and state deceptive trade practices statutes, negligence, and product liability. The general counsel of Tri-Chem then personally interviewed each of the three supervisory advertising personnel and recorded the summaries of the interviews in a separate word memo placed in an electronic case file.

Tri-Chem retained the law firm of Burn & Albright to defend it in litigation. Burn personally met with the president of Tri-Chem and with each of the six division managers and prepared notes on a laptop during such interviews, which were placed in an electronic law office file.

(a) What positions would you advance on behalf of the plaintiff HDE to obtain all of these memos and documents?

(b) What positions would you advance on behalf of defendant Tri-Chem protecting these memos and documents from disclosure?

(c) How would you have planned to discuss and resolve with opposing counsel in a meet and confer conference your disagreements?

(d) As the judge, which of the documents would you rule discoverable:

(1) The October letter from HDE containing handwritten notes by the president of Tri-Chem.

(2) The paragraphs summarizing the November meeting discussions.

(3) The letter from Tri-Chem to HDE with the production manager’s notes.

(4) The three December email memos from the advertising personnel to the advertising manager.

(5) The January email summary memo from the advertising manager to the general counsel.

(6) The February computer memo prepared by the general counsel.

(7) The Burn laptop notes.

24. Hot Dog Enterprises has sued Tri-Chem in federal court alleging that the use of Bond-Mor to construct its restaurant buildings in Kansas violated the applicable deceptive trade practices act and constituted negligence and products liability, which court has jurisdiction. Tri-Chem retains you to defend it in this litigation. You conduct a thorough search of all company documents. Your research uncovers the documents appearing in Case A in Appendix B.

(a) Plaintiff HDE submits a properly drafted request for production of documents seeking the disclosure of “all documents and electronically stored information containing information relevant to the claims and defenses of this litigation” and “relating to the research, development, marketing, advertising, production, and distribution of Bond-Mor.” Which of these documents or portions of them, would you disclose to HDE? What positions would you advance in refusing to disclose any of these documents, or portions of them?

(b) During your investigation you interview a number of Tri-Chem managers. They advise you that there existed many other paper and electronic documents including memorandums regarding Bond-Mor which were destroyed. Some of these documents were destroyed or deleted in the ordinary course of document destruction by Tri-Chem following established company policies and business protocols because it is impossible or inconvenient to retain all documents. Some of these documents were destroyed because there was some concern that litigation may ensue and it would be better for Tri-Chem that such documents did not exist. What would you do in response to this information? Would you ask the managers to prepare a list or a summary of documents that were destroyed? Why or why not?

(c) Presume the same facts as in paragraph (b) above. One of the Tri-Chem managers tells you that while the word documents were deleted and the printed copies destroyed the data likely exists on a company’s dedicated hard drive or backup server. What would you do in response to this information? Would you ask that a search be conducted for this data on the computer to obtain a duplicate? Would you disclose the existence of this information if the other side properly requests such information? Would you affirmatively advise Tri-Chem not to destroy the computer drive and server? Would you advise Tri-Chem of the consequences of destroying these sources and leave the decision of the status of this information to your client?

25. A plaintiff is injured as a result of the bricks falling from HDE’s restaurant buildings in Kansas when the plaintiff visited the restaurant (Case A). The treating physician of the plaintiff composes a written opinion about the physical condition of the plaintiff at the request of the plaintiff’s attorney who intends to call the doctor as an expert at the trial. The physician also met with the attorney for the plaintiff and gave an oral opinion regarding the plaintiff’s condition. HDE is the defendant. What information must plaintiff affirmatively disclose under Federal Rule 26(a)? What information may HDE discover from the plaintiff regarding information known by the expert physician? Why and how, or why not?

26. A chemist at Tri-Chem is a full-time employee in the Product Development Division and was reassigned to spend one year with a retained outside law firm that represents Tri-Chem in its litigation against HDE regarding Bond-Mor (Case A). The chemist during this time conducts non-destructive tests, provides written test reports to Tri-Chem and the law firm, and meets with the attorneys for the firm and renders oral opinions and written memorandums. What is discoverable by HDE? What must be disclosed by Tri-Chem under Federal Rule 26? Why and how, or why not?

27. Tri-Chem hires an engineer who is a full-time university professor to provide it with an expert opinion regarding one of its products known as Roofoam Insulation.

(a) Prior to any problems with Roofoam Insulation or the potential litigation, the professor provides Tri-Chem with an oral opinion and a written report regarding test conclusions about Roofoam Insulation.

(b) Tri-Chem is sued in a product liability case by a plaintiff who claims Roofoam Insulation to be defective. Tri-Chem again retains the full-time university professor to provide it with an opinion regarding whether Roofoam Insulation was defective. The expert provides both an oral report and a written report to Tri-Chem.

(c) After providing Tri-Chem with this information, the professor posts on a blog a few statements from the oral opinion rendered and from the written report submitted to Tri-Chem, along with comments and observations about the legal and expert positions taken by Tri-Chem.

(1) Which of this information, if any, must be disclosed by Tri-Chem under Federal Rule 26 in the product liability case?

(2) Which of this information, if any, is discoverable by the plaintiff in the product liability case?

28. Dr. Ellis has a national reputation as an expert in the treatment of lower-back problems and has been conducting a two-year research treatment program for individuals with lower-back pain. Herb visits Dr. Ellis in March, complaining of chronic lower-back pain, and after tests Dr. Ellis accepts him as a patient in the research treatment program, recommends surgery for reduction of his enlarged disc, and performs the surgery in April. Herb continues to experience the same chronic back pain after surgery. Dr. Ellis recommends a physical therapy program for him, but Herb has too much pain and cannot continue with the program. In June, Herb contacts another back specialist, who places Herb on a hanging-traction program. During July, Herb’s back pain subsides and Herb can engage in normal physical activities. In August, Dr. Ellis completes the two-year research project, which has involved 50 patients, and prepares a final report, which publicly released. In September, Herb sues Dr. Ellis for medical malpractice. Which of the following will be discoverable by the lawyer for Herb and why and how?

(a) Results from the March test that Dr. Ellis conducted on Herb.

(b) The surgery tests and records.

(c) Dr. Ellis’ opinion on why Herb continued to suffer lower-back pain from April through July.

(d) The files and records of the 50 patients involved in the research project.

29. Tri-Chem is sued for the negligent installation of Roofoam Insulation, one of its products, and hires two experts, Maxi and Kyle. Maxi submits a written report to Tri-Chem that supports the position of the company’s engineers. Kyle submits a report that concludes that Tri-Chem’s engineers were negligent in installing Roofoam Insulation.

(a) The company retained Maxi as an expert. What, if anything, must be disclosed by Tri-Chem? What, if anything, may the plaintiffs obtain from Tri-Chem regarding the opinions of Maxi? Explain.

(b) Tri-Chem retains Kyle as an expert but does not use Kyle or the report for anything further in this litigation. What, if anything, must be disclosed by Tri-Chem? What, if anything, may the plaintiff discover regarding the opinion of Kyle? Explain.

(c) Presume the company pays Kyle for the initial report and then dismisses Kyle. What, if anything, must be disclosed by Tri-Chem? What, if anything, may the plaintiff obtain from Tri-Chem regarding the opinion of Kyle? Explain.

(d) Presume the facts in Problem (c) immediately above, Kyle sends smart phone text messages to colleagues about experiences and results with Tri-Chem. Are these messages discoverable? How? Explain.

30. A bystander injured by falling bricks from an HDE restaurant building sues HDE. The answers to interrogatories by Hot Dog Enterprises provide the plaintiff with the names of all eyewitnesses to the incident Subsequent to such answers, HDE learns of another key eyewitness. Must HDE disclose this information? Why and how, or why not?

31. Pursuant to an HDE request for production of documents and electronically stored information, Tri-Chem submits to HDE on May 1st all materials it has relating to telephone and cell phone conversations between Tri-Chem employees and HDE (Case A). Subsequent investigation by Tri-Chem uncovers another relevant phone message, with notes of a conversation between employees of the parties. Must Tri-Chem disclose this information to HDE? Why and how, or why not?

32. Hot Dog Enterprises is involved in litigation with one of its franchisees regarding a lease. The attorney for HDE deposes the plaintiff, who testifies that she said nothing to HDE about a lease in a meeting on August 10th. After the deposition, the plaintiff advises her attorney that she recalls asking two questions in the meeting about the lease terms on August 10th. Must the plaintiff disclose this information to HDE? Why and how, or why not?

33. Hot Dog Enterprises sues Tri-Chem for millions of dollars in damages to its corporate headquarters building constructed with Bond-Mor (Case A) in a federal court with jurisdiction HDE asserts claims based on deceptive trade practices, negligence, and products liability.

(a) Your law firm represents Tri-Chem. You are assigned the task of preparing a protective order for the disclosure of any information Tri-Chem must make to HDE through interrogatories, requests for production, or depositions.

(1) Prepare to discuss in class or online the issues and topics to be included in this protective order.

(2) Outline a list of the issues and topics to be included in this protective order.

(b) Your law firm represents HDE. You anticipate that either Tri-Chem will refuse to disclose information unless a stipulated protective order exists between Tri-Chem and HDE or that a judge would require reasonable restrictions in a protective order regarding information sought from Tri-Chem by HDE.

(1) Prepare to discuss in class or online the issues and topics to be included in this protective order.

(2) Outline a list of issues and topics to be included in a protective order.

34. In Luger v. Shade (Case H), on March 1, the attorney for the Plaintiffs served a notice of deposition on Defendants Shade and Develco. This notice scheduled the deposition of Shade for March 30. On March 8 the attorney for Defendant Shade served notices of depositions on the Plaintiff Lugers and the Defendant Develco. These notices scheduled the depositions of the Lugers for March 22 and 23. On March 10 the attorney for the Lugers sent an email to the attorney for Shade and explained that the Lugers would not appear on March 22 and 23 or at any time for their depositions until after Shade had been deposed on March 30.

(a) As the attorney for Shade, what are your options? What would you do?

(b) As either attorney, how would you attempt to resolve this problem without court intervention?

The attorney for Shade seeks a protective order permitting Shade to be deposed after the Lugers.

(c) As the attorney for Shade, what arguments would you advance on Shade’s behalf to have the depositions of the Lugers taken first?

(d) As the attorney for the plaintiffs, what argument would you advance on the Lugers’ behalf that the deposition of Shade should be taken first?

(e) How would you have planned to discuss and resolve with opposing counsel in a meet and confer conference your disagreements?

(f) As the judge, how would you decide and why?

35. In Luger v. Shade (Case H), Plaintiffs have also sued Defendant Develco and submitted a request for production of documents and electronically stored information seeking the financial records of Develco. In response, Develco seeks a protective order.

(a) As either attorney, how would you attempt to resolve this problem without court intervention?

(b) As the attorney for Develco, what arguments would you advance on its behalf?

(c) As the attorney for the Lugers, what arguments would you advance on their behalf?

(d) How would you have planned to discuss and resolve issues with opposing counsel in a meet and confer conference your disagreements?

(e) As the judge, how would you decide and why?

36. In Luger v. Shade (Case H), the plaintiffs submit interrogatories to Defendant Shade asking Shade about: (A) his personal wealth and finances, (B) his personal insurance coverage, (C) his use of illegal drugs, (D) his user name and password for all his social and professional network accounts. In response, Shade seeks a protective order from having to answer these questions.

(a) As either attorney, how would you attempt to resolve this problem without court intervention?

(b) As the attorney for Shade, what arguments would you advance on his behalf?

(c) As the attorney for the Lugers, what arguments would you advance on their behalf?

(d) How would you have planned to discuss and resolve with opposing counsel in a meet and confer conference your disagreements?

(e) As the judge, what would you decide and why?

37. In Tymons v. Allgoods and Razzle (Case M), the following develops:

(a) The Tymons retain you and ask your advice about suing Allgoods and Razzle. They are obviously concerned about maintaining their confidential witness protection location and privacy. What do you advise them about such concerns? Can you protect them and their identity? Will a protective order be effective?

(b) Allgoods retains you anticipating a lawsuit from the Tymons. Allgoods wants to prevent any publicity that might develop from a public lawsuit. What do you advise? Can you protect the details of the information relating to the apparent security breach from being made public? What other options might Allgoods have?

(c) Razzle retains you anticipating a lawsuit from Tymons. Razzle wants to maintain its policy of providing confidentiality to its users, including the identity of a possible hacker. What do you advise? Can you protect this information? Can you assure them their policy would be retained? What other options might Razzle have?

(d) Jerzy retains you anticipating a possible lawyer malpractice claim by the Tymons. He wants to know whether a protective order would maintain the confidential details of his conduct and what happened. What do you advise him? What other options might he have?

38. Veronica Mikita, Casey Pozdak’s daughter, is a senior law student at Summit College of Law, a private law school. Summit has a student Honor Code which states, in part, that:

A student who has knowledge that another student has cheated in an exam must report this offense to the Code Committee. The failure to so report shall constitute a violation of the Code and subject the student to appropriate disciplinary action by the Code Committee.

Mikita has a classmate, Randall Lee, who told her that he had cheated in an online exam with two other classmates by working together to prepare answers. The Dean of Summit learned of Veronica’s knowledge of this cheating episode and arranged to meet with her to discuss the matter.

Prior to that meeting Veronica met with Professor Phebe O’Connell who discussed the problem with Veronica. When Veronica met with the Dean she refused to answer any questions claiming she did not have to provide any information to the Dean.

When the Dean met with Professor O’Connell the Professor explained that Mikita had not sought legal advice from O’Connell, but that O’Connell considered the conversation confidential because of a professor/student privilege. The Dean unilaterally expels Mikita claiming that he has the discretion to do so, notwithstanding the procedural provisions of the Honor Code, because her silence indicated that she had violated the Code.

Mikita sues the law school in a civil suit seeking reinstatement as a student. The defendant law school notices the deposition of Professor O’Connell.

You represent the Professor. Mikita advises you that she considers her conversations with Professor O’Connell confidential and privileged. Summit has no statute or case law creating a professor/student privilege. What options do you have? What would you do?

39. Bernie worked for Hot Dog Enterprises at its corporate headquarters and was caught stealing $42,000 of computer equipment and software. HDE contacted the police and county attorney and described the theft. Then the HDE lawyer initiated a civil lawsuit based on conversion against Bernie seeking a money judgment for the stolen property that was not recovered. Bernie retains you to represent him in both the potential criminal action as well as the civil action. You contact the county attorney who tells you that she may or may not prosecute because the police have not been able to locate the person who bought the stolen goods. Bernie tells you that he did steal the property and that HDE failed to pay him $24,000 in salary he earned before getting caught. HDE notices Bernie’s deposition in the civil suit. What options do you have? What do you do?

40. You supervise the litigation section of your law firm. There has recently been some confusion among the lawyers regarding various provisions of Federal Rule 26 and discovery. You decide to prepare memos which explain the status of the current law on some of these topics. Prepare a memo explaining:

(a) The application of Rule 26(b)(3) and the creation of trial preparation materials.

(b) Obligations of counsel to advise clients about the retention of documents and electronically stored information relevant to potential litigation.

(c) Rules and procedures dedicated to matters specifically involving electronically stored information.

(d) The propriety of advising clients to destroy information and materials that are not relevant to any potential litigation.

(e) The status of the law regarding sanctions for spoliation of discoverable information and evidentiary materials.

41. Because of your sterling reputation, you have been asked to address a litigation committee of the federal bar association. You select as your topic Rule 26(b)(3) and what information is exempt from discovery as attorney mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories. You decide to summarize considerations that will assist litigators in determining what information falls within the protected attorney mental processes and what falls outside the purview of the rule and is subject to disclosure.

(a) Plan to discuss in class or online these considerations.

(b) Prepare a concise memo listing these considerations.

42. You are a lawyer with Tri-Chem. The general counsel for Tri-Chem has become concerned with the current developments relating to the attorney-client privilege as applied to corporations under federal law. The general counsel has asked you to prepare a concise list of considerations that will assist all corporation lawyers in determining whether their conversations with corporate officers, managers, and employees fall within the range of communications protected by the privilege.

(a) Plan to discuss in class or online these considerations.

(b) Prepare a concise listing of these considerations.

43. Your reputation continues to grow and you have been asked to give a speech to a group of state court judges about developments regarding electronically stored information, the discoverability of social network communications, and the various types of devices used to create and distribute electronically stored information.

(a) Plan to discuss in class or online these developments.

(b) Prepare a concise outline of these developments.

44. You represent Tri-Chem in defense of a class-action lawsuit brought by three named plaintiffs and more than 100 unnamed class members. The plaintiffs have brought the class action under a state consumer fraud act that permits such actions and allege that Roofoam Insulation failed to reduce, in hundreds of buildings owned by the class members, utility expenses as advertised by Tri-Chem. The state rules of civil procedure relating to class actions are identical to Federal Rule 23. The plaintiffs have submitted interrogatories to your client seeking information about customers. You plan to obtain information from the plaintiffs about the alleged claims. Plan to discuss in class or online:

(a) What information the plaintiffs can obtain regarding customers.

(b) What discovery can and should be initiated by you at this stage of the litigation.

(c) Whether and why you would suggest that an experienced neutral be appointed by the court to assist with these and other class action issues.

45. You need to plan a discovery program with the following topics:

• Explain what types of information you want to obtain.
• Identify what information might need to be disclosed affirmatively by a party.
• Describe the discovery devices you plan to use to obtain that information.
• Explain your preferred sequence for the discovery devices.
• Describe what information might be better obtained through informal investigation.
• Consider whether you recommend that a discovery mediator be appointed, or when and why.

(a) Prepare such a discovery plan for the plaintiff HDE in its litigation over Bond-Mor against Tri-Chem (Case A).

(b) Prepare such a discovery plan for Tri-Chem in its litigation with HDE (Case A).

(c) Plan such a discovery plan for the plaintiff in Northern Motor Homes v. Danforth (Case J).

(d) Plan such a discovery plan for the defendants in Northern Motor Homes v. Danforth (Case J).

(e) Plan such a discovery plan for the plaintiff in Burris v. Warner (Case K).

(f) Plan such a discovery plan for the defendant in Burris v. Warner (Case K).

(g) Plan such a discovery plan for the plaintiff in *FJE Enterprises v. Arbor Vineyards. *(Case L).

(h) Plan such a discovery plan for the defendant in *FJE Enterprises v. Arbor Vineyards. *(Case L).

(i) Plan such a discovery plan for a case assigned by your professor.

(j) Prepare such a discovery plan to be submitted to the opposing party for a case assigned by your professor.

(k) You represent HDE in its litigation against Tri-Chem (Case A). Meet and confer with opposing counsel and develop a discovery plan in accord with Federal Rule 26(f).

(l) You represent Tri-Chem in its litigation with HDE (Case A). Meet and confer with opposing counsel and develop a discovery plan in accord with Federal Rule 26(f).

(m) You represent a party in a case assigned by your professor. Meet and confer with opposing counsel and develop a discovery plan in accord with Federal Rule 26(f).

46. Reynolds Metals Corporation owns property near Troutdale, Oregon, west of the Sandy River, on which it operates an aluminum reduction plant. Paul Martin also owns property nearby, east of the river, on which he raises cattle. Martin claims that fluorides emanating from the Reynolds’ plant have been discharged on their lands and into the water, killing 174 cattle that ate vegetation and drank water contaminated by the fluorides. Reynolds expects to be sued by Martin and cannot itself bring or cause the action to be brought. Reynolds also alleges that it has not, in fact, damaged Martin, and it believes that certain information and data will demonstrate that Martin’s cattle have not been damaged, which include:

• The fluorine content of samples of forage, feed, air, water, soil, vegetation and mineral supplements taken periodically from areas where livestock are being pastured.
• Physical examinations of such cattle, including photographs.
• The fluorine content of bone and tissue samples taken from cattle which have died or which have been slaughtered.

On two occasions, Reynolds asked permission to examine Martin’s lands and cattle, and on one occasion asked him to advise it if any cattle died, so that Reynolds might examine them. Martin denied these requests because he is accumulating this information. Reynolds desires to take Paul Martin’s deposition “for the purpose of eliciting from him information concerning present plans for the disposition of the cattle owned by him which are presently being pastured upon the lands as well as information from him concerning cattle which he may have removed from the lands to be pastured in other areas.” Martin believes he has been damaged but does not know whether he will sue.

(a) As counsel for Reynolds, plan a Rule 27 Petition and proceeding.

(b) Draft such a Rule 27 Petition and all supporting documents.

(c) As counsel for Martin, oppose the petition and request.

(d) As the judge, decide. [Then review history:* *Martin v. Reynolds Metals Corp., 297 F.2d 49 (9th Cir. 1961)].

47. You have asked by the state bar association to make a presentation on the following topics. Plan and outline your presentation. Prepare to discuss in class or online.

(1) How can lawyers engage in effective meet and confer conferences in an effort to resolve discovery disputes.

(2) When, why, and under what circumstances should a discovery mediator or a neutral be appointed by the court to assist with discovery issues.

48. Additional problems relating to e-discovery and electronically stored information appear at www.fundamentalspretriallitigation.com. These assignments provide you with the opportunity to investigate, disclose, and discover ESI information from an electronic database that contains ESI and that can be searched for documents. Your professor may assign some of these problems, or you can visit this website and conduct document searches on your own.

1. [LKQ Corp. v. Kia Motors Am., Inc.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I973898a01cae11eeb790d5041f3e0bf7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I973898a01cae11eeb790d5041f3e0bf7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 345 F.R.D. 152 (N.D. Ill. 2023)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I973898a01cae11eeb790d5041f3e0bf7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I973898a01cae11eeb790d5041f3e0bf7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
2. *See, e.g., *Koch v. Koch Indus., Inc., 203 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2000). ↑
3. [Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Does 1–6](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5c6b43569d2011dca1e6fa81e64372bf/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5c6b43569d2011dca1e6fa81e64372bf/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5c6b43569d2011dca1e6fa81e64372bf/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5c6b43569d2011dca1e6fa81e64372bf/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
4. See, e.g., Arbitration Forum Code of Procedure Rule 29 at www.adrforum.com. ↑
5. Olivarez v. GEO Grp., Inc., 844 F.3d 200 (5th Cir. 2016). ↑
6. Jackson v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 278 F.R.D. 586 (D. Nev. 2011). ↑
7. [Anthem, Inc. v. Express Scripts, Inc.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5fa2eaa0b3f311ec99dfd0646e92f5e0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5fa2eaa0b3f311ec99dfd0646e92f5e0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 2022 WL 991773 (S.D.N.Y.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5fa2eaa0b3f311ec99dfd0646e92f5e0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5fa2eaa0b3f311ec99dfd0646e92f5e0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
8. Fausto v. Credigy Servs. Corp., 251 F.R.D. 427 (N.D. Cal. 2008). ↑
9. [Fiumano v. Metro Diner Mgmt. LLC](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2a1778c0fec011ec85c0ddd02fe812fc/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2a1778c0fec011ec85c0ddd02fe812fc/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 2022 WL 2541354 (E.D. Pa.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2a1778c0fec011ec85c0ddd02fe812fc/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2a1778c0fec011ec85c0ddd02fe812fc/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
10. • See **[Surman v. Payne,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I428893a0cfc411edbf09ca8ba086e52e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I428893a0cfc411edbf09ca8ba086e52e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)*[ 2023 WL 2716224 (W.D. Pa.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I428893a0cfc411edbf09ca8ba086e52e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I428893a0cfc411edbf09ca8ba086e52e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
11. [Chicago Joe’s Tea Room, LLC v. Vill. of Broadview](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3d08ab50d51211eea6fb83c62b69fa82/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3d08ab50d51211eea6fb83c62b69fa82/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 94 F.4th 588 (7th Cir. 2024)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3d08ab50d51211eea6fb83c62b69fa82/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3d08ab50d51211eea6fb83c62b69fa82/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
12. [Tori Belle Cosms., LLC v. Meek](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0dba9170e28211edb62e809fb6820847/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0dba9170e28211edb62e809fb6820847/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 2023 WL 3043865 (W.D. Wash.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0dba9170e28211edb62e809fb6820847/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0dba9170e28211edb62e809fb6820847/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
13. [Clayman v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic3cb828353e911d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic3cb828353e911d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 343 F. Supp. 2d 1037 (D. Kan. 2004)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic3cb828353e911d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic3cb828353e911d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
14. [Sun River Energy, Inc. v. Nelson,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5b1d21e551a411e5b4bafa136b480ad2/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5b1d21e551a411e5b4bafa136b480ad2/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 800 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2015)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5b1d21e551a411e5b4bafa136b480ad2/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5b1d21e551a411e5b4bafa136b480ad2/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
15. [Hassebrock v. Bernhoft,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I56b9cfb8e46711e5b86bd602cb8781fa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I56b9cfb8e46711e5b86bd602cb8781fa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 815 F.3d 334 (7th Cir. 2016)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I56b9cfb8e46711e5b86bd602cb8781fa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I56b9cfb8e46711e5b86bd602cb8781fa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
16. See **[In re Google Play Store Antitrust Litig.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8fe8b270ce7911ed8833ddef8168f00b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8fe8b270ce7911ed8833ddef8168f00b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 664 F.Supp. 3d 981 ((N.D. Cal. 2023)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8fe8b270ce7911ed8833ddef8168f00b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8fe8b270ce7911ed8833ddef8168f00b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
17. See [Freeman v. Giuliani](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ibd62a4f0476d11eeb336d6875dfb31d7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ibd62a4f0476d11eeb336d6875dfb31d7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 691 F. Supp. 3d 32 (D.D.C. 2023)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ibd62a4f0476d11eeb336d6875dfb31d7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ibd62a4f0476d11eeb336d6875dfb31d7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
18. See [Good v. BioLife Plasma Servs., L.P., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I625ce840af6f11ed9d438bfa21db1012/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I625ce840af6f11ed9d438bfa21db1012/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[656 F. Supp. 3d 738 (E.D. Mich. 2023)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I625ce840af6f11ed9d438bfa21db1012/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I625ce840af6f11ed9d438bfa21db1012/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0); [Tex. A&M Research Found. v. Magna Transp., Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If9218cd089e211d9b6ea9f5a173c4523/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If9218cd089e211d9b6ea9f5a173c4523/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 338 F.3d 394 (5th Cir. 2003)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If9218cd089e211d9b6ea9f5a173c4523/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If9218cd089e211d9b6ea9f5a173c4523/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
19. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101 (2017). ↑
20. [Mach. Solutions, Inc. v. Doosan Infracore Am. Corp.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8e852bb0f76111e7818da80a62699cb5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8e852bb0f76111e7818da80a62699cb5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 323 F.R.D. 522 (D.S.C. 2018)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8e852bb0f76111e7818da80a62699cb5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8e852bb0f76111e7818da80a62699cb5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
21. See **[Prasad v. Nallapati, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0dbd4cb0b74c11eca998bccac2217b4d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0dbd4cb0b74c11eca998bccac2217b4d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[597 F. Supp. 3d 842 (E.D.N.C. 2022)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0dbd4cb0b74c11eca998bccac2217b4d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0dbd4cb0b74c11eca998bccac2217b4d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
22. [Rhone v. Schneider Nat’l Carriers,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0ee13e60084f11e6be97c29f3a4ca000/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0ee13e60084f11e6be97c29f3a4ca000/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 2016 WL 1594453 (E.D. Mo.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0ee13e60084f11e6be97c29f3a4ca000/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0ee13e60084f11e6be97c29f3a4ca000/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
23. [Landry v. Swire Oilfield Servs., LLC,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia762f010f15611e7af08dbc2fa7f734f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia762f010f15611e7af08dbc2fa7f734f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 323 F.R.D. 360 (D.N.M. 2018)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia762f010f15611e7af08dbc2fa7f734f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia762f010f15611e7af08dbc2fa7f734f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
24. • See **[Ali v. Dainese USA, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie678b210622e11ecbbd0de1b963e14ae/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie678b210622e11ecbbd0de1b963e14ae/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)*[ 571 F. Supp. 3d 205 (S.D.N.Y. 2021)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie678b210622e11ecbbd0de1b963e14ae/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie678b210622e11ecbbd0de1b963e14ae/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
25. [State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifbd7b0309d7111e595f799cc3c3ba45b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifbd7b0309d7111e595f799cc3c3ba45b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 312 F.R.D. 459 (N.D. Tex. 2015)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifbd7b0309d7111e595f799cc3c3ba45b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifbd7b0309d7111e595f799cc3c3ba45b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
26. [Makr v. BNSF Ry. Co.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I309113e0459411e7a6b0f3e4b1d2c082/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I309113e0459411e7a6b0f3e4b1d2c082/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 2015 WL 13358362 (C.D. Cal.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I309113e0459411e7a6b0f3e4b1d2c082/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I309113e0459411e7a6b0f3e4b1d2c082/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
27. [MediaNews Grp., Inc. v. v. McCarthey,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1eb130433c9311dcaba8d9d29eb57eff/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1eb130433c9311dcaba8d9d29eb57eff/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 494 F.3d 1254 (10th Cir. 2007)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1eb130433c9311dcaba8d9d29eb57eff/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1eb130433c9311dcaba8d9d29eb57eff/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
28. [Motorola Solutions v. Hytera Communications Corp,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1cd942e0475a11e9bc469b767245e66a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1cd942e0475a11e9bc469b767245e66a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 365 F. Supp. 3d 916 (N.D. Ill. 2019)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1cd942e0475a11e9bc469b767245e66a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1cd942e0475a11e9bc469b767245e66a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
29. [Robert L. Citroen, Law Corp. v. Micon Optics, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I32dc75f08cce11e7ae06bb6d796f727f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I32dc75f08cce11e7ae06bb6d796f727f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 2017 WL 3707391 (E.D.N.Y.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I32dc75f08cce11e7ae06bb6d796f727f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I32dc75f08cce11e7ae06bb6d796f727f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
30. United States v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006). ↑
31. See **[Rainsy v. Facebook, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I485e40d0545511e88808c81b5a222cba/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I485e40d0545511e88808c81b5a222cba/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 311 F. Supp. 3d 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2018)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I485e40d0545511e88808c81b5a222cba/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I485e40d0545511e88808c81b5a222cba/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
32. [In re](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I19fd49a08b9811d99a6fdc806bf1638e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I19fd49a08b9811d99a6fdc806bf1638e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I19fd49a08b9811d99a6fdc806bf1638e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I19fd49a08b9811d99a6fdc806bf1638e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[Marsden,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I19fd49a08b9811d99a6fdc806bf1638e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I19fd49a08b9811d99a6fdc806bf1638e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 99 Fed. Appx. 862 (10th Cir. 2004)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I19fd49a08b9811d99a6fdc806bf1638e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I19fd49a08b9811d99a6fdc806bf1638e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
33. [St. Paul Reinsurance Co., Ltd. v. Commercial Financial Corp.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib2064db653d411d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib2064db653d411d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 198 F.R.D. 508 (N.D. Iowa 2000)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib2064db653d411d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib2064db653d411d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
34. [Burlington Ins. Co. v. Okie Dokie, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib3ffcd9cc1ce11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib3ffcd9cc1ce11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 368 F. Supp. 2d 83 (D.D.C. 2005)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib3ffcd9cc1ce11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib3ffcd9cc1ce11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). No kidding. ↑
35. [Sonnino v. Univ. of Kan. Hosp. Auth.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I520bf38a541d11d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I520bf38a541d11d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 220 F.R.D. 633 (D. Kan. 2004)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I520bf38a541d11d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I520bf38a541d11d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
36. [Chrimar Sys. v. Cisco Sys., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifd3644c0b9cb11e5be74e186f6bc2536/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifd3644c0b9cb11e5be74e186f6bc2536/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[312 F.R.D. 560 (N.D. Cal. 2016)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifd3644c0b9cb11e5be74e186f6bc2536/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifd3644c0b9cb11e5be74e186f6bc2536/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
37. Marsden v. Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15001 (S.D. Ohio). ↑
38. See **[Mann v. City of Chicago, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I389a916096cf11e7abd4d53a4dbd6890/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I389a916096cf11e7abd4d53a4dbd6890/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[2017 WL 3970592 (N.D. Ill.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I389a916096cf11e7abd4d53a4dbd6890/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I389a916096cf11e7abd4d53a4dbd6890/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
39. Wilmington Trust Co. v. AEP Generating Co., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28762 (S.D. Ohio). ↑
40. [Herbert v. Lando,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic1e4cea29c1e11d991d0cc6b54f12d4d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic1e4cea29c1e11d991d0cc6b54f12d4d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 441 U.S. 153 (1979)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic1e4cea29c1e11d991d0cc6b54f12d4d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic1e4cea29c1e11d991d0cc6b54f12d4d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
41. [Prokosh v. Catalina](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I526c06c153ce11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I526c06c153ce11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I526c06c153ce11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I526c06c153ce11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[Lighting Inc](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I526c06c153ce11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I526c06c153ce11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[., 193 F.R.D. 633 (D. Minn. 2000)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I526c06c153ce11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I526c06c153ce11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0); [In re Surety Ass’n of Am.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib99753858f9d11d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib99753858f9d11d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 388 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1967)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib99753858f9d11d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib99753858f9d11d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0), *quoting *Broadway & Ninety-Sixth Street Realty Co. v. Loew’s Inc., 21 F.R.D. 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). ↑
42. [Landry v. Swire Oilfield Servs., LLC](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia762f010f15611e7af08dbc2fa7f734f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia762f010f15611e7af08dbc2fa7f734f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 323 F.R.D. 360 (D.N.M. 2018)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia762f010f15611e7af08dbc2fa7f734f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia762f010f15611e7af08dbc2fa7f734f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
43. [Herbert v. Lando](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic1e4cea29c1e11d991d0cc6b54f12d4d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic1e4cea29c1e11d991d0cc6b54f12d4d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 441 U.S. 153 (1979)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic1e4cea29c1e11d991d0cc6b54f12d4d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic1e4cea29c1e11d991d0cc6b54f12d4d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0), *quoting *[Fed. R. Civ. P. 1](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NAC2A13A0B95F11D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NAC2A13A0B95F11D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
44. [In re Takata Airbag Prods. Liab. Litig.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3ca48b30022911e6a647af7ccdd8c5d2/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3ca48b30022911e6a647af7ccdd8c5d2/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 2016 WL 1460143 (Fla. S.D.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3ca48b30022911e6a647af7ccdd8c5d2/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3ca48b30022911e6a647af7ccdd8c5d2/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
45. • See *Patterson v. Avery Dennison Corp., 281 F.3d 676 (7th Cir. 2002). ↑
46. United States v. N.M. State Univ., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161421 (D.N.M.). ↑
47. [Webato Thermo & Comfort N. Am., Inc. v. BesTop, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia2ba6d807bf911e88d669565240b92b2/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia2ba6d807bf911e88d669565240b92b2/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 326 F.R.D. 465 (E.D. Mich. 2018)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia2ba6d807bf911e88d669565240b92b2/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia2ba6d807bf911e88d669565240b92b2/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
48. United States v. N.M. State Univ., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161421 (D.N.M.). ↑
49. Cardoza v. Bloomin’ Brands, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45459 (D. Nev.). ↑
50. [Corser v. County of Merced](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4d0b60083d0a11dbbffafa490ee528f6/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4d0b60083d0a11dbbffafa490ee528f6/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 2006 WL 2536622 (E.D. Cal.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4d0b60083d0a11dbbffafa490ee528f6/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4d0b60083d0a11dbbffafa490ee528f6/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
51. John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law §§ 2190–2396 (Wigmore on Evidence); 8 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 2016–2034. ↑
52. Wigmore on Evidence § 2285. ↑
53. [Pearson v. Miller](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib14d1657796411d9bf29e2067ad74e5b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib14d1657796411d9bf29e2067ad74e5b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 211 F.3d 57 (3d Cir. 2000)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib14d1657796411d9bf29e2067ad74e5b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib14d1657796411d9bf29e2067ad74e5b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
54. [Hobley v. Burge,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2cddfe63814a11da9cfda9de91273d56/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2cddfe63814a11da9cfda9de91273d56/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 433 F.3d 946 (7th Cir. 2006)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2cddfe63814a11da9cfda9de91273d56/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2cddfe63814a11da9cfda9de91273d56/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
55. • See *Comcast of L.A., Inc. v. Top End Inter., Inc., 2003 WL 22251149 (C.D. Cal.). ↑
56. [United States v. Johnson,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia7aed13153dd11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia7aed13153dd11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 131 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (N.D. Iowa 2001)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia7aed13153dd11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia7aed13153dd11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
57. [EEOC v. Lutheran Soc. Servs.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I914e968794ad11d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I914e968794ad11d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 186 F.3d 959 (D.C. Cir. 1999)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I914e968794ad11d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I914e968794ad11d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
58. See **[United States v. Southeast Eye Specialists, PLLC](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8b918a708fb011ec9381ff4a09a81529/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8b918a708fb011ec9381ff4a09a81529/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 586 F. Supp. 3d 787 (M.D. Tenn. 2022)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8b918a708fb011ec9381ff4a09a81529/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8b918a708fb011ec9381ff4a09a81529/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
59. • See *In re Blan, 239 B.R. 385 (W.D. Ark. 1999). ↑
60. [Strougo v. Bea Assocs.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iaa58c61753de11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iaa58c61753de11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 199 F.R.D. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iaa58c61753de11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iaa58c61753de11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
61. [In re Master Key Litigation,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ice912ca1905911d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ice912ca1905911d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 507 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1974)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ice912ca1905911d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ice912ca1905911d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
62. [United States v. James,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ida233d0153ec11d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ida233d0153ec11d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 164 F. Supp. 2d 718 (D. Md. 2001)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ida233d0153ec11d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ida233d0153ec11d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
63. [Rockwood Select Asset Fund XI v. Devine](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I37a69f3126c411e5a795ac035416da91/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I37a69f3126c411e5a795ac035416da91/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 113 F. Supp. 3d 471 (D.N.H. 2015)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I37a69f3126c411e5a795ac035416da91/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I37a69f3126c411e5a795ac035416da91/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
64. [United States v. Duke Energy Corp.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3a173fd153f711d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3a173fd153f711d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 208 F.R.D. 553 (M.D.N.C. 2002)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3a173fd153f711d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3a173fd153f711d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
65. [Johnson v. Ford Motor Co.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If35ff0c04fc911e59310dee353d566e2/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If35ff0c04fc911e59310dee353d566e2/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 309 F.R.D. 226 (S.D. W. Va. 2015)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If35ff0c04fc911e59310dee353d566e2/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If35ff0c04fc911e59310dee353d566e2/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
66. • See **[Simmons v. Foods Inc. v. Willia, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ideb46d6453b611d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ideb46d6453b611d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)*[2000 WL 204270 (D. Kan.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ideb46d6453b611d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ideb46d6453b611d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
67. [Smith v. Cromer](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I9240e030947511d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I9240e030947511d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 159 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1998)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I9240e030947511d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I9240e030947511d9a707f4371c9c34f0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
68. [Cameron v. Birkett](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ied588da6542f11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ied588da6542f11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 348 F. Supp. 2d 825 (E.D. Mich. 2004)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ied588da6542f11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ied588da6542f11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
69. [United States v. Hubbell](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6b31d05a9c2511d9bc61beebb95be672/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6b31d05a9c2511d9bc61beebb95be672/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 530 U.S. 27 (2000)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6b31d05a9c2511d9bc61beebb95be672/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6b31d05a9c2511d9bc61beebb95be672/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
70. • See **[Kastigar v. United States,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id4c671f79c1d11d991d0cc6b54f12d4d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id4c671f79c1d11d991d0cc6b54f12d4d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)*[ 406 U.S. 441 (1972)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id4c671f79c1d11d991d0cc6b54f12d4d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id4c671f79c1d11d991d0cc6b54f12d4d/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
71. [Serafino v. Hasbro, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I71f41b76563c11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I71f41b76563c11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 893 F. Supp. 104 (D. Mass. 1995)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I71f41b76563c11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I71f41b76563c11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
72. [United States v. Nixon,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia09c13229c9a11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia09c13229c9a11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 418 U.S. 683 (1974)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia09c13229c9a11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia09c13229c9a11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
73. • See **[Carpenter v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4689dd878a3d11db9127cf4cfcf88547/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4689dd878a3d11db9127cf4cfcf88547/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)*[, 470 F.3d 434 (1st Cir. 2006)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4689dd878a3d11db9127cf4cfcf88547/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4689dd878a3d11db9127cf4cfcf88547/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
74. [Papadakis v. CSX Transp., Inc.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3ba67ad184a411da8ccab4c14e983401/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3ba67ad184a411da8ccab4c14e983401/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 233 F.R.D. 227 (D. Mass. 2006)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3ba67ad184a411da8ccab4c14e983401/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3ba67ad184a411da8ccab4c14e983401/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
75. [Trammel v. United States,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5de5df799c9011d9bc61beebb95be672/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5de5df799c9011d9bc61beebb95be672/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 445 U.S. 40 (1980)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5de5df799c9011d9bc61beebb95be672/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5de5df799c9011d9bc61beebb95be672/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
76. [Upjohn Co. v. United States](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1788f0ba9c1f11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1788f0ba9c1f11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1788f0ba9c1f11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1788f0ba9c1f11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
77. Wengui v. Clark Hill, PLC, 338 F.R.D. 7 (D.D.C.). ↑
78. [United States v. Johnson,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia7aed13153dd11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia7aed13153dd11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 131 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (N.D. Iowa 2001)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia7aed13153dd11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia7aed13153dd11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
79. [Upjohn Co. v. United States,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1788f0ba9c1f11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1788f0ba9c1f11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 449 U.S. 383 (1981)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1788f0ba9c1f11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1788f0ba9c1f11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
80. • **[In re Application for Subpoena, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I78a597c4542d11d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I78a597c4542d11d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)*[224 F.R.D. 326 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I78a597c4542d11d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I78a597c4542d11d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
81. [United States v. Schaltenbran,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I90e58078969a11d9bc61beebb95be672/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I90e58078969a11d9bc61beebb95be672/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 930 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1991)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I90e58078969a11d9bc61beebb95be672/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I90e58078969a11d9bc61beebb95be672/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
82. [Evergreen Trading, LLC v. United States,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifed5c78eb54b11dcb6a3a099756c05b7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifed5c78eb54b11dcb6a3a099756c05b7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 80 Fed. Cl. 122 (2007)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifed5c78eb54b11dcb6a3a099756c05b7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifed5c78eb54b11dcb6a3a099756c05b7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
83. Hanes v. Dormire, 240 F.3d 694 (8th Cir. 2001). ↑
84. *See *[McCormick on Evidence § 89](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib8d75a6b376411db9fd99a1105e1c76e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib8d75a6b376411db9fd99a1105e1c76e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0); [Maine v. U.S. Dept. of Interior,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3becc95953da11d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3becc95953da11d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 124 F. Supp. 2d 728 (D. Me. 2000)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3becc95953da11d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3becc95953da11d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
85. [In re Grand Jury Subpoena,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8decfed753dc11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8decfed753dc11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 132 F. Supp. 2d 776 (S.D. Iowa 2000)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8decfed753dc11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8decfed753dc11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
86. [In re: Abbott Labs.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I08d2a3a0dfde11ee97d7a14724172d98/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I08d2a3a0dfde11ee97d7a14724172d98/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 96 F.4th 371 (3d Cir. 2024)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I08d2a3a0dfde11ee97d7a14724172d98/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I08d2a3a0dfde11ee97d7a14724172d98/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
87. [Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic45f81676be011d9affa95046775f1a7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic45f81676be011d9affa95046775f1a7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 231 F.R.D. 268 (N.D. Ill. 2004)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic45f81676be011d9affa95046775f1a7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic45f81676be011d9affa95046775f1a7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
88. [McCook Metals L.L.C. v. Alcoa Inc.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Idea85f7153b611d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Idea85f7153b611d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 192 F.R.D. 242 (N.D. Ill. 2000)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Idea85f7153b611d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Idea85f7153b611d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
89. [In re Avantel, S.A.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icfa1dd9389e811d9903eeb4634b8d78e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icfa1dd9389e811d9903eeb4634b8d78e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 343 F.3d 311 (5th Cir. 2003)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icfa1dd9389e811d9903eeb4634b8d78e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icfa1dd9389e811d9903eeb4634b8d78e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
90. [Fed. Trade Comm’n v. GlaxoSmithKline,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ibbae47a679db11d98c82a53fc8ac8757/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ibbae47a679db11d98c82a53fc8ac8757/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 294 F.3d 141 (D.C. Cir. 2002)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ibbae47a679db11d98c82a53fc8ac8757/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ibbae47a679db11d98c82a53fc8ac8757/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
91. [Upjohn Co. v. United States,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1788f0ba9c1f11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1788f0ba9c1f11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 449 U.S. 383 (1981)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1788f0ba9c1f11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1788f0ba9c1f11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
92. [Upjohn Co. v. United States,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1788f0ba9c1f11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1788f0ba9c1f11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 449 U.S. 383 (1981)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1788f0ba9c1f11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1788f0ba9c1f11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0) (Burger, C.J., concurring), *citing with approval *Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977). ↑
93. [Rivera v. Kmart Corp.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I976bb91c538711d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I976bb91c538711d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 190 F.R.D. 298 (D.P.R. 2000)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I976bb91c538711d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I976bb91c538711d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). See Charles Wolfram, Legal Ethics In-House Privilege, Nat’l L.J., August 7, 2000, at B5. ↑
94. [Trammel v. United States,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5de5df799c9011d9bc61beebb95be672/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5de5df799c9011d9bc61beebb95be672/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 445 U.S. 40 (1980)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5de5df799c9011d9bc61beebb95be672/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5de5df799c9011d9bc61beebb95be672/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
95. [United States v. Nordby,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icbe44f64798c11d9ac1ffa9f33b6c3b0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icbe44f64798c11d9ac1ffa9f33b6c3b0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 225 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2000)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icbe44f64798c11d9ac1ffa9f33b6c3b0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icbe44f64798c11d9ac1ffa9f33b6c3b0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
96. [WebXchange Inc. v. Dell Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I243992a01c9211df8bf6cd8525c41437/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I243992a01c9211df8bf6cd8525c41437/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 264 F.R.D. 123 (D. Del. 2010)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I243992a01c9211df8bf6cd8525c41437/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I243992a01c9211df8bf6cd8525c41437/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
97. See **[Harrisonville Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I9e692f29b6de11dba10be1078cee05f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I9e692f29b6de11dba10be1078cee05f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 472 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (S.D. Ill. 2006)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I9e692f29b6de11dba10be1078cee05f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I9e692f29b6de11dba10be1078cee05f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
98. [See](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4a1216f136f111dcb414d5df06ce42ae/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_344_249" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4a1216f136f111dcb414d5df06ce42ae/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_344_249)[ 56 F.R.D. 249](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4a1216f136f111dcb414d5df06ce42ae/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_344_249" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4a1216f136f111dcb414d5df06ce42ae/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_344_249). ↑
99. See [Ascom Hasler Mailing Sys. v. U.S. Postal Serv.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I09f56d0e020711dfb08de1b7506ad85b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I09f56d0e020711dfb08de1b7506ad85b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 267 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2010)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I09f56d0e020711dfb08de1b7506ad85b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I09f56d0e020711dfb08de1b7506ad85b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
100. *See, e.g., *[5 U.S.C. § 552](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N80B2C7604A0911E69C0FE30FEF04D3AC/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N80B2C7604A0911E69C0FE30FEF04D3AC/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
101. *See, e.g., *[18 U.S.C. § 3500](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NFDA77020B36411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NFDA77020B36411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
102. See Wigmore on Evidence § 2380. ↑
103. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996). ↑
104. [West’s Rev. Code Wash. Ann. § 10.27.090](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N03F3B20063E411DF88739065252B5D6C/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N03F3B20063E411DF88739065252B5D6C/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
105. [Evans v. Allstate Ins. Co](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ied70f771540a11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ied70f771540a11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[., 216 F.R.D. 515 (N.D. Okla. 2003)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ied70f771540a11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ied70f771540a11d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
106. [United States v. Munoz-Franco](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icdaaf8c653f411d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icdaaf8c653f411d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 203 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D.P.R. 2002)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icdaaf8c653f411d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icdaaf8c653f411d9b17ee4cdc604a702/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
107. [Tice v. American Airlines, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If9bd2ccb53b911d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If9bd2ccb53b911d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 192 F.R.D. 270 (N.D. Ill. 2000)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If9bd2ccb53b911d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If9bd2ccb53b911d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
108. [Nev. Rev. Stat. § 49.291](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N9842AB204D7511DB8C22BE35EE8F8955/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N9842AB204D7511DB8C22BE35EE8F8955/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
109. N.M.R. Evid. § 509. ↑
110. [Nev. Rev. Stat. § 49.290](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N980D6A504D7511DB8C22BE35EE8F8955/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N980D6A504D7511DB8C22BE35EE8F8955/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
111. [United States v. Bisanti](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I17def78aeff311d983e7e9deff98dc6f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I17def78aeff311d983e7e9deff98dc6f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 414 F.3d 168 (1st Cir. 2005)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I17def78aeff311d983e7e9deff98dc6f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I17def78aeff311d983e7e9deff98dc6f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
112. [Smith v. Dow Chem. Co.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie97cffc6566111d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie97cffc6566111d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 173 F.R.D. 54 (W.D.N.Y. 1997)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie97cffc6566111d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie97cffc6566111d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
113. • See **[Pasant v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic860ad6855de11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic860ad6855de11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)*[ 137 F.R.D. 255 (N.D. Ill. 1991)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic860ad6855de11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic860ad6855de11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
114. • See, e.g.,* [12 Okl. St. Ann. § 2506](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N9D6B4EC0C68F11DB8F04FB3E68C8F4C5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/N9D6B4EC0C68F11DB8F04FB3E68C8F4C5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0); [Branzburg v. Hayes,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id8f20fa39c1c11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id8f20fa39c1c11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 408 U.S. 665 (1972)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id8f20fa39c1c11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id8f20fa39c1c11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
115. [Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Idf0220349c9c11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Idf0220349c9c11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 541 U.S. 913 (2004)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Idf0220349c9c11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Idf0220349c9c11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
116. Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 591 U.S. 848 (2020). ↑
117. [Aviles v. S&P Glob., Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3689e710864711ecb061fecc2fb6bc54/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3689e710864711ecb061fecc2fb6bc54/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 583 F. Supp. 3d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2022)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3689e710864711ecb061fecc2fb6bc54/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3689e710864711ecb061fecc2fb6bc54/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0), ↑
118. • **See *Corey v. Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, 742 A.2d 933 (Me. 1999). ↑
119. Ares-Serono, Inc. v. Organon Int’l B.V., 160 F.R.D. 1 (D. Mass. 1994). ↑
120. [Smith v. Allstate Ins. Co,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2b2aa6892b1111e2b66bbd5332e2d275/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2b2aa6892b1111e2b66bbd5332e2d275/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 912 F. Supp. 2d 242 (W.D. Pa. 2012)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2b2aa6892b1111e2b66bbd5332e2d275/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2b2aa6892b1111e2b66bbd5332e2d275/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
121. [Rhoads Indus. v. Bldg. Materials Corp.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I43a1ba91b59511dd9876f446780b7bdc/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I43a1ba91b59511dd9876f446780b7bdc/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 254 F.R.D. 216 (E.D. Pa. 2008)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I43a1ba91b59511dd9876f446780b7bdc/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I43a1ba91b59511dd9876f446780b7bdc/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
122. [Gloucester Twp. Hous. Auth. v. Franklin Sq. Assocs.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If7cc48ec249311e4b86bd602cb8781fa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If7cc48ec249311e4b86bd602cb8781fa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 38 F. Supp. 3d 492 (D.N.J. 2014)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If7cc48ec249311e4b86bd602cb8781fa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If7cc48ec249311e4b86bd602cb8781fa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
123. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Braspetro Oil Services Co., 2000 WL 744369 (S.D.N.Y.). ↑
124. [Insured Aircraft Title Serv., LLC v. Comfort Jet Aviation, Ltd.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I76976770d61311ed90d098384c7e0878/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I76976770d61311ed90d098384c7e0878/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 2023 WL 2826641 (W.D. Okla.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I76976770d61311ed90d098384c7e0878/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I76976770d61311ed90d098384c7e0878/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
125. [Sun River Energy, Inc. v. Nelson,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5b1d21e551a411e5b4bafa136b480ad2/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5b1d21e551a411e5b4bafa136b480ad2/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 800 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2015)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5b1d21e551a411e5b4bafa136b480ad2/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5b1d21e551a411e5b4bafa136b480ad2/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
126. [329 U.S. 495 (1947)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id8f5e03b9c1c11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id8f5e03b9c1c11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
127. The Supreme Court has declared the trial preparation work product doctrine a qualified privilege. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975). Circuit and district court judges frequently fail to define precisely or accurately the doctrine they employ to allow or restrict discovery. ↑
128. The term work product was coined in the argument of the Hickman v. Taylor case before the Third Circuit. The Court of Appeals thought the phrase accurately described what the court held to be excluded from discovery. Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 223 (3d Cir. 1945). ↑
129. [329 U.S. at 505](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id8f5e03b9c1c11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_780_505" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id8f5e03b9c1c11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_780_505). (emphasis added). ↑
130. [Baker v. General Motors Corp.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2879a673796111d98c82a53fc8ac8757/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2879a673796111d98c82a53fc8ac8757/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 209 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2000)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2879a673796111d98c82a53fc8ac8757/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I2879a673796111d98c82a53fc8ac8757/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
131. See **[FTC v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ife4264bbb95511e4a807ad48145ed9f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ife4264bbb95511e4a807ad48145ed9f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 778 F.3d 142 (D.C. Cir. 2015)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ife4264bbb95511e4a807ad48145ed9f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ife4264bbb95511e4a807ad48145ed9f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
132. [In re Xarelto (Rivaroxaban) Prods. Liab. Litig.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I10c4f960ffc611e5a3c8ab9852eeabcd/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I10c4f960ffc611e5a3c8ab9852eeabcd/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 314 F.R.D. 397 (E.D. La. 2016)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I10c4f960ffc611e5a3c8ab9852eeabcd/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I10c4f960ffc611e5a3c8ab9852eeabcd/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
133. A thoughtful and historically informative case opinion illustrating the intertwined and somewhat confusing relationship among all these concepts is Taylor v. Temple & Cutler, 192 F.R.D. 552 (E.D. Mich. 1999), for one of those rainy weekends. ↑
134. See **[Solis v. Milk Specialties Co](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5de45eca534211e1bd1192eddc2af8cc/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5de45eca534211e1bd1192eddc2af8cc/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[., 854 F. Supp. 2d 629 (E.D. Wis. 2012)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5de45eca534211e1bd1192eddc2af8cc/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5de45eca534211e1bd1192eddc2af8cc/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
135. See **[In re Blue Cross Customer Data Security Breach Litigation](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie31387f02ac611e98335c7ebe72735f9/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie31387f02ac611e98335c7ebe72735f9/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 329 F.R.D. 656 (D. Or. 2019)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie31387f02ac611e98335c7ebe72735f9/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie31387f02ac611e98335c7ebe72735f9/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
136. • See *Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 245 F.R.D. 660 (D. Kan. 2007). ↑
137. • See *Regional Airport Auth. v. LFG, LLC, 460 F.3d 697 (6th Cir. 2006). ↑
138. • See **[In re Sealed Case, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic6dac5d9944911d9bdd1cfdd544ca3a4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic6dac5d9944911d9bdd1cfdd544ca3a4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)*[146 F.3d 881 (D.C. Cir. 1998)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic6dac5d9944911d9bdd1cfdd544ca3a4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic6dac5d9944911d9bdd1cfdd544ca3a4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
139. [Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0), Notes of Advisory Comm.—1970 Amendments. ↑
140. See **[United States v. Roxworthy,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icced5d98285911db80c2e56cac103088/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icced5d98285911db80c2e56cac103088/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 457 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 2006)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icced5d98285911db80c2e56cac103088/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icced5d98285911db80c2e56cac103088/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
141. See **[Smith v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1f761960c53711ed87a4a66854c04769/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1f761960c53711ed87a4a66854c04769/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[658 F. Supp. 3d 1054 (N.D. Fla. 2023)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1f761960c53711ed87a4a66854c04769/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1f761960c53711ed87a4a66854c04769/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
142. [Dunsmore v. San Diego Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If56d34c09a9a11eeaa34badc2aba2c71/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If56d34c09a9a11eeaa34badc2aba2c71/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 2023 WL 8631663 (S.D. Cal.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If56d34c09a9a11eeaa34badc2aba2c71/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If56d34c09a9a11eeaa34badc2aba2c71/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
143. [FTC v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I75f8eb84097411e2b11ea85d0b248d27/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I75f8eb84097411e2b11ea85d0b248d27/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 286 F.R.D. 101 (D.D.C. 2012)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I75f8eb84097411e2b11ea85d0b248d27/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I75f8eb84097411e2b11ea85d0b248d27/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
144. [Moe v. Sys. Transp. Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie29756e3d2a511dfb5fdfcf739be147c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie29756e3d2a511dfb5fdfcf739be147c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 270 F.R.D. 613 (D. Mont. 2010)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie29756e3d2a511dfb5fdfcf739be147c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie29756e3d2a511dfb5fdfcf739be147c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
145. In re Raytheon Secs. Litig., 218 F.R.D. 354 (D. Mass. 2003). ↑
146. [Louisiana Corral Mgmt., LLC v. Axis Surplus Ins. Co.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I70b04ab0923f11ed84dec6d9c9f5e345/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I70b04ab0923f11ed84dec6d9c9f5e345/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 650 F. Supp. 3d 491 (E.D. La. 2023)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I70b04ab0923f11ed84dec6d9c9f5e345/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I70b04ab0923f11ed84dec6d9c9f5e345/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
147. See **[Bickler v. Senior Lifestyle Corp.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5176c7d9292211dfb08de1b7506ad85b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5176c7d9292211dfb08de1b7506ad85b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 266 F.R.D. 379 (D. Ariz. 2010)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5176c7d9292211dfb08de1b7506ad85b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I5176c7d9292211dfb08de1b7506ad85b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
148. See **[Sorrels v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I099f4f2c14ad11e3b0499ca71fc6ba70/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I099f4f2c14ad11e3b0499ca71fc6ba70/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 291 F.R.D. 682 (S.D. Fla. 2013)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I099f4f2c14ad11e3b0499ca71fc6ba70/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I099f4f2c14ad11e3b0499ca71fc6ba70/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
149. Wagner v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 238 F.R.D. 418 (N.D. W. Va. 2006). ↑
150. [Mach. Solutions, Inc. v. Doosan Infracore Am. Corp.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8e852bb0f76111e7818da80a62699cb5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8e852bb0f76111e7818da80a62699cb5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 323 F.R.D. 522 (D.S.C. 2018)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8e852bb0f76111e7818da80a62699cb5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8e852bb0f76111e7818da80a62699cb5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
151. [Landry v. Swire Oilfield Servs., LLC](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia762f010f15611e7af08dbc2fa7f734f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia762f010f15611e7af08dbc2fa7f734f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 323 F.R.D. 360 (D.N.M. 2018)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia762f010f15611e7af08dbc2fa7f734f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia762f010f15611e7af08dbc2fa7f734f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
152. See [Rains v. Westminster Coll.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icf789380327d11eda18ac0838af762a5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icf789380327d11eda18ac0838af762a5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 627 F. Supp. 3d 1267 (D. Utah 2022)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icf789380327d11eda18ac0838af762a5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icf789380327d11eda18ac0838af762a5/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
153. See **[Rhoads Indus. v. Bldg Materials Corp.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I43a1ba91b59511dd9876f446780b7bdc/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I43a1ba91b59511dd9876f446780b7bdc/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 254 F.R.D. 216 (E.D. Pa. 2008)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I43a1ba91b59511dd9876f446780b7bdc/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I43a1ba91b59511dd9876f446780b7bdc/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
154. [Benson v. City of Lincoln, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I9b681600b99c11edb7c4d0d5b1b869ba/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I9b681600b99c11edb7c4d0d5b1b869ba/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[343 F.R.D. 595 (D. Neb. 2023)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I9b681600b99c11edb7c4d0d5b1b869ba/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I9b681600b99c11edb7c4d0d5b1b869ba/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
155. See **[Murphy v. K-Mart Corp.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6b317b6ee31b11ddb6a3a099756c05b7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6b317b6ee31b11ddb6a3a099756c05b7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 259 F.R.D. 421 (D.S.D. 2009)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6b317b6ee31b11ddb6a3a099756c05b7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6b317b6ee31b11ddb6a3a099756c05b7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
156. [Trs. of Plumbers & Steamfitters v. Crawford,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I97292c4e6d1d11ddb5cbad29a280d47c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I97292c4e6d1d11ddb5cbad29a280d47c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 573 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (E.D. Tenn. 2008)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I97292c4e6d1d11ddb5cbad29a280d47c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I97292c4e6d1d11ddb5cbad29a280d47c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
157. See **[Drosiin v. Nat’l Action Fin. Servs., Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I08eae953c2cd11ddb6a3a099756c05b7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I08eae953c2cd11ddb6a3a099756c05b7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 72 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 169 (S.D. Fla. 2008)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I08eae953c2cd11ddb6a3a099756c05b7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I08eae953c2cd11ddb6a3a099756c05b7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
158. [In re Blue Cross Customer Data Security Breach Litigation](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie31387f02ac611e98335c7ebe72735f9/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie31387f02ac611e98335c7ebe72735f9/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 329 F.R.D. 656 (D. Or. 2019)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie31387f02ac611e98335c7ebe72735f9/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ie31387f02ac611e98335c7ebe72735f9/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
159. [Sorrels v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I099f4f2c14ad11e3b0499ca71fc6ba70/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I099f4f2c14ad11e3b0499ca71fc6ba70/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 291 F.R.D. 682 (S.D. Fla. 2013)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I099f4f2c14ad11e3b0499ca71fc6ba70/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I099f4f2c14ad11e3b0499ca71fc6ba70/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
160. • See *[Banks v. Office of Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I872b47d3504f11da974abd26ac2a6030/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I872b47d3504f11da974abd26ac2a6030/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[233 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2005)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I872b47d3504f11da974abd26ac2a6030/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I872b47d3504f11da974abd26ac2a6030/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
161. [329 U.S. 495, 509–512](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id8f5e03b9c1c11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_780_509" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id8f5e03b9c1c11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_780_509). ↑
162. [Trs. of Elec. Workers Local No. 26 Pension Trust Fund v. Trust Fund Advisors Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id7d0fb991d0a11df8bf6cd8525c41437/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id7d0fb991d0a11df8bf6cd8525c41437/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 266 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2010)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id7d0fb991d0a11df8bf6cd8525c41437/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id7d0fb991d0a11df8bf6cd8525c41437/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
163. [Upjohn Co. v. United States](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1788f0ba9c1f11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_780_401" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1788f0ba9c1f11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_780_401)[, 449 U.S. 383, 401 (1981)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1788f0ba9c1f11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_780_401" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1788f0ba9c1f11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_780_401). ↑
164. [Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Universal Sec. Instruments, Inc](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4e0263bf6d6811dfaad3d35f6227d4a8/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4e0263bf6d6811dfaad3d35f6227d4a8/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[., 606 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4e0263bf6d6811dfaad3d35f6227d4a8/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4e0263bf6d6811dfaad3d35f6227d4a8/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
165. [449 U.S. 383, 401 (1981)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1788f0ba9c1f11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_780_401" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1788f0ba9c1f11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0&fragmentIdentifier=co_pp_sp_780_401). ↑
166. [State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. New Horizon, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifc9be1231d5611ddb6a3a099756c05b7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifc9be1231d5611ddb6a3a099756c05b7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 250 F.R.D. 203 (E.D. Pa. 2008)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifc9be1231d5611ddb6a3a099756c05b7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifc9be1231d5611ddb6a3a099756c05b7/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
167. [Mervin v. FTC,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I810ad601918111d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I810ad601918111d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 591 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1978)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I810ad601918111d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I810ad601918111d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
168. [Republic of Ecuador v. Hinchee,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I267feb1d681b11e39ac8bab74931929c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I267feb1d681b11e39ac8bab74931929c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 741 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2013)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I267feb1d681b11e39ac8bab74931929c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I267feb1d681b11e39ac8bab74931929c/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
169. [Upjohn Co. v. United States](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1788f0ba9c1f11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1788f0ba9c1f11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1788f0ba9c1f11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1788f0ba9c1f11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
170. See **[United States v. Roxworthy,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icced5d98285911db80c2e56cac103088/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icced5d98285911db80c2e56cac103088/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 457 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 2006)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icced5d98285911db80c2e56cac103088/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Icced5d98285911db80c2e56cac103088/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
171. See **[Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Universal Sec. Instruments, Inc.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4e0263bf6d6811dfaad3d35f6227d4a8/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4e0263bf6d6811dfaad3d35f6227d4a8/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 606 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4e0263bf6d6811dfaad3d35f6227d4a8/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4e0263bf6d6811dfaad3d35f6227d4a8/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
172. See **[Williams & Connolly LLP v. SEC](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I155106359fb611dfa7f8a35454192eb4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I155106359fb611dfa7f8a35454192eb4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 729 F. Supp. 2d 202 (D.D.C. 2010)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I155106359fb611dfa7f8a35454192eb4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I155106359fb611dfa7f8a35454192eb4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
173. [United States v. Nobles,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ice9d40f19c9611d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ice9d40f19c9611d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 422 U.S. 225 (1975)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ice9d40f19c9611d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ice9d40f19c9611d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0), on remand [522 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1975)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ibea499a3909711d98e8fb00d6c6a02dd/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ibea499a3909711d98e8fb00d6c6a02dd/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
174. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 540 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1976). ↑
175. [Cleveland Bros. Equip. Co. v. Vorobey](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic4a977e0ab9911edb0ace8a0114e5235/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic4a977e0ab9911edb0ace8a0114e5235/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 2023 WL 1930000 (M.D. Pa.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic4a977e0ab9911edb0ace8a0114e5235/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic4a977e0ab9911edb0ace8a0114e5235/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
176. [In re Roundup Prod. Liab. Litig](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I906177b0569411efac36e8d2dcf835ad/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I906177b0569411efac36e8d2dcf835ad/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[., 732 F. Supp. 3d 1091 (N.D. Cal. 2024)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I906177b0569411efac36e8d2dcf835ad/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I906177b0569411efac36e8d2dcf835ad/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
177. See **[Cleveland Bros. Equip. Co. v. Vorobey](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic4a977e0ab9911edb0ace8a0114e5235/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic4a977e0ab9911edb0ace8a0114e5235/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 655 F. Supp. 3d 305 (M.D. Pa. 2023)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic4a977e0ab9911edb0ace8a0114e5235/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic4a977e0ab9911edb0ace8a0114e5235/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
178. See **[Higher One, Inc. v. Touchnet Info Sys., Inc., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8703eac19e2b11e3a659df62eba144e8/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8703eac19e2b11e3a659df62eba144e8/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[298 F.R.D. 82 (W.D.N.Y. 2014)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8703eac19e2b11e3a659df62eba144e8/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8703eac19e2b11e3a659df62eba144e8/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
179. [Arendt v. Covidien, Inc. ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iba91eab0068911e6a3c8ab9852eeabcd/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iba91eab0068911e6a3c8ab9852eeabcd/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[314 F.R.D. 547 (E.D. Mich. 2016)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iba91eab0068911e6a3c8ab9852eeabcd/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iba91eab0068911e6a3c8ab9852eeabcd/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
180. See **[Layman v. Jr. Players Golf Acad., Inc., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia215d7a0085d11e6981be831f2f2ac24/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia215d7a0085d11e6981be831f2f2ac24/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[314 F.R.D. 379 (D.S.C. 2016)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia215d7a0085d11e6981be831f2f2ac24/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia215d7a0085d11e6981be831f2f2ac24/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
181. See **[Cedant v. United States, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I878c4b9032fc11ee9350a38d0787ab75/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I878c4b9032fc11ee9350a38d0787ab75/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[75 F.4th 1314 (11th Cir. 2023)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I878c4b9032fc11ee9350a38d0787ab75/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I878c4b9032fc11ee9350a38d0787ab75/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
182. See **[Johnson v. Friesen, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4640d3803e0b11ee93168705a03585ae/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4640d3803e0b11ee93168705a03585ae/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[79 F.4th 939 (8th Cir. 2023)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4640d3803e0b11ee93168705a03585ae/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4640d3803e0b11ee93168705a03585ae/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
183. [509 U.S. 579 (1993)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia094c02a9c9a11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia094c02a9c9a11d993e6d35cc61aab4a/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0); [Anderson v. Raymond Corp.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib52c2da0a27811ed88c9cdbffd1e3dca/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib52c2da0a27811ed88c9cdbffd1e3dca/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 59 F.4th 279 (7th Cir. 2023)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib52c2da0a27811ed88c9cdbffd1e3dca/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib52c2da0a27811ed88c9cdbffd1e3dca/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
184. [Muldrow v. Re-Direct, Inc.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I33fc0aa3295f11dc962ef0ed15906072/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I33fc0aa3295f11dc962ef0ed15906072/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 493 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2007)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I33fc0aa3295f11dc962ef0ed15906072/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I33fc0aa3295f11dc962ef0ed15906072/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
185. [Landivar v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I58c960407fc511ec8482c694aa3b3022/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I58c960407fc511ec8482c694aa3b3022/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 340 F.R.D. 192 (S.D. Fla. 2022)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I58c960407fc511ec8482c694aa3b3022/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I58c960407fc511ec8482c694aa3b3022/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
186. • See, e.g*., Fiber Optic Designs, Inc. v. New England Pottery, LLC, 262 F.R.D. 586 (D. Colo. 2009). ↑
187. See **[Higher One, Inc. v. TouchNet Info. Sys., Inc.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8703eac19e2b11e3a659df62eba144e8/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8703eac19e2b11e3a659df62eba144e8/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 298 F.R.D. 82 (W.D.N.Y. 2014)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8703eac19e2b11e3a659df62eba144e8/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8703eac19e2b11e3a659df62eba144e8/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0); [Eberhart v. Novartis Pharm. Corp.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I29f6c25508f611e1a9e5bdc02ef2b18e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I29f6c25508f611e1a9e5bdc02ef2b18e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 867 F. Supp. 2d 1241 (N.D. Ga. 2011)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I29f6c25508f611e1a9e5bdc02ef2b18e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I29f6c25508f611e1a9e5bdc02ef2b18e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
188. [Tumey, LLP v. Mycroft AI, Inc.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0c47810072af11eebeafd71b8698fb39/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0c47810072af11eebeafd71b8698fb39/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 84 F.4th 775 (8th Cir. 2023)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0c47810072af11eebeafd71b8698fb39/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0c47810072af11eebeafd71b8698fb39/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
189. • See *United States ex rel. Fago v. M & T Mortgage Corp., 518 F. Supp. 2d 108 (D. D.C. 2007). ↑
190. [Jianjun Chen v. 2425 Broadway Chao Restaurant, LLC,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I39793240806f11e9b508f0c9c0d45880/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I39793240806f11e9b508f0c9c0d45880/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 331 F.R.D. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I39793240806f11e9b508f0c9c0d45880/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I39793240806f11e9b508f0c9c0d45880/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
191. [Flynn v. Consol. City of Indianapolis & Marion Cnty.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6ef48760552a11ed84f68bc17a9db3b9/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6ef48760552a11ed84f68bc17a9db3b9/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 342 F.R.D. 439 (S.D. Ind. 2022)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6ef48760552a11ed84f68bc17a9db3b9/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6ef48760552a11ed84f68bc17a9db3b9/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
192. • See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(2). ↑
193. [Fair Isaac Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifc8b63105ffd11eb9407fe481e305651/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifc8b63105ffd11eb9407fe481e305651/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 337 F.R.D. 413 (D. Minn. 2021)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifc8b63105ffd11eb9407fe481e305651/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ifc8b63105ffd11eb9407fe481e305651/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
194. See Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Safe Chain Sols. LLC, 345 F.R.D. 22 (E.D.N.Y. 2024). ↑
195. [In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI),](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8db92f64a1c111e2a555d241dae65084/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8db92f64a1c111e2a555d241dae65084/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 289 F.R.D. 424 (E.D. Pa. 2013)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8db92f64a1c111e2a555d241dae65084/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8db92f64a1c111e2a555d241dae65084/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
196. [Rodriguez v. IBP, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id4a893d179a611d9ac1ffa9f33b6c3b0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id4a893d179a611d9ac1ffa9f33b6c3b0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 243 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2001)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id4a893d179a611d9ac1ffa9f33b6c3b0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id4a893d179a611d9ac1ffa9f33b6c3b0/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
197. See **Haeger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 581 U.S. 101 (2017). ↑
198. [British Telecommunications v. IAC/Interactive Corp.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I449dd8504a3811e987fd8441446aa305/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I449dd8504a3811e987fd8441446aa305/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 330 F.R.D. 387 (D. Del. 2019)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I449dd8504a3811e987fd8441446aa305/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I449dd8504a3811e987fd8441446aa305/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
199. [Goesel v. Boley Int’l (H.K.) Ltd.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I10b5ade06e3911e38913df21cb42a557/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I10b5ade06e3911e38913df21cb42a557/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 738 F.3d 831 (7th Cir. 2013)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I10b5ade06e3911e38913df21cb42a557/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I10b5ade06e3911e38913df21cb42a557/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
200. • **[Weidman v. Ford Motor Co.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I287700105f7211eb9dc5f224bba38290/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I287700105f7211eb9dc5f224bba38290/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)*[ 340 F.R.D. 106 (E.D. Mich. 2021)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I287700105f7211eb9dc5f224bba38290/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I287700105f7211eb9dc5f224bba38290/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
201. [Pinnacle Sur. Servs., Inc. v. Manion Stigger, LLP](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I21617a30510a11e98335c7ebe72735f9/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I21617a30510a11e98335c7ebe72735f9/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 370 F. Supp. 3d 745 (W.D. Ky. 2019)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I21617a30510a11e98335c7ebe72735f9/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I21617a30510a11e98335c7ebe72735f9/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
202. [Romero v. Drummond Co.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iacee7464d24011dbaba7d9d29eb57eff/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iacee7464d24011dbaba7d9d29eb57eff/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 480 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2007)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iacee7464d24011dbaba7d9d29eb57eff/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iacee7464d24011dbaba7d9d29eb57eff/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
203. See **[EEOC v. Synergy Health Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I13f484a1123611dfa7e0c40c26bf1b92/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I13f484a1123611dfa7e0c40c26bf1b92/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 265 F.R.D. 403 (E.D. Wis. 2009)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I13f484a1123611dfa7e0c40c26bf1b92/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I13f484a1123611dfa7e0c40c26bf1b92/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
204. [Ayers v. Cont’l Cas. Co.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib1ab3f5fa2fc11db9127cf4cfcf88547/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib1ab3f5fa2fc11db9127cf4cfcf88547/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 240 F.R.D. 216 (N.D. W. Va. 2007)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib1ab3f5fa2fc11db9127cf4cfcf88547/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib1ab3f5fa2fc11db9127cf4cfcf88547/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
205. • See *Humboldt Baykeeper v. Union Pac. R. Co., 244 F.R.D. 560 (N.D. Cal. 2007). ↑
206. [Republic of Turkey v. Christie’s, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If63e2ea0b86811e8afcec29e181e0751/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If63e2ea0b86811e8afcec29e181e0751/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 326 F.R.D. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If63e2ea0b86811e8afcec29e181e0751/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If63e2ea0b86811e8afcec29e181e0751/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
207. [Pierson v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id83c57b553f011d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id83c57b553f011d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[., 205 F.R.D. 646 (S.D. Ind. 2002)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id83c57b553f011d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id83c57b553f011d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
208. [In re Halkin,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia491980b8bca11d98aaaa007097b7893/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia491980b8bca11d98aaaa007097b7893/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia491980b8bca11d98aaaa007097b7893/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia491980b8bca11d98aaaa007097b7893/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
209. See **[Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I15d23b6289dc11d9b6ea9f5a173c4523/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I15d23b6289dc11d9b6ea9f5a173c4523/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 331 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2003)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I15d23b6289dc11d9b6ea9f5a173c4523/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I15d23b6289dc11d9b6ea9f5a173c4523/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
210. [Acosta v. Heritage, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id22f3060b9c311e99c7da5bca11408d2/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id22f3060b9c311e99c7da5bca11408d2/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[332 F.R.D. 347 (D. Hawaii 2019)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id22f3060b9c311e99c7da5bca11408d2/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Id22f3060b9c311e99c7da5bca11408d2/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
211. • See **[Dag Enter., Inc. v. Exxon Mobil Corp.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I47b4d4508bcd11d99a6fdc806bf1638e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I47b4d4508bcd11d99a6fdc806bf1638e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)*[ 226 F.R.D. 95 (D.D.C. 2005)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I47b4d4508bcd11d99a6fdc806bf1638e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I47b4d4508bcd11d99a6fdc806bf1638e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
212. • See *Robinson v. City of Philadelphia, 2006 WL 1147250 (E.D. Pa.). ↑
213. [Walls v. Int’l Paper Co](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8d2b235b53b911d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8d2b235b53b911d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[., 192 F.R.D. 294 (D. Kan. 2000)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8d2b235b53b911d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8d2b235b53b911d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
214. McKesson HBOC, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 226 F.R.D. 56 (D.D.C. 2004). ↑
215. [McClurg v. Mallinckrodt, Inc](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3b7aebd0c03511e6b27be1b44e7e7e5b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3b7aebd0c03511e6b27be1b44e7e7e5b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[., 2016 WL 7178745 (E.D. Mo.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3b7aebd0c03511e6b27be1b44e7e7e5b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3b7aebd0c03511e6b27be1b44e7e7e5b/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
216. [Walls v. International Paper Co.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8d2b235b53b911d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8d2b235b53b911d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 192 F.R.D. 294 (D. Kan. 2000)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8d2b235b53b911d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8d2b235b53b911d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
217. See **[Standard Process., Inc. v. Total Health Discount](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6dd87706369611dd8dba9deb08599717/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6dd87706369611dd8dba9deb08599717/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 559 F. Supp. 2d 932 (E.D. Wis. 2008)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6dd87706369611dd8dba9deb08599717/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6dd87706369611dd8dba9deb08599717/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
218. Ares-Serono, Inc. v. Organon Int’l B.V., 153 F.R.D. 4 (D. Mass. 1993). ↑
219. See **[Skky, LLC v. Facebook, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I446f5bc0316711e6accba36daa2dab8f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I446f5bc0316711e6accba36daa2dab8f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 191 F. Supp. 3d 977 (D. Minn. 2016)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I446f5bc0316711e6accba36daa2dab8f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I446f5bc0316711e6accba36daa2dab8f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
220. • See, e.g., *Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775 (1st Cir. 1988). ↑
221. See **[Bond v. Utreras, ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I28539e73ce1411de8bf6cd8525c41437/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I28539e73ce1411de8bf6cd8525c41437/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[585 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 2009)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I28539e73ce1411de8bf6cd8525c41437/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I28539e73ce1411de8bf6cd8525c41437/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
222. • See *Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984). ↑
223. See **[New York v. Microsoft Corp.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic99c393553f211d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic99c393553f211d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 206 F.R.D. 19 (D.D.C. 2002)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic99c393553f211d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic99c393553f211d997e0acd5cbb90d3f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
224. See **[Brown v. Maxwell](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1613ebc09db011e998e8870e22e55653/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1613ebc09db011e998e8870e22e55653/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 929 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2019)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1613ebc09db011e998e8870e22e55653/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1613ebc09db011e998e8870e22e55653/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
225. See [Midwest Athletics & Sports LLC v. Ricoh USA, Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ied6e5160ca8211e9b449da4f1cc0e662/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ied6e5160ca8211e9b449da4f1cc0e662/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 395 F. Supp. 3d 461 (E.D. Pa. 2019)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ied6e5160ca8211e9b449da4f1cc0e662/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ied6e5160ca8211e9b449da4f1cc0e662/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
226. See **[Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Nebula Glasslam Intern., Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0622bf1adef011dc8dba9deb08599717/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0622bf1adef011dc8dba9deb08599717/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 248 F.R.D. 632 (S.D. Fla. 2008)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0622bf1adef011dc8dba9deb08599717/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0622bf1adef011dc8dba9deb08599717/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
227. See **[IDT Corp. v. eBay](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1560d535744111e28a21ccb9036b2470/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1560d535744111e28a21ccb9036b2470/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 709 F.3d 1220 (8th Cir. 2013)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1560d535744111e28a21ccb9036b2470/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1560d535744111e28a21ccb9036b2470/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
228. • See *[Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/NCBF83860B96411D8983DF34406B5929B/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0), Advisory Comm. Notes—1970 Amendments. ↑
229. [Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Convatec Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib9a50b03626e11dfae66b23e804c3c12/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib9a50b03626e11dfae66b23e804c3c12/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 268 F.R.D. 255 (M.D.N.C. 2010)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib9a50b03626e11dfae66b23e804c3c12/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib9a50b03626e11dfae66b23e804c3c12/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
230. [Jones v. Circle K Stores, Inc.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I23e181f5568911d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I23e181f5568911d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 185 F.R.D. 223 (M.D.N.C. 1999)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I23e181f5568911d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I23e181f5568911d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
231. [Galella v. Onassis,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3063282a8b8b11d99a6fdc806bf1638e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3063282a8b8b11d99a6fdc806bf1638e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3063282a8b8b11d99a6fdc806bf1638e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I3063282a8b8b11d99a6fdc806bf1638e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
232. • See *Beacon v. R.M. Jones Apartment Rentals, 79 F.R.D. 141 (N.D. Ohio 1978) (discrimination case). ↑
233. See **[In re Avandia Marketing, Sales Practices and Products Liability Litig](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1a13de60778b11e998e8870e22e55653/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1a13de60778b11e998e8870e22e55653/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[., 924 F.3d 662 (3d Cir. 2019)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1a13de60778b11e998e8870e22e55653/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I1a13de60778b11e998e8870e22e55653/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
234. • See *In re First Peoples Bank Shareholders Litig., 121 F.R.D. 219 (D.N.J. 1988). ↑
235. See **[SEC v. Merrill Scott & Assocs., Ltd.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I695bfc9936b911df9988d233d23fe599/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I695bfc9936b911df9988d233d23fe599/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 600 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2010)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I695bfc9936b911df9988d233d23fe599/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I695bfc9936b911df9988d233d23fe599/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
236. [Patterson v. Ford Motor Co.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I95976e8a555911d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I95976e8a555911d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 85 F.R.D. 152 (W.D. Tex. 1980)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I95976e8a555911d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I95976e8a555911d9bf30d7fdf51b6bd4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
237. [Skky, LLC v. Facebook, Inc., ](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I446f5bc0316711e6accba36daa2dab8f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I446f5bc0316711e6accba36daa2dab8f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[191 F. Supp. 3d 977 (D. Minn. 2016)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I446f5bc0316711e6accba36daa2dab8f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I446f5bc0316711e6accba36daa2dab8f/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
238. See **Gaudet v. GE Indus. Servs., 2016 LEXIS 59902 (E.D. La.). ↑
239. [Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic47d2c6eba0811e5a807ad48145ed9f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic47d2c6eba0811e5a807ad48145ed9f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 809 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2016)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic47d2c6eba0811e5a807ad48145ed9f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ic47d2c6eba0811e5a807ad48145ed9f1/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
240. [Cooper Tire & Rubber Co.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I11dcffea553411dea82ab9f4ee295c21/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I11dcffea553411dea82ab9f4ee295c21/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 568 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 2009)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I11dcffea553411dea82ab9f4ee295c21/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I11dcffea553411dea82ab9f4ee295c21/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
241. See **[Tomahawk Mfg., Inc. v. Spherical Indus., Inc.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6fc7458063cd11ee9a348f546a6fc090/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6fc7458063cd11ee9a348f546a6fc090/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 344 F.R.D. 468 (D. Nev. 2023)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6fc7458063cd11ee9a348f546a6fc090/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I6fc7458063cd11ee9a348f546a6fc090/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
242. [Monroe v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Serv., Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia0f44037fdf911df80558336ea473530/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia0f44037fdf911df80558336ea473530/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 2010 WL 4876743 (N.D. Ind.)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia0f44037fdf911df80558336ea473530/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia0f44037fdf911df80558336ea473530/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
243. • See, e.g., *AT & T Corp. v. Sprint Corp., 407 F.3d 560 (2d Cir. 2005). ↑
244. See **[Smith v. Nexus RVs,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If3f5d920778211e9ba33b03ae9101fb2/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If3f5d920778211e9ba33b03ae9101fb2/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ LLC, 331 F.R.D. 491 (N.D. Ind. 2019)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If3f5d920778211e9ba33b03ae9101fb2/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/If3f5d920778211e9ba33b03ae9101fb2/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
245. [Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8c7f0abde6e911e1b66bbd5332e2d275/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8c7f0abde6e911e1b66bbd5332e2d275/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 287 F.R.D. 130 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8c7f0abde6e911e1b66bbd5332e2d275/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I8c7f0abde6e911e1b66bbd5332e2d275/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
246. [Commissariat a L’EnergieAtomique v. Samsung Elecs. Co.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4993c9d0deb511da8b56def3c325596e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4993c9d0deb511da8b56def3c325596e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 430 F. Supp. 2d 366 (D. Del. 2006)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4993c9d0deb511da8b56def3c325596e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I4993c9d0deb511da8b56def3c325596e/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
247. [Lipscher v. LRP Publ’ns, Inc](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia9705d3579c211d98c82a53fc8ac8757/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia9705d3579c211d98c82a53fc8ac8757/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[., 266 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2001)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia9705d3579c211d98c82a53fc8ac8757/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ia9705d3579c211d98c82a53fc8ac8757/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
248. [Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iab729fa4e5b811da8c5e8eef0920bc71/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iab729fa4e5b811da8c5e8eef0920bc71/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 447 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2006)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iab729fa4e5b811da8c5e8eef0920bc71/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Iab729fa4e5b811da8c5e8eef0920bc71/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
249. [Salmeron v. Enter. Recovery Sys. Inc.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I08416941931e11deabded03f2b83b8a4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I08416941931e11deabded03f2b83b8a4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 579 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2009)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I08416941931e11deabded03f2b83b8a4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I08416941931e11deabded03f2b83b8a4/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
250. See **[Petrone v. Werner Enters., Inc.](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib0422ec0136711ed9887e99e19781d33/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib0422ec0136711ed9887e99e19781d33/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 42 F.4th 962 (8th Cir. 2022)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib0422ec0136711ed9887e99e19781d33/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib0422ec0136711ed9887e99e19781d33/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
251. • See *Porter v. Ray, 461 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2006). ↑
252. [In re Solorio](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib694777553cb11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib694777553cb11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[, 192 F.R.D. 709 (D. Utah 2000)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib694777553cb11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/Ib694777553cb11d9a99c85a9e6023ffa/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
253. *In re *Petition of Ford, 170 F.R.D. 504 (M.D. Ala. 1997). ↑
254. DeiulemarCompagnia di NavigazioneS.p.A. v. M/V Allegra, 198 F.3d 473 (4th Cir. 1999). ↑
255. [In re Blow Wind Shipping Ltd.,](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0f61d63f4ec811dfaad3d35f6227d4a8/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0f61d63f4ec811dfaad3d35f6227d4a8/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0)[ 267 F.R.D. 32 (D. Me. 2010)](https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0f61d63f4ec811dfaad3d35f6227d4a8/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0" \o “https://www.westlaw.com/Document/I0f61d63f4ec811dfaad3d35f6227d4a8/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&VR=3.0&RS=da3.0). ↑
256. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1995). ↑